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PHOTO SESSION:
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The Black Sea Security Program began in 2001 with the goal of encouraging a regional security system based on cooperation and integration. It is unique in its mission to bring together leading policy makers in the Black Sea region with senior US officers to gain a deeper understanding of issues affecting the region and to encourage problem solving in areas of common interest. The program involves representatives from regional countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. A high-level delegation of general officers from the United States also participates.

**The program aims to:**
- deepen participants' understanding of global and regional strategy, defense organization, and military reform and restructuring;

Гарвардская Программа Черноморской Безопасности началась в 2001 году с целью со- действия системе региональной безопасности на основе сотрудничества и интеграции. Это уникальный форум общения политиков Черноморского региона (ЧР) с высокопоставленными официальными лицами США для углубления понимания влияющих на регион явлений и содействия разрешению проблем в сферах совместного интереса. Программа включает представителей стран региона: Армении, Азербайджана, Болгарии, Грузии, Греции, Молдовы, Румынии, России, Турции и Украины, а также делегацию американских генералов.

**Цели программы:**
- углубление понимания участниками глобальной и региональной стратегии, организации обороны и проведения военной реформы и ресструктуризации;
identify the very broad common areas of agreement that exist among the Black Sea nations and expose their officials and the US participants to the strong common history and shared values of the region;
highlight the specific areas of current cooperation on issues of vital interest to these countries and, at the same time, identify those issues which divide them and present challenges to regional cooperation;
expose the Black Sea officials to the free flow of ideas inherent in the pluralistic American system and within the US national security community itself by engaging them with policy makers who represent a wide range of viewpoints.

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The U.S. government’s policy is a mixture of idealism and realism. We do not think so much about coloring regions on the map being under our influence or being under another security grouping’s influence. Maybe some people do in the Administration but in general, as a corporate body we really do not think that way. We think of achieving a discrete set of objectives, often very practical, hard, traditional, realistic objectives. They can be grouped around security, energy and economics on one hand, and we also pursue more idealistic objectives in the dome of “advancement of freedom through democratic and market reform”, as President Bush put it.

Matthew J. BRYZA

In Washington there is a debate ranging from whether or not it would be wise to be idealist or realist. I can say based on my experience [I have spent four years working for Bush’s staff, and even more closely, as I do now, with Secretary Rice whom I have known for 24 years since I was at Stanford] that we really do not differentiate between these idealist objectives and traditional hard-core security objectives. We really believe that they are inextricably linked. And we

U.S. Foreign Policy towards Eurasia
Внешняя политика США в отношении Евразии

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believe that the Caucasus, the Central Asia, and the rest of Europe with the Black Sea region function as a kind of centerpiece: I think you will see how these three sets of interests drive our policy from the foundation of a new strategy, which we are trying to develop right now about the Black Sea. Thinking of my own time studying the former Soviet space, we used to talk about correlation of forces in the Soviet doctrine. In talking about what we are trying to achieve in the South Caucasus we think more about the correlation of freedom. This sounds very ideological but we have an underlying sense that as democracy strengthens and advances, and free markets function efficiently, U.S. national security interests are best served. In the sphere of political and economic advances we benefit. That is how idealism and realism come together in our foreign policy.

I will try to describe this a little bit further in terms of how we have organized our government bureaucratically on foreign policy. In the Clinton Administration there was great optimism about the U.S. and Russia being able to work together to reform the world, especially Europe and the former Soviet space on the basis of democratic and market economic reform. Because Russia was such an important partner in achieving that objective, we organized the State Department and the National Security Council (NSC) around Russia and the states of the Former Soviet Union (FSU). We created a separate bureaucratic entity under the Secretary of State's direct supervision. It was called S/NIS (“S” for Secretary, “NIS” for New Independent States). That showed that we were thinking about all the FSU largely from the perspective of Moscow, and we felt that if we could make things right working together with our Russian counterparts, we thought a lot of the reforms in the FSU would follow.

This changed at the end of Clinton Administration. When President Bush came into office we were reorganized again. We folded back all the FSU into the European bureau, and then began thinking about Central Asia and Caucasus separately. Our goal was to try to encourage those states' evolution as independent unique entities but connected to the rest of Europe: not through Moscow but through a gateway from this region to global markets,
which is Turkey. We have already been working for a number of years on a series of oil and gas pipelines transiting from the Caspian Sea into Turkey and onward to the global markets.

It seemed to be a natural progression in terms of how we have organized ourselves

**FACULTY BIOGRAPHIES**

**Matthew J. Bryza**

assumed his current duties as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs in June 2005. In this capacity, he is responsible for policy oversight and management of relations with countries in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Southern Europe. He also leads U.S. efforts to advance peaceful settlements of the separatist conflicts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, and works with our Special Negotiator for Eurasian Conflicts to advance a settlement to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Additionally, Mr. Bryza coordinates U.S. energy policy in the regions surrounding the Black and Caspian Seas. He also works with European countries on issues of tolerance, social integration, and Islam.

In April 2001, Mr. Bryza joined the National Security Council as Director for Europe and Eurasia, with responsibility for coordinating U.S. policy on Turkey, Greece, Cyprus, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Caspian energy.

Mr. Bryza served as the deputy to the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy from July 1998 to March 2001. In this capacity, Mr. Bryza coordinated the U.S. Government’s inter-agency effort to develop a network of oil and gas pipelines in the Caspian region. During 1997-1998, Mr. Bryza was special advisor to Ambassador Richard Morningstar, coordinating U.S. Government assistance programs on economic reform in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Mr. Bryza served at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow during 1995-1997, first as special assistant to Ambassador Thomas Pickering, then as a political officer covering the Russian Duma, the Communist Party, and the Republic of Dagestan in the North Caucasus. He worked on European and Russian affairs at the State Department during 1991-1995.

Mr. Bryza served in Poland in 1989-1991 at the U.S. Consulate in Poznan and the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw, where he covered the “Solidarity” movement, reform of Poland’s security services, and regional politics. He joined the United States Foreign Service in August, 1988.

Mr. Bryza graduated from Stanford University with a bachelor’s degree in international relations. He received his master’s degree in the same field from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He is fluent in Russian and Polish, and also speaks German and Spanish.
bureaucratically both at the NSC and the State Department. We worked that way for the first term of President Bush’s Administration, and towards the end we started thinking about Central Asia in a specific Asian character, less European more Asian. Our goal was to try to foster all the economic linkages (infrastructure, energy, telecommunications) between Central Asia and South Asia, especially Afghanistan, to try to stabilize Afghanistan. As a result, we have reorganized again. And I am not responsible for five Central Asian States. They have been moved to what is now the Bureau of Central and South Affairs. And the NSC had followed the suite again. The idea was to work through the bureaucratic scene between Central Asia and the rest of Asia. That led us not to think so much about the interconnections between Afghanistan and Central Asia.

All this shows you that in the back of our minds we have a broad philosophical sense of the direction in which political, economic and cultural forces are moving, and periodically we tried to reorganize ourselves to better achieve those objectives.

What are these sets of interests that we are trying to achieve in the FSU, and Eastern and Central Europe throughout Eurasia? We have three sets of strategic interests at a core of our policy in Central Asia and South Caucasus. We have security, energy interests, and interests in reform. Security is pretty straightforward initially; at the beginning of the Bush Administration when we talked about security in these regions we met bolstering independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of this group of states. As the years have passed, it seems pretty clear now that sovereignty and independence of these states is well established. President Bush’s visit to Georgia a year ago in May let the Georgians at least feel that once and for all their sovereignty and independence have been established. President Bush’s visit to Georgia a year ago in May let the Georgians at least feel that once and for all their sovereignty and independence have been established. Territorial integrity is a bit of a problem still though, especially in Georgia but also in Azerbaijan, and Moldova. Ambassador Mann, who still is a mediator on Nagorno Karabakh, earlier worked on South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Solving these conflicts in a peaceful way underscores territorial integrity of all the subject states and is something we care very much

БИОГРАФИЯ

Мэттю Дж. Брайза занял свою нынешнюю должность Заместителя Помощника Госсекретаря США по Европейским и Евразийским Делам в июне 2005. На этой должности он отвечает за политический надзор и регулирование отношений со странами Кавказа, Центральной Азии и Южной Европы. Он также направляет миссию США по продвижению мирного урегулирования сепаратистских конфликтов в Абхазии, Южной Осетии и Грузии, а также выступает Специальным Переговорщиком по Евразийским Конфликтам с целью способствовать урегулированию конфликтов в Нагорном Карабахе. Кроме того, Г-н Брайза координирует энергетическую политику США в регионах, окружающих Черное и Каспийское моря. Он также работает с Европейскими странами по вопросам толерантности, социальной интеграции и Ислама.

В апреле 2001 Г-н Брайза работал в Совете Национальной Безопасности Директором направления Европы и Ближнего Востока, отвечая за координацию политик в отношении Турции, Греции, Кипра, Кавказа, Центральной Азии и Каспийских энергоресурсов. Г-н Брайза работал заместителем Специального Советника Президента и Госсекретаря по Дипломатии в сфере энергоресурсов Каспийского бассейна с июля 1998 по март 2001. В этой должности Г-н Брайза координировал действия министерства Правительства США по развитию сети газовых и нефтяных трубопроводов в Каспийском регионе. В 1997-1998 гг. Г-н Брайза был специальным советником Посла Ричарда Морнингстара и координировавшего программу помощи Правительства США экономической реформе в Кавказе и в Центральной Азии.


Г-н Брайза окончил Стэнфордский университет, получив степень бакалавра международных отношений. Он получил степень магистра в этой же сфере во Флетчерской Школе Юриспруденции и Дипломатии. Свободно владеет русским и польским языками, а также говорят на немецком и испанском.
about. It is one of our current security interests in this region.

But of course we have additional security interests and concerns after 9/11. Now counter-terrorism has become our primary interest. We have established access to military bases in Central Asia - in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Now we do not have a base in Uzbekistan but we have the over-flight rights. In Georgia we worked ultimately successfully with the Georgian government starting with President Shevarnadze to successfully eliminate the terrorist haven that we had in the Pankissi Gorge. Our inability to resolve that problem for quite some time led to real tension in our relations with Georgia and with President Shevarnadze.

President Bush established a doctrine after 9/11 that essentially said a state that harbors terrorists is as bad as terrorists themselves. And if we cannot work with such a state to eliminate the terrorist haven then our relations may have a serious tension even despite the fact of previous friendship. In the case of Georgia we had longstanding, very positive relations with President Shevarnadze until 2001. We have invested over $1 billion dollars in assistance to Georgia. But afterwards our relations went off track because of the inability of the Georgian government to control the Pankisi Gorge and eliminate terrorist havens there. We work together successfully, developed a Train and Equip Program that provided the Georgian government the courage to clean out the Pankisi Gorge and reestablish its own control over the region, and its own autonomy to bolster its own territorial integrity.

We worked pretty well with Russia on counter-terrorism. Perhaps not as well as we would like, but believe it is one of our success stories. We worked particularly well with Azerbaijan on counter-terrorism in the region. The ultimate area of our security interests was to stop trafficking of weapons, people, weapons of mass destruction, and contraband, which forms a cornerstone of the monitoring system we provide to the countries of this region. On top of this, we developed a strategic approach in the last two years combating Islamic extremism, which I will talk in more detail about towards the end of my presentation.

и навсегда. Территориальная целостность все еще составляет определенную проблему - особенно в Грузии, Азербайджане и Молдове. Посол Манн, который все еще является посредником по Нагорному Карабаху, ранее занимался вопросами Южной Осетии и Абхазии. Поэтому, мы проявляем большую заботу о разрешении этих конфликтов мирным образом, который делает упор на территориальную целостность всех затрагиваемых государств. Это один из наших текущих интересов в области безопасности в этом регионе.

Конечно, у нас появились дополнительные приоритеты в области безопасности после 11 сентября. Теперь одной из главных забот стала борьба с терроризмом. Мы установили доступ к военным базам в Центральной Азии - в Кыргызстане и Узбекистане. Потом база из Узбекистана была выведена, но мы имеем право перелета над его территорией. В Грузии совместно с ее правительством, начиная с президента Шеварнадзе, в целом проведена успешная работа по искоренению пристанищ террористов в Панкисском ущелье. Неспособность в течение определенного времени решить эту проблему привела к реальной напряженности в наших отношениях с Грузией и президентом Шеварнадзе.

Президент Буш после 11 сентября утвердил доктрину, в которой по существу говорилось, что государство, которое дает приют террористам заслуживает такого же порицания, как сами террористы. И если мы не можем добиться от такого государства искоренения пристанищ террористов, то наши отношения могут иметь серьезную напряженность, даже несмотря на факт предыдущей дружбы. Так же и в случае Грузии, где мы имели долговременные, очень позитивные отношения с президентом Шеварнадзе до 2001 года. Мы инвестировали более 1 миллиарда долларов на оказание помощи Грузии. Но впоследствии наши отношения ухудшились вследствие неспособности грузинского правительства контролировать Панкисское ущелье и искоренить там террористические пристанища. Мы успешно разработали Программу Обучения и Оснащения, которая придала грузинскому правительству мужества в деле очистки Панкисского ущелья и восстановления контроля над регионом для поддержки своей территориальной целостности.

Мы достаточно хорошо сотрудничали и с Россией в борьбе с терроризмом. Возможно, не так хорошо, как хотелось бы, но считаю это одним из наших успехов. Мы особенно хорошо сотрудничаем с Азербайджаном по противодействию терроризму.
There is a misunderstanding in the U.S. government on whether our goal is Muslim outreach (i.e. establishing contact with people of the Muslim world), or rather to influence what people think. This is not a battle with the Muslim world but the battle for hearts and minds within Islam, between moderate and extremist forces. There groups like Hezbollah are functioning in Central Asia and throughout Europe, and they really do pose danger and in many ways are becoming an ideological factor for terrorists. Therefore, we have a strong interest in working with all of our partners throughout Eurasia in combating extremism. This is a security interest.

We have an energy interest as well. It is throughout Eurasian space and especially around the Caspian basin. It is not the U.S. oil and gas market that mostly benefits. We will probably never consume the gas that is produced in the Caspian. Occasionally, we will consume some oil. But the Caspian matters to us because that is a source of hydrocarbons that can reach global markets free of monopoly pressure: Transneft and Gasprom. Our goal is not to go to war with them. We need to work with these companies. We seek a long-term partnership with Russia in energy. During the course of the next couple of decades the U.S. will end up consuming natural gas that is produced in Russia, exported to us in liquid form. Forever, Gasprom will be a primary gas supplier to Europe. So, we need to find a way to work together with Gasprom and Transneft.

But European gas markets do not function as markets. They do not operate efficiently. Gas prices are artificial. Gasprom buys gas for $55-60 per 1,000 cubic meter, sells it in Europe for $235-275 per 1,000 cubic meter that generates an enormous rent, a gigantic amount of money because of the price differential (approximately $200 on each 1,000 cubic meter). It is distributed, as we saw in early January's Russia-Ukraine deal on the RosUkrEnergo Company, in a less than transparent way, through channels that often involve criminal contacts. It also definitely involves cronyism, payment kickbacks of these enormous rents and revenues back to government officials, which in turn creates dis-incentive for energy sector reform, and leads to in this region. The European Union's energy security strategy is less about the security risk from gas supplies, and more about the threat of Russian gas and the need for a competitive market. Gas prices are thus driven by political considerations and coercive power rather than market forces.

In this context, it is important to consider the role of energy in European security. The EU's energy security strategy aims to ensure that the region has access to sufficient, reliable, and diverse energy supplies. This is achieved through a combination of measures, including the diversification of supply sources, energy efficiency, and the development of alternative energy sources such as renewable energy. However, the EU's energy security strategy is also focused on ensuring that energy is used in a way that is sustainable and environmentally responsible.

The EU's energy security strategy is closely linked to its wider geopolitical interests. The EU seeks to strengthen its energy security by increasing its leverage in the global energy market, particularly in relation to Russia. This is achieved through a combination of measures, including the development of alternative energy sources and the diversification of supply sources. However, the EU's energy security strategy is also focused on ensuring that energy is used in a way that is sustainable and environmentally responsible.

In conclusion, the EU's energy security strategy is a key component of its wider geopolitical interests. The EU seeks to strengthen its energy security by increasing its leverage in the global energy market, particularly in relation to Russia. This is achieved through a combination of measures, including the development of alternative energy sources and the diversification of supply sources. However, the EU's energy security strategy is also focused on ensuring that energy is used in a way that is sustainable and environmentally responsible.
strengthening criminality, moving backwards of all the reforms that are in our national interest, and providing potential political and economic commercial power for a very small grouping of people who happened to run the monopoly.

My boss, Secretary Condoleezza Rice, was very critical of what happened on January 1 with the gas cutoff to Ukraine, condemning the use of gas as a political weapon. Our argument is if things continue as they are now with these gigantic splits between the purchase price for Central Asian gas and sales price dictated by Gazprom, the negative trends I have just described will get worse. The situation will never get better. And the commercial and political power concentrated in the hands of a small number of people who operate those monopolies will not diminish. On the contrary, it will grow stronger, and the market for gas in Europe will become increasingly distorted, and the U.S. national interests are more poorly served. What do we do about it? Chto delat’?

We do not just talk about it. We do not go to political war over this. We cannot simply show up at the G8 summit in Saint-Petersburg to address energy issues with President Putin only. Gazprom has to behave in a different way. We have to find a way through market forces to create incentives to channel Gazprom’s behavior and our own behavior back toward a more unified approach through diversification. It is only by creating a multiplicity of gas export routes to Europe that will be effective. Then we can begin to create a competition, which will lead to harmonization together of the Central Asian gas prices so that this generation of enormous rents vanishes. Together we need to think about how Gazprom can attract more foreign investment through reforming the company. We would love to see Gazprom to become more competitive, more efficient by virtue of foreign investment to develop domestic Russian fields. And we look forward to working with Russians to make that happen.

On energy, and on gas, we see diversification. We would like to work with our European allies and friends to move as much gas as possible through a Northern corridor that already exists, transiting Russia, Ukraine to Poland. It will be expanded soon by a Baltic pipeline (a shorter
Across the Baltic to Germany. We would like also to expand and build a significant pipeline system through the Black Sea, or to the West of the Caspian, or to the West of the Black Sea. The initial component of that gas pipeline system will begin operating hopefully this fall. This is the South Caucasus or Shakh-Doniz gas pipeline. It will carry gas from Azerbaijan into Georgia and in Turkey.

We would like to work with the countries and companies to expand that pipeline and allow it to feed into additional pipelines in the heart of Europe. One transits from Turkey to Greece and to Italy, another one is called Nabuko pipeline that will move from Turkey to Romania, Hungary and into Austria.

So, the idea here again is not to go to war with Russian gas suppliers. It is a competition. And as I described to a Russian Deputy Minister of Industry last week in Tessaloniki, it is like playing tennis: once you win, and another time you lose. That is competition, and the name of the game. Of course, the U.S. advances its own national interests, but if Gazprom transforms itself and performs more competitively, that would be good for Gazprom and Russian consumers as well.
The same is true about oil (e.g. the Kashagan will probably be the world’s largest oil field over the next 3.5 decades). Our goal again is to be free from the geographic and monopolistic choke points, which should not contribute to those parts of the world where two thirds of the proven oil reserves already are in the Gulf area. A lot of companies argued a few years ago: why did we allow them to export the Caspian oil to Iran? From our strategic perspective it makes no sense to take these largest newly found hydrocarbons and have it being further concentrated in the part of the world where two thirds of the proven oil reserves already are. As a result, we want to move as much of this oil along the similar corridor transiting Azerbaijan, and Georgia, and Turkey, and also Russia.

Russia is not out of the oil transit game from our strategic perspective by any means. There are two pipelines, that we strongly supported, that transit Russia - two out of the five overall sets of pipelines that we have supported over the last decade. Baku-Novorossiysk -- without that pipeline it would have been really difficult to develop the upstream assets in Azerbaijan. The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) that Russia recently allowed to expand, which transits oil from the Tengiz field on the shore of Kazakhstan across Southern Russia's Krasnodarskiy Kray to Novorossiysk.

Finally, we have a more idealistic set of interests: advancing political and economic freedom through reform. We really do not believe this is ideology. We believe that the long-term security and stability flow from reform. We believe that stability can only happen when there is a political legitimacy and prosperity in any particular state of the government. Democratic election, process and culture are also critically important. But we know that a democratic election cannot automatically lead to real democracy. There is a need for a wise combination of all these things.

In this way Georgia has become so important to the U.S. Back in 1990’s many people believed we supported Georgia primarily because it was a cross-point of a lot of pipelines, and President Shevarnadze was our special friend. But in times of the Rose Revolution many people said that we stopped supporting monoplistical удавок, которые не должны воздействовать на те части мира, где две трети подтвержденных запасов нефти уже находятся в зоне Персидского залива. Множество компаний спорило несколько лет назад, стояли ли нам соглашаться с экспортом каспийской нефти в Иран. Со стратегической точки зрения США, нет смысла в том, чтобы эти крупнейшие вновь открытые запасы углеводородов концентрировать в той части мира, где уже существуют две трети их подтвержденных запасов. Поэтому, мы хотим транспортировать как можно больше этой нефти по маршруту, проходящему через Азербайджан, Грузию, Турцию, а также Россию.

По нашим стратегическим планам, Россия ни в коем случае не выходит из игры по транспортировке нефти. Мы мощно поддерживаем два трубопровода, проходящие через Россию; это два из пяти проектов трубопроводов, которые мы поддерживали на протяжении последнего десятилетия. Баку-Новороссийский - без этого трубопровода было бы действительно трудно осваивать увеличивающиеся активы Азербайджана. Каспийский Трубопроводный Консорциум (КТК), который Россия недавно решила развить, транспортирует нефть из месторождения Тенгиз на побережье Казахстана через Краснодарский край на юге РФ до Новороссийска.

И, наконец, мы имеем более идеалистический набор интересов: продвижение политической и экономической свободы через реформы. Мы действительно не считаем это идеологией. Мы полагаем, что долговременная безопасность и стабильность исходят от реформ. Мы полагаем, что стабильность может иметь место только тогда, когда в любом конкретном государстве имеются политическая легитимность и процветание. Демократические выборы и развитие общей политической культуры также чрезвычайно важны. Но мы знаем, что демократические выборы не могут автоматически привести к реальной демократии. Необходимо разумное сочетание всех этих вещей.
Shevarnadze and somehow facilitated this revolution against him. We did not do that. We did not care just about pipelines. There was something more. In Georgia we had hope in pursued political freedom, that if we were able to unleash it, to work with the young generation of people who have been trained in the West, if we could help them advance their ideas, we would realize a platform for long-term stability in the middle of the Caucasus.

In case of the Rose Revolution a lot of people have criticized the U.S. government for somehow facilitating that turn of events. If we could engineer a revolution like that, I think you would probably see them all over the place. We cannot do that. What we did do is offer guidance to the people who were involved in the events. We made it clear that we could not possibly support them if there is violence. We also made clear that people have every right in the world to protest peacefully. The Georgian people themselves have decided that their true choice was stolen. What was special about that situation is that the U.S. government negotiated an agreement between the opposition and President Shevarnadze. I traveled with James Baker, a former Secretary of State, to Georgia in July of 2003. He sat down at the table for a couple of days with all the Georgian opposition leaders and with President Shevarnadze. We chose Secretary Baker because he and President Shevarnadze are close personal friends. And so, a tolerant decision was found, the elections ended up fairly. But again, our role was to make the sides avoid violence in a course of demonstrations, and to pursue stability and quiet things down.

I talked to Saakashvili every night during that period, and say: we are going to do this or that. And I answered: this is not our business, as long as it is peaceful, and according to the framework of the agreement with President Shevarnadze a few months back. So, we have been very supportive subsequently of the Rose revolutionaries - in contrast to the period when the Revolution was actually taking place. The success of Georgia's democratic and market economic experiment matter to us. If Georgia can make it, if Georgia can solidify and advance its reforms, we would argue it will establish a
beachhead for a broader advancement of political and economic freedom throughout the Caucasus.

Saving those for Ukraine, we want Ukraine to succeed. However, we have not seen the same degree of unanimity, the same converging of views about the direction of Ukraine towards the Euro-Atlantic family. But we did what we possibly could to encourage success of historic reforms in both of those countries.

To sum it all up, we see that reforms to enhance freedom, in energy and security are all interlinked. Our policy says that we cannot achieve any single set of those interests if all three sets of those interests are moving forward simultaneously. Sometimes we may pursue the same set of interests more actively than another. Right after September 11th we certainly focused more on counter-terrorism, and lining our partners to promulgate the war in Afghanistan more for a few months than we did democratic reform or more than we focused developing the multiplicity of oil and gas pipelines. But after a few months, once we have taken care of that set of security issues, we turned back toward pursuing all three sets of our interests simultaneously.

There can be no energy investment if there is no security. Energy investments, however, can generate revenues. But the revenues should be used to power economic reform, and to increase prosperity, and to advance economic reform. If we could see unrest and lack of a stable environment, the inability to achieve our security interests, as well as vicious circles. Reforms are necessary to attract energy investment, and as we know where there is no security, there are no investments. All of these issues are top priority, when we see realism and rationality blending together in requiring a balanced approach.

Finally, the Black Sea fits in the middle of everything that I was talking about. It is all about security, energy, and internal reform. Such is the core of the strategy we are trying to develop with the littoral states of the Black Sea and their nearby neighbors: Greece, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Moldova. We would like to work with all of these countries to develop cooperative vision, programs and shared interests. It is easier to say than to achieve however. We face a
couple of obstacles in trying to develop a strategy for the Black Sea region itself. There is a divergence of opinions of what security means. For some (e.g. Ukraine and especially for Georgia) security means moving towards NATO as quickly as possible. For Turkey, and especially for Russia, Georgia's rapid sprint is not necessarily such a great thing. Yet, we really need Russia's cooperation on security in the Black Sea to pursue one of our other vital security interests in the Black Sea, which is peaceful resolution of separatist's conflicts (e.g. Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia).

Operational implementation of this vision is very complicated. And we need to find a way to pursue, as we believe, such realistic objectives as the Euro-Atlantic integration of Georgia and Ukraine, and resolution of separatist conflicts. Here we have to be in partnership with Russia and Turkey. In terms of security they are uncomfortable because of spreading NATO's footprint. The Turks know that the legal foundation of the Turkish Republic are the Lasagna Treaty and the Montreux Convention, which afford Turkey a certain degree of autonomy and jurisdiction over the Turkish Straits. The Montreux Convention limits the ability of the non-littoral states to enter the Black Sea. Turkey is very uncomfortable with the idea of the non-littoral states' maritime forces entering the Black Sea. Within the official U.S. and with the similar group of your predecessors we were discussing and even arguing about the utility of NATO's expanding its presence in the Black Sea. We have also talked about operation Active Endeavor. And I remember one rear admiral and my counterpart in the White House were really angry with each other about information sharing during the Black Sea Harmony operation and operation Active Endeavor. I finally learned last week why there was a disconnect in this regard. It is because Turkey was in a process of establishing the cooperation between Black Sea Harmony and Active Endeavor. The Turks know that the legal foundation of the Turkish Republic are the Lasagna Treaty and the Montreux Convention, which afford Turkey a certain degree of autonomy and jurisdiction over the Turkish Straits. The Montreux Convention limits the ability of the non-littoral states' maritime forces entering the Black Sea. Within the official U.S. and with the similar group of your predecessors we were discussing and even arguing about the utility of NATO's expanding its presence in the Black Sea.

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Поэтому, практическое воплощение этой задачи очень затруднено. Но все равно надо искать путь достижения, как мы полагаем, таких реалистических целей, как Евро-атлантическая интеграция Грузии и Украины, а также урегулирование сепаратистских конфликтов.

В этом деле нам необходимо взаимопонимание с Россией и Турцией. В рамках безопасности они ощущают некоторый дискомфорт из-за расширения НАТО. Турки знают, что юридическим основанием образования Турецкой Республики являются Договор в Лазанье и Конвенция Монтрё, которые предоставляют Турции определенную степень автономности и юрисдикцию над Турецкими проливами. Конвенция Монтрё ограничивает возможности не-прибрежных государств по выходу к Черному морю. Поэтому Турция ощущает большой дискомфорт от идеи свободного доступа военно-морских сил не-прибрежных государств в Черное море. Внутри официальных кругов США и вместе с аналогичной группой ваших предшественников мы обсуждали и даже доказывали полезность расширения НАТО своего присутствия в ЧР. Мы также говорили об операции Активное Стремление. И я помню, как один контр-адмирал и один мой визави в Белом доме были недовольны друг другом относительно необходимости предоставления информации во время операций Черноморской Гармонии и Активное Стремление. И на прошлой я, конечно, понял причину такого расхождения подходов. Турция принимала активное участие в установлении взаимосвязи между операциями Черноморской Гармонии и Активное Стремление. И последние 1.5 года это проходило достаточно успешно. И правительство США слегка отступило. Возможно, нашей целью было не...
ity that NATO already is quite present in the Black Sea. e.g., Turkey is a major littoral state as well as one of the strongest militarily in all of Europe. Romania and Bulgaria are also in the Black Sea. We start to think that perhaps it is sufficient in terms of the NATO maritime footprint in the Black Sea. Or, perhaps we need to set our sites on how we take into account the sensitivities or the concerns of other's around the Black Sea about NATO's footprint expanding as it does, and inevitably how it will be. I believe it is a good thing by virtue of the organic presence of Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria in the Black Sea. Maybe we need to find ways how to build more of this cooperative vision about the soft security, border security, stopping the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction, people and contraband. As a result, we are trying to work through the conceptualization of our security cooperation around the Black Sea.

In terms of energy, I think it is in our common interests to work on natural gas exports to Europe. Our Russian friends may be uncomfortable about that. On the other hand, our Russian friends are very interested in a bypass pipeline that will move oil around the Turkish Straits to avoid congestion and the possibility of a shutdown of the Straits. And there are couple of options of pipelines bypassing the Bosphorus where there are possibilities to cooperate with Russia. In that sense we can be both competitive and cooperative with all the states around the Black Sea, endeavoring to bring them to life. The result is a cooperative overall strategy. This might be a more difficult area to find common grounds with all littoral states around the Black Sea. And nonetheless we are working particularly with Turkey to advance democratic reform, especially in the Broader Middle East.

Finally, I want to emphasize not only how important Turkey is for the U.S. but also how difficult our relationship is with Turkey. It is really one of the most difficult issues my colleagues, working on Turkey, have ever encountered. Recently, I met for about hour and a half with senior leaders from Turkey. Then I met for about two hours with the Turkish energy minister. Then I had a lunch with the Turkish prime-minister's policy adviser. We had very deep strategic discussions. And it became clear that NATO already is quite present in the Black Sea. e.g., Turkey is a major littoral state as well as one of the strongest militarily in all of Europe. Romania and Bulgaria are also in the Black Sea. We start to think that perhaps it is sufficient in terms of the NATO maritime footprint in the Black Sea. Or, perhaps we need to set our sites on how we take into account the sensitivities or the concerns of other's around the Black Sea about NATO's footprint expanding as it does, and inevitably how it will be. I believe it is a good thing by virtue of the organic presence of Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria in the Black Sea. Maybe we need to find ways how to build more of this cooperative vision about the soft security, border security, stopping the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction, people and contraband. As a result, we are trying to work through the conceptualization of our security cooperation around the Black Sea.

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to me how valuable an asset Turkey is: both as a NATO ally, but much more importantly as a secular democracy with a predominantly Muslim population.

Turkey is not a standard model. It is unique. For almost 160 years modernizing reforms have been moving forward, although the overall system is not perfect. There is a whole series of problems. Is Turkey ready for EU membership, is it too big, too poor, too Muslim, is it free religiously and ethnically tolerant? There were difficulties with Turkey when it came to the Iraqi war. Our request to move military forces into Iraq were refused that surprised a lot of people in my government. But within 10 days after that decision we showed our displeasure by offering Turkey a gift of $1 billion (not many people know this) with no strings attached, except for two minor ones. One is that Turkey would stick with its IMF reform program. And two: to avoid that when we are moving into Iraq, Turkey should not launch its assault in Northern Iraq in a not coordinated way to deal with the Kurdish issue.

Ultimately, Turkey decided it did not need the money. But even at that moment the greatest disappointment in Washington was that we believed that Turkey continues to be our major strategic ally. It was not a bribe at all. It was a sort of compensation, as we predicted that the war in Iraq would pose an external pressure on Turkey's economy. We did not want to destabilize the Turkish economy. We really do care about our partnership with Turkey.

We are trying to understand Turkish history, the benefits it can provide by virtue of its history, in the context of these historical sensitivities and concerns, and by understanding each other to work with Turkey as a real anchor in advancing a broad strategy in the whole Black Sea region on energy, security, economic cooperation, and advancing freedom through economic reform.
Over the last few days, I experienced a unique opportunity. We have completed a one-week exchange between the U.S. Strategic Command and the Russian Space Forces. General Popov and I have visited all our service academies, launch and space control areas. We have had in-depth discussions about U.S. space capabilities. After that, we spent 3-4 days with General Jones on the NATO side. Then we went to Moscow and Plesetsk Cosmodrome followed by a visit to the Saint-Petersburg Space Academy and one of the Russian space control centers.

James E. CARTWRIGHT

This provides an idea of the scope of interaction going on in your region at the levels of the U.S., European, Pacific and Strategic Commands. I will walk through some of the mission areas and thinking that the U.S. strategic Command has going on. I will endeavor to frame the environment that we are working in today, as well as to talk about things that the U.S. strategic Command is thinking about.

На протяжении последних нескольких дней у меня была уникальная и благоприятная возможность. Мы проводили однодневный обмен делегациями между Стратегическим командованием США и Российской космической силами. Генерал Попов и я посетили все наши военные училища, пусковые установки и космические центры управления. Мы провели углубленные дискуссии о космических средствах США.

После этого, мы провели 3-4 дня вместе с генералом Джонсом в рамках программы под эгидой НАТО. Затем мы поехали в Москву и на космодром Плесецк. После этого мы посетили Санкт-Петербургскую космическую академию и один из российских центров космического управления.

Джеймс Е. КАРТРАЙТ

Итак, это дает представление о масштабах взаимодействия, имеющего место в вашем регионе на уровнях командования ВС США в Европе, а также Тихоокеанского и Стратегического командований. Я останавливалась на некоторых нынешних задачах Стратегического командования, которые, думаю, сохраняются и в
about broad missions set for the U.S. Strategic Command, and go through some of the challenges in each of these mission areas.

