HARVARD BLACK SEA SECURITY PROGRAM 2005

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PHOTO SESSION:

Ankara, Turkey
Boston-Harvard, USA
Washington DC, USA
Chisinau, Moldova
The Black Sea Security Program began in 2001 with the goal of encouraging a regional security system based on cooperation and integration. It is unique in its mission to bring together leading policy makers in the Black Sea region with senior US officers to gain a deeper understanding of issues affecting the region and to encourage problem solving in areas of common interest. The program involves representatives from nine regional countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Turkey and Ukraine. A high-level delegation of general officers from the United States also participates.

The program aims to:

- identify the very broad common areas of agreement that exist among the Black Sea nations and expose their officials and the US participants to the strong common history and shared values of the region;
- highlight the specific areas of current cooperation on issues of vital interest to these countries and, at the same time, identify those issues which divide them and present challenges to regional cooperation;
- expose the Black Sea officials to the free flow of ideas inherent in the pluralistic American system and within the US national security community itself by engaging them with policy makers who represent a wide range of viewpoints.

The 2005 Black Sea Security Program took place from March 31 through April 12, hosting 20 Regional Representatives and 16 US Participants. The regional delegation began the program in Ankara, Turkey on March 31, for a two-day seminar on regional security and Turkish foreign security policy. On April 2 the Regional Participants arrived at Harvard University, where they united with their American counterparts for an intense 5-day curriculum at the Kennedy School of Government. The topics focused on issues ranging from civil-military relations to the global war on terrorism. From Harvard the Regional Delegation continued to Washington, DC, for three days with meetings at the Pentagon, National Security Council, FBI, and a round table discussion group at the Center for Defense Information. The next Program will occur on April 5-15, 2006 in Athens, Greece, and the US with the executive session at Harvard running from April 9-15.

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Гарвардская Программа Черноморской Безопасности началась в 2001 году с целью со- действия системе региональной безопасности на основе сотрудничества и интеграции. Это уникальный форум общения политиков Черноморского региона (ЧР) с высокопоставленными официальными лицами США для углубления понимания влияющих на регион явлений и содержания разрешению проблем в сферах совместного интереса. Программа включает представителей девяти стран региона: Армении, Азербайджана, Болгарию, Грузию, Грецию, Молдову, Румынию, Турцию и Украину, а также делегацию американских генералов.

Цели программы:
- углубление понимания участниками глобальной и региональной стратегии, организации обороны и проведения военной реформы и реструктурной деятельности;
- определение общих сфер взаимодействия, которые существуют среди государств ЧР и их совместное обсуждение с американскими участниками;
- выяснение особых сфер текущего сотрудничества по вопросам, представляющим жизненно важный интерес для этих стран и, в то же время, обсуждение спорных тем и проблем регионального сотрудничества;
- ознакомление официальных лиц стран ЧР со свободным обсуждением идей, присущих плюралистической американской системе.

Гарвардская Программа Черноморской Безопасности-2005 прошла с 31 марта по 12 апреля, приняли 20 представителей ЧР и 16 американских участников. Программа началась в Анкаре, Турция, 31 марта 2-дневным семинаром по региональной безопасности и внешней политике Турции. 2 апреля региональные участники прибыли в Гарвардский университет, начав со своими коллегами из США 5-дневные занятия на Факультете Государственного управления. Были рассмотрены вопросы от гражданско-военных отношений до глобальной войны с терроризмом. Из Гарварда региональные участники убыли в Вашингтон для проведения 3-дневных встреч в Пентагоне, Совете национальной безопасности, ФБР и круглого стола в Центре Оборонной Информации.

Следующая Программа пройдет 5-15 апреля 2006 в Афинах, Греции, и США, где интенсивные занятия в Гарварде состоятся 9-15 апреля.