**Today's Environment and Major Strategic Challenges**

One relatively undeniable challenge is the fact that we have moved to a global society. It is very difficult for the U.S. not to think about all these things that are ongoing everyday: elections, scandals, and the impact of business in other countries, oil, commodities, and natural resources among others. We are all impacted by various natural disasters. We have to expect to be able to work in any place throughout the world. It really has changed the way we do business, as you cannot have a single action in a single regional area that does not have a global impact.

We are immersed in an information age, and everyone has access to information. We have access to technology. In the military, we have state-of-the art technologies. Also, it empowers people in a non-state environment, e.g. in terrorism. It is unprecedented, and it is also a challenge.

In the Cold War times, really the basis of our strategies, of the relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was warning. We understood how much warning there was going to be. And when someone impacted on that warning time it reduced our options, and made the U.S. very uncomfortable.

The previous structure of warning is simply inappropriate and inadequate for today's problems. What is the structure of a new structure of warning? What do we want to do for security to ensure that somebody who gets up in the morning on the wrong side of the bed does not pull the trigger on something that is a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) on a neighbor? How are we going to handle today's world? What are the most appropriate things as we are moving towards the 21st century to deter behavior that is reactive in nature, has no warning, is not anticipated by the neighborhood, and yet is catastrophic in its scale as well as on a global level?

America began as an agrarian society. We went through a period of a Civil War, which was about the industrial North versus the agrarian South. It

**Современная обстановка и главные стратегические проблемы**

Одна относительно неоспоримая проблема заключается в том факте, что мы движемся к глобальному обществу. Нам очень оставаться в стороне от того, что происходит в мире каждый день: выборы, скандалы, влияние событий на другие страны, нефть, предметы потребления, природные ресурсы и т.д. Мы все находимся под воздействием различных природных катастроф. И мы должны быть готовы к работе в любой точке мира. Это действенный подход, так нельзя иметь единственное действие в единственном районе, не имея глобального воздействия.

Мы живем в информационном веке. Мы все имеем доступ к информации. Мы обладаем доступом к технологиям. В военном деле мы имеем самые современные технологии. Также, это наделяет силой людей в негосударственной сфере, например в терроризме. Это беспрецедентно и это также является проблемой.

Во времена Холодной войны, реальным базисом наших стратегий и отношений между США и Советским Союзом было оповещение. Мы понимали, насколько много значило предупреждение. И тот, кто воздействовал на это время оповещения, сокращал наши варианты выбора, и делал нас очень уязвимыми.

Но прежняя структура предупреждения просто не подходит для сегодняшних проблем. Итак, какой является новейшая структура предупреждения? Что мы хотим сделать для безопасности, чтобы гарантировать, что кто-то, кто встал утром с постели не с той ноги не нажмет спусковой крючок на чем-то, что является оружием массового уничтожения (ОМУ), направленным на соседа. Как мы собираемся обращаться с сегодняшним миром. Что является наиболее подходящим по мере продвижения в 21 век для сдерживания поведения, которое является реактивным по природе: без предупреждения, без ожидания, со стороны соседей и катастрофическому своему глобальному масштабу и уровню?
was at that point when we made a transition. We became focused on the industrial world. We changed laws, the transportation system, the ways of doing business; we started working across the boundaries. And now, in the times of globalization and the information age, the question is: what changes do we need to introduce, and who is going to be the first to change?

The U.S. Strategic Command deals with global activities. The recognition that the boundaries we had in the industrial age for all of our nations are probably not appropriate for the future age. What should they be? How should we work in a new environment? How do we exchange effectively? How do we handle conflicts, aggression and other emerging modern problems?

In the U.S. Strategic Command, we have a large portfolio of missions. Intelligence reconnaissance and surveillance on a global scale is one of our key missions.

We also deal with the cyber environment, networks, and information that is continually passed was at that point when we made a transition. We became focused on the industrial world. We changed laws, the transportation system, the ways of doing business; we started working across the boundaries. And now, in the times of globalization and the information age, the question is: what changes do we need to introduce, and who is going to be the first to change?

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and moved around. Talking about command and control as a stand-alone activity, in the U.S. we are moving to a footing where we have the joint operational and tactical levels of military management, which is called Joint Command and Control. For the global scale we have Command and Control, which falls under the U.S. Strategic Command. Then we have what is emerging now, the National Command Capability that brings the other elements of our government into a common network enabling the U.S. to share information, strategy and planning.

These three command and control levels are just now starting to emerge in the U.S. But they are long overdue. We have been very "stove-piped". The U.S. State Department sometimes does not work well with the U.S. Department of Defense. Treasury, Justice, as well as all other departments and different elements of the U.S. government have been isolated to some extent. Now we are trying to bring them together to be able to work in this information age in a coherent manner. And
the forces are part of the problem, part of the answer, and part of the solution. But you have got to have all elements of government tied together in a coherent way, able to plan, to offer options, particularly under stress, in order to be functional as a government.

Another part of the portfolio is space. The entire space portfolio falls under direction of the U.S. Strategic Command. It is an area that is growing very quickly. A few years ago it was probably dominated by Russia and the U.S. Today you have a lot of other countries that are populating space. It is becoming increasingly crowded. It is clear that in space we all have national interests. Space is used in commercial, information, military, scientific, and intelligence purposes. All of our nations use it. How we use it, and how we do business there is becoming more and more challenging.

A lot of the work that we did over the last couple of weeks between the U.S. and Russia had to do with trying to manage space as a result of that fact that it is getting crowded. There are not so many slots on the orbits that you can put satellites. And if those satellites start to get close together who do you call, and how are you made aware? If they start to interfere with each other in the electromagnetic spectrum, how do you manage that? The bulk of the satellites that are out there are commercial in nature. A relationship between Russian and the U.S. military is important but it only covers a small segment of what is going on in space. How are we going to manage that? We had very significant activity recently with the two Chinese manned launches. And one of the biggest problems that we had was that they really had no way to make sure that in their flight they would not run into something.

The two countries that have surveillance capability - Russia and the U.S. - did not necessarily ask for help. Finally, we broke through this barrier, and we have a very good relationship now de-conflicting in space. But there are more and more nations getting into this. And how are we going to do this? What is future space policy going to look like? What about the big issue of weapons in space? Is that something that we want to have? Right now we are thinking about how to work in this new space environment, to have the capability to work in it.
our policy is no. But the more you put nation-
al interest there, and the more that a country
relies on its space assets, the more lucrative
the target becomes. As a result, at some point
we have to make thinking about this a priori-
ty. We cannot put the genie back in the bottle.

Another controversial issue in our portfolio is missile defense. A lot of the dialogue on
missile defense is focused on intercontinental
ballistic missiles and our ability to potentially
defeat them. That is just a small niche of what
missile defense is about. The real challenge is
in short-medium-range missiles. They give
you no warning, and contain the potential to
carry WMD. They really have driven multiple
countries to start to move to a footing of hav-
ing something other than just offensive strike
alone to deter their neighbors from shooting
at them. The question is on a global scale:
how we are going to do this? How do we lay
down a structure that allows nations to pro-
tect themselves? Defense is not the only
answer. A sophisticated adversary will always
be able to get through your defense.

Missile defense is more about changing the
calculus of the adversary from taking that first
shot than it is about some impenetrable
shield. There is no broad based defense proce-
dure a nation can afford to use to eliminate
every shot, at least using the technology that
is known. But what you want to do is to
increase the warning time that provides more
options to work with. That is what is really at
the heart of what missile defense is about. In
particular, with regard to your region, as we
started dialog there about missile defense, this
is a highly debated issue that has significant
ramifications for all the countries involved.

The U.S. Strategic Command also has
incorporated in its portfolio a mission called
Combating WMD. There are three missions
associated with this area:

1. **Proliferation** - the work we are doing
   with the former Soviet republics in trying to
   cleanup some of the stockpiles, eliminate
   some of the weapons, and institute security
   on other weapons, especially in cases when
   nations cannot secure them themselves.

2. **Counter-proliferation** - keeping
   nations from selling and distributing WMD.

3. **Combating WMD** - efforts to
   contain the threat of WMD.

The most pressing issue facing the world is
the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This
problem is escalating, not diminishing, and
must be addressed head-on. As the world
becomes more interdependent, the threat of
nuclear weapons poses a significant danger to
every nation.

One way to address this threat is through
increased international cooperation and
coordinated efforts. This includes
strengthening existing arms control
agreements and developing new ones.

In conclusion, it is essential that the
international community work together to
address the proliferation of nuclear weapons
and other weapons of mass destruction. Only
through concerted efforts can we ensure a
safer and more secure world for future
generations.
There is a very good international program that is working in gaining these capabilities called the Proliferation Security Initiative [PSI] run by the U.S. State Department. It has become a great forum and a positive program for nations to get together, increase the police in their borders, and work within constraints of their laws to prevent WMD from being proliferated.

3. Consequence Management - a) if a WMD is deployed; you have got to clean it up. And if it is deployed in the course of a conflict, you have to fight through that, and not be stopped by WMD; b) the terrorist aspect, which means that it is very difficult to deter an individual terrorist who wants to be a murderer. There is an extremely high probability you will not be able to intercept them. It is likely you will not find this individual until he/she shows up at a shopping mall or some other public venue. As a result, you need at least to take away from that individual their objective. Consequence Management is a vehicle by which we can harden our society so that a terrorist looses willingness to do the act. Consequence Management is part of that mindset.
The final mission area of the U.S. Strategic Command is an offensive strike. We have both nuclear weapons and conventional weapons for a long-range, global-type strike. In this area we are in the process of going through mutual reduction under Moscow Treaty. We are reducing our deployed stockpiles significantly, for both nations. Under that treaty we have moved away from several types of weapons and delivery platforms or significantly reduced them. In September of 2005, we took the last of our Peacekeeper missiles out of the whole. We have reduced our intercontinental land-based missiles down to a level of approximately 450 (as of end of April 2006) out of about 500. The number of missiles deployed aboard submarines has been reduced. We have taken four of our ballistic submarines out of inventory and converted them to conventional carriers. The first two of the conventional carriers of those four entered service this year. Two more will enter service next year.

We are also in a process of walking away from fielding conventional ballistic missiles. This is a controversial issue. Nuclear weapons are not always appropriate for the targets that we are going to address in the future. With a given precision of the ballistic missiles, you do not need nuclear weapons to service every target. As a result, we are starting to move some of our nuclear forces to a conventional footing. The good news is that we have elected not to classify that activity. We are talking about this openly. We decided to brief those nations we interface with in both military-to-military and political formats.

We have the so-called triad. However, we have understood that offensive strike alone is not a good enough deterrent for the 21st century. So, offense has to be balanced by defense and your infrastructure, underpinned by effective intelligence and command and control. Depending on whom you are working with, the choices that you have in a triad are that sometimes you want more or less defense, and sometimes you want more or less offense. You try to tailor (one size does not fit every solution) it for a region and for an adversary. It is appropriate for the deterrence that you drive all of the activities towards a more stable environment with more choices.

Заключительная сфера задач Стратегического командования ВС США заключается в наступательном ударе. Мы обладаем как ядерным, так и обычным оружием для нанесения дальнего удара глобального типа. В этой сфере мы находимся в процессе прохождения через взаимное сокращение в соответствии с Московскими договором. Оба наши государства существенно сокращают свои развернутые средства. В соответствии с этим договором мы должны убрать несколько типов вооружения и платформ их доставки, или значительно сократить их. В сентябре 2005 года США уничтожили свои последние ракеты "Пискипер". Мы сократили наши межконтинентальные ракеты наземного базирования с ок. 500 до ок. 450 (по состоянию на конец апреля 2006 г.). Мы сократили ряд ракет, развернутых на подводных лодках. Мы вывели из боевого состава ядерных сил четыре баллистические подводные лодки, и преобразовали их в носители обычного вооружения. Перевезли две из них в строй в этом году. Еще две будут введены в строй в следующем году.

Мы также находимся в процессе отхода от размещения обычных баллистических ракет. Это спорный вопрос. Ядерное оружие не всегда соответствует целям, на которые мы хотели бы нацелиться в будущем. При нынешней точности баллистических ракет нет необходимости в ядерном оружии для поражения каждой цели. Поэтому, мы начали переводить некоторые из наших ядерных сил на обычную платформу. Позитивно то, что мы решили не засекречивать эту деятельность. Мы говорим об этом открыто. Мы решили вкратце ознакомить с этим государства, с которыми мы взаимодействуем в военном и политическом форматах.

У нас есть так называемая триада. Но мы поняли, что сам по себе наступательный удар не является достаточно хорошим сдерживающим фактором в 21 веке. Поэтому наступательные удары также должны быть подкреплены эффективной обороной, инфраструктурой, эффективной разведкой и системой военного управления. В зависимости от характера возникающей проблемы, из триады нужно выбрать либо больше или меньше обороны, либо больше или меньше наступления. Решение принимается в зависимости от региона и противника (один размер всем не подойдет). Для сдерживания подходит такой вариант, когда вся деятельность направлена на обеспечение более стабильной обстановки, при которой имеется больше вариантов действий.
The Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership

On the 5th of June 2006, Bucharest hosted the summit launching the Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership (BSFDP) that brought together Heads of State and Government, Ministers and other high representatives of the Black Sea countries, as well as senior officials of the European Union and NATO, European countries and the United States, regional and international organizations. The BSFDP Summit was also attended by representatives of NGOs, think tanks, academic and research institutions, the civil society and business associations and companies from the region and the Euro-Atlantic community. The Black Sea countries agreed in Bucharest to enhance their responsibility in maintaining peace, prosperity, stability and good neighborly relations in this area, as shown in the Declaration adopted on the occasion.

The main motivation for creating the Forum was that the Black Sea area presents a special value and importance. The region's strategic value stems from its unexplored potential as a regional hub between East and West, and a secure crossroads of strategic routes from Europe to Central Asia and the broader Middle East. The fact that in the region one could find solutions to some of the essential questions posed to the...
Euro-Atlantic community, like the fight against terrorism, energy supply, institutional consolidation and the enlargement of the democratic community, prompts the area even more on the European and Euro-Atlantic agenda. The Black Sea region could benefit from the reviving interest of the EU in the broader context of reviewing the European Neighborhood Policy.

The region should be thus approached not as the periphery of Europe anymore, but as a part of the European and Euro-Atlantic mainstream at the beginning of the 21st century. Consolidating a Black Sea area of predictable, democratic and developed countries, that enjoy self-sustainable security and economic growth, would make the region and Europe safer. The key to stability in the region is broader regional dialogue, which in turn would favor economic development and enable the region to move from marginality to the very centre of the new European space.

The idea behind launching the Black Sea Forum was to create an open floor and flexible platform for free and fair dialogue, to ensure better connectivity and cross-fertilization between academic circles and political decision with a view to fostering synergy and bringing them closer to the European and Euro-Atlantic community. The best brand name for the BSFDP is that of a 'network of networks', which is meant to put to work the energies, political will and resources of regional actors to the benefit of stronger partnerships, in a pragmatic and project-oriented manner.

The Forum’s objectives are:
- to underline the importance of Black Sea region stability and highlight the value of democratic transformations and European aspirations of Black Sea countries;
- to enable the re-emergence of the Black Sea regional market, interconnected with the European economic area;
- to offer a new platform and new opportunities for countries in the region to present their views about the region’s future, thus promoting regional interests in a cooperative manner, based upon solidarity and transparency;
- to increase synergy of efforts among all actors engaged in the region (regional and international organizations, individual countries), based upon agreed priorities and to facilitate the emergence of an external critical mass to act as "unofficial" guarantors of democratic stability in the region.
- to enhance regional identity through defining common challenges, interests, and needs of regional countries, as well as common solutions to common problems;
to facilitate a broad regional dialogue between governmental and non-governmental organizations and help them channel resources to agreed targets;

to generate new ideas on conflict prevention and crisis management, providing new opportunities to develop a multilateral context within which regional countries can cooperate.

The first high-level BSFDP event focused on four areas of critical importance for the development of regional cooperative architecture (how to shape a common vision and set a common agenda for the Black Sea region): good governance, sustainable development, energy security, and crisis management.

Mr. Dranga

was born in Bucharest, Romania. He graduated from the Bucharest Polytechnic Institute in 1990. Following graduation, he has been working as a journalist at the Romanian Foreign Affairs Magazine "The World" for one year. In 1991, he joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, being assigned as an expert in the Policy Planning and Speech Writing Division. Following completion of the post graduated course for international relations sponsored by the Bucharest University and the Romanian Institute for International Relations (1992-1993), he was promoted to 3rd Secretary (1994), 2nd Secretary (1995), 1st Secretary (1998), and Diplomatic Counselor (2000). After the post of Deputy Secretary of State for Defense Policy and Euro-Atlantic Integration in the Ministry of Defense, at present, he holds the position of Director General, Ministry of Defense Romania.

His other MFA assignments include: Expert, NATO and WEU Division (1995-1996); 2nd and 1st Secretary, Mission of Romania to NATO and WEU (1996-2000, from 1999 to 2000 Deputy Head of Mission); Director, NATO and Strategic Issues Division (2000-2001).

Mr. Dranga also graduated from the Italian Institute for International Relations in Florence (1992) and the "George C. Marshall" European Center for Security Studies, (College for Strategic Studies and Defense Economics), in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany (1994). He attended the Black Sea Regional Security Program, organized by JFK School of Government, Harvard University (2001) and a Master in Public Administration at that School. He is also a graduate of several other courses on security related issues, negotiation techniques and international relations.

Mr. Dranga is author of over fifty articles and contributed to a couple of books and studies in the field of diplomacy and international relations.

He is fluent in English, Italian and French.
development, energy security and crisis management. The workshops held during the BSFDP summit aimed at identifying critical gaps and required action toward a stable, prosperous, democratic and secure Black Sea region. Also, practical ways to improve national and regional capacities enabling the countries of the region to respond in a cooperative manner to present challenges and opportunities were also discussed.

The activities envisaged for the Forum should adapt to a framework that ensures:

- A bottom-up approach, where representatives of both governmental and nongovernmental organizations from inside and outside the region are able to set jointly the agenda at both regional and European/Euro-Atlantic levels.
- A pro-active attitude, which should induce individual countries, regional and international organizations to have a better understanding of the available means and resources to make the best-case scenario for the region come true.
- A Multidisciplinary Integrative approach to develop 'win-win' solutions in the relations between the countries of the Black Sea region based on enhanced cooperation, with due respect and adequate protection of the legitimate interests of the countries concerned.

Romania is interested in further substantiating the Black Sea Forum and advancing concrete projects. The fields of special interest are improving regional cooperation on crisis management, promoting inter-cultural dialogue, environment, a study on regional cooperation on crisis management, promoting inter-cultural dialogue, environment, etc., aiming at improving the cooperation among the crisis management systems of the countries of the region, and other referring to the dialogue among cultures in the Black Sea Region. They will be open to all potential contributors. Romania is committed to the principles of openness, flexibility and inclusiveness in all regional cooperation formats, and we will continue our efforts to enlarge and deepen regional support for the Black Sea Forum.

Romania invites all countries in the region and partners from the European and Euro-Atlantic community to make the best use of this new platform for dialogue and cooperation to ensure it is put to work in the interest of the region and the wider international community.

Today, in the post-cold war era, one may say that the risk of world conflict, at least for the near and mid-term future, due to the traditional dispute between "East" and "West", is almost non-existent. In Europe, the enlargement of NATO and the EU to the East with the integration, or even the prospect for integration, of new member-states and the willingness and readiness of the other states in the region to cooperate with the Euro-Atlantic structures, has enhanced stability and security, while new prospects have emerged for the settlement of longstanding disputes, confrontations and conflicts.

Nevertheless, uncertainty and instability still constitute the main features of the current strategic environment. On the international stage, new and to a great extent trans-national risks, as well as new challenges, have emerged, threatening international and domestic security and stability of states.

The broader Black-Sea region is a crossroads of vital geo-strategic and geo-economic importance in South-eastern Europe, since it constitutes:


Подполковник Полихронис НАЛМПАНТИС
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Тодь, в эру после окончания Холодной войны, можно сказать, что риска мирового конфликта, как минимум в ближайшей и среднесрочной перспективе, вследствие традиционного спора между Востоком и Западом почти не существует. В Европе, с расширением НАТО и ЕС на Восток, интеграция или даже перспектива интеграции для их новых членов, а также готовность остальных государств региона взаимодействовать с Евро-атлантическими структурами, усилили стабильность и безопасность, а также стимулировали появление новых перспектив для урегулирования давнишних споров, конфронтаций и конфликтов.

Однако неуверенность и неустойчивость все еще составляют главную особенность нынешней стратегической обстановки. На международной арене, появились новые - в основном транснациональные - риски вызовы, угрожающие международной и региональной безопасности и стабильности государств.

Расширенный Черноморский регион (РЧР) - это жизненно важное геостратегическое и гео-
a strategic passage connecting Europe to the Central Asia and the Middle East;
a route for the transportation of energy resources from Caspian sea and the Central Asia and European markets;
an area for potential future EL and NATO enlargement, and a place where major international security and co-operation issues will have to be addressed, such as terrorism, etc.

However, the broader Black Sea region is often characterized as a source of problems and threats against the security of states of the area as well as the security of Europe as a whole. The factors contributing to the destabilization of the region are national disputes; territorial claims and conflicts (such as Nagorno-Karabakh, Chechnya, Abkhazia, North Ossetia and Transnistria); organized crime; conflicting international interests and objectives, as it regards the political and economic control over specific regions, along with their energy reserves.

In the Balkans, the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia, and the hostility and atrocities that followed, have had a tragic impact on the people and the stability in the region. Besides, the resurgence of irredentism and ethnic-religious fanaticism, the poor economic conditions and the organized crime, in combination with ineffective control of borders have contributed to the development of a "constant instability". This instability affects the entire region, fostering the emergence of the so-called "asymmetric" threats. Furthermore, the ambiguity over the final status of Kosovo and the consequent potential impact on the broader region, make the situation even more complicated.

European Strategic Security, adopted by the European Union in December 2003, identifies the following as "principal threats" against European security: terrorism; proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction; regional conflicts; potential problems that rogue states could cause; organized crime pertaining to a number of illegal activities such as drugs, weapons and human cross-border trafficking; illegal immigration; environmental issues, incl. climate changes, economical cooperation of the South-Eastern Europe, and so on.
floods, scarcity of natural resources - mainly water and energy reserves, potential emergence of epidemic diseases threatening health systems etc. These threats are interconnected. For instance, organized crime and international terrorism usually thrive in countries characterized by a weakness of state structures, a democratic deficit, corruption, and abuse of power. Besides, regional conflicts lead to the collapse of state structures and, as a result, this create instability and uncertainty.

European states have to deal effectively with another important issue: their absolute dependence on energy resources that are taken from regions beyond their own borders, in which instability and endemic security problems prevail.

Threats against security of Greece from the Black Sea region cannot be characterized as "direct", in the sense that they do not pertain to our vital national interests. Let us refer briefly to the potential security problems that could affect Greece:

- Destabilization of the counties or delay of their democratization process and economic development due to the revival of ethnic conflicts, terrorist actions etc.
- Spread of organized crime in areas bordering Greece.
- Increased number of immigrants entering Greece and Western Europe.
- Increased competition for control over oil and gas transportation routes towards European markets.

The geographical position of Greece in the eastern part of the Mediterranean basin makes it a link between Europe, Asia and Africa. Moreover, Greece is a-member-state of both, the EU and NATO, and more recently a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (1 January 2005 until 31 December 2006), and its proximity to the wealth-producing sources of the Middle East, have extended the country's geo-political horizons and importance.

Greece, distinguished among its neighboring states for its high level of economic development, security, peace, stability and democracy, is duly considered a model for all
countries in the region. Its own strategic objective is to maintain an enhanced role for the reconstruction and development of the region and to contribute to the stabilization and prosperity of its people and of the whole area. Greece believes that any potential crisis could and should be addressed through peaceful the co-existence of people and ethnicities, the protection of minorities; the Euro-Atlantic perspective and course of the countries in this area, and the positive contribution of the international community.

Greece contributes actively to the consolidation of collective security and international peace by supporting the Balkan countries' Euro-Atlantic perspective and course, and playing a more active role in the wider SE European region and by contributing towards the stability, economic growth, progress and co-operation among countries and people in the region. The Greek foreign policy in the Black Sea region is implemented, to a great extent, through bilateral relations and active participation in collective efforts, such as the Black Sea Economic Co-operation-Pact (BSECP). The Greek origin population, living mainly in Caucasus, Ukraine and in other littoral states of the Black Sea, plays an essential role in the process of mapping out the Greek policy in the region.

Defense and Security Policy of Greece

These new challenges and the need for the country to address them immediately have dictated the course of the country's security and defense policy. Greece is situated in a sensitive geo-political area, which fosters the emergence, including the consequences, of such threats against security. Preparation for the prevention and if needed, countering of challenges and threats is considered an issue of high priority by the Armed Forces' strategic and operational planning.

The country's National Defense Policy meets these new challenges of its geo-strategic and geopolitical environment. Greece's defense policy focuses on strengthening the Armed Forces' military power and preventive

безопасностью, миром, стабильностью и демократией, по праву считается образцом для всех стран региона. Ее стратегическая задача - поддерживать усиление роли в реконструкции и развитии региона, а также содействовать стабилизации и процветанию ее народа и всего региона. Греция верит, что любой потенциальный кризис мог бы и должен решаться путем мирного сосуществования народов и этносов, защиты нацменьшинств, а также предоставлением странам региона Евро-атлантической перспективы и позитивным вмешательством международного сообщества.

Греция содействует активной консолидации коллективной безопасности и международного мира с помощью поддержки ЕвроАтлантической перспективы и курса для Балканских стран, а также играя более активную роль в расширенном регионе Юго-Восточной Европы в содействии развитию стабильности, экономическому росту, прогрессу и сотрудничеству стран и народов региона.

Греческая внешняя политика в Черноморском регионе (ЧР) осуществляется, в значительной мере, через двусторонние отношения и активное участие в коллективных проектах, типа Организации Черноморского Экономического Сотрудничества (ОЧЭС). Население греческого происхождения в основном проживает на Кавказе, в Украине и других прибрежных странах ЧР и играет весьма важную роль в процессе планирования греческой политики в регионе.

Политика обороны и безопасности Греции

Эти новые вызовы и необходимость для страны решать их немедленно продиктовали курс политики обороны и безопасности Греции. Греция расположена в чувствительной геополитической области, которая стимулирует появление или подвержена угрозам от внешних угроз безопасности. Подготовка к предотвращению и, если нужно, противостоянию вызовам и угрозам считается проблемой высокого приоритета для стратегического и оперативного планирования в Вооруженных Силах.

Национальная Политика Государственной Обороны соответствует этим новым вызовам и ее геостратегическому и геополитическому окружению. Греческая оборонная политика сосредоточена на усилии военной мощи своих Вооруженных Сил
capability, as well as on protecting our country's interests through its active foreign policy, a real "core of stability".

The defense of Greece is part of the Hellenic Security Policy. Its security doctrine is "defensive-preventive", aiming at "defending the country's national independence, sovereignty and integrity against any threat". Greece fully supports the European course of the countries in the area and all Western European political and defense institutions, such as NATO, the EU and the OSCE.

The defense priorities of Greece focus on dealing with any future threats against its security by land, sea, and air. We have modernized our Armed Forces and we maintain a preventive and reliable force to counter either any conventional threats or the full spectrum of "asymmetric" threats.

Greece's National Defense Policy is implementing according to the following principles:

- Support the European prospect of the countries in the region, subject to the EU standards and principles.
- Participate in the efforts of the international community to support peace and consolidate international security, stability and co-operation and to combat international terrorism according to the principles and procedures provided for in the Constitution and the legislation of the country, as well as, the international Law.
- Support the efforts for a firm and viable solution of the Cyprus problem, aiming at the unification of the island in the context of the UN decisions, as well as, the European "acquis communautaire".
- Take all necessary measures to effectively address asymmetric threats.
- Improve the Armed Forces' preventive capability and their effectiveness, to include the necessary interoperability with the EU and NATO member-states.

Co-operation of Greece with the International Organizations

Greece supports and participates in interventions of International Organizations (such as the UN), which aim at ensuring and main-

и их упреждающей способности, а также на защищите интересов страны посредством активной внешней политики - настоящего "ядра стабильности".

Оборона Греции - это часть Греческой Политики Безопасности. Её доктрина безопасности является "оборонительно-предупредительной", направленной на "отстаивание национальной независимости страны, суверенитет и целостность перед лицом любой угрозы". Греция полностью поддерживает европейский курс стран региона и Западноевропейские оборонно-политические структуры, такие, как НАТО, ЕС и ОБСЕ.

Приоритеты обороны Греции нацелены на любые потенциальные угрозы безопасности, исходящие с суши, моря и воздуха. Мы модернизировали наши Вооруженные Силы и поддерживаем в боеготовности надежные войска, готовые к упреждающим действиям и противодействию любым обычным и "асимметричным угрозам".

Политика Национальной Обороны Греции реализуется согласно следующим принципам:

- Поддержка европейской перспективы для стран региона на основе соблюдения стандартов и принципов ЕС.
- Участие в усилиях международного сообщества по поддержанию мира и усилению международной безопасности, стабильности и сотрудничества в борьбе с международным терроризмом - согласно принципам и процедурам на основе норм Конституции и законодательства страны, а также международного права.
- Поддержка усилий, направленных на надежное и действенное решение проблемы Кипра, объединение острова в контексте решений ООН, а также европейского "acquis communautaire".
- Принятие всех необходимых мер для эффективного противодействия асимметричным угрозам.
- Усовершенствование превентивных возможностей Вооруженных Сил и их общей эффективности, включая необходимую взаимосвязанность с армиями стран-членов ЕС и НАТО.

Сотрудничество Греции с международными организациями

Греция поддерживает и участвует в операциях международных организаций (например, ООН), которые нацелены на гарантирование и под-
taining international peace and security. Specifically, it contributes personnel and assets to peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, as well as, operations led by the UN, NATO and the EU, namely ALBA, KFOR, ISAF, ALTHEA etc., including disarmament operations.

Greece provides training, accommodation and food to foreign officers in the facilities of the Multinational Training Center for Peacekeeping Operations in Kilkis. After the training, the officers are employed as military Observers in the UN Peacekeeping Missions. (The UN pays only the cost of tickets.)

Greece supports NATO’s transformation into a collective security organization and it’s enlargement towards the East, and it plays an active role in a number of programs, missions and operations of the Alliance, and namely:

- The new Command Structure - NCS [NDC-GR].
- The NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Center (NMIOTC) in Souda.
- The improvement of the Alliance’s Capabilities (Prague Capabilities Commitment - PCC) by offering the services of the Athens Sealift Coordination Center (SCC).
- The formation of the NATO Response Force (NRF).
- The deployment of SEEBRIG in Afghanistan under ISAF under the condition that the member-states will first reach an agreement on the issue of sharing the costs pertaining to the deployability and sustainability of forces in the field.
- The expansion and the promotion of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative.

The position of Greece on ESDP issues is derived from its conviction that the development of European Military Capabilities will strengthen the EU's stabilizing role and they will contribute to the consolidation of a more secure regional and international environment. Specifically, Greece contributes to:

- The development of the Common European Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).
(ESDP), as well as the formation of the European Rapid Reaction Elements.

- The participation, along with Portugal, in a multinational Battle Group, which will be formed in the framework of the Spanish-Italian Amphibious Forces (SIAF) in the 1st half of 2006. In the 2nd half of 2007, Greece will also participate, as a "Framework Nation", in the "Balkan" multinational Battle Group, with the additional participation of Bulgaria, Romania and Cyprus (signed in Brussels in 21 November 2005).

- The participation in the European Defense Agency (EDA) to improve the EU's defense capabilities.

Strategic co-operation between the EU and NATO, as well as their mutual support, contribute effectively to the consolidation of world security, and demonstrate that the principles of "equality" and "synergy" prevail in the relations of the two organizations. Greece supports this relation, since it facilitates the consolidation of peace and welfare.

**Greece and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)**

All BSECP countries were pleased to welcome Greece to the Pact as a country with "European" identity. Indeed, the country has acted in an exemplary way in bilateral interstate relations, and it supported their future integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures.

It is important to note that the Black Sea countries have considered Greece as a link between the Black Sea and the European Union and asked her to undertake a series of relevant initiatives. Greece's "specific gravity" in the BSECP increased after 1998 when the BSECP Bank and the International Center of Black Sea Studies were established, in Tessaloniki and Athens respectively.

BSECP plays a leading role in consolidating peace, stability and prosperity in sensitive regions, such as the Balkans and Caucasus, and in developing a Euro-Asian common economic space. The EU, in turn, claims that regional cooperation has to be supported actively and promoted, first, as the predominant means of

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maintaining peace and strengthening stability in volatile regions and, second, as a way to approach the European political and economic structures. This position is included in the new European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) adopted by the EU last year with the cooperation of the EU with the Mediterranean and Black Sea countries. 

Greece will continue to seek systematic co-operation between the BSECP countries and the EU and it will make any possible effort to further enhance it.

**Conclusions**

The application of an active policy pertaining to the Black Sea countries is not only a challenge for Greece to achieve the objectives of its foreign policy (stability, economic cooperation, democratization). It is also a pre-condition to effectively address new forms of threat at the international security level. 

However, it must also be noted that "Europeaization" of the Black Sea countries still constitutes a major challenge for the EU. 

Greece, as an EU and NATO member, is capitalizing on its excellent relations with all the Black Sea countries to increase the cooperation level in the region. 

We have to aim at co-operation in order to contribute decisively in international peace, progress development and solidarity. 

We aspire to develop friendly relations and collaborations, which would thrive in a spirit of mutual understanding and reciprocity, and promote the quality of life and dignity of the human beings and of the society in general. 

Greece firmly supports and spares no effort, at any possible level, to carry out its objective to consolidate peace, stability and security in the Wider Black Sea Region. Together with relevant international organizations, we are taking firm actions to develop bilateral relations with all states, based on equality, so as to be able to establish a spirit of cooperation, mutual trust and understanding.

с европейскими политическими и экономическими структурами. Это положение включено в Европейскую Политику Нового Соседства (ENP), принятую ЕС в прошлом году относительно сотрудничества ЕС со странами Средиземного и Черного морей.

Греция будет продолжать системное сотрудничество между странами ОЧЭС и ЕС, а также делать все возможное для его углубления.

**Заключение**

Проведение активной политики в отношении Черноморских стран - это не только вызов Греции в плане достижения ее внешнеполитических целей (стабильности, экономической кооперации, демократизации). Это является и условием эффективного противодействия новым формам угроз на международном уровне безопасности.

Однако нужно также отметить, что "европеизация" Черноморских стран еще остается главной проблемой для ЕС.

Греция, как член ЕС и НАТО, делает ставку на свои превосходные отношения со всеми Черноморскими странами во имя повышения уровня сотрудничества в регионе.

Нам нужно настраиваться на кооперацию для того, чтобы весомо содействовать международному миру, развитию прогресса и солидарности.

Мы стремимся построить дружеские отношения и сотрудничество, которое должно зиждиться на духе взаимопонимания и взаимности, а также повысить качество жизни и защиту достоинства людей и общества в целом.

Греция мощно поддерживает, не жалея никаких усилий на любом возможном уровне, необходимость выполнения задачи по укреплению мира, стабильности и безопасности в РЧР. Вместе с соответствующими международными организациями мы предприимаем серьезные действия для развития двусторонних отношений со всеми государствами, основанных на равенстве, с целью создания духа сотрудничества, взаимного доверия и понимания.
Why banks matter more than tanks?
Почему банки значат больше, чем танки?

T the Black Sea Area is a classic case of a region that one might characterize less as a distinct competitive arena with its own strategic identity. It is a point where the vectors of vibrant strategic dynamics originating outside it, sometimes far outside it, come together. From this perspective, the Wider Black Sea region displays certain regional features in relation to the adjoining areas. It is not some sort of "grey zone" or "black hole" that sits in the middle of Europe, Eurasian landmass and the Greater Middle East, but is an area defined by a number of converging vectors that might significantly alter the way insiders and outsiders alike view future challenges and opportunities. This, in turn, shapes how these elements of the world politics would design strategies to pursue a broad range of national interests.

Being at crossroads, the whole area (BSEC is its institutional configuration) is supposed to contribute, as noted above, to new relationships that are developing among countries, both within and far beyond the region. It is quite obvious that the Black Sea area is an integral part of the all-European system of security and cooperation and, at the same time, a vital link, "a strategic corridor" to outlying regions that have huge potential for strategic realignment.

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It is also "a strategic space" often having in external perceptions many of the same characteristics that "Central Asia" evokes to the outlying regions. Though this obvious geographic fact needs to be proved strategically to the outside world by the Black Sea community yet.

Of course, globalization trends involve great expectations for accelerated growth and prosperity through the expansion of cross-border flows of ideas and information, goods and services, technology and capital.

At the same time, however, increased interdependence of the regional States, facilitates the spillover of economic turbulences and instability from one area or country to another, from poverty to AIDS to drugs to terrorism.

In this connection, it should be also noted that, the some Black Sea States are still in painful and turbulent state-building, transit - transformation processes, involving a lot of unresolved issues, including the problems territorial integrity. And these processes go on a parallel track with a

FACULTY BIOGRAPHIES

Ambassador Tedo Japaridze
citizen of Georgia, assumed his current duties as Secretary General in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) Permanent Mission on 1 November 2004 upon the decision of the 11th Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs held in Tbilisi in October 2004. Born in Tbilisi on 18 September 1946, he completed his studies in the Tbilisi State University. Ambassador Japaridze has joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia in 1989, after his academic career at the Tbilisi State University and the USSR Academy of Sciences. Before being posted as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Georgia to the United States of America - Canada and Mexico, he served as the Assistant of the Head of the Council of National Security and Defense of Georgia. Ambassador Japaridze was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia for the period of November 2003 - March 2004. Before assuming his responsibilities in the BSEC PERMIS, he was the Honorary Chairman of the Transcaucasus Foundation and Special Advisor to Washington Strategic Advisors, LLC. Ambassador Japaridze is married to Ms. Tamar Japaridze and has one son.
Democracy - building process and they from time to time contradict each other.

That is why we all need to acknowledge the fact that further cooperation on trade and development in the region should be linked to a renewed determination to promote enhanced sense of stability through confidence-building process and implementation of "soft" security measures, emphasizing on the immediate linkage between the economic and security dimensions for the regional sustainability.

What makes that space, defined, by the experts, as the "new Black Sea bullring", strategically so important for the European and the Euro-Atlantic communities or for the stability and security of the entire Eurasian landmass?

There are certain strategic developments in the Black and Caspian Sea areas that should attract the attention of policy-makers and analysts.

1. That is the energy development: the first non-OPEC oil and gas extraction, production and transit-transportation within and through that space. These processes are already impacting and altering the strategic landscape in and around the entire Region.

Sometime by June in 2006, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline will begin to disgorge at least one million barrels of crude oil per day directly into the waiting ships and refineries.

This development would be followed up a little bit later with the implementation of the South Caucasian Gas pipeline that is supposed to forward the Azeri gas through Georgia to Turkey and from there to European countries. But the oil and gas output, according to the experts, may reach perhaps even those subsidiary pipelines that are beyond the Region and are located in the Eastern Mediterranean.

So that fascinating development will connect these two Regions with a veritable umbilical cord, impacting by the way, the strategic dynamics on the ground there, especially in those BSEC countries, that are tormented by some internal and external problems, including the issues of the "frozen" conflicts. I strongly believe that sustainable economic prosperity should become one of the driving forces to tackle these unresolved problems.

Thus the unique transit potential and the energy resources of that wider Black Sea area should become an important guarantor of Europe's energy security in the years ahead. In the worst-case scenarios of upheaval in the energy markets of the сырой нефти в день прямо на ожидающие судна и нефтеперерабатывающие предприятия.

За этим вскоре последует реализация проекта ЮжноЦкаспийского газопровода, предназначенного для поставки азербайджанского газа через Грузию в Турцию и оттуда в европейские страны. Но нефть и газ, считают эксперты, можно доставлять даже до вспомогательных трубопроводов, находящихся за пределами Региона, находящимися в Восточном Средиземноморье.

Т.о., этот потрясающий шаг соединит эти два Региона подлинной пуповиной, кстати, влияющей на стратегические процессы в их практической жизни - особенно тех странЦчленов ОЧЭС, которые страдают от определенных внутренних и внешних проблем, включая "замороженные конфликты". Я очень верю в то, что устойчивое экономическое процветание должно стать одной из движущих сил для решения этих проблем.

Поэтому, уникальный транзитный потенциал и энергетические ресурсы Расширенного ЧР должны стать важным гарантом энергетической безопасности Европы на годы вперед. При худших сценариях развития событий, связанных с потрясениями не энергетических рынках Ближнего Востока, Западной Африки и

**BIография**

Посол Тедо Джапаридзе является гражданином Грузии. Он приступил к выполнению своей нынешней должности Генерального секретаря Постоянной миссии Организации черноморского экономического сотрудничества (ОЧЭС) 1 ноября 2004 г. в свете решения 11-го Совета Министров Иностранных Дел, состоявшегося в Тбилиси в октябре 2004 г. Родился в Тбилиси 18 сентября 1946 г., окончил Тбилисский Государственный Университет. Посол Джапаридзе поступил на работу в МИД Грузии в 1989 г. после академической карьеры в Тбилисском Государственном Университете и Академии Наук СССР. До своего назначения Чрезвычайным и Полномочным Послом Грузии в США, Канаде и Мексике, он работал на посту Помощника Главы Совета Национальной Безопасности и Обороны Грузии. Посол Джапаридзе исполнял обязанности Министра Иностранных Дел Грузии в период с ноября 2003 по март 2004 г. До принятия должности Генерала Посольская Миссия ОЧЭС был Почетным Председателем Транскавказского Фонда и Специальным Советником групп "Вашингтонских Стратегических Советников, ЛЛС". Посол Джапаридзе женат на Господине Тамаре Джапаридзе и имеет одного сына.

EXPERT OPINION

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Поэтому, уникальный транзитный потенциал и энергетические ресурсы Расширенного ЧР должны стать важным гарантом энергетической безопасности Европы на годы вперед. При худших сценариях развития событий, связанных с потрясениями не энергетических рынках Ближнего Востока, Западной Африки и

**BIография**

Посол Тедо Джапаридзе является гражданином Грузии. Он приступил к выполнению своей нынешней должности Генерального секретаря Постоянной миссии Организации черноморского экономического сотрудничества (ОЧЭС) 1 ноября 2004 г. в свете решения 11-го Совета Министров Иностранных Дел, состоявшегося в Тбилиси в октябре 2004 г. Родился в Тбилиси 18 сентября 1946 г., окончил Тбилисский Государственный Университет. Посол Джапаридзе поступил на работу в МИД Грузии в 1989 г. после академической карьеры в Тбилисском Государственном Университете и Академии Наук СССР. До своего назначения Чрезвычайным и Полномочным Послом Грузии в США, Канаде и Мексике, он работал на посту Помощника Главы Совета Национальной Безопасности и Обороны Грузии. Посол Джапаридзе исполнял обязанности Министра Иностранных Дел Грузии в период с ноября 2003 по март 2004 г. До принятия должности Генерала Посольская Миссия ОЧЭС был Почетным Председателем Транскавказского Фонда и Специальным Советником групп "Вашингтонских Стратегических Советников, ЛЛС". Посол Джапаридзе женат на Господине Тамаре Джапаридзе и имеет одного сына.
Middle East, West Africa or Southeast Asia, Europe's not only investment in an energy security regime, but in security and stability perspectives of the entire area, makes especially good sense.

But there are other, strategically no less important, projects to which BSEC, in the capacity of the only full fledged regional Organization, which I represent here, pays special attention, striving first, to accumulate and then to utilize the huge transit potential of the region in general.

The Black Sea port system is a gateway to Central Asia, and beyond and vice versa. Without adequate transport connections, applied with high quality service levels, East-West trade could be hardly developed extensively. The whole system of streamline corridors or transport axes will eventually bring closer the Black Sea area to Europe, making this cooperation mutually beneficial.

The network improvements, alongside with energy developments, would be not only instrumental for enhancing the region's natural advantages as a genuine transit area, but would promote social cohesion and balanced regional growth, strengthening dramatically the security and sustainable development dimensions for the whole region, thus making European and even Euro-Atlantic communities much safer and more secure in everyday life.

But, as I admitted above, there are certain serious obstacles on the way of these exciting regional developments. Predominately, these are risks and challenges that arise from a combination of old and new threats. They derive from global trends, both those caused by factors external to the Region and those that arise from developments within the wider Black Sea region or outstanding problems in relations among them.

When coupled with modern forms of communication and transportation and the higher mobility of the population, the endemic "weakness" of most states in the area encourages the operation of transnational organized crime, all sorts of illicit trafficking in people, drugs, weapons, nuclear materials, money, and terrorist networks. These threats not only drain away a big part of the national resources of regional States. They delay, for example, the resolution of the abovementioned "frozen" conflicts, that in reality are alive on a low intensity scale, obstructing development plans, breeding terrorism in general as well as instigating the creation of small territorial "entities" that in reality are engaged in illicit activities, such as drug trafficking, terrorism and other forms of organized crime.

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vation of criminalized and authoritarian de-facto entities - so called grey - lawless zones, disrupting and damaging the democratic process and good governance throughout the whole region. And these things, if they are not taken care of properly and resolutely, would have an immediate and painful impact on the countries located in areas of the European continent and far beyond.

That is why European and Euro-Atlantic Institutions need more effectively and efficiently cooperate with the Black Sea area States and concretely with BSEC, as far as this Organization seems to be the most adequate and well-organized mechanism for these sort of activities.

I am struck by how radically the strategic landscape has changed between the time BSEC was founded and today. In the broadest sense, the Black Sea region can no longer be considered in isolation of the larger dynamics that unfold around us. I hope the arguments I have outlined above are convincing on this score.

While we once were a collection of states (some new, some old) congregated around a large body of water, today the Black Sea region sits at the hinge of emerging strategic dynamics coming from all directions. Put differently, where once the Black Sea was part of a road to somewhere else, today it is a vital crossroads where things happening elsewhere intersect. BSEC's membership, indeed, reflects these interesting intersections.

The Black Sea is a critical node in the strategies not simply of independent states that emerged from outworn Cold War configurations or from traditional littoral countries like Turkey, Russia, Romania, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Georgia. In addition, as I admitted earlier, this Region has become already integral to the evolving policies and strategies of the states of the Eastern Mediterranean; to a new and vital Russia, which has such an important role to play throughout the Region; to the larger South Caucasus; to the Greater Middle East; and, of course, to Europe.

And it is obvious that where all of these dynamics converge, interest from the United States, Japan, China and some other far away countries now with a larger presence in the Middle East and Central Asia, cannot be far behind, if in fact it is not already far ahead.

BSEC must respond to this new strategic map in ways that are appropriate to our objectives and charter. I have some ideas about how we might do this, but suffice it to say that now is a time for posing the right questions.

If these are indeed the challenges we face, then it is incumbent upon us to make sure that the organization is aware of them, and more importantly, that it is ready to address them. BSEC has the potential to be a dynamic player in the region, but it will require a commitment from all parties involved to make it so.

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questions rather than espousing instant answers. Some of the right questions, I believe, go like this.

How does BSEC fit into this new strategic landscape? How does or should it connect to other structures and organizations with similar, parallel, or related objectives and agendas? What role can BSEC play in helping to harness the forces of globalization to that states seeking to build capacity must understand and accommodate to? How do we move closer to Europe, yet remain a positive force in managing the strategic vectors pressing in on us from many other parts of the world? How, to put it succinctly, can BSEC function best as the representative of a strategic corridor in the midst of a changing world?

These are critical questions, in my view, that bear directly on BSEC's effectiveness. The process of fashioning ties to Europe is, I believe, inevitable and inescapable for the entire region. At the same time Europeans need to accept the existence and the presence of the Black Sea region not only as a fact of geography but as a strategic reality.

The Black Sea area and BSEC as an Organization, have unique perspective and location. And perhaps in the past BSEC has not itself seen the relevance or importance of that perspective or position. But recent political, economic and security related developments, both good and bad, have made that view a necessary element of the broader strategic picture. Though we need to request or even urge from our European and Euro-Atlantic partners more precise and adequate attention to the regional developments and processes, only the BSEC countries can bring this about.

Today is a unique time in modern history, and the Black Sea region is a unique strategic space. We need to use this uniqueness to build a distinctive BSEC approach, one that fully coincides with European value aspirations and promotes the interests of its members through understanding and leveraging the interests of other strategic actors.

… The ancient Greeks called the Black Sea "Pontus Axeinus" (the inhospitable sea) because of its wintry storms and the ferocity of tribes that lived around it. But I hope that the developments and perspectives as well as my personal reflections, would help to find appropriate arguments to transform the Black Sea area into "euxeinos" (friendly) for the regional states as well as for the countries far beyond it.

Как ОЧЭС вписывается в этот новейший стратегический ландшафт? Как она соотносится или должна быть связана с другими структурами и организациями с подобными, параллельными или взаимосвязанными целями и задачами? Какую роль ОЧЭС может играть в оказании помощи государствам, стремящимся построить государственность, с полной применимостью силы глобализации, понять и приспособиться к ним? Как сближаться с Европой, в то же время оставаясь в положительной силе в условиях развития стратегических векторов, давших на нас из многих частей мира? Как, выражаясь лаконичнее, ОЧЭС может лучше всего функционировать, являясь стратегическим коридором в гуще меняющегося мира?

Всё это - критические вопросы, которые, по-моему, влияют непосредственно на эффективность ОЧЭС. Процесс сближения с Европой, я думаю, безальтернативен и неизбежен для всего региона. В то же время, европейцам нужно принять существование и присутствие ЧР не лишь как факт географии, а как стратегическую реальность.

ЧР и ОЧЭС, как организация, имеют уникальную перспективу и расположение. И возможно в прошлом сама ОЧЭС не видела взаимосвязи или важности этой перспективы или позиции. Однако, соответствующие недавние политические, экономические и процессы в сфере безопасности, как позитивные, так и негативные, привнесли необходимый элемент в более широкую стратегическую картину. При этом мы должны попросить или даже призвать Европейских и Евро-атлантических партнеров к более пристальному и адекватному вниманию к региональным процессам, на которые влияют лишь страны-члены ОЧЭС.

Нынешний период времени уникален для современной истории, а ЧР - это уникальное стратегическое пространство. Нам нужно использовать эту уникальность для формирования четкого подхода со стороны ОЧЭС, который бы совпал с ожиданиями европейских ценностей и продвигал интересы ее членов путем развития взаимопонимания и влияния на интересы других стратегических игроков.

… Древние греки называли Черное море "Pontus Axeinus" (незаселенное море) из-за его зимних сквозняков и жестокости племен, населявших его побережье. Но я надеюсь, что перемены и перспективы, а также мои собственные усилия могут помочь найти нужные аргументы для превращения ЧР в "euxeinos" (дружественный) - как для региональных стран, так и стран, лежащих далеко за его пределами.
Opening remarks
Вступительное слово

His Excellency
Mr. Corneliu D.V. DOBRITOIU
State Secretary and Chief of Department for Policy of Defense and Planning of the Romanian Ministry of Defense

С большим удовольствием приветствую всех вас на совместной Региональной конференции под эгидой Гарвардской Программы Черноморской Безопасности и Министерства Обороны Румынии. Как вы знаете, она является продолжением двух недавних мероприятий: конференции "Усиление сотрудничества по безопасности в Черноморском регионе", состоявшейся в январе, и "Черноморского форума за диалог и партнерство", прошедшего в июне.

Я думаю, что и нынешнее мероприятие представляет новые возможности для дальнейшего углубления нашего общего понимания вопросов безопасности Расширенного Черноморского региона (РЧР), а также позволит лучше использовать экспертные знания, которые принес сюда каждый из нас.

В этом контексте, позволяю мне выразить благодарность за участие высоких гостей из таких важных структур и организаций.

Несомненно, что сегодня, и я считаю ваше присутствие здесь солидным подтверждением этому, аспекты безопасности, относящиеся к РЧР, стали характерным и достаточно важным пунктом международной повестки дня.

За прошедшие годы наш регион во многом и почти до неузнаваемости преобразился, и эти позитивные изменения явно видны по всему региону. Три страны региона являются членами НАТО, два из них вскоре станут частью Европейского Союза (ЕС), в то время как другие начали и свои переговоры по вступлению в ЕС. Все прочие страны региона активно...
cooperation with both international organizations. Therefore, I appreciate that we may talk today of NATO and EU as of international actors directly interested in the area. These realities conduct to an almost natural process of assimilation not only at the individual, but also at the level of the region as a whole, of the democratic values and of a new perspective on the security concept. We have come to realize, accordingly, that our future is strictly related to wider dialogue and cooperation.

Not all the regional aspects related to security have been yet over-passed. The area still holds a complex legacy that we are all aware of. And, not less important, it is subdued to the new emerging types of risks and threats, the greatest of all being that of becoming in itself a generator of instability. These old inheritance and new challenges that the region faces with affect not just the area as such but the European community as well.

From this point of view, we consider that a multifaceted approach is the most suitable one in order to address the security challenges in the region. This approach calls for joint efforts at national, regional but also Euro-Atlantic level, using a variety

no включились в процесс сотрудничества с обеими этими международными организациями. Поэтому я приветствую то, что сегодня мы можем говорить о НАТО и ЕС как о международных играх, напря- 
му заинтересованных в этом регионе. Эти реалии приводят к практически естественному процессу ассимиляции не только на индивидуальном, но и в целом на региональном уровне, демократических ценностей новой перспективы в концепции без- 
опасности. Нам пришлось осознать, соответственно, что наше будущее однозначно связано с более широким диалогом и сотрудничеством.

Не все региональные аспекты, связанные с без- 
opасностью, уже разрешены. В регионе по-прежнему имеется сложное наследие, о котором все мы знаем. И, что не менее важно, оно уступает новым возника- 
yм видам рисков и угроз, наиболее из которых сами по себе становятся источником нестабильнос- 
ти. Это старое наследие и новые вызовы, с которыми сталкивается регион, влияют не только на регион как таковой, но также и на Европейское сообщество.

С этой точки зрения, мы считаем, что многосторонний подход является наиболее целесообразным для реагирования на вызовы безопасности в регио-
of instruments as well as attracting partners from private sector and civil society.

In our view, it is necessary for the countries in the region to cooperate towards reaching common goals such as: economic development, environmental protection, strengthening the rule of law, combating organized crime, means of increasing border security and response to civil emergencies and last but not least, peaceful and long-lasting resolution of the frozen conflicts.

Therefore, I kindly invite you to use this opportunity for analyzing the possible ways that could conduct to sustainable formulas for the resolution of the regional security challenges. Furthermore, the analysis we are to perform over this region offers us the opportunity of identifying the proper domains where NATO and EU might and should have an active role.

Also, allow me to rise to your attention an important aspect that should be kept in mind.

Корнелиу Д.В. Добрицою

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Семейное положение: женат, двое детей
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2004—2006 — Заместитель Государственного Секретаря та Начальник Департамента ЕвроЦАтлантической Интеграции и Обороны Политики;
2000-04 — Начальник Директората ЕвроЦАтлантической Интеграции и Международных Военных Отношений;
1998-2000 — Штабной офицер, Директорат Сотрудничества и Региональной безопасности, Международный Военный Штаб, Штаб-квартира НАТО, Брюссель;
1996-1998 — Начальник Секции Оценки Международных Военных Отношений, Директорат Международных Военных Отношений, Министерство национальной обороны (МНО);
1995-1996 — Начальник Офиса Международных Контактов, Директорат Международных Военных Отношений, МНО;
1995 — Начальник Румынской Группы Военных Сотрудников по программе военного сотрудничества Румыния—США "MIL-TO-MIL";
1994-1995 — эксперт политического анализа, Директорат Политико-Военного Анализа и Международных Военных Отношений, МНО;
1993-1994 — Заместитель начальника разведывательного отдела, 57 тактическая дивизия, Бухарест;
1993 — Начальник разведки, 2 механизированное войск, Бухарест;
1983-1987 — командир батальона, Военно-медицинский институт, Бухарест;
1980-1983 — Заместитель начальника разведки, 1 механизированная дивизия;
1978-1980 — Командир пехотной роты, 1 механизированная дивизия;
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ОБРАЗОВАНИЕ:
2005 — Аспирантура военно-морских исследований, Курс для высшего военного состава, Монтерей, Калифорния, США;
2004 — Колледж НАТО, Курс для послов и генералов, Рим;
1995 — Центр "Джорджа Маршалла" по исследованиям европейской безопасности, Колледж исследований стратегической и оборонной экономики;
1993 — Академия высших военных исследований, Бухарест;

БИОГРАФИЯ

EXPERT OPINION

нел. Этот подход призывает к совместным усилиям на национальном, региональном и ЕвроЦАтлантическом уровне с использованием разнообразных инструментов, а также привлечением партнеров из частного сектора и гражданского общества.

На наш взгляд, странам региона нужно сотрудничать для достижения таких общих целей, как экономическое развитие, защита окружающей среды, усиление главенства права, борьба с организованной преступностью, усиление безопасности границ, реагирование на чрезвычайные ситуации невоенного характера и, наконец, но не менее важно, мирное и надежное урегулирование замороженных конфликтов.

Поэтому, я искренне призываю вас использовать эту возможность для анализа возможных путей по выработке надежных формул для решения вызовов региональной безопасности. Более того, рекомендации, которые мы выработаем по этому региону, дадут нам возможность определить те...
during all our sessions: based on the transparency principle, our primary responsibility at regional level remains that of identifying win-win solutions for all the parties involved. And the common ground for any of these solutions should be that of not isolating the region from the international community.

So, I believe that any solution that we may find during our talks will bring an added value to the overall process of judgment on the Wider Black Sea Area issues only if we approach the region as an integral part of the European continent.

On the 25th of October is the day of the Romanian Armed Forces' Day. The year of 2006 is representing a transformation benchmark of the Romanian Armed Forces, is the year when we put an end to the compulsory military service, in the same time replacing it with the voluntary-based military service. Also this year, the Romanian Armed Forces have four new NATO-certified battalions, a part of a long-term process that will end with two fully-operational brigades of the Land Forces.

In 2007, Romania joins the EU with a new, modern and democratic law regarding the military service. Now, the Romanian ministry of defense's main priority is to fill the gap that the so-called draft has left behind, and more than 30,000 people, who were interested on these new perspectives of the military career since the beginning of October, entitle us to hope for new grounds of the Romanian Armed Forces.
The timeliness of today's discussion is underpinned by recent and forthcoming events, which are a clear proof of the dynamism of the processes taking place in the Black sea region. In May this year the GUAM Summit in Kiev resulted in the establishment of the GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development. On June 5th in Bucharest a regional Summit took place and brought together regional players, major relevant international organizations, as well as, the USA and launched a Black sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership. All this is adding to the background a sense of an intense effort to find the right way forward on the basis of a bold vision for the future of the region.

This is a short outline of the presentation. Here is the place to mention that geopolitically we always regard the Black Sea region in its entirety or in other words "wider Black Sea Region" which encompasses not only the littoral states but Moldova, Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Своевременность сегодняшних дискуссий подкрепляется недавними и грядущими мероприятиями, которые являются явным подтверждением динамики процесса, происходящего в Черноморском регионе (ЧР). В мае 2006 г. Саммит ГУАМ в Киеве привел к созданию Организации ГУАМ за Демократию и Экономическое Развитие. 5 июня в Бухаресте прошел региональный Саммит, который собрал региональных игроков, представителей соответствующих международных организаций, а также США, и положил начало Черноморскому Форуму Диалога и Партнерства. Все эти события добавляют к происходящему ощущение мощного шага по поиску верного пути вперед на основе смелого видения регионального будущего.

Это краткая канва презентации. И здесь нужно упомянуть, что геополитически мы всегда рассматриваем ЧР в его целостности, гово-ря "расширенный ЧР", т.к. он включает не только прибрежные государства, но и Молдову, Азербайджан и Армению. Именно этот более широкий и системный подход ко всем компонентам безопасности может обеспечить адекватные оценки и эффективные меры.
Exactly this wider and systemic approach towards all security components can provide for adequate assessments and effective measures. This approach helps us in identifying clusters of challenges that can be tackled effectively by the international and multilateral organizations or/and individual states with the necessary experience and expertise.

The Black Sea area recently attracted more and more the attention of the international organizations and fora. This greater awareness of the significance of the Black Sea area for the Euro-Atlantic security is due to following factors:

- as NATO and EU enlarge the region turns into Eastern frontier for both organizations, bridging them with Central Asia and wider Middle East - in geographic, political and economic terms. It becomes strategic avant-poste for the Allies in the fight against international terrorism;
- geographic position of the Black Sea region determines its importance also as an energy supply and transportation route. The recent problems with energy prices imposes seriously the need to develop constructive cooperation in this field not only with involvement of regional actors but with engagement and commitment on behalf of the international organizations;
- the region is a scene of serious political transformations. The success of the democratic agendas of the countries in the region needs, alongside the political will of the leaderships, an outside support and assistance;
- the Black Sea region is still marked by lingering security problems such as frozen conflicts and illegal trafficking that could have implications for the whole Euro-Atlantic security.

All these issues demonstrate the complexity of problems, trends and challenges the region is confronted with. Their solution and their management require concerted action of the international community, a common strategy that will encompass the variety of relevant tools to tackle the multiple problems.

Этот подход помогает нам выделять группы вызовов, которые можно решать эффективно через международные и многосторонние организации или/или отдельные государства, имеющие необходимые опыт и компетенцию.

С недавних пор, ЧР стал привлекать к себе все больше внимания международных организаций и форумов. Все большее осознание важности ЧР для ЕА безопасности обусловлено следующими факторами:

- с расширением НАТО и ЕС, регион превращается в восточную границу обеих организаций, становясь для них мостом в Центральную Азию и расширенный Ближний Восток - в географическом, политическом и экономическом смысле. Он становится стратегическим аванпостом для союзников в их борьбе с международным терроризмом;
- географическое расположение ЧР также определяет его важность как энерго-транспортного и транспортного маршрута. Недавние проблемы с ценами на энергоносители привели к серьезной необходимости развивать конструктивное сотрудничество в этой сфере с привлечением не только региональных игроков, но и профильных международных организаций;
- регион является сценой серьезных политических трансформаций. Успех демократических планов стран региона нуждается, кроме политической воли их руководства, и во внешней поддержке и помощи;
- ЧР по-прежнему отмечен и затяжными проблемами безопасности, такими как замороженные конфликты и незаконные перемещения, которые могут повлиять на всю Евро-атлантическую (ЕА) безопасность.

Все эти вопросы демонстрируют сложность проблем, тенденций и вызовов, стоящих перед регионом. Их решение и урегулирование требуют совместных действий международного сообщества, общей стратегии, включающей разнообразные соответствующие инструменты для решения многочисленных проблем.

Как я упомянул вначале, один из путей решения всего комплекса проблем безопасности - это рассмотрение их по группам.

Во-первых, недавние политические процессы в регионе склонили ряд государств к...
As I mentioned at the beginning one way to tackle the complexity of all security challenges is to look at them in clusters.

First, the recent political developments in the region oriented a number of states towards closer Euro-Atlantic integration. Their commitment to fulfill the necessary requirements is inextricably linked to the need to implement crucial reforms across the whole political, security and economic spectrum. At the same time, the existing serious economic disparities between the countries in the region pose additional obstacles towards the accomplishment of the reforms. NATO and EU should better focus their assistance. What we need to see is complementarity of efforts and coordinated leading roles according to their comparative strengths and advantages. NATO and EU need to broaden and deepen their political dialogue on the problems related to the region.

The second point is related to the solution of the frozen conflicts. Undoubtedly, the progress in the democratic transformation will have a direct impact on the developments in this area. Recent developments provide a rationale for a cautious optimism. The current political leadership of the countries should demonstrate an increasingly dedicated approach vis-à-vis the regional problems. The international community should work to encourage and support these countries’ initiatives. At the same time, the main international actors should work out a common approach in the efforts to achieve a co-operative attitude from all relevant parties. When necessary, they have to seek ways to apply concerted leverage aimed at furthering the positive momentum.

In this context, the question how to approach Russia’s attitude merits a special attention. NATO, through the NATO-Russia Council, has a framework, although with certain limitations, to interact in a positive way by regular political dialogue and practical cooperation. Working with Russia on a course of action that is beneficial for the whole region should be a key element in the relations of the international organizations with this country. Of course, this requires a delicate balancing of greater EA integration. Their efforts to implement necessary reforms are intrinsically linked to the need to implement crucial reforms across the whole political, security, and economic spectrum. At the same time, the existing serious economic disparities between the countries in the region pose additional obstacles towards the accomplishment of the reforms. NATO and EU should better focus their assistance. What we need to see is complementarity of efforts and coordinated leading roles according to their comparative strengths and advantages. NATO and EU need to broaden and deepen their political dialogue on the problems related to the region.

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between the opportunities of the international organizations to come forward with common positions and the individual national interests of the member states.

The existence of frozen conflicts and unsecured borders is a natural breeding ground for international terrorism and criminality, as well as religious and ethnic tensions. The illegal trafficking and terrorist activities represent the third cluster of challenges that pose a serious threat to security and stability in the Black Sea region and the whole Euro-Atlantic space. This set of challenges also has the potential to negatively affect the security of the energy corridors crossing the Black Sea region. When looking for ways to counter those risks the existing regional cooperation is judged by some to be sufficient in this respect. Indeed, different regional initiatives exist, but hardly one can imagine that the solution of these problems could be limited only to the efforts of the regional countries. Existing initiatives are not designed as the ultimate response to today’s security challenges but rather focus on the development of good-neighborly relations, confidence-building, civil-military co-operation and exchange of experience. A meaningful engagement on the part of the major international players is required who, together with the regional countries and in addition to the various regional endeavors under way should undertake joint steps to fight those risks.

Having said that, it should be pointed out that notwithstanding the existing limitations, the broadening of the scope of regional initiatives with involvement of countries outside the Black Sea region creates opportunities for further impetus and quality of cooperation. In this respect we can also refer to possible involvement of Black Sea countries in the initiatives, initially designed for other regional configurations, as is the case of recent accession of Moldova /3.05.2006/ to the Process of Cooperation in the South-Eastern Europe /Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece, Republic of Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Turkey, Croatia/. The SEDM Process /Southeast Europe Defense
Ministerial Process/ is another case in point for fruitful cooperation where alongside the Balkan and Black Sea countries Italy and US are also involved. Recent deployment of SEDM Multinational Force HQ /SEEBRIG HQ/ to ISAF HQ in Kabul demonstrates how a regional initiative could go well beyond its initial purpose and cooperate successfully with a major defense and security organization. It is our conviction that a far-sighted approach should bring about the conclusion that the lasting solution of the problems in the Black Sea region needs a common vision and appropriate involvement by the international organizations.

Regional co-operation in different spheres is developing but hardly sufficient to tackle overarching problems that require a broad approach.

What is needed for finding a key to lasting stability and security in the region?

- First, the elaboration of a broader approach to security in the Black Sea region to address the whole range of security challenges: from democratization to countering illegal trafficking, terrorism and weapons proliferation;
- Second, the engagement of the major international players who are in a position to make a real difference. NATO and UE should remain the premier provider of security and stability for the Euro-Atlantic region, which includes the Black Sea. NATO is already playing a role through dialogue mechanisms with non-member littoral states. These include the NATO-Russia Council, the NATO-Ukraine Commission, PfP activities with countries throughout the region, and the intensified dialogue with Georgia. The EU is also enlarging its similar activities.
- Clear Euro-Atlantic perspective for the region is one of the solid elements that will strengthen the positions of the democratic leadership and contribute to the progress and irreversibility of the reforms. NATO, through existing partnership tools and the special focus on the Caucasus and Central Asia regions is developing differentiated relations with the partners from the Black

Недавнее развертывание Штаба Многонациональной Группировки SEDM /Штаба Бригады Юго-Восточной Европы (SEEBRIG HQ)/ в штабе Международной Группировки по Стабилизации и Помощи (ISAF HQ) в Кабуле демонстрирует то, как региональная инициатива может выйти далеко за пределы своего начального предназначения и успешно сотрудничать с основной организацией по обороне и безопасности. Мы убеждены, что лишь дальновидный подход должен привести к выводу, что долговременное решение проблем ЧР требует общего подхода и соответствующего участия международных организаций.

Региональное сотрудничество в различных сферах развивается, но не всегда достаточно для решения возникающих проблем, требующих широкого подхода.

Что нужно для создания ключа к решению надежной стабильности и безопасности в регионе?