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Издание при поддержке Корпорации Карнеги из Нью-Йорка
Homeland Security

Внутренняя безопасность

In my estimation it is the worst job in the government to be the Homeland Security Advisor to the President. If nothing happens to compromise the safety and security of people in this country, they would say we have spent too much money and wasted our time. If something happens, they'll say: 'You didn't do enough.'

The 9/11 attacks were a continuation of a series of events from the previous ten years. One of the most important events that led up to 9/11 was the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. Others include: the gas attack in the Tokyo subway by Aum Shinrikyo, bombing of the U.S. Embassies, & the USS Cole incident. The Patriot Act, passed in the fall of 2001, is an attempt by Congress to legislate additional authority, or the Justice Department, to collect information from private citizens about their enterprises and people. This has become a controversial issue. This means that the government was able to perform wiretaps, e.g. with more ease than has been the case in the past. It significantly affects civil liberties. But still some Congressmen argue even to extend the Patriot Act provisions. Dozens of them will expire this year, unless they are renewed by the Congress.

All this refers to the principal question: 'How much intrusion and information are you willing to compromise your enterprises and people?' This has become a very pressing issue. It is interference – 'Orange Level'. Because they are not only security, but also business and industry. People fear that the government will have too much power to collect information from private citizens about their enterprises and people. This has become a very pressing issue. It is interference – 'Orange Level'.

There was a tremendous amount of good solid effort put into domestic security, and notably there has not been a significant terrorist incident in the U.S. since 9/11. The Patriot Act, passed in the fall of 2001, was an attempt by Congress to legislate additional authority, or the Justice Department, to collect information from private citizens about their enterprises and people. This has become a controversial issue. This means that the government was able to perform wiretaps, e.g. with more ease than has been the case in the past. It significantly affects civil liberties. But still some Congressmen argue even to extend the Patriot Act provisions. Dozens of them will expire this year, unless they are renewed by the Congress.

This refers to the principal question: 'How much intrusion and information are you willing to tolerate and make recommendations to strengthen preparedness?'

Admiral Steve ABBOT

Deputy Director of the Office of Homeland Security since October, 2001. Immediately prior to assuming this position, he was the Executive Director of Vice President Cheney’s National Preparedness Review tasked to evaluate and make recommendations to strengthen preparedness against terrorism, particularly one using weapons of mass destruction. Admiral Abbot served in the U.S. Navy from 1966 until his retirement as a four-star admiral in 2000. He was a naval aviator commanding a carrier-based squadron and serving as a test pilot for the F/A-18 and other aircraft. He commanded the aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt from 1990 to 1992, a period that included the Persian Gulf War. He subsequently commanded the Roosevelt Carrier Battle Group. Admiral Abbot also served as the Deputy Director of Operations for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the end of the previous Bush administration and at the outset of the Clinton administration, and as Commander of the Sixth Fleet. His final military assignment was as Deputy Commander of U.S. European Command during the recent conflict in Kosovo. Admiral Abbot is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy as well as a Rhodes Scholar.
to permit government to collect in order to ensure domestic security?* 

In terms of reorganization of the U.S. government, the Homeland Security issue was the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Since the times of President Lyndon Johnson, we have not created new departments with the exception of the Departments of Transportation and Education. Generally, we wanted to resist growing government beyond certain levels. Some significant things have been accomplished, e.g. establishment of the TCA or the Transportation Security Administration, and the U.S. Northern Command, although it didn’t become operational for a while longer. We have created a centralized place to collect intelligence about terrorism – the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). Reorganization also occurred in the U.S. Intelligence Community. Now we have a new system of alerts. But we are compelled to admit that it is not a very popular system.

Why? Because the essential groundwork for an effective alert system is good intelligence. Over the last three years the quality of the system improved. As a result, we decided to change department there is no one coherent, functional piece of government. All of our agencies have a component of responsibilities while protecting the country, all have to cooperate in order to graduate.