- Во-первых, выработать более широкий подход к безопасности ЧР с тем, чтобы решить весь спектр вызовов безопасности: от демократизации до противодействия незаконным перемещениям, терроризму и оружию массового поражения/;
- Во-вторых, привлекать главных международных игроков, которые способны при внести реальные перемены. НАТО и ЕС должны оставаться главными сторонами, обеспечивающими безопасность и стабильность ЕА региона, включающего ЧР. НАТО уже играет роль посредником в палитре механизмах с Черноморскими странами, не являющимися членами Альянса. К таковым относятся Комитет НАТО-Россия, Комиссия НАТО-Украина, деятельность в рамках Программы НАТО "Партнерство ради мира" со странами всего региона, а также интенсифицированный диалог с Грузией. ЕС также расширяет подобную деятельность.
- Четкая ЕА перспектива для региона - это один прочных элементов, который усилит позиции демократического руководства и внесет вклад в прогресс и необратимость реформ. НАТО, посредством существующих инструментов партнерства и особого внимания к регионам Кавказа и Центральной Азии, развивает дифференцированные от-
Sea region. The development of the relationship with countries like Ukraine and Georgia that stated clearly their wish to join the Alliance is permanently under review and any decision that is to be taken should be carefully balanced between strategic considerations and individual performance. The benefits of this approach are apparent. A greater engagement on the part of the international community with the whole range of security issues would give an impetus to problem solving in Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova and other countries in the Caucasus and help consolidate the reformist trends. This would also contribute to overcoming existing apprehensions towards broad international initiatives in the Black Sea region and would galvanize the efforts to address today's security challenges. We are also in favor of intensifying the cooperation among the Black Sea region states and especially among the NATO member ones.
The break up of the Soviet Union in 1991 was the most radical event in terms of redrawing the map of the world since 1918. The break up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire after World War I also led to radical redrawing of the map of Eurasia. WW I was a messy and bloody event with so many problems left over.

The end of the Cold War was totally different. This was a peaceful event, and literally overnight you saw the coming into being of all the newly independent states. The area behind the Iron Curtain suddenly became extremely important. Suddenly, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia became important issues for policy makers. We started talking about the politics in the Caspian basin that includes the Caucasus and the Central Asian countries. It became very clear that the first Bush Administration and then Clinton Administration believed that there should be an American policy to try to support the independence of Newly Independent States, to have there the pro-Western and hopefully democratic states. That was an objective shared both by the U.S. and the EU.

...
Invariably, there were struggles. Russia was put in a state of shock because it has lost an empire. Countries like Turkey saw a new world opening up to the East, where many Turkic speaking countries were now independent, with whom they hoped to have very good relations. China and India saw great economical opportunities in Central Asia, which they had not really been able to exploit before. Countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia for different reasons saw opportunities for trade but also because the majority of the populations in Central Asian countries were Muslim.

These geopolitical factors coincided with a period in modern history where the growth of the world economy had reached the point where there was true concern about energy security. Where would all the fossil fuel come to fuel the new growth in the world? At this point of time, we are beginning to talk about China and India emerging as significant economic powers. We are also beginning to talk about greater energy security. The security of fossil fuel supplies, particularly oil supplies, had been compounded in the same year the Soviet Union dissolved. Because of the First Gulf War in 1990 Saddam Hussein invades Kuwait. The U.S., the Soviet Union, and the entire world came together to oppose this occupation of Kuwait.

One reason the U.S. felt so strongly about it was a very clear one. By occupying Kuwait the Iraqi Army posed a direct threat to the Saudi oil fields in Eastern Saudi Arabia. I think, it is fair to say that the current war in Iraq, in my judgment, was not fought over oil at all, but for other reasons. The First Gulf War in 1991 was fought very much about concern that a dominant Middle East power like Iraq could, if it controls the Saudi Arabian oil fields, have an extraordinarily powerful effect upon the world economy. And if Saddam did not have new weapons in 1990, he would have been able to get them if he would be able to control the Saudi oil.

The world was alert in the early 1990's to the fact that the world's oil supplies were primarily located in an extremely dangerous region - the Persian Gulf, where there have been several wars, the latest one being in 1991. This coincided with the great concern of the big international oil companies: Exxon, Shell, Mobil, and BP. For the previous three decades since early 1950's, the major oil companies had really been denied access to some of the most lucrative oil fields in the world because...
FACULTY BIOGRAPHIES

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is the Director of Regional Strategic Programs at the Nixon Center. His current areas of interest focus on U.S. policy in the greater Middle East including the geopolitics of energy in the Caspian Basin and Persian Gulf, the Arab-Israeli peace process, and U.S. relations with Iraq and Iran. He received his Ph.D. in political science at M.I.T. and his M.A. and B.A. degrees from Oxford University. He served in the White House during the first Reagan administration and was Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Near East and South Asia on the National Security Council Staff. Prior to his current position, he was a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace where he was Director of the Middle East Arms Control Project. In the 1970s he worked in the Defense Department in the Policy Planning and Program Analysis and Evaluation Offices and made major contributions to studies on U.S. security policy and options for South West Asia. From 1970 to 1980, he was a tenured member of the faculty of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. He presently teaches a seminar in U.S. Middle East policy with Professor Fouad Ajami at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He frequently comments and writes on US foreign policy in the US, European, Middle East, and East Asian media.

He is the author or co-author of many books and monographs on regional security, most recently: Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East, 1997; Point of No Return: The Deadly Struggle for Middle East Peace, 1997; Energy Superbowl: Strategic Politics and the Persian Gulf and Caspian Basin (1997); America and Iran: Road Maps and Realism (Washington, DC: The Nixon Center, 1998); Iran's Bomb: American and Iranian Perspectives (editor), (Washington, DC: The Nixon Center, 2004); U.S. and Iran, The Nuclear Dilemma: Next Steps (Washington, DC: The Nixon Center, 2004), and Iran and Iraq: The Shia Connection, Soft Power, and the Nuclear Factor (Washington, DC: USIP, 2005).

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of nationalism. As a result of nationalization, the oil companies could not develop oil in the Middle East, the Soviet Union, some Latin American countries or South East Asia. They were very active in the Northern Sea, in Northern Africa, and in the Gulf of Mexico. But big oil companies like to have new areas to develop. And what coincided was growing concern in the world about oil supplies.

The breakup of the Soviet Union, rumors and stories about huge amounts of oil in Central Asia and Azerbaijan, and moreover, an increasing talk about a new oil Bonanza made people suddenly talk about a region of the world next door to the Persian Gulf that was now controlled by the independent states that would have a much more friendly attitude towards international oil companies. It was coincident that these two regions were together, and became a strategic energy ellipse. Schematically, over 70% of the world's proven oil, and over 40% of the world's natural gas are concentrated in this ellipse that includes the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Basin region. Now this traditional very important area suddenly became even more important.

There are several differences between these areas. One is weather. To the South the weather is much warmer and milder. You do not get the
weather extremes that you have in the Caspian. It is easier to drill oil fields in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq and the lower Persian Gulf than in the North. But even a bigger difference is that all the Gulf countries can get the oil to the market directly by sea. Iraq has more of a problem than Kuwait, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Emirates. They all have direct access to markets, whereas the countries of the Caspian region - Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan (the later three in particular) - cannot get to the market without going through somebody else's territory. And that is a huge geopolitical problem.

In the 1990's a huge still unresolved debate started on how to get the energy out - both oil and natural gas. The traditional way it went out to the West was through the Soviet Union/Russia, which controlled and controls this area. There was talk, and it is still ongoing today, on major pipelines going East and to China where there is some oil traffic between Kazakhstan and China. A lot of it goes by train. But they have not yet built major pipelines to China because it is so extraordinarily expensive. There was talk at one point of bringing oil and gas out through Afghanistan into Pakistan, but the problem was there was a war going on in Afghanistan, and it was not stable. There were a lot

Между этими районами имеется несколько различий. Одним из них является погода. На юге погода на много жарче и спокойнее. Там нет экстремальных проявления погоды, как в Каспийском бассейне. Нефтяные скважины легче бурить в Саудовской Аравии, Кувейте, Ираке и в нижней части Персидского залива, чем к северу от них. Но самое большое различие заключается в том, что все страны Персидского залива могут поставлять нефть на рынки прямо по морю. У Ирака больше проблем, чем у Кувейта, Ирана, Саудовской Аравии и Эмиратов. Все они имеют прямой доступ к рынкам, в то время как страны каспийского региона - Азербайджан, Казахстан, Узбекистан, Туркменистан (три последние в особенности) - не могут выйти на рынок иначе, чем через чью-то территорию. И это представляет собой огромную геополитическую проблему.

Поэтому, в 1990-х годах начались большие и все еще не решенные споры относительно того, как получать энергоносители: нефть и газ. Традиционный путь на запад проходил через Советский Союз/Россию, которая контролировала и контролирует этот регион. Были и продолжаются дискуссии о небольших трубопроводах в восточном направлении, по которым осуществляется поставка нефти из Казахстана в Китай. Большая часть этого транзита осуществляется по железной дороге. Большой же трубопровод до Китая пока не построен, так как он является чрезвычайно доро-

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of proposals to build pipelines through Afghanistan, but nothing happened to them because of the chaos there.

The Iranians argued very strongly that their country was a natural route to bring out the Azeri, Turkmeni and Kazakh oil and gas because they are so close to the Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean, and in general, to the Asian market: China, Korea, Japan. But the Iranians had a problem that we will come to later, which they still do have.

Russia, obviously, would like to have seen all the oil and gas continue to go through the old pipelines system, which they set up under the Soviet Union. And because of that a big debate came to whether or not you could take out the Azeri oil through Turkey to the Mediterranean going through Georgia. That great debate about the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline was a very intense one in the 1990’s. A lot of people opposed it, arguing that it made most sense to go through Iran or Russia. Certainly, there was something that Russians and the Iranians encouraged, but the U.S. government for complicated reasons was very firm in pushing the BTC pipeline. In addition, it was something supported by Georgia and Turkey. Turkey was very worried that if most of the oil would go on the route from the Caspian to the Russian ports on the Black Sea, it would have to egress through the Bosphorus unless pipelines were built across Southern Europe. That would have posed huge problems in the Bosphorus, and the BTC pipeline ignores the Bosphorus. Therefore, it solves, what the Turks believe, a major environmental threat.

Nothing would have happened however - no matter what the U.S. government said or urged - if the major oil company BP had not decided that this was going to be a financially lucrative proposal. The ultimate decision to build the BTC pipeline was one taken by an international oil company for very hard-headed practical economic reasons.

The BTC pipeline has just been opened. It is hoped that ultimately a gas pipeline will be completed along most of that oil pipeline route that will feed the Turkish market. It is hoped that at some point oil from Kazakhstan will be fed into the pipeline once a connection between Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan will be completed.

Of course, this is opposed by the Russians, who would like to see the oil continue to flow through

гостоящим. В одно время были разговоры о транспортировке нефти и газа через Афганистан в Пакистан, но проблема заключалась в продолжающейся войне в Афганистане и в его нестабильности. Было много предложений о строительстве трубопровода через Афганистан, но дело не сдвинулось с места после настоявшего там хаоса.

Иран очень активно доказывает, что является естественным маршрутом для транспортировки азербайджанской, туркменской и казахстанской нефти и газа, так как он близок к Аравийскому морю, Индийскому океану и вообще к азиатскому рынку: Китаю, Корее, Японии. Но у иранцев была и остается проблема, о которой мы поговорим ниже.

Россия, очевидно, хочет, чтобы вся нефть и газ продолжали транспортироваться по старой трубопроводной системе, которой была создана при Советском Союзе. И вследствие этого, разгорелись большие споры: транспортировать или нет азербайджанскую нефть через Грузию и Турцию в Средиземное море? Эти крупные дебаты вокруг трубопровода Баку-Тбилиси-Джейхан (БТД), были очень горячими в 1990-е годы. Многие люди были против него, аргументируя, что более целесообразно проводить его через Иран или Россию. Конечно, было нечто, что поддерживали россияне и иранцы, но правительство США по трудным для понимания причинам было твердым в отставании трубопровода БТД. Свои интересы отстаивали и Турция с Грузией. Турция была сильно обеспокоена тем, что если большинство нефти будет идти по маршруту от Каспийского моря к российским портам на Черном море, то она дальше будет транспортироваться через Босфор, пока не будут построены трубопроводы через Южную Европу. Это создало огромные проблемы на Босфоре. Следовательно, это создает, по мнению турок, большую угрозу окружающей среде.

Однако ничего не произошло, на чем бы ни настаивало правительство США, если бы крупная нефтяная компания BP не решила, что это финансово выгодное предложение. Итак, окончательное решение о строительстве трубопровода БТД было принято международной нефтяной компанией по очень практических экономических причинам.

Трубопровод БТД только что открылся. Есть надежда, что в конечном итоге будет заключен и газопровод, идущий вдоль большей части этого нефтепровода в направлении Турции. Есть надежда и на то, что когда-то в этот трубопровод попадет и казахская нефть, после налаживания поставок между Казахстаном и Азербайджаном.
Russia. So, it remains an open question: who is ultimately going to get the bulk of the Kazakh oil going through their territory? Although today the BTC pipeline has proven that it can be economic, it still remains to be seen whether it makes a huge amount of money for BP or not.

What we can definitely say so far in this great debate on how the oil and gas gets out is that the biggest looser in this game is Iran. It is a big looser because the U.S. policy has denied the Iranians the opportunity to exploit their geography, which is obvious from the map, and to exploit their own gas reserves. An extraordinary fact is that Iran contains the world's second largest deposits of proven natural gas, only after Russia. Today's Iranian export is none of it. Some goes to Turkey in dribs and drabs. However, Iran should be one of the biggest gas suppliers to the markets, particularly of Asia and Europe. They have a huge demand for natural gas, but they cannot get any countries or companies to sign on for the billions and billions of dollars it takes to setup the gas infrastructure.

There is a big difference between the sorts of economic decisions that have to be taken into consideration if you are going to develop new oil or gas fields. The reasons are very simple. These are different products. If we discover oil in the middle of the Kennedy School out there in the courtyard under the ground, we have to find a way how to take it to the surface. It is a heavy, risky liquid that can be put literally in pots and pans and taken to a refinery for processing and distribution. Remember during the Vietnam War, the North Vietnamese bought oil in cans. Oil is shipped by train, truck, or barge. It is easy to move oil around. The big cost is getting it on the ground and to the market. In case of gas, you would first have to have a market for it. You cannot just pump gas out of the ground and put in a can. It has to go in pipes, or be liquefied, or delivered to a specific destination and then put into a network. That is an extremely expensive upfront capital cost. It costs billions more dollars to develop a big natural gas facility than oil facility. And you have to have a guaranteed market, because gas does not command a worldwide price like oil. If you cannot sell your oil to the North America market, you sell it to the Japanese market. You cannot do the same with gas at this point of time.

The resulting Iranian dilemma from the energy point of view is that the U.S. is blocking their routes to export gas to the world, or getting the money they need to develop pipelines. They are not able to export gas to Japan, or Europe, or Asia. They are not able to earn any money on their gas. Iran has suffered a huge reduction in its exports, but they cannot get any countries or companies to sign on for the billions and billions of dollars it takes to setup the gas infrastructure.

Konечно, это вызвало недовольство россиян, которые хотели, чтобы нефть продолжала идти через Россию. Поэтому остается открытым вопрос: кто в конечном итоге добьется транспортировки огромного объема казахстанской нефти через свою территорию. Хотя на сегодняшний день трубопровод БТД доказал свою экономическую эффективность, все еще остается неясным, принесет ли он огромные прибыли компании BP.

Что можно сказать определенно в этой большой дискуссии о путях доставки нефти и газа, так это то, что больше всего в этой игре потерял Иран. Он потерял больше всех вследствие того, что политика США заблокировала иранцам благоприятную возможность использовать свое географическое положение, которое очевидно, если взглянуть на карту, и использовать свои собственные запасы газа. Примечательно, что Иран обладает вторыми в мире по величине подтвержденными запасами природного газа после России. Сегодняшний иранский экспорт практически сведен к нулю. Некоторое количество поступает в Турцию по кровам. Но Иран должен был быть одним из крупнейших поставщиков газа на рынки, особенно Азии и Европы. Эти регионы испытывают огромную потребность в природном газе, но они не могут найти стран или компаний, готовых подписывать соглашения на миллиарды и миллиарды долларов для создания газовой инфраструктуры.

Существует большое различие между видами экономических решений, которые следует принять, если вы собираетесь разрабатывать новые нефтяные или газовые месторождения. Причины очень просты. Это различные продукты. Если вы открываете месторождение нефти посередине Школы им. Кеннеди, во дворе под землей, то вам следует найти способ ее доставки на поверхность. Это тяжелая, опасная жидкость, которую можно буквально залить в котелки и кастрюли и доставить на нефтеперерабатывающий завод для переработки и распределения. Вспомним, как во время Вьетнамской войны, северные вьетнамцы покупали нефть в канистрах. Нефть перевозились по железной дороге, грузовиками, баржами. Нефть легко транспортируется. Больших затрат требует ее доставка на поверхность и подготовка к поставке на рынок. В случае с газом, вначале для него необходимо найти рынок. Нельзя просто выкачивать газ из-под земли и помещать его в канisterу. Он должен транспортироваться по трубам, или сжижаться, или доставляться в конкретное место назначения и затем вводится в сеть. А всё это связано с чрезвычайно большими первоначальными капитальными затратами. Создание крупного предприятия по добыве
of egress, and is putting a veto on efforts to build pipelines across their territory. They cannot attract the necessary foreign capital to develop their huge gas reserves. Right now in the U.S. the debate over Iran is reaching a climax.

The historic relationship between Iran and the U.S. is very complicated. During World War 2, the U.S. Army operated the Persian Corridor. It was one of the main ways of getting land lease equipment to the Red Army. After the World War II, the U.S. established very close ties with the Shah in 1953 that resulted in the Shah being ousted by an elected government. The U.S. and the British secret services orchestrated a coup d'etat, and the Shah came back into power. And that is one of the reasons we had a revolution, and that is also one of the reasons we hold you responsible for what happened beforehand. Iranians will never forgive us for that.

What America remembers mostly about Iran, is that after the Iranian Revolution in 1979 the Iranian government approved the taking of American diplomats as hostages for 444 days that caused enormous anger and anxiety in this country. Jimmy Carter was in trouble, and he might have not been reelected as his running of the U.S. diplomats' hostage crisis weakened him. It was a constant blur on his reputation. When Ronald Reagan became President, these hostages were released the very day Ronald Reagan was inaugurated. It was a sort of snub by the Iranian government to the Carter Administration. The things with Iran were very difficult during the Reagan years and they reached the crisis point in 1986 when there was the Iran Contras scandal. The Reagan Administration was found to be selling arms to the Iranians who were losing their war with the Iraqis in exchange for the American hostages taken by Hizballah in Lebanon. It nearly brought down the second Reagan Administration in 1986-87. His Vice-president George H. Bush was tainted by the Iran Contras scandal. And when he became President after Reagan, he wanted nothing to do with Iran. It was dangerous. And every American President since then has handled Iran very delicately because of this memory.

The reason we have the crisis today is not only the history. The real reasons of today's crisis are Iraq, the Iranian nuclear program, and what has happened since June 2005 concerning Iranian statements about Israel. The U.S. has always had природного газа стоит на миллиарды долларов больше, чем аналогичное нефтяное предприятие. К тому же, нужно иметь гарантированный рынок сбыта, так как газ не диктует мировую цену, подобно нефти. Если нельзя продать свою нефть на североамериканский рынок, то можно продать ее на японский рынок. С газом же это сделать нельзя.

Поэтому, иранская дилемма с энергетической точки зрения, заключается в том, что США блокирует их выходные маршруты, и накладывает вето на усилия по строительству трубопроводов через свою территорию. Иран не может привлечь необходимый иностранный капитал для разработки своих огромных газовых запасов. Как раз сейчас в США дискуссия вокруг Ирана достигает своей кульминации.

Исторические взаимоотношения между Ираном и США являются очень сложными. Во время Второй мировой войны войска США действовали в Персидском коридоре. Это был один из главных путей поставки оборудования Красной армии по ленд-лизу. После Второй мировой войны, США установили очень тесные связи с Шахом в 1953 г, что привело к свержению Шаха избранным правительством. Секретные службы США и Британии организовали мятеж, и Шах возвратился к власти. Это было одной из причин последующей революции и одной из причин, почему мы несем ответственность за все произошедшее. Поэтому, иранцы никогда не простят нас за это.

Больше всего американцам запомнилось то, что после Иранской революции 1979 г. иранское правительство одобрило захват американских дипломатов в качестве заложников на 444 дня, и вызвало огромное возмущение и беспокойство американцев. Джимми Картер был обеспокоен тем, что его могли не переизбрать, так как ход кризиса с захватом американских дипломатов ослабил его позиции. Это легло пятном на его репутацию. Когда Рональд Рейган стал президентом, эти заложники были отпущены именно в день инаугурации Рональда Рейгана. Это было своего рода проявлением пренебрежения иранским правительством в адрес администрации Картера. Положение дел с Ираном было очень трудным в течение ряда лет правления Рейгана, а оно достигло критической точки в 1986 г., когда произошел скандал Иран Контрас. Вскрылось, что администрация Рейгана продает оружие иранцам, развивавшим войну с Ираком, в обмен на американских заложников, захваченных Хизбаллой в Ливане. Это почти подорвало вторую администрацию Рейгана в 1986-87-х годах. Его вице-президент Джордж Буш был запятнан скандалом Иран Контрас. И
only hard power in the region. Iranians think they are now surrounded by Americans in every direction. The U.S. troops are in Iraq and Turkey. Through a period of time, there were U.S. troops in Uzbekistan, and Pakistan. The U.S. now has pretty close military relations with India. As a result, the U.S. has Iran pretty much encircled. We have the hard power right now. But the Iranians have soft power. Iranians are next door to Iraq. They have three times the population. They have hundreds of thousands of their citizens in Iraq today for different reasons. There are cadres of intelligence officers, Revolutionary Guards Corps, Hizballah supporters, and other people who have the potential to do nasty things. There are a lot of pilgrims. One of the effects of Saddam Hussein’s regime was that Saddam did not allow Shiite worshipers from Iran to come to Karbila and Najef on pilgrimages. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqi Shiites fled to Iran during Saddam’s rule. They did not come back, but they have family contacts between Iran and Iraq apart from the religious context. Along with the pilgrims that are coming into Iran from Iraq come businessmen who see an opportunity to open motels, to sell trinkets, to make money. The key leadership in Iraq today have very close ties with Tehran. The main contenders for the leadership in the Shiite parties, all spend time in Iran. The most powerful man in Iraq the Ayatollah Ali Sastani is Iranian. Even the President of Iraq, the Kurd Mr. Talabani has close ties with Tehran. The Iranians have great influence in Iraq. Are they using this influence in a positive or a negative way?

America and Iran have a couple of very common interests in Iraq. Neither the U.S. nor Iran want to see Iraq break apart. If Iraq breaks apart, there will be a civil war, and the U.S., Iran and all the Iraqi neighbors will be sucked in this mess. But beyond that, the interests diverge. When the Bush Administration made a case for going to war with Iraq, it was to rid the country of weapons of mass destruction. The second agenda was to foster a new Iraq that would be integrated with secure borders, a democratic, secular, pro-Western government and hopefully a government that would set the model for other countries in the region - most notably in the Arabian Gulf. In other words, it would be a beacon for everything that the U.S. hoped for throughout the region.
This, if it would happen, would have been a huge challenge and threat to Iranians. It has not happened, but neither has a disaster at this point of time. This puts the Iranians in a very interesting position. They do not want the Americans to fail right now, as a U.S. failure would mean the country collapses, and we have real trouble. On the other hand, they do not want us to stay there permanently. They do not want to see American bases in Iraq in perpetuity. They want us to leave. Furthermore, they want us to leave having had enough of the Middle East. They want us to feel about Mesopotamia the way Churchill felt about it in the 1920's: "I don't want to see this place again". Why? Because the last thing the Iranians want is for the U.S. to get the taste for overthrowing Middle East regimes, because they fear they may be next in the list. Why do they feel this way? In the immediate aftermath of the fall of Saddam Hussein in April and May of 2003 there was great euphoria in Washington. There was a feeling: we got rid of Saddam, we can redraw the Middle East. And some of the most hawkish supporters of the Bush Administration used the phrase: "men go to Baghdad, real men go to Tehran". There was a feeling: "you, Mullahs in Tehran, watch it or you will be next". And that euphoria was very intimidating, and the Iranians actually compromised on a lot of issues during that summer, particularly on negotiations over their nuclear program. But as the American war began slipping in Iraq, the Iranians regained more confidence. And now they think: if we do anything hostile towards them, they can retaliate in Iraq.

But Iraq is not the only reason. The Iranians are developing a full nuclear fuel cycle. They say it is to produce fuel for nuclear power plants that they intend to build over the next two decades. They want to have nuclear power because they want to sell their fossil fuels on the international market, and because they have listened to what anyone else is getting. The problem is that the Iranians have been very badly affected by past sanctions on them during the Iran-Iraq war. The U.S. orchestrated a very effective arms embargo on the Iranians. Under the Shah Iranians bought their weapons from us, particularly for all their Air Force and the Navy. When the Revolution came, and they
took U.S. hostages, we cut off all our arms supplies, and began to put the squeeze on them in terms of spare parts. After 1982 we started Operation Storage, which was designed to cripple the Iranian Air Force. And it was very successful. Iranians really did not have their Air Force for most of the war. And fighting a war in open terrain without an air force is not a smart idea. The Iranians learned one lesson: you cannot rely on anyone to supply you in a time of crisis.

Secondly, the Iraqis used chemical weapons against them. And nobody did or said anything because we did not like Iranians. We did not like Saddam but he was not as bad as these Mullahs. The Iranians have never forgotten that.

When they say they want a full fuel cycle to produce nuclear rods for power plants, they say they do not trust the international system to supply them with fuel in a time of crisis. Now we all know that is a reasonable argument for the Iranians. But the problem is if you have a full cycle, if you have a capability to produce fuel rods for nuclear power plants, then you have the capability ultimately to build nuclear weapons. And that is precisely what we think they are going to do.

Since the second Bush victory in 2004, the Bush Administration has adopted a policy that is very different from the policy they had in the first term. The policy now is to work with the Europeans, with the international community, with Russia and China to try to put pressure on Iran to stop its independent fuel cycle, and in particular its enrichment program. This has been quite successful. Russia and China, which mostly opposed the sanctions, have actually agreed to refer this matter to the UN. And they did this. The U.S. has more support in the International Atomic Energy Agency than Iran does. We have Indians even supporting us. But who knows if this is going to change anything in Iran.

And if nothing happens, if Iranians do not change, if the Russians and the Chinese oppose economic sanctions, the next level of escalation will be the Europeans imposing sanctions on Iran, similarly to what the Americans already have. And that would be quite damaging for Iran, particularly for energy investment. And if that does not work, the Bush Administration is already on record to say that the U.S. will not permit Iran to have nuclear weapons. Does that mean Bush is determined to go to war with Iran? No. It is the case if the Iranians
and the Americans are on a collisions course.

Another reason has to do with Israel. The new President of Iran, since he became President last June, has made statements about Israel quite unlike those that we heard out of Iran since the early days of the revolution. He said essentially two things. First, Israel should not exist; the creation of the state of Israel was a consequence of crimes committed against the Jewish people by the Europeans; and therefore the Europeans have to take care of it; and it is not a Muslim problem. Second, he has denied that the Holocaust took place. In six months, the new Iranian President has done more to bring support to the American position on Iran than anything that has happened in the last 4-5 years. The Europeans are on their hoping map. And Iranians themselves are very concerned about what their new President is saying and doing. There is a big struggle going on in Iran right now. And we do not know how it is going to come out.

You hear talk about U.S. war plans to bomb Iran's nuclear facilities. Of course, there are such plans. We still have plans to bomb Russia, for God's sake. Why should not we have plans to bomb the Iranian facilities. There is even a plan on someone's desk to use tactical nuclear weapons against their facilities. But that is not the same thing as saying we are going to do it.

This issue is a very serious one. It is not in any way resolved. It links very emotional issues: the war in Iraq, the state of Israel, and the fear of nuclear proliferation in the minds of many people. Can any compromise be found? I do not think in the short run the compromise will be found, but I do think it can get to the point where discussions can start, and there may not be a resulting need to talk about the use of force anymore. The current Iranian President is unpopular within the conservative ruling elite. But the one thing they all agree on is that Iran should have the right to develop nuclear technology. A way should be found to permit Iran to develop its nuclear technology without having at the same time to avoid a capacity to independently build a bomb. Whether that can be done soon, I do not know. But it can be done if they have the will to do it. If it is not done, then I suggest that Iran is very vulnerable to economic pressure. I am not talking about cutting off Iran's oil supplies. We are not going to do that, as it would send the oil price up to over $200 a barrel.

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But if the U.S. would be very effective in preventing the Iranians from investing in their long-term energy programs, and if the Europeans come to join the Americans in that, it would be even more effective. If the Japanese are going to invest in Iran, that is one thing. If Russia, China and India were to come in to invest, the scenario would be very different. Likely, they are not going to do that, they are not stupid. You do not invest billions of dollars into a country that is isolated, and has an unpopular government that the U.S. and the EU oppose. So, would these types of sanctions be sufficient to change the policy of the Iranian regime? They might be. And I think that is a route that President Bush would be advised to take. He is not going to take the force off the table. It would be silly to do that. But I think the stock of imminent war is premature, to put it mildly.
Major talking points:
1. What the war on terror is?
2. Perspectives on conflicts the U.S. military recently faced.
3. The U.S. strategy for building capacity in the Black Sea region. Examples of the work done by EUCOM in moving forward with the strategy for the war on terror.
4. NATO’s unprecedented role in Afghanistan and Iraq. The war on terrorism knows no bounds. In order to promote stability and security that we need throughout the world today, NATO has to transform its notion of security into a type of partnership on the part of NATO. It will be one of the centerpieces for NATO’s Riga Summit-2006 that our President will attend. This notion of global partnership will have NATO reaching out to nations such as Japan, and Australia [as representative examples].

1. I have just returned from Afghanistan and Iraq having spent about two weeks in theater. As a result, I have a fresh perspective on what we call the front line of the war on terror.

The war on terror is much different than anything we have ever faced before. It fuels the transformation of not only the U.S. military but also military alliances around the world.
The war on terror is not popular with the U.S. public today. As a result, there are critics who are questioning our approach. I think those are legitimate questions. As the U.S. military we need to stand up and explain ourselves. If in fact there are parts of our strategy, they should be understood.

Who are the enemies in the war on terror, according to the U.S. military strategy? The enemy is the transnational movement of extremist organizations, networks and individuals. It is not simply Al Qaida, it is not simply the Taliban. It is a group of connected fundamentalist extremists who have hijacked the religion to impose their will ultimately on the entire world. The primary enemy though is Al Qaida as they are on the frontline of the war on terror. They exploit Islam, and they use terrorism to include assassinations and murders as the means to accomplish ideological ends. They are supported by state and non-state actors, and by the opportunistic alliances of convenience.

Let me give you an example what I mean by that. There is an old saying that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend". And if you take Afghanistan as an example, what you see is a nexus drug traffickers and the Taliban. Both entities are targeted by a stable, secure environment. And so they must cooperate with one another not because they necessarily agree in principle with what the other are doing, but because they are the target of a stable and secure environment.

The Global war on terror is a long war. Why is it a long war? It is a long war because we are fighting against a committed enemy. Most people in the U.S. believe that the war on terror began on 11 September 2001. In fact, the students on war on terror would tell you it has been with us for hundreds of years. And it will likely be with us hundreds more years. The enemy is committed; he is prepared to fight to the death for what he believes is the defense of his religion. He has a local, regional and global aspiration. I guess, the most recent example of his local aspiration, sort of an insidious problem that we face with the war on terror would be the London train bombings. Violent extremists with a few hundred dollars are able to target innocent civilians and cause massive disruption, and impose a huge economic impact at the local level. These were extremists, mili-
Douglas J. McAneny
Rear Admiral McAneny began his naval career at the University of Nebraska at Lincoln Naval Reserve Officers Training Unit, graduating in 1978 with a Bachelor of Science degree, majoring in civil engineering. Early tours included assignments as Division Officer, USS Trepang (SSN-674) from December 1979 to October 1983; Flag Lieutenant, Commander Submarine Group Two from October 1983 to October 1985; Engineer, USS Tunny (SSN-682) from April 1986 to July 1989; Executive Officer, USS Drum (SSN-677) from August 1989 to August 1991; and Officer in Charge of the Moored Training Ship (MTS-635) from February 1992 to November 1994.
Rear Adm. McAneny's first command assignment was as Commanding Officer of USS Philadelphia (SSN-690) from June 1995 to March 1998. During his command, the ship was awarded three consecutive Battle “E” Awards. Following this tour, Rear Adm. McAneny completed a joint tour at the U.S. Strategic Command from March 1998 to January 2000 where he served in the Plans and Policy Directorate (J5). Following this tour, he was assigned to work for the Director Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (NAVSEA 08) where he served as the principal assistant to the Director for Training, Personnel, and Policy matters.
Rear Adm. McAneny was then assigned to Major Command as Commander, Submarine Squadron Eleven with additional duties as Commander Submarine Force U.S. Pacific Fleet Representative West Coast from June 2002 to April 2004 and was responsible for the operations, maintenance and training of six nuclear submarines, a floating drydock, and three torpedo retrievers. In May of 2004, he was selected as the executive assistant to the Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet headquartered in Pearl Harbor Hawaii. In September of 2005, he began his present assignment on the Joint Staff in Washington D.C. as the J-5/Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs (Europe/NATO/Russia/Africa). Rear Adm. McAneny received a Masters of Arts degree in Economics from the University of Oklahoma in July of 1999. His personal decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit (Four Awards), Meritorious Service Medal (Three Awards), Navy Commendation Medal, and the Navy Achievement Medal (Two Awards).
tion [25-30 years] to establish a framework that will support the civil society.

From the U.S. perspective, this war cannot be won by the U.S. alone. It requires increased partnership capacity as well as cooperation between military, and police. It would require economic development, good governance, and the development of civil society.

It is a paradigm shift in the security environment. If you look at our old military structure, we were positioned, as the military, against an easy-to-find but hard-to-kill adversary - the former Soviet Union. Today we face a hard-to-find but easy-to-kill adversary. We have the military structure that must be transformed to face today's threat. And we are moving forward in an effort to do so.

It is not a religious or cultural clash. It is not a fight against Islam. It is about tolerance and moderation, and the preservation of ordinary people's right to live as they choose. We are in this fight together, and we have to share the same ideology. I use Al Qaida's ideology to make my point. If you look at the ideology, you will see that it's a paradigm shift in the security environment.

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find that they claim that this is a clash of civilizations, and that the militant Jihad is a religious duty before God. Only two camps exist. There cannot be a middle ground. They call it the war between Islam and the forces of evil. There cannot be a middle ground. They call it the war between Islam and the forces of evil. The latter is not merely the West, but also Muslims that do not share Al Qaeda's vision of the true Islam. Violence of Muslims in defense of Islam is the only solution. Peaceful existence with the West is a dangerous illusion.

U.S. power by extension of power of other economically developed nations is based on their economies. Therefore, large-scale, mass-casualty attacks focused on the U.S. and other democratic regimes, is their primary goal. Theological and legal restrictions on the use of violence by Muslims do not apply to this war. Compunctions against violence on the part of the infidel only assist the terrorists.

As a result, our strategy is to counter the lines behind this terrorist ideology, which targets the very people the terrorists most want to exploit: the faithful followers of Islam.

Regional support for the war on terror represented by most of you in the room, is very strong. Today in Afghanistan and in Iraq the countries represented by the Black Sea Security Forum represent over 4,000 men and women in uniform both in Iraq and Afghanistan. This I think strengthens the resolve of the world that is united against this threat.

As we look at the state of the world today, and what the strategy encompasses, it is expanding the arch of stability. If you are not in the arch of stability, it does not suppose that you are stable. It is just the way representing the movement. It is not meant to be a literal translation of an expansion of security and stabilization to the rest of the world.

Now, I would like to draw your attention to just a few very important current initiatives in the war on terror. Talking about the so-called "indicators of success" of the purely military approach in our war against global terror, I must admit that one thing that we have not done is develop a useful metric to convince ourselves and the American public, and the international community that we are winning. There is a debate in the Pentagon today concerning cooperating with other members of the international community to try to develop meaningful
measures of our success. We are spending billions of dollars but in a tangible way you can point to a frequency and a magnitude of terrorist attacks that occur around the world.

The Counter-Terrorist Initiative is a latest example of a global initiative that involves the Northern and Sahara portions of Africa. It can help to build a stable and secure environment that can make those regions of the world inhospitable for terrorist elements.

Another significant measure is the acceptance of the U.S. public and the international community of a simple fact that terrorism threatens the lives of ordinary people.

**Operation Active Endeavor**

This NATO operation is in progress today. It involves maritime nations of the NATO Alliance and over 10,000 individual ships operating in the Mediterranean. We know that the war on terror has no bounds. And in fact, much of the war on terror depends on the seas of a neighbor. And by the strong presence in the Mediterranean we are facing down one of the threats of the global war on terror. The use of the maritime domain to carry out their will.

The mechanism of state-partners is also in place. Recently, I traveled to Poland. Their state-partner is the Illinois Air and Army National Guards. This state partnership program, which came from the Pacific, is an important enabler in helping to develop the security for our allies all around Europe. I have talked to my partners in the Pacific to try to encourage them to follow the lead of the EUCOM in developing these partnership programs. They are important to us as we move forward on the war on terror.

Stability and sustainable MONOPS is a very important program going on today in Ukraine. I will travel to Ukraine next month. Ukraine is considered a very important ally in the war on terror. We are working very hard with Ukraine to get them into MAP and ultimately into NATO.

Having traveled to some degree with Ambassador Dan Freed, I will tell you that he considers the Black Sea region to be the frontier of freedom. To add to that, the Minister of Defense of Afghanistan Minister Wordock recently told me...
that the Commonwealth of Independent States is
providing today in Afghanistan an example to the
Afghan people, and is the most important ally in
the war on terror in Afghanistan.

We have seen in the arch of stability an increas-
ing support for the democratization represented by
the color revolutions, both the Rose and the
Orange in Ukraine. And we are expecting that
Ukraine and Georgia will be giving MAP admission
on the way to become full members.

Romania and Bulgaria in 2004 became mem-
bers of NATO. Today they are conducting important
work for the coalition in the war on terror.

Regional challenges

Talking about recent challenges in the Black Sea
region, it is worth to note that the Beslan school
bombing led by Basaev in 2004 and the death of
over 300 innocent people are probably the starkest
example of the insidious threat we are facing.

We are increasingly concerned about Iran.
Ahmadinajad had publicly stated that he is interest-
ed in wiping Israel off the face of the map. And his
pursuit to destruction caused significant concern
for our nation, and for our military.

No doubt, if weapons of mass destruction were
made available to terrorist threats we face around
the world, they would be used in advancing their
corrupt ideology. We also face this notion "the
enemy of my enemy is my friend". We see the traf-
cicking, the drug trade. Those are threats to stabi-
licity that some non-state actors support in advancing
this corrupt ideology that we face today with the
war on terror.

The most recent example of terrorism in the
Black Sea region that occurred this winter was
about energy supplies. Your pipelines are easy tar-
gets, and breed a type of civil unrest that the terror-
ists look for as they advance their ideology.

All this leaves us with the vital importance of
the Black Sea region in combating the terrorist
threat that we all face today. I look at the Black
Sea region, and every country is either a member
of NATO or the Partnership for Peace, which is
an organization that allows us to build new
capacities together: military capacity and stabil-
ity in this vital region.

We see our role as one in cooperation. I am
aware that, as far as the Black Sea security, that

Afганистана Вордок недавно сообщил мне, что Содружество Независимых Государств сегодня служит примером для афганского народа, а также является наиболее важным союзником в войне с терроризмом.

Мы видим на дуте стабильности возрастающую поддержку демократизации, представленную цветными революциями: Революцией роз в Грузии и Оранжевой революцией в Украине. И мы ожидаем, что Украина и Грузия присоединятся к ПДЧ на пути к полному членству в НАТО.

Румыния и Болгария в 2004 г. стали членами НАТО. И сегодня они проводят важную работу в составе антитеррористической коалиции.

Региональные проблемы

Говоря о некоторых недавних проблемах ЧР следует сказать, что взрыв в школе в Беслане под руководством Басаева в 2004 году и смерть более 300 невинных людей является, вероятно, наиболее ярким примером коварной угрозы, нависшей над нами.

Мы все более обеспокоены ситуацией в Иране. Ахмадинеджад публично заявил, что он заинтересован в стирании Израиля с лица земли. И его стремление к разрушению вызывает большие опасения среди наших граждан и наших военных.

Нет сомнения, что если оружие массового уничтожения станет доступным для террористических угроз, которые стоят перед всем миром, они применяют его для продвижения своей порочной идеологии. Мы также сталкиваемся с принципом "враг моего врага мой друг". Мы наблюдаем контрабанду и торговлю наркотиками. Вот те угрозы стабильности, которые поддерживают отдельные негосударственные структуры в продвижении той порочной идеологии, с которой мы сталкиваемся сегодня в войне с терроризмом.

Наиболее недавние примеры терроризма в ЧР, которые произошли прошедшей зимой, были связаны с поставками энергоносителей. Ваши трубопроводы представляют собой легкие мишени, и порождают то гражданское беспокойство, к которому стремятся террористы в продвижении своей идеологии.

Все это подтверждает огромную важность ЧР в борьбе с террористической угрозой, которая стоит перед всеми нами. Глядя на ЧР, мы видим, что его страны являются либо членом НАТО, либо участником Программы НАТО Партнерства Ради Мира, которые являются структурами, позволяющими нам вместо создавать новые возможности военные возможности и стабильность в этом жизненно важном регионе.
the states surrounding the Black Sea, take charge in the security in the Black Sea. What you will hear from Mr. Feith later in the week is that we understand this concept, and we want to cooperate with that. We would also like to share some of our own understanding with the nations in the region. I would get back to NATO Charter’s Article 5, which is a guarantee: attack against one is an attack against all. From a U.S. perspective, we would support and advocate for as many countries in the Black Sea region as it feels necessary to become a willing partner in the NATO Alliance.

Russia enjoys a special relationship in the NATO-Russia Council. That promotes stability, security, and information sharing that allows us to move forward together.

The global war on terror is going to be with us, and will be long after we will all be gone. It is a threat we are going to face for centuries to come. Only through cooperation in vital economic regions of the world like the Black Sea, we will be able to make this unsafe world empowered to drive this threat away. The long-term goal is to eliminate the efficacy of unsavory characters that we find sponsoring the war on terror. It is not a fight against religion. It is a fight against ideas. Together we have to drive away this notion that ordinary peace-loving people can be targeted, and to establish a barrier that would restrict ordinary peoples’ right to freedom and religious choice.

The war on terrorism knows no bounds. In order to promote stability and security that we need throughout the world today, NATO has to transform its notion of security into a type of partnership on the part of NATO. It will be one of the centerpieces for NATO’s Riga Summit 2006 that our President will attend. This notion of global partnership will have NATO reaching out to nations such as Japan, and Australia, as representative examples.
Although I represent the office that handles the South Caucasus and its regional conflicts, we work with our Ambassadors and our colleagues in the field in Baku, Yerevan and Tbilisi as well as with other members of the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs to advance our goals and interests in this very important region. We consult regularly as well with our partners in the EU, the UN, NATO, OSCE, other international organizations and relevant countries including Russia because of its key role in this region. Of course we also maintain close contacts with both governmental and non-governmental actors in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia as well as with other important countries in the region.

The U.S. Policy in the South Caucasus

"First and foremost, it is driven by our national and international interests," - President

U.S. Interests and Policy in the South Caucasus

Интересы США и политика на Южном Кавказе

Хотя я представляю офис, который занимается Южным Кавказом и региональными конфликтами, мы работаем не только с нашими Послами и нашими коллегами на местах в Баку, Ереване и Тбилиси, но и с другими членами Бюро Европейских и Евразийских Дел Госдепартамента США с целью продвижения наших целей и интересов в этом очень важном регионе. Мы регулярно консультируемся с нашими партнерами в ЕС, ООН, НАТО, ОБСЕ, других международных организациях и соответствующих странах, включая Россию, которая играет ключевую роль в этом регионе. Конечно, мы также поддерживаем тесные контакты с правительственными и неправительственными организациями в Армении, Азербайджане и Грузии, а также в других важных странах региона.

Политика США на Южном Кавказе

"Прежде всего, она проистекает из наших национальных и международных интересов", - заявил
Bush laid down in his second-term National Security Strategy just a couple of weeks ago. Of course, national interests must determine the position that our country or any country takes in foreign affairs. In international affairs countries constantly have to be recalculating and recalibrating the benefits they are receiving with respect to their national interests.

There are good reasons for the U.S. to take care about the South Caucasus. The region is one of Europe's frontiers of freedom. It is a region comprising Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. These are new countries with old traditions and very promising futures. The South Caucasus frontiers are vast, stretching from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea, linking Europe and serving as a gateway to Central and Southern Asia. The national interests of the U.S. in this region are really shared interests with the countries of the region itself. It involves a number of factors: security, energy, economic interests, and the process of internal reform and democratization. The U.S.'s role in that democratic process is to help the people, and the governments of these countries to find their voice, to attain their own freedom, and to make their own way.

We want very much for each of these countries to succeed. Reforms are advancing, but the separatist conflicts, challenges of terrorism, organized crime and forces of corruption all post-communist countries face continue to pose continuing challenges to the fulfillment of their full potential for democratic and economic development.

One point however in our national interests in the South Caucasus I would like to stress, is we do not see our own interests in terms of competition with those of Russia. We believe that we share with Russia an interest for the region that enjoys security, democracy, peace and prosperity, and it is not marked with religious extremism, drugs trafficking, organized crime, and terrorism. The achievement of this sort of reason would be a win-win outcome for the U.S., Russia and for all the countries of the region, and the global community at large.

The U.S. has vested interests in having strong, democratic societies emerge from all the countries of the former Soviet space. A principal, fundamental for democracy is rule of law, and our national interests is to see equitable societies
Elizabeth Rood assumed responsibility for the State Department’s Office of Caucasus Affairs and Regional Conflicts in February 2006. This newly established office develops and implements U.S. policy with respect to the three South Caucasus countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, as well as the unresolved conflicts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (in Georgia), Nagorno-Karabakh (between Armenia and Azerbaijan), and Transnistria (in Moldova). From 2004 to 2006, Ms. Rood was the Deputy to the Special Negotiator for Eurasian Conflicts and in that position was also charged with U.S. efforts to facilitate peaceful, negotiated settlements to these conflicts.

In fact, U.S. and Armenia just signed an Assistance Agreement for $235 million in March. This Millennium Challenge Account Compact is a testament to Armenia’s progress and its commitment to do more on good governance, economic freedom and investment. Armenia’s democratic progress must keep pace however with its economic extension. Parliamentary and presidential elections in 2007 and in 2008 respectively will be watched carefully by Washington, and we urge them to be conducted freely and fairly indeed if the Millennium Challenge Compact is to be sustained. The constitutional referendum in Armenia in November 2005 unfortunately was tainted with reports of vote-tricking. This we confirm by the Council of Europe and domestic observers. The U.S. encourages the government of Armenia to address other reform measures as well including increasing media freedom since strengthening the judiciary.

Azerbaijan is still struggling to solidify its independence. After 1991, Azerbaijan established an independent, sovereign foreign policy, and laid the basis for wealth through a sound and economic reporting and other U.S. interests in the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia. From 1996 to 1998 Ms. Rood served as Economic-Political Officer at the U.S. Embassy to Vienna, Austria; from 1994 to 1996 she was a Consular Officer and Staff Assistant to Ambassador Thomas Pickering at the U.S. Embassy to Moscow, Russia. Before joining the Foreign Service Ms. Rood taught foreign languages in the Frederick County, Maryland public schools. Ms. Rood holds an MA from the University of Maryland at College Park and a BA from Randolph-Macon Woman’s College. She speaks French, Russian, and German.

EXPERT OPINION

governed justly according to the rule of law in the South Caucasus. One of the ways, we have expressed our support for these principle, is through assistance programs.

Так, США и Армения в марте подписали Соглашение о Помощи на сумму $235 миллионов. Этот Компактный Договор Вызова Тысячелетия - дань прогрессу Армении и ее стремлению усовершенствовать госуправление, экономическую свободу и инвестиционный климат. При этом армянский демократический прогресс должен идти в ногу с экономическими преобразованиями. Парламентские и президентские выборы в 2007 и 2008 гг., соответственно, будет тщательно наблюдать Вашингтон, и мы призываем провести их действительно свободно и справедливо, если есть стремление продолжить действие Компактного Договора Вызова Тысячелетия.

Америка продолжает закреплять позиции своей независимости. После 1991 г. Азербайджан стал проводить независимую, суверенную внешнюю политику и заложил основу для экономического богатства посредством существенного улучшения инвестиционного климата в секторе энергоресурсов. Но тяжелая

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climate for investment in the energy sector. But the difficult work is still ahead, and it is becoming increasingly critical. We are working with Azerbaijan urging the government to implement economic reforms including anti-inflationary and anti-corruption measures, banking reform, and increased attention to business climate. These reforms will be necessary if Azerbaijan is to overcome the danger of the so-called resource curse, and to develop the free market economy based on diversified sources of income. In May the rerunning of the parliamentary races, which were fraud significantly affected the outcome of the November 2005 parliamentary elections, will be an important sign of Azerbaijan's willingness to make them a credit case. If Azerbaijan is serious about working to become a full democracy, however, the government cannot stop with elections alone. The elections are not the goal or the end-point of the democratic reform but a single aspect of it. Development of civil society, professionalization of the parliamentary and judiciary reform are also elements that require attention if Azerbaijan is to remain stable. Fair and transparent trials based on evidence and respect for due process concerning the trials of several people accused of coup plotting will be another key test.

Georgia has been called the success of our work. But there is still much work to do. We are working hard to make sure that the elections in Georgia are fair and transparent. We are also working on economic reforms, including anti-inflationary measures, banking reform, and increased attention to business climate. These reforms will be necessary if Georgia is to overcome the danger of the so-called resource curse, and to develop a free market economy based on diversified sources of income. In May the rerunning of the parliamentary races, which were fraud significantly affected the outcome of the November 2005 parliamentary elections, will be an important sign of Azerbaijan's willingness to make them a credit case. If Azerbaijan is serious about working to become a full democracy, however, the government cannot stop with elections alone. The elections are not the goal or the end-point of the democratic reform but one aspect of it. Development of civil society, professionalization of the parliamentary and judiciary reform are also elements that require attention if Azerbaijan is to remain stable. Fair and transparent trials based on evidence and respect for due process concerning the trials of several people accused of coup plotting will be another key test.

Грузия названа успехом в нашем понимании свободы. Хотя, фактически работа только начала.
freedom agenda. Although, in fact its work has really only just begun. President Bush visited Georgia in May of last year, two years after the Rose Revolution. He called it a beacon of liberty for the region and world, because of the work that President Saakashvili’s government accomplished so far in transforming Georgia from a failed state to a democratized nation and a growing market economy. He along with our European allies promised support and assistance to help Georgia to consolidate the gains that it has made. The U.S. sees the future of Georgia as a member of the Euro Atlantic community. We stand behind Georgia as it continues the hard work of continuing reform. Upcoming elections on the local level this fall are going to be a litmus test for Georgia's progress in electoral reform. We cannot do Georgia's work for Georgia. It should do these things for itself. The electoral process is going to be conducted to meet international electoral standards. There is much work to be done between now and the fall for those local elections to meet the test.

The countries of the South Caucasus have also proved to be reliable partners in border security cooperation, counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism. We very much appreciate their work on these fronts. Addressing our shared security concern, the U.S. is grateful for the security cooperation of our partners in the South Caucasus, and their contribution to fighting terrorism.

Azerbaijan has established itself as a strategic partner of the U.S., and we are both focused on ways to deepen that security relationship. More than 150 Azerbaijani troops stand alongside U.S. marines to safeguard the Khadid Zaden in Iraq, and Azerbaijani battalions also contribute to peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo. Over-flight permission for U.S. aircraft as well as strong information sharing and law enforcement cooperation in fighting terror are critical symbols of Azerbaijan's global approach to security cooperation.

Armenia also has sent non-combatant troops to Iraq and Kosovo, and we appreciate these contributions.

The government of Georgia is also a committed partner in promoting global peace and security. In Iraq Georgia contributes 857 soldiers, and this is the largest per capita contribution in the coalition. Georgia is also contributing 160

Президент Буш посетил Грузию в мае прошлого года - спустя два года после Революции Роз. Он назвал эту страну маяком свободы для региона и мира из-за работы, проведенной на тот момент правительством Президента Саакашвили, по преобразованию Грузии из несостоятельного государства в демократизированную страну с растущей рыночной экономикой. Президент Буш, наряду с нашими Европейскими союзниками, обещал поддержку и помощь Грузии в удержании достигнутых высот. В будущем США видят Грузию членом Евро-Атлантического сообщества. Мы поддерживаем Грузию на ее тяжелом пути по продолжению реформы. Предстоящие этой осенью выборы местного уровня станут лакмусовой бумажкой прогресса Грузии в избирательной реформе. Мы не можем сделать за Грузию ее работу. Все это она должна сделать для себя. Избирательный процесс должен быть осуществлен в соответствии с международными избирательными нормами. Так что остается много работы, которую нужно проделать до осенних выборов в местные органы власти для того, чтобы пройти этот тест.

Страны Южного Кавказа также оказались надежными партнерами в сотрудничестве по безопасности границ, противодействию наркотрафику и терроризму. И мы очень ценим их работу на этих фронтах.

Решая общие проблемы безопасности, США благодарны за сотрудничество со своими партнерами на Южном Кавказе в деле обеспечения безопасности, а также за их вклад в борьбу с терроризмом.

Азербайджан утвердился в роли стратегического партнера США, и обе наши страны сконцентрированы на путях углубления взаимоотношений по безопасности. Более 150 азербайджанских военнослужащих бок-о-бок с морскими пехотинцами США обеспечивают безопасность Хадид Задена в Ираке; батальоны из Азербайджана также содействуют сохранению мира в Афганистане и Косово.

Предоставление воздушного коридора для пролета боевой авиации США, а также мощный обмен информацией и правоохранительное взаимодействие в борьбе с терроризмом являются важнейшими проявлениями глобального подхода Азербайджана к сотрудничеству в сфере безопасности.

Армения также отправила подразделения некомбатантов в Ирак и Косово, и мы ценим этот вклад.

Правительство Грузии - это тоже проданный партнер в деле усиления глобального мира и безопасности. В Ираке действует 857 грузинских военнослужащих, что является наименьшим вкладом на душу населе-
troops Kosovo, and it is considering ways to contribute in Afghanistan.

Each of these countries seeks to strengthen its ties with NATO. Armenia and Azerbaijan have completed their NATO Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAPs) in 2005, and Georgia is now completing its own IPAP. Georgia would like to get from NATO the Membership Action Plan this year. We certainly support this aspiration, but Georgia has to do some work yet not only to address its defense reforms but political, social and economic reforms in addition.

Explosions in January cut off all of Russian gas and most electricity to Georgia and Armenia for a week during unusually cold weather. This was a dramatic event, and the crisis that underscored great need of these nations to diversify energy supplies. It also highlighted the urgency of regional cooperation on energy.

In terms of oil, Caspian nations led by Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan's significant reserves will contribute to the world fastest growth in non-OPEC production between now and 2010. This non-OPEC oil will have help to diversify world energy supplies. The U.S. supports the energy policy of diversification in the region. At its heart, we are anti-monopoly. We support the region's work to diversify energy production, and to facilitate the transit of oil and gas. I have had great fortune in working with Ambassador Steven Mann who has dedicated much of the past year not only to working on the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, but also on creating the East-West energy corridor running through the Caucasus into Turkey and out to global markets.

Our policy is about trade, investment and business, and an over-arching goal of supporting the countries of the region as they break away from the power of pipeline monopolies. The Baku-Tbilisi-Celhan (BTC) oil pipeline is a great achievement, and is one we are very proud of. We applaud President Aliev and President Saakashvili for making this ambitious project a reality. We hope that Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan would now be able to reach an agreement to link Kazakhstan's North Caspian oil fields by tanker to the BTC pipeline of Baku. We also hope Russia, Kazakhstan and the oil companies operating in the region will be able to reach agreement on expansion of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, ления из всех стран коалиции. К тому же, Грузия имеет 160 военнослужащих в Косово и рассматривает возможность своего участия в Афганистане.

Каждая из этих стран стремится усилить связи с НАТО. Армения и Азербайджан завершили свои Индивидуальные Планы Действий по Партнерству с НАТО (IPAP) в 2005 г., а Грузия заказывает выполнение своего IPAP. Грузия ждет получить от НАТО План Действий для Получения Членства. Мы конечно поддерживаем это стремление, но Грузии еще придется поработать не только по оборонной, но и политической, общественной и экономической реформам.

Взрывы в январе на целую неделю отрезали Грузию и Армению, в которых была необыкновенно холодная погода, от российского газа и большей части электричества. Это стало драматическим событием и кризисом, который подчеркнул значительную важность диверсификации источников энергоснабжения для этих стран. Это также высветило необходимость региональной кооперации в сфере энергетики.

Что касается нефти, то Каспийские страны, обладающие ее наибольшими запасами - Азербайджан и Казахстан - войдут в число самых быстро растущих в мире производителей нефти вне ОПЕК в период до 2010 г. Эта не-ОПЕКовская нефть поможет диверсифицировать мировые поставки энергоресурсов. США поддерживают политику энергетической диверсификации в регионе. По своей сути, мы - антимонополисты. Мы поддерживаем региональные процессы по энергетической диверсификации и облегчению транзита нефти и газа. Мне очень повело работать с Послом Стивеном Манном, который в прошлом году посвятил много времени не только работе над конфликтом в Нагорном Карабахе, но и созданию энергетического коридора "Восток-Запад", проходящего через Кавказ до Турции и далее на мировые рынки.

Наша политика основана на торговле, инвестициях и бизнесе, а сверхзадача - это поддержка стран региона в их отходе от трубопроводных монополий. Нефтепровод Баку-Тбилиси-Джейхан (БТД) - это большое достижение, которым мы очень гордимся. Мы аплодируем Президенту Алиеву и Президенту Саакашвили за превращение этого амбициозного проекта в реальность. Мы надеемся, чтобы Казахстан и Азербайджан вскоре решатся связать Казахстанские нефтяные промыслы Северного Каспия танкерами с трубопроводом БТД. Мы также надеемся, что Россия, Казахстан и нефтегазпомы, действующие в регионе, будут способны достичь соглашения по расширению Каспийского
which carries Russian crude oil to Novorossiysk on the Russian coast of the Black Sea.

Parallel to the BTC pipeline is the South Caucasus natural gas pipeline serving Azerbaijan's Shakhteniz field, which is going to follow the same route, and will bring Azeri gas to the Turkish gas network. The opening later this year or perhaps early next year of the South Caucasus Pipeline will fill further underscore the region's role on the global energy markets. Down the road, we believe it will be possible and highly beneficial for Turkmenistan and perhaps Kazakhstan to work with Azerbaijan to construct the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline. Eventually, gas from the entire Caspian region could reach European markets and help Europeans diversify their sources of energy imports.

On the trade front, we hope to see Azerbaijan join Georgia and Armenia as members of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Discussions in Geneva on March 30th showed that much work remains on the part of Azerbaijani government to meet the WTO's standards and to lower barriers to trade in goods and services, and to effective promotion of intellectual property rights. The U.S. remains committed to working with Azerbaijan, including with technical assistance towards its eventual WTO accession.

In the long run, we want to see greater economic integration in the South Caucasus region and beyond. This understandably is a difficult undertaking. It is difficult without the settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. And it is even harder because of the other conflicts in the region: South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The U.S. is going to keep encouraging integration to the extent possible working around these conflicts. At minimum, we strongly urge the countries of the region not to erect new trade barriers between one another, which simply make resolution of the conflicts more difficult.

The lingered separatist conflicts is the product of the breakup of the former Soviet Union. The conflicts should provide an opportunity for the U.S. to cooperate with Russia. A potential of this opportunity for cooperation should not be underestimated. The four conflicts are really tough challenges. They hamper economic and full democratic development of the countries involved. They pose a barrier to the greater integration of these

Трубопроводного Консорциума, который поставляет сырье российскую нефть в Новороссийск, находящийся на российском побережье Черного моря.

Южно-кавказский газопровод, несущий природный газ из азербайджанского месторождения Шахденииз, планируется проложить параллельно маршруту трубопровода БТД с тем, чтобы доставлять азербайджанский газ в турецкую газовую сеть. Открытие Южно-кавказского газопровода во второй половине этого или в начале следующего года еще более усилит роль региона на мировых рынках энергоресурсов. В дальнейшем, мы надеемся, что Туркменистан и возможно Казахстан поймут чрезвычайную выгоду от перспективы работы с Азербайджаном по созданию Транс-каспийского газопровода. В конечном счете, газ со всего Каспийского региона мог бы достичь европейских рынков и помочь европейцам диверсифицировать свои источники импорта энергоресурсов.

На торговом фронте, мы ожидаем, что Азербайджан последует за Грузией и Арменией, которые стали членами Всемирной Торговой Организации (ВТО). Переговоры в Женеве 30 марта показали, что правительству Азербайджана предстоит проделать еще много работы по части достижения стандартов ВТО, снижения барьеров в торговле товарами и услугами и действенного продвижения интеллектуальных прав собственности. США остаются преданными работе с Азербайджаном, в т.ч., по вопросам оказания технической помощи для ожидаемого вступления в ВТО.

В конечном итоге, мы хотим видеть большую экономическую интеграцию в регионе Южного Кавказа и вне его. Понятно, что это непростая задача. Ее сложно решить без урегулирования конфликта в Нагорном Карабахе. И еще труднее из-за наличия прочих конфликтов в регионе: в Южной Осетии и Абхазии. США, насколько возможно, будут способствовать сближению позиций сторон этих конфликтов. По минимуму, мы настойчиво призываем страны региона не возводить новых торговых барьеров между собой, что еще больше усложнило бы разрешение конфликтов.

Сепаратистские конфликты - это следствие разведения бывшего Советского Союза. Конфликты должны предоставить США возможность сотрудничать с Россией. Потенциал для такой возможности сотрудничества нельзя переоценивать. Упомянутые четыре конфликта бросают действительно жесткие вызовы. Они препятствуют экономическому и полноценному демократическому развитию задействованных стран. Они являются барьером на пути еще большей интеграции.
countries into Euro Atlantic institutions. For this reason, the U.S. is working to facilitate peacefully negotiated settlements to these conflicts. Of course, each conflict has its own history and has to be approached accordingly.

A unifying threat in the Georgian and the Moldavian conflicts is the pervasive influence of Russia on the separatist regions combined with the presence of Russian troops enforcing the status quo of the early 1990's ceasefires. Despite Russia's stated support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia and Moldova, we see real clear inclination on the part of Russia to move beyond the status quo towards peaceful reintegration of the separatist regions into unified Georgia and the unified Moldova. Our policy on the conflicts aims to move this process forward trying to see cooperation with Russia, coordinating our efforts with our European partners, and stressing to all parties involved that we believe there are no military solutions to these problems.

On Nagorno Karabakh, we cooperate very closely with Russia and with France as the co-chairs of the OSCE's Minsk Group to promote the negotiated settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Although, the recent summit in February between presidents Aliyev and Kocharyan at Rambouet did not produce the desired principles for an agreement that many observers had hoped for. The momentum has returned to the negotiating process. They stun upcoming election cycles in Azerbaijan and Armenia coming up in 2007 and 2008. We continue to believe very strongly that 2006 is the time for a deal. And we continue to believe that if this window of opportunity passes that the prospects for a peaceful resolution of the conflict dim rapidly.

What the U.S. seeks in this region is neither hidden nor complex. President Bush has said a mandate for his government is to advance freedom and democracy in the world. We take the lead to reinforce the independence of these newly independent states very seriously. We want them to be prosperous. We want them to develop in a stable way because ultimately we believe that free, fair and democratic societies limit the scope that America's enemies have to work in. These are the goals that I hope will meet with the good will of everyone in this room.
I am going to talk today about the Orange revolution, and the Rose revolution. What I have to say about it is now somewhat different from what I would have said even a few months ago.

James SHERR

I am going to talk today about the Orange revolution, and the Rose revolution. What I have to say about it is now somewhat different from what I would have said even a few months ago. It seemed to me in early 2005 after the inauguration of Victor Yushchenko as President of Ukraine that Ukraine's Orange Revolution would be the single greatest factor influencing relations and dynamics inside the former Soviet Union, possibly inside the Russian Federation itself, and to a considerable degree within the Black Sea region as a whole. After President Yushchenko dismissed his government in September 2005 it seemed to me that very possibly the failure with Ukraine's Orange Revolution would be the single greatest factor affecting Russian policy, Russia's relations with its neighbors and that it would also have a considerable affect on the Black Sea region as a whole.

Never trust an analyst who says he has been right. Today we have to be much more qualified in both our optimism and pessimism about the significance of these events. I say that for two reasons. First of all, the failure of Victor Yushchenko's leadership, as perceived in many in Ukraine, as well as some of the betrayal perceived in Ukraine, has not led and I think will not
lead to the restoration of all the pre-Orange order in Ukraine. Ukraine had parliamentary elections on the 26th of March. These are extremely significant elections because the new Parliament takes up its seats at the time when Ukraine is becoming a fully fledged parliamentary republic, in which the President retains important powers, but does not begin to retain the dominance, which he has traditionally had under the 1996 Constitution that was agreed to and established under his predecessor Leonid Kuchma. What is interesting about these elections is that the electorate punished Yushchenko very heavily, and his party "Our Ukraine" received some 14% of the vote. More interestingly, is that they did not reward his principal foil and his former rival, the former Prime Minister Victor Yanukovich, and his "Party of Regions". Victor Yanukovich himself received slightly less percentage of the vote, 32%, than he received in the first round of the elections in October 2004.

Similar events took place in Georgia as well. In both countries the political cultures have come in to their own. Both in Ukraine and Georgia we are no longer dealing with post-Soviet political culture. We are dealing in each case with something very distinct, with its own attributes, and its own problematic features. That means that those two countries will remain problematic for Russia, the West, and its two central pillars - NATO and the EU. That is one reason why we have to be certainly qualified in pessimism, which was very wide-spread. I was a great exponent of pessimism quite early concerning what was happening in Ukraine beginning with Yushchenko's victory. There is another reason about the significance of these internal changes, and that because to a very substantial extent relations in the former Soviet Union and in the entire region are being shaped by energy, and by Russia's view of that energy and how it fits in its overall scheme of economic and geopolitical interests.

Despite that, the so-called colored revolutions and the specter of those revolutions in other countries, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Central Asia - the question is do they still matter? I would say they matter profoundly because in all of the countries of the former Soviet Union internal politics matter profoundly. Along with the influences caused by the policies of NATO, the EU, and the Russian Federation, every country of the former Soviet Union and the most Black Sea regional countries are extraordinarily affected by the problems of internal politics, security and energy relations, and energy supplies. And
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EXPERT OPINION

this is true out of a very simple reason: independence is fine, but it has a very limited utility if you do not have the capacity to do anything with it.

That is a key point when you are talking about these countries, which only 15 years ago were the part of the former Soviet Union, and its integrated economic and political system. These countries were by design deprived of the ability and self-confidence, the competence and the institutions, and the means to make their own decisions and implement them. When we talk about relationships in the former Soviet Union we are still talking about vulnerability and dependence. There is a clear difference between the nezavisimost’ [formal independence] and samostoyatelnost’ [ability to stand, to do things for itself]. The latter in hard technical terms is a function of institutions, it is a function of their capacity, the integrity of the institutions, and ownership of the institutions. I will come back to those three issues towards the end of this presentation, when I talk about energy.

How do internal and external factors relate in three key areas, which in this part of the world and in Europe we do not devote proper attention to, thus causing some real problems and surprises? The political establishments of EU countries and North America are today largely unprepared.

Following are the three key areas I would like to discuss now:

FACULTY BIOGRAPHIES

James Sherr
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What is the Russian thinking and policy with regard to the former Soviet Union? By the mid-1990's this was a period of romanticism in Russian thinking that has ended. A different type of intellectual dynamic has come up on the scene. Russian political establishment had abandoned the Cold War view of security, but unlike NATO and the EU it has not substantially tried to replace the Cold War perspective on security. Instead, they replaced it with the pre-Cold War view of security, meaning that international politics is essentially power politics, that international politics is a struggle for power, that states primarily maximizes the other factors: civic, humanitar- ian, ethical through classic geopolitical objectives. And along with that ... between great powers, and Russia is certainly one, there is a rational enlighten- ing between great powers to work out and define alleged spheres of interest that Russians call the zones of interests. Even in this so-called romantic period before 1994 there was the time that stated usual and implicit consensus that Russia's zone of natural special interest was the former Soviet Union.

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Romantic was an expectation of the elites at that time that the West did not accept all of this in the interests of stability and security. As early as 1993 President Yeltsin called the leading Western powers and the UN to recognize Russia's primacy in the former Soviet Union to guarantee and maintain security and stability in that space. It was not very clear in the West about the tenor of their response to that. Usually, the most universal public response to this proposition was negative. Russia's position towards the West is one of having been eluded, as well as frustration and anger that the West is unwilling to accept this view of security and view of the world. With that the implication that the independent states of the former Soviet Union on the Russian periphery are somehow lesser states whose sovereignty must be qualified and limited to a certain degree. Since the West totally refuses to accept the concept of lots, in Russia this concept is seemingly reasonable and not surprising at all that the Western policy was anti-Russian. This profoundly colors Russia's view of NATO. I would like to resist a temptation to discuss why there is a limited comprehension as to why NATO should survive. If it is not NATO - is there a perception it is anti-Russian? There is virtually no comprehension as to why it should be enlarged if NATO policies were not anti-Russian.