There is the President of the National Security Council (NSC), who cooperates with four major players, participating in the NSC. And those are often engaged in a strong dialog and are making difficult decisions, such as «Should we go to war in Iraq?» It is important to emphasize that agreements are reached either with ultimate resource commitments, or are made after the fact. There is a legislative element, which is a reflection of the fact that in the three-party system of government, nothing ultimately happens without the money. The Senate and the House of Representatives, authorizing and appropriating committees, and those that represent specific interests, are all the people and organizations that are influenced to make decisions about implementation. And their discussion is basically about «show me where the money comes from».

spring of 2002. It was after we had a major attempt in December to persuade the cabinet officers in the U.S. government that in fact we need to change the organization of homeland security. And the President said «you need to go more on this». Afterwards he approved the reorganization of 22 separate agencies into the one which included the Coast Guard, the Transportation Security Administration, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), an organization used to dealing with natural disasters, e.g., hurricanes, fires etc.

Any reorganization consumes additional resources. Not all of these organizations were dealing with security threats, e.g., some dealt with immigration processes. But you should be aware that this organization had to be self-transformed in January of 2003 after the new Secretary assessed its performance. In the U.S., despite the fact that we have a single government, nothing ultimately happens without the money. But if it’s put up in contrast to the DoD – $50 billion is a great deal of money, compared to the $10 billion a year at that time to more than $50 billions dollars expected in 2006. $50 billion is a great deal of money. But if it’s put up in contrast to the DoD budget, you can see that the DHS spending is in fact a small fraction of the DoD’s money. Much of the DHS spending is attributable to existing personnel structures in places such as the Customs and Border Patrol, and the Immigration Service.

Stруктура МВБ была создана в недрах Белого Дома в 2002 в результате широкомасштабной попытки усвоить важные чиновников правительства США в том, что на самом деле нужно изменить организацию. Чиновники сказали «нет», нам это не нужно. А Президент ответил: «Вам, наконец, будет сидеть за этим».

Во время переговоров о реорганизации, одна из них была оценена как «не нужно». Или, как сказал один из чиновников, «мы должны ввести двойное выражение». Вашингтонский журнал Entrepreneur охарактеризовал Национальный Агентство по координации и борьбе с терроризмом как «новых игроков, которые входят в игру».

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The Future of Democracy in the Black Sea Area

Будущее демократии в Черноморском регионе

I. Georgia: Inspiration for Change

Mr. Chairman, I was an election observer during the November 2003 parliamentary elections in Georgia and saw firsthand how tens of thousands of people refused to accept the theft of their votes and the silencing of their voices. More than anything, the Georgian people no longer wanted to live in a ‘failing state’, they feared that if the post-Communist regime stayed in office any longer, the damage would be such that they would forever lose the prospect of reuniting Georgia and Ukraine, as well as to the democratic future of the Black Sea region as a whole.

II. The recent revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine. Georgia's November 2003 Rose Revolution and Ukraine's 2004 Orange Revolution have inspired people and countries from throughout the region (especially Moldova) and around the globe.

III. Russian energy monopoly over the European and Eurasian countries. This is one of the main impediments to the future success and prosperity of Georgia and Ukraine; as well as to the democratic future of the Black Sea region as a whole.

IV. The dangerous trend in Armenia and especially Azerbaijan. If Azerbaijan does not hold democratic parliamentary elections in the fall of 2005, Islamist forces may gain ground. Moreover, if there is no solution to the Karabakh issue over the next several years, Armenia and Azerbaijan may once again go to war.

The deterioration in the US-Turkey bilateral relations. Turkish mistrust of US long-term objectives again go to war.