The first conclusion that comes out of this way of thinking is that the standing source of friction between Russia and the West is comprised of very different perspectives of what is needed in terms of security, a matter that Europe particularly should consider. The second proposition that comes out of this was that this predominance is seen in this area as natural because those states surrounding Russia are states that broadly speaking - are more or less defined as lacking in samostoyatel'nost, in this capacity to realize any concrete goal that they have. This sense of incapacity by the time Putin became President of Russia became a matter of framing Russian policy in a very systematic way. This is sometimes described very coherently and loosely by Russian analysts, such as Dmitry Trenin who presented a very concise analysis a couple of years ago - the so-called project SNG [CIS project], in which he spoke about the policy and the methods of exploiting dependencies and vulnerabilities, and needs for using the economic ties. This can be called a soft security issue versus hard security issues to maintain dominance internally, which is one reason why; if you are in Ukraine or in Georgia the Russian factor is...
not just an external factor. It is also the factor related to the internal politics because of the way the elite work, a result of common business culture, various ties, relationships and networks. The aim set up by Trenin is to gradually weaken and neutralize pro-Western circles in these countries. However, Putin has changed this whole equation. This is not a result of consumption. It is an operational change, and it is of a profound significance. It is a change of capacity.

The problem when Yeltsin was the President of Russia was that in operational terms Russia did not always function as a state. It functioned as an arena upon which very rich entities [military, security, banks, industry] competed with one another for wealth and power on the transnational scale, but not disciplined in the way of a unified framework of state policy. Hence Putin's enormous emphasis on strengthening the vertical of power in Russia - an effort that has been largely successful to harmonize not just the capacity of the state but also its political, commercial, geo-economic and geo-strategic objectives. The objective is to turn these structures into instruments of the state policy. Of course, this is not accomplished completely and perfectly, but there has been a qualitative change.

Now you should understand why the Orange Revolution is of immense importance. It calls the expectations invested in it by the Maidan [hundreds of thousands of people who demonstrated their will during the freezing winter in Kyiv's Independence Square]. What kept them there? First, the determination that there finally will be a democratic society. Talking about this aspect of political culture, the Yeltsin years in Russia persuaded many not for the first time that democracy was very harmful for Russia and therefore it was a very broad popular resentment of Putin's approach restoring the strongly centralized state. Whereas Kuchma has persuaded people in Ukraine to an opposite conclusion, namely that there has not been real democracy per se in Ukraine. By the end of the year 2004 the Ukrainian electorate was determined that there should be real democracy in Ukraine. In this respect President Yushchenko has not disappointed expectations. And possibly there was another primary reason that at last Ukraine should be governed by people in the interests of the country and not in the interests of themselves. That was the reason why over the past year they have been profoundly disappointed.

российский фактор - это не только внешний фактор. Это и фактор, относящийся к внутренней политике - вследствие подходов элиты к работе, общей культуре ведения бизнеса, разнообразных связей, отношений и союзов. Цель, которую ставит Тренин - постепенно ослабить и нейтрализовать прозападные круги в этих странах. Однако Путин изменил всю картину, дав понять, что речь идет о важном изменении функционального подхода в вопросе усиления влияния государства.

Во времена президентства Ельцина, проблема РФ заключалась в том, что в функциональном смысле РФ не всегда действовала как государство. Это была арена конкурирования различных богатых структур (армии, безопасности, банков, промышленности) на транснациональном уровне, а не скоординированная выработка единой государственной политики. Отсюда и огромный акцент Путина на усиление в РФ вертикальной власти - процесса, который оказался в значительной степени успешным в деле гармонизации не только возможностей государства, но и его политических, коммерческих, геоэкономических и гео-стратегических целей. Цель - превратить эти структуры в инструменты государственной политики. Конечно, это не выполняется целиком и идеально, но уже есть качественные изменения.

Теперь вы должны понять огромную важность Оранжевой революции. В нее было вложено много ожиданий Майдана (сотни людей, продемонстрировавших свою волю во время холодной зимы на киевской Площади Независимости). Что держало их там? Во-первых, вера в то, что наконец-то они получат демократическое общество. Говоря об этом аспекте политической культуры, годы правления Ельцина в РФ впервые подтолкнули к выводу, что демократия вредна для России; поэтому такая аргументация стала широко использоваться и Путином при попытке реставрировать сильное централизованное государство. В это же время, Кучма убеждал народ Украины в обратном, а именно: что в Украине никогда и не было демократии как таковой. Поэтому, к концу 2004 г. украинский электорат и был настроен на построение в Украине настоящей демократии. В этом отношении Президент Ющенко не разочаровал ожиданий. Но люди вышли на Майдан по другой причине: наконец-то Украине должны править люди в интересах страны, а не самих себя. Это и объясняет то, что за последний год люди глубоко разочаровались.
But the prospects that the things that would occur naturally had to threaten the entire paradigm of Russian thinking and policy was built with respect to that neighbor, and also some others, and possibly internally as well. This challenge was put very well by the editor of the influential journal "Russia and global affairs" Fyodor Lukyanov, who wrote shortly after that: Russian policy has been traditionally oriented towards power. It is skillful in building relations with loyal regimes.

The West is working along totally different lines. The West appeals towards what is called civil society - people. Of course, George Soros has invested money, but this is not what matters. Money does not decide. The work with people is what yields results. Whether this is good or bad is another question, but it works.

The last thing that it works for is the extremely politically pragmatic elite in Moscow, particularly President Putin. Of course, President Putin did not feel under pressure to reassess his views about Ukraine since his conclusion was: we were defeated in Ukraine by Ukrainians, and we were defeated by the West. We were defeated by Western money, by a very clear and settled form of intervention orchestrated by Brussels and Washington, who were working together to achieve this result. Therefore, people like me at that time said it is not enough for Yushchenko to win. After he wins he needs to succeed, because if he does not succeed the paradigm not only will not be changed, but also reconfirmed. By the autumn of last year it was quite clear there were no systematic reforms inside Ukraine with the exception possibly of Armed Forces in 1-2 other areas. No systematic reform, no systematic approach to address systematic problems, no unity with regard to wide-spread incompetence, and finally great public disillusionment. This brought immense pressure on President Putin, and in itself played a role in something we discovered in January, when the supply of gas was cut off for Ukraine. Up until this point, Gazprom had very tentatively and with some delicacy informed Ukrainians that the terms of trade with gas had to change. If you examine everything that was happening over a period of months, the overall Russian approach towards dealing with this very legitimate issue was tactful and cautious. Suddenly in the winter it ceased to be tactful and courteous, and to assume this paradigm shift did not change the political evaluation of what was taking place in Ukraine was very naïve.
Now we have the elections of March 26. I do not think Moscow is happy about those elections. One comment that suggests this is from Konstantin Kozachyov, who is the chairman of the State Duma International Policy Committee, who accused the West of interfering in the parliamentary elections. If you arrange the facts in a certain way you make a case, and even some iconoclastic journalists and analysts in the West have also made a case that the West to a certain extent did interfere in the Ukrainian presidential elections of 2004. But no one can make the same conclusion about the elections. This sounds like a very emotional response of a very disappointed individual. Why they are unhappy?

Because before those elections in Ukraine the Yanukovich’s Party of Regions was seen as a natural party of power. Despite certain konkurentsija [rivalries, competitive interests] in the area of business basically seen as a naturally pro-Russian party committed to the same sort of business culture, and the same economic understanding and geopolitical vision of the country as the Kremlin was. What the elections demonstrated about the Party of Regions is that true to its name it is simply a regional, but not national, force, and by no means a natural party of power. The second thing that some began to notice is that if it ended up having the former Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko brought back to a new parliament as a new prime minister, and she does what she threatened to do, which is to denounce the gas supply accord of January 2006, she would be supported by the majority of the Eastern Ukrainian businessmen. This totally conflicts with the image of Ukraine as being basically yedinyi narod [common people], as Eastern Ukraine is essentially representative of the views of most Ukrainians, the other views being a product of Western Ukraine nationalists, NATO and EU actions.

What is more problematic though, which might take sometime for everyone to understand, is that this new political system, a shared power between parliament and the president (most of it in parliament), and all of these different factions that are combined and work together, in the form of the prospect of temporary coalitions, then the certainty that the first coalition agreement concluded now will not be the last, and has really brought Ukraine back to itself. It also revealed the existence of a political culture that is not very different from Russia’s, but is going to be very different for both Russia, the EU and NATO to deal with. I have defined this in the article that it is very naively to think, that such a systemic change in Ukraine is not linked with a political calculation.

Теперь о выборах 26 марта. Я не думаю, что Москва довольна их результатами. Это подтверждает комментарий Константина Козачева, председателя Комитета Госдумы по международной политике, обвинившего Запад во вмешательстве в парламентские выборы. Если должным образом сопоставить факты, то можно сделать вывод (а к аналогичному умозаключению пришли даже самые "иконоборческие" журналисты и аналитики Запада), что Запад некоторым образом вмешивался в украинские президентские выборы 2004 г., но ничего подобного нельзя сказать о последовавших парламентских выборах в Украине.

До этих выборов, Партия Регионов (Януковича) считалась естественной партией власти. Невзирая на определенную конкуренцию в сфере бизнеса, ее в основном рассматривали как пророссийскую партию, руководствующуюся теми же, что и Кремль, бизнес культурой, экономическими подходами и геополитическим видением перспективы страны. Выборы продемонстрировали, что Партия Регионов, вопреки названию, - это лишь региональная, а не национальная сила и ни в коем случае не партия власти. Второй момент, который отметили некоторые, заключается в том, что если бы бывшая Премьер-министр Украины Юлия Тимошенко снова была избрана Парламентом на премьерскую должность и сделала то, что обещала (денионсировать договор о поставке газа от января 2006 г.), то ее бы поддержало большинство бизнесменов Восточной Украины. Это полностью противоречит расхожему мнению, что в основном Украина - это единый народ, на самом деле, в восточной Украине считают, что именно они представляют собой настоящую Украину, а все прочее - это происки западно-украинских националистов, НАТО и ЕС.

Хотя, еще больше проблемой может стать то, что в этой новой политической системе распределения власти между Парламентом и Президентом (с большей властью у парламента), первое коалиционное соглашение не станет последним. Также проявилось наличие политической культуры, не очень отличающейся от российской, но с тенденцией к тому, что и РФ, и НАТО, и ЕС будет сложно работать с Украиной. Я написал об этом в российской "Независимой газете" следующее. Украина сворачивает к наследию децентрализации, недостаточному плю-
you have in your readings, which I wrote in the Russian Nezavisimaya Gazeta: What Ukraine is returning to, is its heritage of decentralization, lack of pluralism, distrust of power, and loathing of absolutism. Along with that, there is a tendency towards moderation, compromise, bargaining, maneuvering, manipulation, and the avoidance of clear choices. What both Russia and the West want from Ukraine is the emergence of a clear political course. I do not think we are going to realize this. Not soon. It could be very difficult for us to live with that. We have the every right at the moment to be confused.

Transnistria

Its issue is absolutely connected to Ukraine. In 2005 I went around Ukraine, and I had a number of nosy interviews, in which I said the following: How Ukraine deals with Pridnestrovy is a litmus test for whether the Orange Revolution is serious and whether it is succeeding. The real issue with Pridnestrovy is not the presence of Russian Armed Forces there. The real issue is the fact that a particular entity Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic [PMR] is a pathological state, which causes problems for its surroundings. What do I mean by a pathological state? All the post-Soviet deficiencies [the inability to separate politics from business, and business from crime] are there in countries such as Ukraine and Georgia. But in Moldova and PMR, it is the system of power based upon a merger between the military, security, business and criminal structures. That not only defines the state but also its strength. That is why I use the term pathological about that political order. It is a pathological entity, which can only survive because of the parasitic relationship with its primary neighbors — the greater part of Moldova itself and, of course, Ukraine.

If you had Dutch-style customs and border services, police forces, and local government, you could not have such a state on its borders. Borders would be controlled, the income would rise, and everything would have been shut down. Hence, it is clear that if Ukraine showed the will and ability to control that border, to impose the EU-style order there, it would immediately put pressure on the whole thing. It would not be necessary to confront Russia directly. What happened to my and everyone's immense surprise? On 3 March 2006, Ukraine announced the

ralismu, недоверию к власти к абсолютизму. Вмес-
"тэ с тем, есть тенденция к сдержанности, компро-
миссу, переговорам, манипулированию, манипуля-
ции и уходу от четких форумтировок.

В целом, и РФ, и Запад хотят от Украины выра-
ботки четкого политического курса. Хотя, я не ду-
маю, что он появится скоро.

Приднестровье (ПМР)

Вопрос ПМР плотно взаимосвязан с Украиной. В 2005 г. я ездил по Украине и имел целый ряд дотошных интервью, в ответ на которые я отвечал следующее: деятельность Украины в отно-
шении ПМР будет индикатором того, насколько серьезна и успешна Оранжевая революция. На-
стоящая проблема ПМР — это не присутствие там российского военного контингента. Дело в самом существовании такого ненормального государ-
ственного образования как ПМР, причиняющего проблему своему окружению. Что я имею в виду, говоря "ненормальное" государство? Все постсо-
ветские недостатки (неспособность отделять поли-
тику от бизнеса, а бизнес от криминала) прису-
щи и таким странам, как Украина и Грузия. Но в Молдове и ПМР — это система, основанная на слиянии военных структур, спецслужб, бизнеса и криминалитета. В этом ее сила. Но такая система может держаться лишь на паразитических связях со своими ближайшими соседями — большей час-
тю с Молдовой и, конечно, Украиной.

В случае, например, голландской системы та-
моженного и пограничного контроля, полиции и местного самоуправления, такого государства не существовало бы в его границах. Границы были бы под контролем, доходы бы росли, а все безоб-
разья были бы прекращены. Так что если Украина продемонстрирует волю и способность контроли-
ровать свою границу с ПМР по стандартам ЕС, то немедленно будет оказано давление на всю эту ситуацию. Причем, не надо в лоб конфликтовать с РФ. Ведь, в конце концов, что произошло к мое-
му и всеобщему удивлению? 3 марта 2006 г. Укра-
йина объявила о введении пограничного режима, схожего со стандартами ЕС и отвечающего поли-
тике ЕС. Все, кто знает ситуацию изнутри, затаи-
ли дыхание. Ведь вводя новый режим в ПМР, ты бросаешь вызов очень мощному бизнесу и в са-
мой Украине. Это люди, в значительной степени, реально контролирующие страну, а также тене-
imposition of an EU-style border regime, and fell into line with the EU policy. Everyone who knows anything about it had rightly drawn their breath, because what that means is if you impose it then you are willing to stand up to very powerful business in Ukraine itself, to people who, in many respects, really run the country, and to the shadow structures of power, who have penetrated all of the official structures of power, all the services, customs, and local government.

So, how long did that border regime last? It has not disappeared yet, but the retreat began on 15 March after a meeting of secretaries of the respective National Security Councils of Russia and Ukraine in Moscow. If what I have said so far makes sense, then I hope you will understand it if I say that this retreat came about not primarily because of Russian threats, but because of the people who decided: we are going to do the right thing over Moldova and PMR, and realized that they were not strong enough to accomplish this inside Ukraine to make it happen. That is a key issue. One has to know the other contributing points because that is not the whole story.

It is apparently fine for the EU to say that if Ukraine is serious, it should adapt similar EU standards towards Moldova and for that matter towards Belarus as well. Excellent. But one has to keep in mind the following factors: Ukraine is not a member of the EU and NATO; when it comes to both Belarus and Moldova, Ukraine is a frontline state; Belarus is a leading trading partner of Ukraine, among the top five; we have the Russian army and all these criminal structures in PMR. And the EU is asking Ukraine to take on its own an exceptionally risky policy. And what does it offer? Just demands and words. Are there any guaranties? No. Are there promises of EU accession? No. Is anyone thinking about how Ukraine can be helped, if the result of this policy is pressure from PMR, from Moscow, or from somewhere else? I do not think so. These problems are very much related.

So, this is an illustration of the fact that if Western policy remains only as one that is simply principled and rhetorical, but unwilling to become directly engaged, the internal factors inside Ukraine will triumph over a sense of national interest.

**Georgia**

Do not think the problem between Georgia and Russia can be understood simply at the level of state-to-state relations. They involve several types of inter-
nal factors. The dynamics taking place inside Russia's North Caucasus, is part of the Russian Federation, but the area is increasingly moving out of Russia's de-facto control. Chechnya now is not a fundamental issue. There is a very strong, unsavory regime in Chechnya that has been given a lot of power by Russia. It is the other part of the Northern Caucasus, which is becoming an issue, starting with Dagestan. This is a problem that spreads over into a non-Caucasian part of Russia itself: Krasnodar, Stavropol. The problem is a serious one, it is not invented. Russia faces an exceptionally acute, serious and fearful security problem in the North Caucasus, which we all underestimate. What is not understood in Moscow is that these problems are the consequence of Russian behavior and methodology.

Throughout the pre-Soviet and the Soviet period, for probably 150 years, the methodology has been defined in the context of a clan to back it, to give it everything it wants, and forget about the rest. There has been no concerted attempt to reconcile dominance with legitimacy. The result is in areas like Dagestan where the political culture is based upon shared power, arrangements and agreements. When you do this you alienate all other clans. Finally if all other clans win, then you have a new black hole that has been created, as well as the desire to do more about it. This is happening in Chechnya at the moment. Kadyrov is very strong, and every other force in Chechnya knows him. One thing Kadyrov would like to do is be given backing by Moscow to begin to wage some kind of war in Georgia, involving the Chechen-Georgian relationship, which is not good. This is one dimension of Russia-Georgia relations.

Another dimension of it are the so-called frozen conflicts: Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. What has happened in the past few weeks? The President of South Ossetia has made now an official appeal to the Russian Constitutional Court to consider his region's legal accession into the Russian Federation after succession from Georgia. Tbilisi has wisely said: if this goes to a referendum, we are not contemplating a military response. Incidentally, at the very end of last year and the beginning of this year with the explosion of a pipeline connecting Russian energy to Georgia, the natural tendency in Tbilisi was to blame the Russian Federation. But probably those elements in South Ossetian leadership is to be blamed. Why did all of this happen? What are the reasons for all this to occur inside Georgia itself? It is no secret that

нодарский и Ставропольский края. Проблема не высосана из пальца. РФ столкнулась с исключительно острой, серьезной и опасной проблемой для безопасности Северного Кавказа, которую все мы недооцениваем. В Москве не понимают, что эти проблемы являются следствием поведения и методов РФ.

До и во время СССР, на протяжении около 150 лет методология заключалась в продержке определенных кланов, предоставлении им всего необходимого и закрывании глаз на все остальное. Не было комплексной попытки прими- рить влияние с законностью. В результате, например, в Дагестане возникла политическая культура основанная на разделение власти, договоренностях и соглашениях. При этом от тебя отворачиваются все другие кланы. В итоге, если последние одерживают верх, то появляется "черная дыра" и, соответственно, желание ее залатать. Вот что в данный момент происходит в Чечне. Кадыров очень силен, каждая прочая сила в Чечне знает его. Один из планов Кадырова — это при поддержке Москвы начать что-то типа войны в Грузии, играя на не очень хороших отношениях между чеченцами и грузинами. В этом заключается одно из направлений российско-грузинских отношений.

Еще одно направление — это т.н. замороженные конфликты: Абхазия и Южная Осетия. Недавно, Президент Южной Осетии официально обратился в Конституционный суд РФ с просьбой о законном присоединении к РФ после отсоединения от Грузии. В Тбилиси мудро отреагировали: если дело идет к референдуму, то мы не исключа- ем военного ответа.

Так случилось, что в конце прошлого - начале этого года был взорван трубопровод, поставляющий энергоресурсы из РФ в Грузию, и естественно Тбилис поднял вопрос о законном присоединении к РФ после отсоединения от Грузии. В Тбилис мудро отреагировали: если дело идет к референдуму, то мы не исключа- ем военного ответа.

Почему все это происходит? Что за причины стоят за происходящим в Грузии? Не секрет, что внутренняя ситуация в Грузии остается сложной. И кому-то может прийти в голову вопрос: а могут ли при нынешних обстоятельствах определенные официальные круги и лица Грузии соблазниться возможностью обострить антirosсий- ские настроения с целью мобилизовать определенные ресурсы. Соблазн присутствует во всей внутренней обстановке.
internally the situation in Georgia remains difficult and in many ways a very unhappy one. One must at least ask the question whether under these circumstances some forces in the Georgian establishments, and individuals might be tempted to exacerbate the rhetoric in confrontation with Russia and all its mobilization efforts to maintain its support. The temptation is there in the overall internal situation.

Energy Issue

There are three dimensions to this energy relationship. The problem is that most of the people are focusing on only one. If you do not see all three of them you do not see the whole picture.

One aspect is economic. The main economic reality is that Russia’s gas production is declining relative to demand. The only way to change that situation in the long term is to explore the huge unexploited gas fields, which is not happening because the rule of entry maintained under the Putin system for foreign entities are uninviting, and do not encourage them to contribute the expertise, and the capital needed. As powerful as Gazprom is (it is the most powerful gas company in the world), its reach as it is, and as much progress it has made, and as much expertise as it has there, Gazprom itself does not have the technology, capital, and expertise to pursue unlimited new projects. This in itself multiplies other types of pressures to control all transit routes, all infrastructure, and all downstream facilities to expand to other countries downstream including the UK. In order to tie Europe more and more closely with these Russian energy monopolists, there is no alternative way other than to follow Russia’s energy policy.

The second aspect is geopolitics, which is mentioned in paragraph one of the official energy strategy of the Russian Federation, that "our position in energy significantly determines the geopolitical position in the world".

The third factor, which until recently did not command proper Western attention, although it garnered significant attention in Ukraine, is what the Ukrainians call a "subjective factor". It is the institutional factor. Let us look at the agreement that Ukraine and Russia have concluded in January to receive gas at sums that seem difficult to explain or calculate through an entity called RosUkrEnergo. In addressing the concept of capacity, did those people in Ukraine who negotiated this agreement fully

Энергетические вопросы

Есть три аспекта взаимоотношений в сфере энергоресурсов. Проблема заключается в том, что большинство людей концентрируются лишь на одном, но если не рассматривать все три из них, то общей картины не увидеть.

Первый аспект - экономический. Основная экономическая реальность заключается в том, что уровень производства газа в РФ падает относительно уровня спроса. Единственное, как можно изменить ситуацию в долгосрочной перспективе - это развивать огромные неразведанные месторождения, что не происходит вследствие непривлекательных правил входа на рынок для иностранных компаний, выработанных при правлении Путина, которые не способствуют экспертным и капитальным инвестициям. С мощью Газпрома (мощнейшей газовой компанией мира), его возможностями, достижениями и экспертным уровнем, Газпром все-таки не имеет технологий, капитала и экспертов для реализации новых проектов. Это само по себе усиливает прочие виды давления с целью контроля всех транзитных маршрутов, всей инфраструктуры и всех транзитных объектов для расширения поставок в другие страны, включая Великобританию. Для того чтобы еще больше завязать Европу на этих российских монополистов, нет другого пути, кроме как подчиняться энергетической политике РФ.

Второй момент - это геополитика, упомянутая в параграфе 1 официальной энергетической стратегии РФ: "Наша позиция по энергетике значительно определяется геополитической позицией в мире".

Третий фактор, на который Запад, в отличие от Украины, до недавнего времени не обращал должного внимания, украинцы называют "субъективным". Это институциональный фактор, давайте посмотрим на соглашение между Украиной и РФ от января 2006 г. относительно получения газа через структуру под названием РосУкрЭнерго по ценам, которые трудно объяснить или просчитать. Исходя из концепции влияния, понимали ли переговорщики от Украины, на что они соглашаются в целом? Поняли ли люди, которые их посылали на переговоры, начиная с президента страны, на что они согласились? Были ли на межведомственном уровне согласованы и утверждены стратегия переговоров и мониторинг их результатов? Решался ли этот вопрос во взаимодействии
understand what they have agreed to? Were the people who sent them there, beginning with the president present, and did they understand what they were agreeing to? Was it an interagency process of discussion in setting the framework for negotiation, the monitoring of it, and the approving of it? Did the Cabinet of Minister of Ukraine coordinate this issue with the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine? Or was it decided in a hotel room on the back of an envelope? Did official institutions control this process or did it take place in the shadows, by a few trusted but untoward people? All these are rhetorical questions because the answers are obvious.

Analogically to the North Caucasus’s situation with transparency, the central question is simply an ability to factually know: What decision has been made, where, by whom and why it has been implemented, when it comes to this 4th January agreement? We do not know the answers.

The next question is ownership. Who owns RosUkrEnergo? We do not know. Who really owns UkrNaftoGas? Legally, it is a state company, but whom do they answer to? What are their real royalties? I would suggest, we do not know. A modest example of what I mean is when British Petroleum entered into a merger with the Russian private oil company TNK. At the time it happened I had a friend who worked for TNK, who said: "Everyone was very nervous. Why? Because of the question of ownership. You should understand how this company works. There are three levels of management. The first is senior management. We never see them. They are involved in political, geopolitical and geo-economic projects. We have people like me, who are junior management, and we are living in a state of insecurity wondering if we are going to have another job in two months. But most of the people here are middle management. What they do is steal". One might ask: who really owns them, whom do these people really work for?

If you want to understand the problem posed by the energy sector, particularly in Ukraine and Russia as well, you should think about the problems that had been and are posed by the Armed Forces of the former USSR. What do they have in common? 1) Both the energy and defense sector have at their disposal an immense amount of power and resources. 2) Both deal with issues that directly involve national security, and national survival -- even if the military primarily deals with the hardest traditional aspects of this, and energy is primarily about the

Кабинета министров Украины с Советом национальной безопасности и обороны Украины? Или все было решено в гостиничном номере на обратной стороне конверта? Контролировали ли официальные структуры этот процесс, или он совершался в тени кучкой непрофессионалых, но доверенных людей? Все это риторические вопросы, т.к. ответы на них очевидны.

Аналогично ситуации с прозрачностью на Северном Кавказе, главный вопрос заключается лишь в том, чтобы реально знать: какое решение было принято, где, кем и почему (говоря о соглашении от 4 января)? Ответы неизвестны.

Следующий вопрос - собственность. Кто владеет РосУкрЭнерго? Неведомо. Кто на самом деле владеет Укрнефтегазом? Юридически, это госкомпания, но кому она подчиняется? Каковы ее реальные прибыли? Наверное, это тоже неизвестно. Хороший пример того, что и имею в виду, задавая эти вопросы, произошел с Бритиш Петролеум. Когда эта компания слилась с российской частной нефтевой компанией ТНК, то там работал мой друг, и он сказал: "Все на нервах. Из-за чего? Из-за вопроса собственности. Нужно понимать, как работает эта компания. Есть три уровня менеджмента. Первый - старшие менеджеры. Мы никогда их не видим. Они занимаются политически, геополитическими и геоэкономическими проектами. Такие как я - это младшие менеджеры, живущие в состоянии постоянной неопределенности, боясь через пару месяцев потерять работу. Но большинство сотрудников компании - средние менеджеры. Они занимаются тем, что воруют". А теперь вопрос: кто их хозяин и на кого эти люди работают?

Если вы хотите понять проблемы энергетического сектора - особенно в Украине и РФ, то вы должны вспомнить о проблемах, которые были и остаются в наследие от Вооруженных сил бывшего СССР. Что между ними общего? 1) И энергетический, и оборонный сектора имеют в своих руках огромную власть и ресурсы. 2) Оба непосредственно соприкасаются с национальной безопасностью и выживанием нации - даже пусть военные традиционно больше оперируют самыми жесткими формами их обеспечения, а энергетика, в основном, занимается более мягкими аспектами.

3) Нельзя начать контролировать, или влиять, или вырабатывать политику в обеих сферах, не имея достаточных знаний. Эти знания получить очень трудно, т.к. нужно стать настоящим экспертом, на-
softer aspects of this. 3) You cannot begin to control or influence or make policy in either without substantive knowledge. Knowledge of both areas is very difficult to acquire as it involves real expertise, e.g., rigorous [at least two years] training in the so-called military sciences. All this expertise exists only inside these institutions. But what should other institutions, that need this expertise, do - e.g., the Parliament of Ukraine, Presidential Administration, office of the President, society at large, NGO's, and other experts? The other two problems are very similar. That is total lack of transparency, and an inability to understand what is going on inside -- unless you are part of it or you have special ties and connections inside these institutions. There is a total arrogance about themselves and a complete absence of any accountability to anyone but themselves. The problems are very similar. I have a friend who periodically negotiates with Gasprom. He said to me one day that talking with Gasprom is like talking to the Soviet General Staff. The challenge of this is that NATO recognizes that even if Ukraine was very serious [and it has become such] in reforming its defense and military structures, it could not do this entirely on its own. The result of this has become a whole menu of NATO-Ukraine cooperation, which primarily works through the Working Group on Defense Reform. It has done an immense amount to change not only the military system, but also the military culture in Ukraine. But the other question is: Are the EU and NATO willing and able to resurrect equivalent institutional mechanisms to begin the process of transforming Ukraine's energy sector and helping Ukraine develop a national energy strategy, which can be really sustainable and implemented? The answer to that will not simply affect Ukraine and its security. It will affect the Black Sea region as well as Europe and the U.S.
Regional separatist issues
Проблемы регионального сепаратизма

1. Current state of play in frozen conflicts.
2. How does the conflict in Kosovo relates to the conflicts in the former Soviet-ruled territories? And if some outcome of Kosovo is yet to be determined, could or could not serve the model and precedent for the resolution of all post-Soviet conflicts.

Vladimir SOCOR

There are four conflicts in the former Soviet-ruled countries: Abkhazia, Karabah, South Ossetia and Transnistria. They are often misleadingly known as ethnic conflicts. They are perceived largely as inter-communal conflicts between ethnic communities in the respective countries. That perception was partly warranted during the final years of the Soviet Union and in post-Soviet years. But it is a perception that is clearly outdated today. These conflicts have transcended that level. They have become interstate conflicts with clear geopolitical implications that reverberates not only beyond the boundaries of these countries. They have impact on the region itself with implications for security in Eurasia and worldwide, and in some ways even for global security in terms of transit of energy from Caspian countries to consumer countries in the West, because those transit routes traverse the South Caucasus, where three of these four conflicts are ongoing.

Moreover, the interstate dimension of these conflicts has been accentuated by Russian
President's Putin and Foreign Minister's Lavrov recent statements attempting to link the resolution of these post-Soviet conflicts with the resolution of the Kosovo conflict. That too adds an interstates conflicts international dimension to our conflicts within this region.

To give a very brief presentation of the state of play of each of these conflicts, let us take them from West to East in this geographical order.

Transnistria

There has been a very significant development in the last few months. Most significant one was that the EU has established a physical presence on the Transnistria sector of the Ukraine-Moldova border. This is an unprecedented step for the EU, which until very recently had consigned the Transnistria conflict along with others to something called the EU-Russia common neighborhood, implying that both sides - the EU and Russia - would have roughly even prerogative to determine the outcomes in these conflicts.

Since last December, the EU is taking step on its own deploying the European Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) on what is Europe's largest black hole in terms of illicit trading and various forms of illegal trafficking through the 460 km-long unpoliced border between Ukraine and Moldova on the Transnistrian sector. It was and still is controlled by Ukrainian side in a very lax way along massive trafficking and smuggling, and by Russia-supported Transnistrian forces the Transnistrian side of what is the international law the Ukraine-Moldova border.

Since March 3rd of this year the EU has successfully prevailed on Ukraine to police the border very effectively under an arrangement that introduces a new border regime and customs regulations that are aimed at suppressing the smuggling on the part of the leadership in Tiraspol. That's a major qualitative change.

Secondly, the negotiating framework, which had until a few months ago been overwhelmingly dominated directly or indirectly by the Russian side, has now become more balanced because the EU and the US have joined this negotiating framework. It is now known as "5+2". Five full participants are Russia, Ukraine, Transnistria, Moldova and OSCE. The old framework was heavily unbalanced in Russia's favor. Now the US and the EU are performing their roles as observers very effectively.

Гарвардская Программа Черноморской Безопасности-2006
Abkhazia

In Abkhazia, as in South Ossetia, we have noticed two accelerating trends in the last months. The first trend is almost completion of the de-facto incorporation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia into the Russian Federation without any legal arrangements. This de-facto incorporation proceeds on the economic and military front. There is a new emphasis on military instruments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia with a growing number of Russian officers being seconded for leadership posts in the Abhaz and the South Ossetian military, and those growing rhetorical militancy both in Moscow and in Suhumi and Tshinvali. Regarding post-war resolution of the conflict, if not immediately but after some time through absorption in some way into the Russian Federation, there is a new emphasis that in recent months has become heavier than it was previously the case.

In the case of Abkhazia, the negotiating framework remains heavily dominated by Russia. Although, Western countries are present, but present rather as ineffective bystanders.

Within that framework Russian diplomats in the last couple of months have introduced two changes - two diplomatic documents that are being issued in that context. One change consists of abandoning the document that had previously served as basis for negotiations. That is the document known as the Boden Paper, named after the German diplomat Dieter Boden who in 2002 authored this document on the division of competencies between Tbilisi and Suhumi in the framework of the reunified Georgian state in the future. The assumption was that the settlement was going to consist the division of competencies. The Boden document was very flexible; it did not set any specific terms, only the principle of the division of competencies between Tbilisi and Suhumi. The Russian side has recently vetoed references to the Boden document in the negotiating process.

Abхазия

В Абхазии, аналогично Южной Осетии, за последние месяцы отмечено две усиливающиеся тенденции. Первая тенденция - это практически завершение де-факто включения Абхазии и Южной Осетии в РФ без к.-л. юридических рамок. Это де-факто присоединение происходит на экономическом и военном фронте. Новый упор в Абхазии и Южной Осетии делается на военные инструменты; причем, все больше российских офицеров назначаются на вторые по важности руководящие посты в вооруженных силах Абхазии и Южной Осетии, а также усиливаются воинственная риторика в Москве, Сухуми и Цхинвали. В смысле послевоенного разрешения конфликта если не сразу, то некоторое время спустя посредством поглощения к.-л. путем в состав РФ, то подобный новый акцент за последние месяцы усилился в сравнении с прошлым.