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The deterioration in the US-Turkey bilateral relations. Turkish mistrust of US long-term objectives again go to war.
Ms. Zeyno BARIK
Director of International Security and Energy Programs. Prior to joining the Nixon Center in January 2003, Ms. Bari was Director of the Caucasian Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). In 1998, Ms. Bari established the Georgia Forum at CSIS, the first program in the United States, specializing exclusively on this strategic country and its relations with the U.S. and Russia. Ms. Bari has also worked on Caspian oil and gas pipeline projects. She frequently travels to the region. Bari has appeared on a number of Caucasian and Turkish television networks, as well as CNN’s NewsNight and is widely quoted in the print media. In 2001 she was selected as a member of a Greek-Turkish working group striving to improve bilateral relations. While she was born in Turkey, Ms. Baran spent a significant part of her childhood growing up in Greece, giving her a unique perspective on bilateral issues. Ms. Baran received her MA in international economic development and her BA in political science from Stanford University. Her work on the compatibility of Islam and democracy received the Freedom Medal for Stanford's most outstanding political science/international relations honors thesis in 1996.

and strong support for his overarching reforms in the judicial sector when he was minister of justice. Former prime minister and parliamentary speaker Zurab Zhvania, who tragically died in a traffic accident, similarly benefited from his close work with the American assistance community. These are just some of the many Georgians who, over the period, developed personal relationships with American leaders, while discovering that both sides shared the same values and principles. Based on these experiences, these Georgians took the initiative to move their country in a positive direction, both while in government and in opposition. Following this example, then, I strongly urge that the United States assistees reform within governments, and want-ed to share it with their country's strategic partners, Ukraine. Soon after the Rose Revolution of November 2003, even before he was inaugurated as president, Saakashvili made Kiev his first foreign destination in 2004. In fluent Ukrainian, Saakashvili con-fidently predicted that Ukraine would become demo-cratic over the next year, while pledging his support for this process. While few in the West (or in Russia) noticed, over the next year Georgians and Ukrainians, in government as well as in civil society, worked together to forge a new Ukrainian d emoc-triumph. While many in the West (and in Russia) looked down on the state of Ukrainian civil society, Georgians knew that they had helped inspire this European nation and reawakened its quest to reclaim its place in the West on the basis of the same shared values and principles. When the Georgian president, prime minister, and other officials met with their American counterparts after that period, they urged US support for Ukraine's democratic voices. They knew that if Georgia remained the sole island of democratic change in the Black Sea region, it would be very tough to succeed, especially given the Russian pressure. Now Saakashvili and Yushchenko want to sup-port others who want to move in a pro-democratic direction by aggregating their voices to obtain more attention from the EU and the US. This is precisely what happened with the Moldovan parliamentary elections on Sunday, March 6. Both Saakashvili and Yushchenko met with President Voncin just ahead of the elections in order to provide support for a leader who seeks to reintegrate Moldova into Europe. But the situation in Moldova is complicated. While Voronin is head of the Communist Party of Moldova, he has distanced Moldova from Moscow in recent years in pursuit of Moldova's European vocation. His underlying goal may have been to preempt a democratic revolution by playing Moldova's European card. In contrast to Georgia and Ukraine, Moldova is thus pursuing an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary reform process. But the country's progress towards democracy is no less real.

As Saakashvili stated, Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova now together believe that we can complete democratization's third wave in Eastern Europe. Completing this wave means that each
country has committed to fighting crime, corruption, and the influence of clans that has led these countries to internal weakness and external vulnerability. To achieve success, each country must consolidate democratic gains and move closer to the Euro-Atlantic institutions; and it means that each country needs the continued support of the European Union and the United States to succeed.

The sustainability of the Georgian and Ukrainian revolutions is essential for others in the Black Sea region to follow a reformist trend, whether revolutionary or evolutionary. For this sustainability, Georgia and Ukraine have submitted their EURAP plans—plans that need to be seriously considered, as the prospect of eventual EU membership will provide the necessary incentive for both countries to undertake meaningful reforms. The US needs to support, and to urge its European allies to support, both Georgia and Ukraine in their EU process as well as in their implementation of the NATO Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAP), which pave the way for their eventual alliance membership.