В случае Абхазии, на переговорный механизм по-прежнему существенно влияет Россия. И хотя западные страны имеют свое присутствие, но они, скорее, являются лишь неэффективными сторонними наблюдателями.

В рамках этого механизма, за последние пару месяцев российские дипломаты внесли два изменения: в этом контексте были представлены два дипломатических документа. Один прекращает действие документа, который до этого служил основой для переговоров. Он известен как Документ Бодена в честь германского дипломата Дитера Бодена, который в 2002 г. стал автором этого документа о разделении полномочий между Тбилиси и Сухуми в пределах воссоединенного в будущем Грузинского государства. Считалось, что урегулирование должно
The second change is that the UN Security Council vowing to Russia's veto power has eliminated references to the outcome of the negotiations. Until now, the official goal of the negotiations was defining Abkhazia's status in Georgia. This phrase was eliminated a few months ago and again eliminated a few weeks ago for the second time from UN Security Council documents. In the case of South Ossetia there is also new development pointing in the same direction. The Russian Prime-Minister Mikhail Fradkov's top aid who handles frozen conflicts Gennadiy Bukayev, recently organized a meeting with the North Ossetian and South Ossetian authorities in Vladikavkaz, the capital of North Ossetia, where Bukayev advised both of those sets of authorities to accelerate economic integration of North and South Ossetia preparatory for political integration, which, Bukayev intimated, would follow in a short period of time.

Finally, in Karabakh the most significant recent development is the initiative taken by the US, to achieve modus vivendi and possibly a political settlement this year under American auspices. This is a very promising development. The US does not want to abandon or to shrink the existing negotiating framework, which exists nominally under the auspices of the OSCE and is chaired by three countries: Russia, the US and France. At that, France is not acting on behalf of the EU but on behalf of France itself as a national French project. Without questioning at all, the validity of this framework, the US has taken the initiative in it own hands. And the year 2006 is regarded as a key year because it is a year without parliamentary or presidential elections in either Armenia or Azerbaijan. This means 2006 is a window of opportunity. It would be a great success, in the first place for the peoples of Armenia and Azerbaijan, if this initiative succeeds in 2006. The first summit under this initiative of the Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents took place in Rambouet in February. It did not produce results. Nevertheless, I was pleased to see a new approach and new efforts on the part of the USA to resolve the conflict.
do not share the widespread perception that the lack of results in Rambouet doomed that process at all. We are only at the beginning of the year of opportunity: 2006 - early 2007. There is still plenty of time for success, and peoples and leaderships of Armenia and Azerbaijan are the most interested partners in such a success. So, as you see relative improvements in Moldova and Karabakh are deteriorating the outlook in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Another most recent development is the use by Russia of market access for Georgia and Moldova's agricultural products in Russia as an instrument of pressure on these countries. I'm sure the participants from Russia here are very well aware that Russia has banned the entry of Georgian and Moldavian wine to Russia, citing alleged dangers to health from drinking these wines. This move is aimed at dealing a severe blow to the economies of Moldova and Georgia, where a large number of people are engaged in the wine industry and related industries, and where a large part of the foreign exchange income and export income come precisely from the wine industry. It's also blow against the image of these countries. Wine industry in Moldova and Georgia is a matter of national pride, and to some extent national identity.

The reason for ban on wines is completely contrived. No one in Russia has ever suffered from poisoning from Georgian wines. Russia has a severe problem from alcoholic poisoning, but not from those wines. An in fact, Moldavian and Georgian wines are a contributor to the health even for poor strata in those countries. Wine is a major factor maintaining public health as well as in the diet of Georgians, Moldavians and Russians. Georgia and Moldova combined are accounted to 62% of Russia's total wine imports in 2005. Russia's sources of wine are diversifying. It is a growing volume of wines from Western Europe and also from the Southern hemisphere coming to Russia, but still the lion's share comes form Moldova and Georgia.

The issue that uppermost on the governments' minds, from Moscow to Yerevan, Tbilisi, Baku and also in the neighboring countries of Ukraine and Romania, is the declared policy of the Russian Federation to establish a linkage between the outcome of negotiations on Kosovo and the frozen conflicts in the former Soviet Union. In January of this year, the international contact group on Kosovo began discussing the final status of Kosovo with a
The goal of formulating that status by the end of 2006. President Putin, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and other Russian officials as well as Russian analytical community and massive coverage in the media are proposing establishing a link between Kosovo and the one hand, and the post-Soviet conflicts on the other hand. The theory is that they should be what Mr. Putin calls a single universal standard for resolving these conflicts. Russian policy states Russia supports Serbia's territorial integrity and, generally speaking, the principle of territorial integrity of countries and inviolability of borders. But in the event that negotiations in the Contact Group lead to international recognition of the independence of Kosovo, i.e. Kosovo's separation from Serbia and formation the independent state, then, Russian policy goes on, what should stop Russia from recognizing the succession and independence of unrecognized enclaves in the former Soviet countries?

Western governments reply that no single standard possible because every single conflict has its own characteristics. There are no two conflicts alike in Europe or elsewhere. Therefore, each solution has to be tailored to local circumstances to guarantee and effective and lasting settlement with account taken of local conditions, and the routes of the conflicts locally. There is no chance that any Western governments would accept the idea that there should be a single, universal standard. If Russia recognizes succession and independence of the four territories of the former Soviet Union, no government in the West and anywhere in the world would follow suit with possible but very hypothetical exception of Belarus under Alexander Lukashenko. But even that is questionable. Furthermore, it is unlikely that even Russia would recognize succession and independence process of the post-Soviet territories even if Kosovo is recognized as a separate and independent. Should Russia proceed the recognition of the four post-Soviet territories, it would, first, lose any chance in the indefinite future of exercising of any sort of influence over Georgia, Moldova or Azerbaijan. It would be branded as an aggressor because Russian troops are in place in three of those territories, and it would definitely meet with tense disapproval in the West.

So, the idea that Russia would recognize all post-Soviet territories if Kosovo is recognized, is rather an opening gambit in a complicated process of negotiations. Because at the same time Russian
diplomacy is encouraging the Serbian government to resist the separation of Kosovo, and to raise unsurpassable obstacles to it. Russian diplomacy is playing a very skilled game. It is trying to position itself as an ultimate arbiter or swing factor in both sets of ongoing negotiations, in four post-Soviet countries and in Kosovo, to seek opportunities for advantageous reallocations in either of them, and to be a very flexible player on both tracks.

The most reliable indicator that this is the case is the reaction of the leaderships in Tiraspol, Sukhumi, Tskhinvali and Stepanakert. They are not enthusiastic at all about the Russian proposal to establish direct connection between those four conflicts and Kosovo. The leaders in these four secessionist capitals have shown great caution and portion of skepticism about this Russian proposal. The gist of the arguments of these four secessionist capitals is “we have far better arguments than Kosovo for our separation and independence to be recognized”. They are quoting a lot of international cases which they consider to be precedents: East Timor in relation to Indonesia, Eritrea in relation to Ethiopia, the split of the former Czechoslovakia. They are shopping for precedents. They themselves say they don’t need a Kosovo precedent. Of course they would like to use it if such a precedent arises but they don’t bank on it. Because they see Russia is trying to extract maximum advantage for itself in both sets of negotiations, bargaining with the West for tradeoffs in return for Russia’s consent to Kosovo separation in one case, or in return for Russian acceptance in the UN Security Council and of some other Western initiatives in return for Russian free hands in the former Soviet Union.

Now let me return to the academic point correctly made by Western governments: there no two conflicts alike, and each conflict requires specific solutions tailored to local circumstances in order to be effective. Here is the chart which illustrates the differences between various conflicts in return for Russian acceptance in return for Russian tree withdrawals in return for Russian engagements. They are shopping for precedents. They therefore don’t need a Kosovo precedent. Of course they would like to use it if such a precedent arises but they don’t bank on it. Because they see Russia is trying to extract maximum advantage for itself in both sets of negotiations, bargaining with the West for tradeoffs in return for Russia’s consent to Kosovo separation in one case, or in return for Russian acceptance in the UN Security Council and of some other Western initiatives in return for Russian free hands in the former Soviet Union.

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ty was once established its autonomous decision to be within another Soviet republic).
2) POPULATION DISPLACEMENT (other than using an emotional term Ethnic Cleansing which is less correct, though it sometimes better displays the real picture).
3) ROUTES of CONFLICT in the societies of those regions.
4) AGENDA OF THE SECESSIONIST GROUPS (not to say separatist).
5) SOURCE OF EXTERNAL AUTHORITY (who determines political developments on the ground in each case?).
6) MILITARY PRESENCE.
7) NEGOTIATING MECHANISM.
8) CONSENT OR NON-CONSENT OF AN INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED STATE TO THE SUCCESSION OF A TERRITORY FROM ITS BORDERS.

So, these conflicts are very diverse. And Kosovo is incomparable to all post-Soviet conflicts as they are unique.

The idea of using the developments in the Balkans as a precedent for possible resolution of post-Soviet conflicts is not an old idea at all. It was first proposed by former Georgian President Eduard Shevarnadze. In 1995, at the time of the Dayton Agreements for Bosnia, Shevarnadze said this model could be applied in South Ossetia as a new type and quality of peacekeeping. Western peacekeeping in Bosnia took the form of peace enforcement under genuine international aegis. Whereas peacekeeping in Georgia in the 1990s was exclusively Russian affair, and did not propose settling the conflict, as it was the case in Bosnia, but on the contrary freezing it. Therefore, Shevarnadze proposed that Bosnia become a precedent to be applied to Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In 1999, it was also Shevarnadze who proposed that Kosovo be applied as a precedent usable in Georgia as the result of Western intervention in Kosovo was to reverse the ethnic cleansing of the Albanian majority by the Serbian minority supported from Belgrade. Shevarnadze wanted the same thing done in Abkhazia, reversing ethnic cleansing off the Georgians by the Abkhazs with help from Moscow and the North Caucasus. Shevarnadze insisted for years about the value of these precedents, and their relevance and applicability in the South Caucasus. It cut no eyes, ne, когда-то самостоятельно принявшей решение войти в состав другой советской республики).
2) ВЫТЕСНЕНИЕ НАСЕЛЕНИЯ (чтобы не использовать эмоциональный термин этническая чистка, являющийся менее корректным, хотя иногда он лучше отражает реальную картину).
3) ИСТОКИ КОНФЛИКТА в обществах конкретных регионов.
4) ЦЕЛИ ОТДЕЛИВШИХСЯ ГРУПП (чтобы не сказать сепаратистских).
5) ИСТОЧНИК ВНЕШНЕГО ВЛИЯНИЯ (кто определяет развитие политических событий на местах в каждом случае?).
6) ВОЕННОЕ ПРИСУТСТВИЕ.
7) ПЕРЕГОВОРНЫЙ МЕХАНИЗМ.
8) СОГЛАСИЕ ИЛИ НЕСОГЛАСИЕ МЕЖДУНАРОДНО-ПРИЗНАННОГО ГОСУДАРСТВА НА ВЫХОД К.ЦЛ. ТЕРРИТОРИИ ИЗ ЕГО СОСТАВА.

Итак, эти конфликты очень различаются. И Косово нельзя сравнивать со всеми постсоветскими конфликтами, т.к. все они уникальны.

Идея использовать события на Балканах как прецедент для возможного разрешения постсоветских конфликтов не нова. Впервые она была предложена бывшим Президентом Грузии Эдуардом Шеварнадзе. В 1995 г., во времена действия Дейтонских Соглашений по Боснии, Шеварнадзе заявил, что эта модель могла бы быть применена в Южной Осетии в качестве нового типа и качества миротворчества. Западное миротворчество в Боснии приняло форму принуждения к миру под реальной международной эгидой. В то время как миротворчество в Грузии в 1990-х гг. было исключительно делом России, это не способствовало урегулированию конфликта как в Боснии, а наоборот заморозило его. Поэтому Шеварнадзе предложил использовать прецедент Боснии для Грузии, Абхазии и Южной Осетии. В 1999 г. Шеварнадзе снова предложил применить прецедент Косово к Грузии в том смысле, что в результате западного вмешательства в Косово удалось прекратить этнические чистки албанского большинства сербским меньшинством, поддерживающим Белградом. Шеварнадзе хотел того же в Абхазии, т.е. прекращения этнических чисток грузин со стороны абхазов, поддерживающих Москвой и Северным Кавказом. Шеварнадзе несколько лет отстаивал ценность этих прецедентов, а также их адекватность и применимость для Южного Кавказа. Но все даром, т.к. в то время политика Запада,
because at that time overall Western policy, US and European, was still unclear and indefinite regarding the conflicts in the former Soviet Union. So, Shevarnadze's idea got nowhere. But Georgia for years insisted on the Kosovo precedent to be applied in that way, and the Bosnian precedent to be applied in that way to the South Caucasus.

Talking about today's situation, the reaction in Chisinau, Tbilisi, Baku, Yerevan, Kiev and Bucharest, which share these concerns, are is still indefinite. I don't think those governments have mad up their minds about how to respond to the present situation in Kosovo, and an apparent march of Kosovo to the independence by the end of 2006. In those mentioned capitals one idea is to influence the decision making on Kosovo in such a way, that is does not result in complete independence for Kosovo, so as to avoid the creation of a possible precedent or model. Some of these governments are trying to influence the Western position (the U.S. and the EU) regarding the final status of Kosovo.

The other ideas in the mentioned capitals suggest a complete separation between the Kosovo issue and the other post-Soviet conflicts, building, as I call it, "a legal and conceptual cementing fire wall" between Kosovo and the post-Soviet conflicts. My view, it is counterproductive for Chisinau, Tbilisi, Baku, Yerevan, Kiev and Bucharest to try to tinker with Western proposals on the Kosovo status, or to water it down for fear of creating a precedent. It would be much more productive for these capitals to echo, support and reinforce the Western contention that there can be no possible precedent or model. This is the position of all Western actors involved, without exception. It is a very important point gained in this discussion. It serves no useful purpose to try to establish a conceptual, legal linkage where it does not exist in the first place, and where Western policies recognize it does not exist.

It might be a useful discussion point in debates to reply along the following lines. If you really want a Kosovo precedent for the post-Soviet countries, fine. Let's bring in NATO troops. Let's install Western protectorates under the EU aegis in Transdniestria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Karabakh. Of course, that's unrealistic. Such a retort could earn debating points, but only on a theoretical level. And it will jeopardize the basic point which is cementing that firewall. So, those negotiations in all of these five sets of negotiations reflect that separation and the uniqueness of each conflict.

США и Европы в отношении бывшего СССР все еще была неясной и неопределенной. Так что идея Шеварнадзе ни к чему не привела. Но Грузия годами настаивала на том, чтобы прецеденты Косово и Боснии использовать на Южном Кавказе.

Говоря о сегодняшней ситуации, реакция Кишинева, Тбилиси, Баку, Еревана, Киева и Бухареста, которых касаются аналогичные проблемы, по-прежнему остается неопределенной. Я не думаю, что правительства этих стран уже решили, как реагировать на нынешнюю ситуацию в Косово и явное движение Косово к независимости к концу 2006 г. В упомянутых столицах один из подходов заключается в том, чтобы влиять на принятие решений по Косово т.о., чтобы это не привело к полной независимости Косово и созданию возможного прецедента или модели.

Некоторые из этих правительств пытаются влиять на позицию Запада (США и ЕС) в отношении окончательного статуса Косово.

Другие подходы в упомянутых столицах предполагают полное отделение вопроса Косово от других постсоветских конфликтов, выстраивая, как я это называю, "легальную и концептуальную защитную стену из бетона" между Косово и постсоветскими конфликтами. На мой взгляд, для Кишинева, Тбилиси, Баку, Еревана, Киева и Бухареста непродуктивно тратить время впустую, рассматривая предложениями Запада по статусу Косово, или же "толочь воду в ступе" из-за боязни создать прецедент. Этим столицам было бы более продуктивно продублировать, поддержать и усилить риторику Запада о том, что создание прецедента или модели невозможно. Такова позиция всех западных участующих сторон без исключения. Это очень важная позиция, достигнутая во время переговоров. Во-первых, бесполезно пытаться создать концептуальную законную аналогию там, где ее не существует там, где западная политика признает, что ее не существует.

Быть может, полезным предметом для обсуждения в дебатах могла бы быть следующая логика. Если вы действительно хотите применить косовский прецедент для постсоветских стран, хорошо. Но тогда давайте введем туда войска НАТО. Давайте установим западные протектораты под эгидой ЕС в Приднестровье, Абхазии, Южной Осетии и Карабахе. Конечно, это нереально. Подобная риторика возможна лишь для теоретических дискуссий. Ведь она подрывает главную опору, удерживающую защитную стену. В целом же, все упомянутые пять переговорных форматов отражают существующие отличия и уникальность каждого конфликта.
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<th>Territory</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>Majority of Albanians/ Serbian</td>
<td>Ethnic-religious+land ownership: Belgrade's policy of setting Serbian minority in</td>
<td>Independent state</td>
<td>Western countries acting through</td>
<td>NATO, US troops (Brindisi base), EU military</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>authorities/Reversed</td>
<td>Albanian territories since WW2</td>
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<td>EU protectorate</td>
<td>elements</td>
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<td>Western with a symbolic Russian role</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transnistrian Moldovan Republic (TMR)</td>
<td>Moldavians</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>Few % of Moldavians in TMR's big cities/TMR authorities/Not reversed</td>
<td>Political+shadow economy, smuggling and other illegal activities' profits</td>
<td>Political and business status quo</td>
<td>Basically Russia, which backs Russian-born leaders, often Russian citizens. Russia massively assists politically and economically, more than $1 billion in the last 10 years for gas debts</td>
<td>Russian troops</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>Non-native Russians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Russian troops</td>
<td>Russian-dominated especially until a few months ago</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abkhazia (pre-conflict)</td>
<td>Abkhazs</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td>Majority of Georgians/ Russian-backed Abkhaz authorities/ Not reversed</td>
<td>Ethnic-religious (limited)</td>
<td>Unclear; variants: independent state from Russia and Georgia; accession to Russia-accession to Georgia</td>
<td>Similar to TMR: Russia dictates politically, economically, and in military and security terms</td>
<td>Russian troops</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Georgians</td>
<td>44%</td>
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<td>Russian troops</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Ossetia (post-conflict)</td>
<td>Ossetians</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>Balanced displacement by both Ossetians and Georgians, respectively, to North Ossetia and Georgia/Not reversed</td>
<td>Ethnic+self-identity and social problems</td>
<td>Reunification with North Ossetia; incorporation into Russia</td>
<td>Similar to TMR and Abkhazia: Russia dictates politically, economically, and in military and security terms</td>
<td>Russian troops</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Georgians</td>
<td>30%</td>
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<td>Russian troops</td>
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<td>Karabakh (pre-conflict)</td>
<td>Armenians</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>Majority of Azerbaijan/Azerbaijani authorities/Not reversed</td>
<td>Ethnic+religious(a factor)</td>
<td>Unification with Armenia in every sense</td>
<td>Strong Russian support + Karabakh-born President Kocharian and Defense Minister Sargsyan (presumably successor to Kocharyan)</td>
<td>Armenian troops</td>
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<th>Территория</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Косово</td>
<td>Альбанцы</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>Большинство альбанцев/ Сербское</td>
<td>Этические, религиозные, владение землей: политика Белграда по расселению сербов в</td>
<td>Независимое государство</td>
<td>Западные страны, действующие через</td>
<td>Войска США, НАТО (база Бондстил), военные</td>
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<td>властн/Возвращено</td>
<td>Косово на альбанской земле после 2-й</td>
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<td>Администратор от ЕС</td>
<td>элементы ЕС</td>
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<td>мировой войны</td>
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<tr>
<td>Приднестровская Молдавская Республика (ПМР)</td>
<td>Молдаване</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>Мало % молодан в больших городах ПМР/ властн/Не возвращено</td>
<td>Политические, теневая экономика, контроль книпи́ть от других незаконных действий</td>
<td>Политический и бизнес статус-кво</td>
<td>В основном РФ, которая поддерживает родившихся в России лидеров – частое граждан РФ, Ф широко помогает политико, экономическое, более $1 млрд за прошлые 10 лет за газовые долги</td>
<td>Российские войска</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Украинцы</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>Немецкие русские 25%</td>
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<td>Доминирует РФ, Западные страны играют символическую роль</td>
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<td>Этические, частично религиозные</td>
<td>Неопределен; варианты: независимые от РФ и Грузии государственное присоединение к РФ, присоединение к Грузии</td>
<td>Аналогично ПМР: РФ диктует политически, экономически, а также в сферах военной и безопасности</td>
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<td>Российские войска</td>
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<td>Этические, самозащита и социальные проблемы</td>
<td>Воссоединение с Осетией в состав РФ</td>
<td>Аналогично ПМР и Абхазия : РФ диктует политически, экономически, а также в сферах военной и безопасности</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Объединение с Армянами во всех отношениях</td>
<td>Сильная поддержка РФ и рожденных в Карачаеве Президент Кохарян и Министер Обороны Саргсян (возможна замена Кохаряна)</td>
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Struggle for superiority in the Black Sea region. Combat capabilities of the Russian Black Sea fleet and Turkish Naval forces

Аfter the fall of the Soviet Union, the appearance of new independent states, the aims and strategy of Black Sea Region countries have received the new contents. The main players on the geopolitical field of the Black Sea Region at the beginning of a new century have become Russian Federation and Turkey - these both states see themselves as regional leaders in the Black Sea. In a large game a great enough role is allotted to the naval forces, whose task is to achieve domination in the Black Sea to provide geopolitical influence on all the region.

Maybe, our country will not be touched by those processes, but there is one thing - the Russian Black Sea Fleet, basing on the Ukrainian territory in the Crimea. So, with or without our wish, Ukraine has appeared drawn to the sphere of competition the navies of two neighboring states.

Russian Federation, increasing combat potential of units and task groups of the Black Sea Fleet located in the Crimea, explains its actions by that fact, that this is an adequate response to the naval forces of other Black Sea Countries, namely Turkey, increase. According to the evaluations of...
some Russian experts, the Turkish naval forces during the last 5 - 10 years have reached 2.5 - 3 superiority over the Black Sea Fleet. Is it really so?

Actually, in the second half of 90-th, when in the Black Sea Fleet as in all Russian Navy there were the processes of uncontrolled reduction of the ships, in the Turkish naval forces, first time during the last 20 years, was developed a wide program of ships and armament modernization - in 1996 was developed and confirmed the Perspective plan of the Turkish naval forces modernization until 2025. According to the plan it was foreseen the reinforcement of the Navy with armament Ц 2006. It was directed a 10-year Program on buying and supply to nowadays requirements. To reach these goals the main efforts were directed on buying the contemporary armament which may be put to the serial production, installation of modern techniques, the reduction of ships, which do not correspond to nowadays requirements. To reach these goals it was directed a 10-years Program on buying and supply the Navy with armament - 2006.

As to opinion of military and political leadership of Turkey, the realization of these programs will give a possibility to support the combat capabilities and weaponry of the Navy on the level sufficient to restrain aggression from the sea directions and guarantee the national security of the state. The today's condition of the Turkish naval forces - is an evidence, that they have chosen the right course that time.

The condition of the Russian Black Sea Fleet is not so deplorable. By the end of 90-th the Black Sea Fleet Command was in success to crush the trends to reduction the combat potential of the fleet. The ship-repair industry began to work at a full might - the cruiser "Moskva", the patrol submarine "Alrosa" and etc. were commissioned. The fleet received the new ships - missile catamaran (PGGF) "Samum", minesweeper (MSO) "Valentin Pikul". In the fleet aviation it was created the strike component - 24 front bombers Su-24 "Fencer". Naval infantry was reinforced with a separate battalion, located in the Caucasus coast.

The main short-comings of the Russian activities to increase the combat potential of the fleet at that period - the lack of systematic approaches, the lack of balanced program of the Navy modernization. And it is clear: on the background of the crisis of 90-th, the Russian leadership didn't pay attention to the Navy problems. The situation began cardinaly change at the beginning of new decade - it was adopted the Maritime Doctrine of the state, and it began the realization of a "World Ocean" federal program. On
appearance the conceptual documents it has begun the development of federal shipbuilding and ship-repair programs. As to the words of Russian MoD leadership, there exists an united vision of the Black Sea Fleet future - the fleet will be reinforced by multipurpose ships of "frigate - corvette" classes, submarines. On July 27, 2005, while celebration the Navy Day in Sevastopol, Sergey Ivanov declared: "The new ships for the Black Sea Fleet are already being built".

Scheme 1.
Turkish Naval Forces.

Submarines-patrol

Total (SSK) ............................ 14
Class, years of building .............. G?r (209/1400) 2001-2007
Names ................. G?r, ?anakkale, Burakreis, I.Inonu
Class, years of building .............. Preveze (209/1400) 1989-2000
Names ............... Preveze, Sakarya, 18 mart, Anafartalar
Class, years of building .............. Ay (209/1200) 1972-1981
Names .............. Atilay, Sald?ray, Batiray, Yildiray, Do?anay, Dolunay

Frigates

Total (FFGHM, FFGH) ................. 20
Class, years of building .......... Salihreis (MEKO200-IIB) 1995-1997
Names ............... Salihreis, Kemalreis
Class, years of building .............. Barbaros (MEKO200-IIA), 1993
Names .............. Barbaros, Orucreis
Class, years of building .............. Yavuz (MEKO200-II), 1985-1987
Names .............. Yavuz, Turgutreis, Fath, Yildirim
Class, years of building .............. Gabya (O.H.Perry), 1978-1980
Names .............. Gabya, Giresun, G?ksu, Gelibolu, Gediz, Gokova, G7kusu
Class, years of building .............. Tepe (Knox), 1970-1971
Names .............. Tepe, Muavenet, Zafer, Karadeniz, Ege

Corvettes

Total (FFH) .......................... 6
Class, years of building .......... Aviso (A-69), 1972-1976
Names .............. Bozcaada, Bodrum, Bandirma

Fast patrol boat/Corvettes-missile

Total (PFGF, PFGF) ....................... 6
Class, years of building .......... K?lk, 1997-1999
Names .............. K?lk, Kalkan, Mizrak
Class, years of building .............. Kil? (II), 1997-2006
Names .............. Tufan, Meltem, Imbat

Fast attack craft

Total (PGGF, PTGF) ...................... 18
Class, years of building .......... Yildiz, 1996
Names .............. Yildiz, Karayel
Class, years of building .......... Dogan, 1977-1980
Names .............. Dogan, Marti, Tayfun, Volkanc
Class, years of building .......... Kartal, 1966-1970
Names .............. Denizkusu, Atmaca, Sahin, Kartal
Pe?kan, Alb?ros, Simsec, Kasirga
Class, years of building .......... Ruzgar, 1985-1988
Names .............. Ruzgar, Poyraz, Gurbet, Firtina

работы федеральных целевых кораблестроительных и судоремонтных программ. По словам руководства Министерства обороны России, уже существует единое видение будущего Черноморского флота - флот будет пополняться многоцелевыми кораблями класса "фрегат-корвет", подводными лодками. 27 июля на праздновании Дня ВМФ России в Севастополе министр обороны России Сергей Иванов заявил: "Новые корабли для Черноморского флота уже строятся".

Таблица 1.
Боевой состав Военно-Морских Сил Турции

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| Примечание: * - находятся в стадии строительства, |
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Кол-во ...................................................... 1
Тип, год постройки .................................. Проект 1164, 1983
Наименование ........................................ Москва

Подводные лодки
Кол-во ...................................................... 2
Тип, год постройки .................................. Проект 877 с, 1990
Наименование .......................................... Апоса

Тип, год постройки .................................. Проект 6416, 1982
Наименование .......................................... Горьковский комсомолец

Эсминцы
Кол-во ...................................................... 7

Большие противолодочные корабли
Кол-во ...................................................... 2
Тип, год постройки .................................. Проект 1134, 1973-1975
Наименование .......................................... Очаков, Керчь

Ракетные корабли 2 ранга
Кол-во ...................................................... 7
Тип, год постройки .................................. Проект 2323, 1989-1993
Наименование .......................................... Апра, Сум, СКР

Тип, год постройки .................................. Проект 61, 1969
Наименование .......................................... Сметливый

Тип, год постройки .................................. Проект 1135 (1135м), 1989-1981
Наименование .......................................... Ладный, Пытливый

Малые ракетные корабли
Кол-во ...................................................... 3
Тип, год постройки .................................. Проект 1234 (1234.1)
Наименование .......................................... Мирах, Штиль, Зарница

Ракетные катера
Кол-во ...................................................... 6
Тип, год постройки .................................. Проект 1241.1 (1241.7), 1981-1990
Наименование .......................................... Ивановец, Р-334, Р-109, Р-239, Р-71

Тип, год постройки .................................. Проект 206мр, 1978
Наименование .......................................... Р-44

Малые противолодочные корабли (корветы)
Кол-во ...................................................... 7
Тип, год постройки .................................. Проект 1124 (1124м), 1976-1989
Наименование .......................................... Гайдуцкий, Муromets, Александровец

Тип, год постройки .................................. Проект 1145.1, 1987-1990
Наименование .......................................... Владимировец

Тип, год постройки .................................. Проект 1141пс, 1980
Наименование .......................................... Касимов

Патрульные катера
Кол-во ...................................................... 5
Тип, год постройки .................................. Проект 368пс, 1971
Наименование .......................................... АК-527

Тип, год постройки .................................. Проект 1400
Наименование .......................................... ЛК-331, ЛК-407, ЛК-831, ЛК-833

Большие десантные корабли
Кол-во ...................................................... 7
Тип, год постройки .................................. Проект 775, 1986-1990
Наименование .......................................... Олы, Азов, Новочеркасск, Цезарь Кукков

Тип, год постройки .................................. Проект 1171, 1966-1976
наименование .......................................... Орск, Саратов, Николай Филимонов
So, taking into consideration that fact, that Turkey has finished in 2006 the first stage of their naval forces modernization, but Russia only starts the systematic changes in the combat component of the Black Sea Fleet, there is now exists a certain preponderance of the Turkish naval forces on the Black Sea. But is it so large, as the Russian specialists tell about it? The analysis of correlation testifies that the large antisubmarine ships, large attack (missile) ships on air cushion and patrol frigates should be attributed to the destroyers. This classification is not correct, but it is based on various Russian reference books.

Notes: * - the authors do not consider that the large antisubmarine ships, large attack (missile) ships on air cushion and patrol frigates should be attributed to the destroyers. This classification is not correct, but it is based on various Russian reference books.

Таким образом, учитывая то, что Турция в 2006 году завершила первый этап модернизации своих BMC, а Россия только приступает к системным изменениям в боевом потенциале флота на Чёрном море, некоторый перевес турецких военно-морских сил на Чёрном море существует. Но так ли он велик как говорят об этом российские специалисты?

Получается, что антисубмаринная во время соотношение BMC Турции и ЧФ России по основным классам кораблей и сил представлено в диаграммах № 1 и № 2.

Анализ соотношения сил свидетельствует о том, что российское командование не согласны с данными, опубликованными в Гарвардской программе Черноморской Безопасности.

Впрочем, Генеральный директор НИИ Пирогова В.В. Жуков, указывал на то, что анализ различных данных российских справочников приводит к неравномерности отображения сил BMC Турции и ЧФ России по различным классам кораблей и сил.
С другой стороны, турки имеют бесспорное превосходство в ударных силах ближней зоны. И не просто превосходство, в последние годы их флот пополнился современными фрегатами УРО типа MEKO200 и MEKO200-II классов, ракетными катерами типа Kili?. Списание устаревших и ввод в боевой состав новых кораблей проводится по схеме "корабль на корабль" то есть без ущерба для боевых возможностей флота. К 2008 году ВМС Турции должны иметь в своем составе 24 фрегата УРО и не менее 20 современных ракетных катеров Kili?, - "ракетных корветов" по турецкой классификации. Уже сегодня по количеству крылатых ракет в первом залпе турецкий флот превосходит ЧФ России почти в три раза. Количество ПКР в залпе корабельной группировки ВМС Турции - 280 (252 "Гарпун", 16 "Пингвин", 12 "Эксосет"), Черноморского флота - 78 (16 "Базальт", 22 "Москит", 12 "Малахит", 8 "Термин", 16 ракет-торпед). Видимо отсюда и возникли цифры о трехкратном превосходстве южного соседа. При таком соотношении сил противопоставить Турции Россия может только ресурс поддерживающей стратегической авиации.

Второй пункт, по которому ВМС Турции имеет бесспорный перевес - подводный флот. Двум российским лодкам противостоят одиннадцать турецких. Подводные силы являются одним из приоритетов в модернизации турецких ВМС. Хотя внешне количество ПЛ в составе флота за пять
The second point, where the Turkish naval forces have an indisputable superiority - the submarine fleet. To 2 Russian submarines oppose 14 Turkish ones. The submarine forces are one of the priorities in the Turkish naval forces modernization. The quantity of the Turkish submarines during five years has reduced almost two times, it was the process of substitution the old American submarines "Guppy" and "Tang" classes to German 209/1200 and 209/1400 types, which were considered to be the best in the world. According to the closest planes of the Turkish military, is buying or building on the national shipyards submarines with anaerobic engines. However, to the powerful submarine forces of Turkey the Russian Black Sea Fleet may oppose rather strong task group of antisubmarine forces. In distinction from the NATO Navies, which consist of multipurpose ships in principle, the Russian Navy has large and small antisubmarine ships: there are 2 large antisubmarine ships, 3 frigates and 7 small antisubmarine ships in the combat component of Black Sea Fleet. This fleet has a large antisubmarine aviation - 13 aircraft Be-12 "Mail" and 20 helicopters Ka-27 "Helix".

The third point, which is sufficiently visual - the superiority of Turkey in landing ships and boats. Let us consider it in details. The visibility of a disbalance appears because of the presence in the Turkish naval forces almost half a hundred landing boats, although on quantity of landing ships the main classes, correlation is 7:5 to the Russian Black Sea Fleet favor. The general capacity for one Black Sea Fleet LST in taking marines aboard is 2100, Turkish LST - 2980. The manpower of Russian Naval infantry on the Black Sea is 2900, and Turkish marines is 3000, so the quantity of LST of both navies is almost equal and corresponds the necessity. The presence in the Turkish Navy LCT and LCM is necessary while a conflict with Greece in the Aegean Sea, where the fight will be for a large number of small islands, where the usage of large landing ships is not expedient. It does not concern the Black Sea Theater, which physical conditions are absolutely another. Nevertheless, the Turks have no objections to correct this situation in their favor - the Turkish Navy Command Scientific Center together with Taskizak Naval Yard (Istanbul) has been developing the project of LPD ship, to be built on national shipyards. The main requirements the ships are: marines aboard capacity - to 560, 4 LCVP, 4 helicopters.