Second, the US needs to work closely with its European allies to urge the resolution of the separatist conflicts in the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as the Moldovan region of Transnistria. It is encouraging to see Ukraine and Romania cooperating on the issue of Transnistria, and to hear about the formation of a new group of friends of Georgia (consisting of Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) taking the lead in urging Brussels and Washington to pay attention to these issues. As in so many other F-OSSA states that have now joined the EU (Bulgaria and Romania are expected to join in 2007) and NATO have become the most visionary and constructive of America’s European allies. They are also helping the Europeans to better understand Russia and are urging the resolution of the frozen conflicts, without which further democratic reforms are difficult, to say the least. As long as these conflicts remain, they will be sources of potential instability and of potential Russian pressure.

Senator Richard Lugar’s resolution on Russian troop withdrawal from Georgia and Moldova, urging it to implement the 1994 OSCE agreement to withdraw its troops from these two countries, is extremely timely and very important as the existing Russian military forces have become a hindrance to peace. One of the four Russian bases in Georgia has been vacated, the status of the second is in dispute, and talks are ongoing regarding the remaining two. Yet after six years, Russian troops still remain in both countries, and discussions on troop withdrawal are often held in parallel with discussions on democratization.

The US also needs to at the high levels engage the EU and NATO to ensure a new Border Monitoring Mission (BMO) in Georgia to replace the Mission, which, following the Russian veto, will terminate in May. The BMO has been critical to the effort to obtain credible information on Russian borders with the Russian republics of Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia. Moreover, in the past, it was thanks to these monitors that the West found out that Russian planes had bombed Georgian territory. The US needs to help find a mechanism to replace the BMO, there are several European countries that are willing to step up to the task, but none wants to take the lead for fear of drawing Russia’s wrath.

If Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova are also eager to revive the GUUAM organization, consisting of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova, an effort for which they need US political support. As GUUAM is perceived in Moscow to be an alliance against Russian interests, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan at this point are not interested in reviving it in a political form; they instead want to increase cooperation in the economic sphere, especially regarding east-west transportation corridors. While Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova may prefer to include security and democratization issues in the GUUAM process (a welcome development), the US should still consider an economic GUUAM organization and to instead utilize it as much as possible, an initial focus can be energy-an area in which the United States can be particularly helpful.

II. Russian Energy Monopoly

Mr Chairman, a very important yet often ignored hindrance to further reform in Georgia, Ukraine, and the Black Sea region is the effects of the Russian energy monopoly in Europe and Eurasia. The West ignored the clear intentions of Anatoly Chubais, head of Russia’s RAO UES, who declared in September 2003 that "Russian business ought to be allowed to expand, with the aim of creating a liberal empire" in the former Soviet sphere. In addition to such an expansion of Russian energy monopolies, over the last year Russia’s largest oil company Yukos has been dis- mantled and through Rosneft its assets consolidated under Kremlin control. When Rosneft merges with Gazprom, Putin will be in direct control of the world’s largest integrated oil and gas company.

It is encouraging to see Ukraine and Moldova’s joint efforts to reach an agreement with Russia on the transit of natural gas, an agreement that will be very important in light of the possible decline in Russian gas supplies to Europe. In all likelihood, the US will have to continue to play the role of a guarantor of the political stability of Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova as long as an energy security solution is not reached.