лет сократилось почти вдвое, реально шел процесс замены устаревших американских лодок типов Guppy и Tang на немецкие 209/1200 и 209/1400 проектов, которые в своем классе считаются одними из лучших в мире. В ближайших планах турецких военных - закупка или строительство на национальных верфях подводных лодок с анаэробными энергетическими установками. Однако, мощным подводным силам Турции Черноморский флот может противопоставить довольно сильную группировку противолодочных сил. В отличие от военно-морских сил стран НАТО, которые состоят в основном из многоцелевых кораблей, ВМФ РФ имеет на вооружении большие и малые противолодочные корабли: в боевом составе ЧФ 2 бпк, 3 скр и 7 мпк. Флот имеет также большую противолодочную авиацию - 13 самолетов Бе-12ПЛ и 20 вертолетов Ка-27ПЛ.

Третий момент, который сразу бросается в глаза - видимое превосходство Турции по десантносапливальным средствам. Рассмотрим его подробнее. Видимость дисбаланса возникает вследствие наличия в составе турецких ВМС почти полусотни десантных катеров, хотя по количеству амфибийных кораблей основных классов соотношение составляет 7:5 в пользу Черноморского флота России. Общая десантносапливаемость БДК ЧФ - 2100 морских пехотинцев, ТДК ВМС Турции - 2980 морпехов. Исходя из того, что численность российской морской пехоты на Черном море - 2900 человек, а в МП ВМС Турции - 3000 человек, количество десантных кораблей обоих флотов соответствует потребности и примерно равно. Наличие же у турок десантных катеров определяется тем, что при возникновении конфликта с Грецией в Эгейском море, где борьба будет идти за большое количество мелких островов, использование больших десантных кораблей нецелесообразно. Это не касается черноморского театра, физико-географические условия которого совершенно другие. Хотя, по видимому турки не против исправить этот пробел - Научным центром командования ВМС Турции совместно с Taskizak Naval Yard (Стамбул) уже разрабатывается проект десантного корабля типа LPD, который бы строился на национальных судоверфях. Основные требования к кораблю: десантносапливаемость до 560 морских пехотинцев, 4 десантносапливочные средства типа LCVP, вертолетная площадка на 4 вертолета.

Развитию противоминных сил придают особое значение обе стороны. В минувшем
Both sides pay a great attention to the development of mine countermeasure forces. In 2005 the Black Sea Fleet was reinforced by minesweeper-ocean "Valentin Pikul", and as to the words of Russian military, in future they would receive not less than one more ship. The Turkish naval forces have begun the building of a new series of minehunters "Aydin" class (it is a modernized German 332 type).

It is necessary to mention, that Russia pays attention to this problem on the background of three times reduction of its coastal line, but Turkey's coastal line can't be compared with any Black Sea country. The Turkish Navy leadership considers the quality and quantity of mine countermeasures ships extremely insufficient to guarantee the mine countermeasures defense of the Navy and merchant shipping in the strategic important regions for the Turkish economy: in zone of the Turkish Straits, the eastern part of Mediterranean, the Aegean and Black Seas. As a result, despite the insignificant growth of mine flotilla, the mine countermeasure forces of Turkish Navy have undergone considerable changes - were commissioned contemporary minehunters of French production "Circe" class ("E" as to Turkish classification), in February 2005 in German shipyard Abeking & Rasmussen it was finished the building of the minehunter "Alanya", which should become the first ship in the series of 6 Turkish minesweepers "Aydin" class (two of them "Amasra" and "Ayvalik", built on the national shipyard Pendik Naval Shipyard) are commissioned now.

We should like to consider separately the aviation components of the fleets. In 1999 the maritime assault squadron of the Black Sea Fleet, located at the airfield Gvardeyskoe (Crimea) was reinforced with 24 Su-24 (20 Su-24M front bombers and 4 reconnaissance aircraft Su-24MR). The appearance of maritime tactical aviation in the Black Sea Fleet has a large enough significance in forces correlation in the field of immediate aviation support of the fleets. The matter is, that the Turkish naval forces do not have tactical aviation in its structure, and the level of existing interoperability between the Naval forces, Air force and Army aviation, as to the opinion of Turkish military, is unsatisfactory and not corresponding the nowadays conditions.

From the other side, the Turkish naval forces aviation during the latest time was reinforced by
contemporary anti-submarine aircraft: to change morally and physically old S-2E "Tracker" were received modernized Spanish CN-235D/K "Series" for the Maritime Patrol Aviation. Soon they'll receive 10 more aircraft ATR-72ASW "Meal" (contract on their delivery was signed with ALENIA company in July, 2005). The Russian amphibious aircraft Be-12PL, (thirteen of them are now in the Black Sea Fleet) despite their positive qualities, have become obsolete. Their substitution with contemporary A-40 "Albatros" at the nearest time is not foreseen.

As to the shipborne helicopters of maritime aviation, there is a helicopter antisubmarine regiment in the structure of the Black Sea Fleet - two tens of Ka-27 "HelixA/B" - one of the best ASW helicopters in the world. Turkey, to arm frigates MEKO-200 class, buys shipborne helicopters AB-212ASW "Agusta" and S-70B "Sea Hawk". The substitution of helicopters had begun in 2002, when the Turks received 8 ASW helicopters S-70B (Sykorsky company). In July 2005, it was signed additional contract with this firm on delivery 12+5
helicopters SH-60B in antisubmarine and patrol variants to substitute the helicopters AB-21ASW/EW (8 and 3 helicopters correspondingly) and AB-204AS (3 helicopters). The new helicopters must be received in 2007. So, by the quantity of shipborne helicopters the Turkish naval forces have practically caught up the Russians, and maybe in the nearest future they will outstrip them.

The changes dynamics evaluation concerning the Turkish naval forces and the Russian Black Sea Fleet (scheme # 4) testifies that between these two states there is a tendency to the "regional arms race". In this process, Turkey has reached certain superiority, thanks to timely and complex modernization of its naval forces. But taking into consideration the economical changes in the Black Sea Region countries, Russia is able, and according to the declarations of its political leaders, is ready to compensate a certain backwardness of the Black Sea Fleet in the nearest decade. To reach this goal, it is necessary to determine clear priorities in the Russian maritime policy, to develop concrete plans of the Russian Navy development.

The Naval Forces of Ukraine, after the fall of the USSR, have received one of the longest coastal lines in the Black Sea, but they have appeared far behind their neighbors, except, maybe, Georgia. Our country has no maritime doctrine, the naval forces aims and missions, determined by military doctrine are indistinct and non-concrete. There is no a real plan of modernization and renewing the naval forces. Promulgated in the Ukraine's Strategic Defence Bulletin until 2015 ("Defence White Paper") plans, are sooner the plan of reduction the

тельный контракт на поставку еще 12 + 5 вертолетов SH-60B в противолодочном и патрульном вариантах на замену вертолетов AB-212ASW/EW (на вооружении 8 и 3 ед. соответственно) и AB-204AS (на вооружении 3 ед.). Новые вертолеты должны поступить на вооружение ВМС на протяжении 2007 года. Таким образом, по количеству вертолетов палубного базирования ВМС Турции практически догнали россиян, и, видимо, в ближайшем будущем опередят их.

Оценка динамики изменений состава Военно-морских сил Турции и Черноморского флота Российской Федерации свидетельствует о том, что между двумя странами существует тенденция к "региональной гонке вооружений". При этом Турция достигла определенного превосходства за счет того, что своевременно и комплексно подошла к вопросу модернизации своего флота. Но, учитывая экономические изменения, которые происходят в странах региона, Россия способна и, судя по заявлением ее политических лидеров, готова наверстать некоторое отставание ЧФ в ближайшее десятилетие. Способствовать этому призваны определение четких приоритетов в российской морской политике, разработка конкретных планов развития Военно-морского флота.

Флот Украины, которая после распада СССР получила одну из наиболее по протяженности береговую линию в Черном море, уже остался далеко позади своих соседей, за исключением, пожалуй, Грузии. Наша страна не имеет единой морской доктрину, цели и задачи ВМС, определенные военной доктриной, расплывчаты и неконкретны. Отсутствует реальный план модернизации и обновления флота. Обнародованные в "Стратегическом оборонном бюллетене Украины до 2015 года" ("Белой книге Украины") планы скорее представ-
ships component until 2015, than its modernization and reinforcement. The conclusion is - if we'll continue to ignore the experience of our Black Sea neighbors, by 2015 it is easier to agree with the proposals of some Russian mass-media to pass the defense functions of the southern borders of Ukraine to the Russian Navy. The Russians usually say: "The Black Sea Fleet is able to defense Ukraine".
Scenario planning: Black Sea region 2020
Сценарии развития Черноморского региона до 2020

The Crisis Management Initiative recently organised a meeting comprised of ten civil society representatives from Moldova/Transnistria, Georgia/South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Armenia, Azerbaijan/Nagorny-Karabakh. During this workshop participants engaged in a scenario planning exercise for the best case and worst case of the Black Sea Region in the year 2020. Special emphasis was paid on the resolution of conflicts in the Black Sea Region.

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The worst case scenario

The worst-case scenario, defined by participants as "the status quo" scenario, describes situations where existing conflicts, authoritarianism, zero-sum game logic fuel each other and create an environment which can be defined as "no war, no peace". Militarization and Islamic fundamentalism represent additional ingredients for transforming the Eastern Black Sea area, and especially the South Caucasus in a volatile and unstable region (new powder keg).

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Dr. Antje Herrberg

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Наихудший сценарий

Наихудший сценарий, получивший название "статус кво" предполагает ситуацию, при которой существующие конфликты, авторитаризм и логика поведения с нулевым результатом лишь подливают масло в огонь и создают условия, при которых нет ни войны, ни мира. Милитаризация и исламский фундаментализм являются дополнительными факторами, способствующими превращению восточной части Черного моря, и особенно Южного Кав-
prone to escalation of existing conflicts and the emergence of new ones. The losers of such a scenario are societies who are denied freedom and human rights and live with perceptions of fear. This worst-case scenario sees external actors increasing their competition for the control of the region. In this scenario, the EU and NATO are losing their attractiveness for regional countries which are locked in internal disputes and intra-regional rivalries. As a result, the Black Sea area is becoming a 'play-ground' for geopolitical actors from the outside. Societies and countries in the region are not able to reap the economic and political benefits deriving from the region being situated at the crossroad of different geopolitical spaces.

**Key issues regarding the Worst Case scenario**

Democratic political transition processes in the region have failed. Ukraine and Georgia experience a reversal of democratic reforms; anti-democratic forces are in power. The failure of democracy, increased militarization of societies, disrespect for human rights, especially minority rights, create an environment favourable to the rise of new conflicts (Georgia - Armenian and Azeri minorities; Ukraine - Crimea). In zones of conflict hostilities are resumed and develop into 'hot conflicts'. Added to this is the spread of Islamic fundamentalism and increased risk of terrorism, either determined by disillusionment with current authorities or stemming from various political forces within states in adjacent regions (Middle East, North Caucasus). This endangers also the regional energy infrastructure (pipelines).

**Russia** has become more authoritarian and has more leverage in the neighbourhood by using political and economic instruments to consolidate control over the region (including unilateral recognition of self-proclaimed states, and energy politics. Russia still keeps control over the North Caucasus, but counter-ideologies flourish (Islamic fundamentalism) and the movement for creating independent states in North Caucasus is strengthened. The spill-over effects from the North Caucasus are felt in the entire Black Sea Region and create the conditions for increased instability and fundamentalism in the South Caucasus.

каза, в неспокойный и вырывоопасный регион (новую пороховую бочку), способствующий эскалации существующих конфликтов и развитию новых.

При этом сценарии проигрывают те общества, которые отказались от свободы и прав человека, и живущие в страхе. В наихудшем сценарии внешние игроки усиливают соперничество за контроль над регионом. При этом сценарии ЕС и НАТО теряют свою привлекательность для региональных стран, которые погрузились во внутренних спорах и межрегиональной вражде. Как результат, Черноморский регион превращается в зону противодействия внешних игроков. Страны и общество региона не в состоянии воспользоваться экономическими и социальными преимуществами геополитического "перекрестка", на котором они расположены.

**Основные положения наихудшего сценария.**

Политические процессы перехода к демократии потерпели провал. В Украине и Грузии происходит поворот от демократических реформ; противники демократии приходят к власти. Поражение демократии, растущая милитаризация, несоблюдение прав человека, особенно прав меньшинств, создают предпосылки для возникновения новых конфликтов (в Грузии - армянское и азербайджанское меньшинство, в Украине - Крым).

В зонах существующих конфликтов возобновляются боевые действия, и они превращаются в "горячие конфликты". К этому стоит добавить фактор распространения исламского фундаментализма и риска терроризма из-за разочарования в действиях существующих властей или же из-за действий различных политических сил из соседних государств (Ближний Восток, Северный Кавказ). Это также подвергает опасности региональную энергетическую структуру (трубопроводы).

**Россия** становится более авторитарной и оказывает растущее давление на соседние регионы, используя политические и экономические рычаги для консолидации контроля за регионом (включая одностороннее признание самоопределившихся государств), а также энергетическую политику. Россия продолжает контролировать Северный Кавказ, но там распространяются другие идеологии (исламский фундаментализм), а также усиливается движение за создание независимых государств на Северном Кавказе. Влияние процессов на Северном Кавказе распространяется на весь Черноморский регион и создает условия, способствующие усилению нестабильности и фундаментализма на Южном Кавказе.
Turkey's EU accession is stopped. This is determined by the development that the EU is reluctant to engage Turkey and/or by disillusionment with democratic values. Having little external incentives for change, Turkey becomes inward looking and re-orients to forging partnerships in the East (Russia, Iran).

At the regional level, the increasing authoritarian states on the Eastern Black Sea shore have little ability to engage at the regional level, as they are mainly inward looking. Moreover, they are locked in a zero-sum logic, preventing regional cooperation, and the establishment of a meaningful process for conflict resolution. The increased militarization of states contributes to a security dilemma at regional level (arms race, formation of opposing security alliances).

The preservation of status quo in the region, mainly with regard to resolution of conflicts, entails that there is no willingness to engage constructively in a meaningful peace-building processes. While there are still official formats for conflict settlement (backed by some international organisations), they remain empty formulae as there are drawn out and futile negotiating processes. Civil society dialogue is negligent and not encouraged. A factor contributing to the 'frozenness' is due to a deterioration of relations between external actors (Russia versus US/EU) (as a result of US attack on Iran and subsequent US military bases in the region). The authoritarian states/entities in this worst case scenario leave no space for the manifestation of alternative visions for conflict resolution at the grass-roots level.

The status quo represents stagnation not enduring stability. It further constrains the overall democratic and economic development in the region. The static situation creates a downward spiral as countries and people of the region continue to drift apart.

The energy potential of the region, at the cross-road of Europe, Middle-East, Russia and Central Asia cannot be utilised, as either existing routes are controlled and used as political instruments or because they are endangered by increased regional instability. The increased competition between countries in the region and external actors limits also drastically the possibilities of development of new transit routes and the overall economic development of the region.

EU and NATO enlargement have halted at 2007 levels. The EU is introvert, unable to project influence outside its borders since focuses on maintaining the internal benefits already gained. The Russia-US dialogue is strained, resembling the logic of Cold War.

Приостанавливается процесс приема Турции в ЕС. Это определяется тем фактом, что ЕС не желает принимать Турцию из-за разочарования уровнем развития демократических ценностей. Не имея внешних стимулов для перемен, Турция замыкается в себе и начинает ориентироваться на усиление партнерства со странами на востоке (Россия, Иран)

На региональном уровне, страны с растущим авторитаризмом в восточной части Черноморского региона не имеют возможности для регионального сотрудничества и замыкаются на внутренних проблемах. Более того, они следуют логике поведения с нулевым результатом, исключая региональное сотрудничество и установление серьезного процесса разрешения конфликтов. Растущая милитаризация государств способствует ущемлению региональной безопасности (гонка вооружений, формирование недружественных союзов).

Сохранение статус кво в регионе, в основном по отношению к разрешению конфликтов, приводит к отсутствию конструктивной позиции для создания серьезного процесса мирного урегулирования. Хотя существуют официальные форматы для урегулирования конфликтов (при поддержке некоторых международных организаций), в целом они исчерпали себя и не предоставляют особой пользы. Гражданский диалог практически не существует и не поддерживается. Другим фактором, способствующим "замораживание" конфликтов является ущемление отношений между внешними игроками (Россия против США/ЕС), как результат нападения США на Иран и размещение американских баз в регионе. Авторитарные страны в наихудшем сценарии не имеют возможности выработки альтернативного решения конфликтов при участии всего общества.

Ситуация статус кво ведет к стагнации и не способствует стабильности. Она сдерживает демократическое и экономическое развитие региона. Эта статическая ситуация ведет к тому, что страны и народы региона продолжают двигаться в противоположных направлениях.

Энергетический потенциал региона, на пересечении дорог Европы, Ближнего Востока, России и Средней Азии не может быть использован из-за того, что существующие пути контролируются и используются в политических целях, либо они находятся в зонах с ухудшающейся безопасностью. Удлиняющееся соперничество между странами региона и внешними игроками резко уменьшает возможности развития новых транзитных путей и общее экономическое развитие региона.

Расширение ЕС и НАТО остановилось на уровне 2007 года. ЕС сосредоточивается на внутренних проблемах и не способен оказывать влияние за своими пределами,
In the Middle East, the deterioration of Iran-US relations led to increased regional instability but also facilitates new foreign military presence in the region (US) which determines a counter-reaction from Russia.

The Black Sea region is divided by a new wall between EU and NATO member states on the Western shore and the failed states of the Eastern shore which are facing more pressure from Russia, Islamic fundamentalism and serious internal problems - economic, political and security.

Best Case Scenario 2020: Within European "boundaries"

The best case scenario describes an integrated Black Sea region with strong and effective linkages with European and Euro-Atlantic community. Key regional actors, like Russia and Turkey participate fully and constructively in regional cooperation. Turkey is an EU member. The pillars on which this vision is based are democracy, good-governance, rule of law, including in break-away regions. A sustainable process for the resolution of conflicts is in place which is monitored and guaranteed by international organizations. These national developments facilitate the gradual integration of the area and in the same time support its stronger inclusion in the common European space. Trade and removal of barriers for free movement of goods and people are instrumental for strengthening regional cooperation and the participation at the European common space. External stabilizers factors are EU and its ability to take decisive leadership in its foreign policy with regard to the Black Sea Region. EU and NATO membership (or a clear perspective for membership) is offered for interested and qualifying ENP countries in the region. The scenario foresees an ability of Russia to forge a cooperative relationship with the EU and the US.

Specific issues regarding the Best Case Scenario

Good governance is a strong element of the best-case scenario for the Black Sea region in 2020. Good governance is supported by sustainable democratic institutions. They embrace political institutions, division of powers as well as strong civil society. Free and fair elections are seen as a normal practice. Rule of law is a core principle of governance and human rights are also respected. Corruption is diminished and administrative фокусируясь только на сохранении тех внутренних благ, которых он добился ранее. Диалог Россия - США заходит в тупик, подчиняясь логике холодной войны. На Ближнем Востоке ухудшение взаимоотношений между Ираном и США ведет к региональной нестабильности, а также усиливает иностранное военное присутствие (США) в регионе, что вызывает ответную реакцию России.

Черноморский регион разделяется новой стеной между членами ЕС и НАТО на западном побережье и несостоявшимися государствами на восточном побережье, которые подвергаются усиливающемуся влиянию со стороны России, исламского фундаментализма, и испытывают серьезные внутренние проблемы в экономическом и политическом плане на фоне ухудшающейся безопасности.

Наилучший сценарий: в европейских "границах"

При наилучшем сценарии Черноморский регион тесно интегрируется в европейское и евроатлантическое сообщество. Ключевые региональные игроки - Россия и Турция - полностью вовлечены в конструктивное сотрудничество в регионе. Турция является членом Европейского Союза. Основой сотрудничества являются демократия, ответственные правительства, верховенство закона, даже в неприсоединившихся регионах. Имеется значительный прогресс в разрешении конфликтов, который регулируется и гарантируется международными организациями. Уровень развития в странах способствует постепенной интеграции региона в общее европейское пространство, с одновременной поддержкой со стороны ЕС. Развитие торговых связей и отсутствие барьеров на пути свободного передвижения товаров и людей является основополагающим фактором для усиления регионального сотрудничества и участия в едином европейском пространстве. Продвинутые страны региона получают членство (или ясные перспективы членства) в ЕС и НАТО. Данный сценарий предполагает усиление связей России с США и ЕС.

Особые моменты наилучшего сценария

Хорошее управление обществом является сильным элементом наилучшего сценария для Черноморского региона в 2020. Хорошее управление обществом поддерживается сильными демократическими институтами. Они включают в себя политические институты, разделение власти, а также сильное гражданское общество. Свободные и честные выборы становятся нормальным явлением. Верховенство права является основным
capacity is increased. This contributes to turning the area into one of wealth, stability and economic growth. Democratization and good governance practices are applied and supported within the unrecognized entities.

Negotiated processes of conflict resolution are in place in all cases. The peace-building process is not driven by elites only, but it is rooted in larger societal changes. Free media and democratization further reinforce peace-building processes.

The EU together with other international organisations are guarantors of the peace agreements. The agreements are convened between the parties and guaranteed by international organizations and states (OSCE/Russia/EU). Real peace monitoring missions are established to safeguard implementation of agreements.

At the regional level, the countries of the Black Sea have stopped using negative stereotypes against each other (especially in the South Caucasus). There are diversified sources of independent and non biased information available to citizens of the region. This creates common understanding and contributes to an overall cooperative climate.

Regional integration means that borders are open within the region. Free movement of people, services and capital will contribute to sustainable development and peace. No country/entity is isolated, entailing also that the borders with Russia and Turkey are opened. There are effective administrative capacities for border management which cooperate at regional level to limit trafficking and international organized crimes.

Functioning market economies exist in all countries in the region. National and regional stability as well as effective governments and regional mechanisms make it possible for states and people to reap the benefits in terms of energy exploitation (Azerbaijan), energy transit and diversification of supply. There is a functioning regional market, including on energy. There are joint Black Sea 'business structures' and a functional regional infrastructure network for the transportation of goods and people.

As regional integration is becoming feasible and necessary, different formats of integration are considered. There are strong linkages with EU, with some countries on the accession track. The EU has deep free-trade agreements with Black Sea countries. There are special visa facilitation arrangements, which ease travelling and people to people contacts. The region benefits from common educational and cultural arrangements and/or 'spaces' with EU.

принципом управления, а права человека надежно защищены. Коррупция уменьшается, а административная ответственность увеличивается. Все это способствует процветанию и стабильному экономическому развитию региона. Демократизация и хорошее управление обществом также получает распространение в непризнанных образованиях.

Переговорный процесс происходит во всех моментах по разрешению конфликтов. Миротворческий процесс не только проводится элитами, но также поддерживается всем обществом. Свободная пресса и дальнейшая демократизация усиливают миротворческий процесс.

ЕС совместно с другими международными организациями является гарантом мирных договоров. Эти договоры заключаются между сторонами и гарантируются международными организациями и странами (ОБСЕ/Россия/ЕС). Устанавливаются реальные миссии по мониторингу для безопасного исполнения договоров.

На региональном уровне страны Черноморского региона отказываются от негативных стереотипов в отношении друг другу (особенно в Южном Кавказе). В регионе существуют независимые средства информации, доступные гражданам региона. Это приводит к всеобщему взаимопониманию и способствует созданию климата сотрудничества.

Региональная интеграция подразумевает открытие границ региона. Свободное движение людей, товаров и капитала приводит к устойчивому развитию и миру. Ни одна страна или государственное образование не находится в изоляции. Подаются, что границы России и Турции также открыты. Устанавливаются эффективный механизм контроля за границами при полном региональном сотрудничестве, что уменьшает незаконную торговлю и международную организованную преступность.

Функционирующая рыночная экономика существует во всех странах региона. Национальная и региональная стабильность, а также ответственные правительства и региональные механизмы позволяют странам и народам воспользоваться благами энергетики (Азербайджан), транспортировкой энергии и ее диверсифицированными поставками. Существует функционирующий региональный рынок, включая энергии. Существуют общественные Черноморские "бизнес структуры", а также функциональная сеть инфраструктуры для транспортировки товаров и людей.

Региональная интеграция становится необходимой реальностью, существуют различные форматы интеграции. Укрепляются связи с ЕС, некоторые страны продвигаются по пути получения членства в Евросоюзе. ЕС заключает договора о свободной торговле.
Russia and the Black Sea countries cooperate in addressing issues of peace and conflicts including those in the North Caucasus. This contributes considerably to the stability of the entire region. Moreover, Russia and EU have an agreement on human security that covers also the Black Sea Region.

Georgia and other states from the region are new NATO members. The fact that Georgia had become, for some time, a NATO member, has contributed to changing the overall geopolitical landscape.

Turkey is an EU member state and other regional countries are on the accession track. The unrecognised entities are also on the orbit of European integration, as part of the "peace package".

The EU constitutional 'project' is completed, meaning that institutional reforms are consolidated under a different mechanism. The European Union has now the ability to have a coherent foreign policy (supported institutionally by a European foreign minister). The EU has one single Black Sea Policy. The overall approach is to have a common economic, security and political space extending to the Caspian Sea. The Black Sea Region and EU share the same values, enjoy free trade and free movement of people, jointly respond to different security threats (like trafficking, joint border monitoring) and cooperate closely in conflict resolution.

These scenarios leave much room for interpretation and allow for some out of the box thinking. It is interesting to note that

- The worst-case scenario was built around the idea of preserving the existing "status quo", which shows that there is overall dissatisfaction with the current situation in terms of lacking a meaningful process for both liberal democratic development and peace-building.
- The main factors for change as seen are democratic reforms connected to EU/NATO integration and economic benefits determined by regional projects, including in the energy sector.
- The critical countries that need to be firmly anchored on the track of European and Euro-Atlantic integration are Turkey (EU), Ukraine and Georgia (NATO and/or EU). However, the case of the other Eastern ENP countries cannot be neglected, as there is a momentarily "vicious circle" dynamic which lacking real progress in transition to liberal democracies and lack of a membership perspective which re-enforce each other negative-

co with scanty Черноморского региона. Упощеченность визовый режим, что облегчает передвижение людей и укрепление контактов. Регион пользуется культурными и образовательными программами, а также становится частью "пространства" ЕС.

Россия и страны Черноморского региона усиливают сотрудничество с целью решения конфликтов и установления мира, в том числе и на Северном Кавказе. Это значительно укрепляет стабильность во всем регионе. К тому же, Россия и ЕС подписывают соглашение о защите прав человека в регионе, в который входит и Черное море.

Грузия и другие страны региона становятся членами НАТО. Вступление Грузии в НАТО меняет весь геополитический ландшафт.

Турция является членом Евросоюза, а другие региональные страны уже близки к членству. Непризнанные государственные образования также находятся в орбите европейской интеграции, как часть "мирного пакета".

Завершается конституционный "проект" ЕС, имеется в виду, что институциональные реформы проходят с использованием других механизмов. Теперь ЕС может проводить согласованную внешнюю политику, и существует должность министра иностранных дел Европы. У ЕС есть единая политика по отношению к Черноморскому региону. Новые подходы включают расширение общего экономического и политического пространства на Каспийское море. Черноморский регион и ЕС имеют общие ценности, свободную торговлю, вместе решают проблемы по обеспечению безопасности (незаконная торговля, общая охрана границ), а также тесно сотрудничают по вопросам урегулирования конфликтов.

Все эти сценарии могут развиваться по-разному, и требуют творческого подхода. Интересно заметить, что

- Наихудший сценарий развивается при сохранении статуса quo в регионе, что доказывает наличие недовольства существующим положением дел в области либерального демократического развития и решения конфликтов.
- Главными факторами для перемен являются демократические реформы, связанные с интеграцией в ЕС/НАТО, а также экономическими благами, благодаря региональным проектам, в том числе в области энергетики.
- Важные страны региона должны быть тесно интегрированы в евроатлантическую систему - Турция (ЕС), Украина и Грузия (НАТО и ЕС). Хотя другие страны региона не должны быть забыты, так отсут-
ly and strengthen the status quo situation. The motor for change is civil society, but it remains quite weak, especially in Armenia and Azerbaijan.

- At the strategic level, the assumptions of the worst case scenario is that the West is getting weaker overall (with EU and US further drifting apart) and Russia is gaining a more decisive influence. The US is still viewed as the main global player, whilst the EU is not able to balance and complement the US approach. In the region, both Russia and US could play potentially destabilizing influence, either indirectly in adjacent region (Middle-East, North Caucasus) or through direct actions of gaining control/influence over countries in the region. Their competition, together with EU unwillingness or inability to play a decisive role in the region, blocks the "geopolitical level" and contributes to further entrenchment of the situation.

- The best case scenario on the hand recognises, the clear need for substantial reforms for democratic and market economy.

- It is clear that EU efforts in conflict resolution have a clear potential to 'motor' a dynamic of regional integration. The EU and other regional and international organizations were seen as the guarantors of peace-building for the region.

- 'Negotiated processes of conflict resolution' concern processes and structures that are set to provide for longer term but sustainable policy on conflict resolution. Regional integration is perceived by participants as bringing its own benefits in itself, but it is also viewed as a reinforcing factor for EU integration for interested regional countries. Moreover, there is a growing demand from unrecognized entities to be included on the orbit of democratization and European integration.

- Clear enough is that civil society represents a key driver of positive change at national and regional level.

In conclusion such scenario-building exercise do not represent the entire diversity of the Black Sea region, but the unique cases of:

- New independent states which faced self-determination movements (and failed to respond to these) and which are now into a transition phase, most of them aspiring to consolidate a democratic and prosperous state.

- Entities which believe that self-determination can be obtained only through an independent state or

стие перспективы включения в ЕС и НАТО могут привести к негативным настроениям и усилить ситуацию статус кво. Двигателем перемен должно служить гражданское общество, которое пока остается слабым, особенно в Армении и Азербайджане.

- На стратегическом уровне, наихудший сценарий предполагает, что запад становится более слабым (и Европа все больше отделяется от США), а влияние России усиливается. США продолжает остаться главной глобальной державой, хотя ЕС не способен больше балансировать и дополнять американскую политику в регионе. Россия и США могут оказывать дестабилизирующее влияние через близлежащий регион (Ближний Восток, Северный Кавказ), или непосредственно, путем завоевания контроля над странами региона. Это соперничество на фоне нежелания или неспособности ЕС играть решающую роль, блокирует возможность достижения "геополитического уровня" и способствует ухудшению обстановки.

- С другой стороны, наилучший сценарий предполагает явную необходимость проведения значительных демократических реформ, а также развитие рыночной экономики.

- Очевидно, что усиление ЕС в области разрешения конфликтов могут привести к положительным сдвигам в плане региональной интеграции. ЕС и другие международные организации являются гарантом миротворчества в регионе.

- "Переговорный процесс для решения конфликтов" устанавливает структуры, обеспечивающие долгосрочную стабильность и политику для разрешения конфликтов. Региональная интеграция воспринимается, как положительный процесс, а также как дополнительный фактор европейской интеграции с заинтересованными странами региона. К тому же, отмечается растущая заинтересованность непризнанных государственных образований быть включенными в орбиту демократизации и европейской интеграции.

- Совершенно ясно, что гражданское общество представляет собой движущую силу, ведущую к позитивным преобразованиям на национальном и региональном уровнях.

В заключении стоит подчеркнуть, что приведенные сценарии не отражают всего многообразия Черноморского региона, хотя совершенно очевидно, что:

- Новые независимые государства, в которых существуют движения самоопределения (и невозможность его остановить), находятся на переходной стадии
(the most) have very few and loose connections with the former "parent" state.

While in general, the dialogue between representatives of the two categories has been centred around sovereignty/autonomy/self-determination issues, the benefit of such activity of interaction in scenario building is that it offers the opportunity to look at the broader regional and external inter-conditionalities and to raise awareness with regard to both opportunities that should not be missed and common challenges.

It is also important to note that the scenarios represent a common understanding of the present situation and of the factors that could determine change (both positive and negative). While the perceptions still differ (for example, with regard to Europeanization or economic development as leading automatically to peaceful and sustainable resolution of conflicts), there are sufficient elements on which to build new formats for interaction at civil society-level from countries and entities in the region. Only by enlarging both the format and the scope of interaction, a general climate of better common understanding could be forged, which is instrumental for ensuring that the Black Sea region becomes more stable, prosperous and integrated.
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**Mr. Sergei KONOPLYOV**

Director of the Harvard Black Sea Regional Security Program and Executive Director of the US-Russia Security Program. He served as Acting Director of the Eurasia Foundation for Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova in 1994-1996. A former officer of the Soviet Armed Forces, Sergei served in several military missions in Africa, Latin America and Central Asia. A graduate of the Moscow Military Institute, he also holds a degree from Kyrgyz University in Journalism (Summa Cum Laude).
Laude) and a Masters degree in Public Administration from the Kennedy School of Government. Since 1998 he has been a member of the International Institute of Strategic Studies (London). He is also a NATO Fellow and recently received his Ph.D. at the Kiev Institute for International Relations. Since 2000 Sergei has served as Assistant to the Head of the National Security Committee of the Ukrainian Parliament.

Ms. Katherine BOURNE

Assistant Director at the National Security Program at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. Her primary contributions are to the US-Russia Security Program, the Russian Federal Assembly Program, and the Black Sea Security Program. Katherine graduated from Wellesley College in 1998 with degrees in Religion and Russian Area Studies. She proceeded to work at the New York City Bar Association, where she coordinated the Refugee Assistance Project. From 1999 to 2000, Katherine was in Novgorod, Russia as a Fellow for the US-Russian Young Leaders for Public Service Project, organized by the International Research and Exchanges Board and funded by the US State Department. Her fellowship focused on the problem of orphans and abandoned children in Russia. Before coming to Harvard in 2001, Katherine spent four months working for American Councils for International Education in Lviv, Ukraine.

Ms. Heather PETERSON

Joined the National Security Program at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government in December of 2001 where she worked extensively with the National Security Fellows Program, a ten-month postgraduate research fellowship for US military officers comprised of Lieutenant Colonels or Colonels from all the uniformed services. Ms. Peterson became a dedicated Program Coordinator as of January 2003 and works with various Executive Programs offered at the Kennedy School of Government. Ms. Peterson graduated from Whitworth College with a double degree and received her Masters Degree in 2004.
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Гарвардская Программа Черноморской Безопасности-2006

ФОТО РЕПОРТАЖ

HARVARD BLACK SEA SECURITY PROGRAM

2006
Harvard, USA
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