As long as Europe’s energy needs will depend heavily on Russian supplies, the US cannot let the energy issue get away from it, for the US needs to ensure a more diverse energy security policy. The US cannot place too much emphasis on energy security and the influence of clans that has led these countries to internal weakness and external vulnerability. To achieve success, each country needs the continued support of the European Union and the United States to succeed.
Politya Putin demonstrates a desire to strengthen Russia's already strong position in the Eurasian and energy markets. If Russian monopoly power increases, then countries will have difficulty resisting Russian political and economic pressure. Similarly, if Russian market power within the European sector increases, then European countries will be even less willing than they are now to lean on Russia when Moscow's policies toward the European gas sector increases, then the countries is situation is in the oil sector. Ukraine needs the most help in this area; it has constructed the Odessa-Brody oil pipeline to transport Caspian oil to European markets yet, under Russian pressure, the Kuchma government last year agreed to its reversal so that Russian oil could be transported to the Black Sea. While commercial reasons were presented as justification for the reversal, it is more likely that it was done in consideration for Russian political support to the Yanukovych presidential campaign. This is apparent by the fact that, over the past several months, the Russians have not put enough oil into the line to make it profitable; expectations were that it would supply half the amount it originally pledged for 2005.

The Yushchenko government recently announced at a joint press briefing of the Ukrainian and Georgian prime ministers that Odessa-Brody would be reversed back to its original direction. On March 4, the Ukrainian and Polish prime ministers also agreed to the extension of the pipeline to the Polish city of Plock. In this way, Poland will also be able to diversify its energy consumption: Despite its strategic importance, Ukraine - a frozen country where notwithstanding will be able to exchange the contracts, because the situation in the gas sector - is the last country that has been able to enter even into Ukraine and then be transported onwards to the European markets. However, it is also the weakest link in this Black Sea chain. The difficult economic conditions prevailing in Georgia have given Gazprom a great opening to try and acquire the title to the Georgian gas pipelines, thus bolstering its monopoly power. If Tbilisi unintentionally helps Gazprom in this effort, then Georgia will only be enhancing the company's role in gas pipelines, thus bolstering its monopoly power. If a company that currently holds a monopoly in this area is able to transport gas, it will be able to make a profit; expectations are that it would supply half the amount it originally pledged for 2005.

Mr. Chairman, I have followed developments in Armenia and Azerbaijan closely since 1996 and believe that until the Karabakh issue is resolved it will be very difficult to see real progress in democratic and economic reform. Both countries’ policies are totally consumed by this issue and both sides believe time is on their side: as a result, neither one wants to make a concession which is a dirty word in that part of the world. The main losers are the youth of these countries, who are spending their most productive years waiting.
Azerbaijan is told by the West that it lost Karabakh in the war and needs to give up this piece of land for the sake of peace and prosperity and move on with its integration into the Euro-Atlantic integration process. This kind of talk only hardens the nationalists, who believe that with massive oil and gas revenues starting to flow into the budget over the next several years, they can strengthen their military, and take back their land. Given that there are already four UN resolutions supporting their military, and take back their land. Given that

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left to the OSCE Minsk group, which cannot deliver a solution, as the issue requires top level discussions. While it is good to keep the dialogue going between Armenia and Azerbaijan, failure to deliver a solution is leading to massive frustration among the people and hurting the image of the OSCE.

In addition to a committed Bush-Putin discussion, the solution to Karabakh requires democratic progress in both Armenia and Azerbaijan so that the governments have legitimacy in the eyes of their people, which is essential for support for the final agreement. The US therefore needs to encourage the leaders of these two countries to embrace the democratization process as essential to regional security and stability.

I will not spend much time on Armenia, as issues relevant to Armenia are well known here thanks to the work of the strong Armenian diaspora. I will simply mention that if the Karabakh conflict goes both ways, it also limits US ability to encourage democratic change in this country. The US simply cannot put the same kind of pressure on President Ilham Aliyev, as it was able to do with President Leonid Kuchma of Ukraine; it is inconceivable to think that Washington would threaten to keep senior Armenian government officials out of the US in case of a failed elections.

Azerbaijan, unlike Armenia, has fewer friends in the US as it does not have a major diaspora; however, potentially it can be a great strategic partner. Azerbaijan is the only Muslim country with troops in Afghanistan, Iran and Kosovo. It is a secular democracy with a Shiite majority neighboring Iran. As many Azerbaijanis proudly state, theirs was the first secular democratic republic in the Muslim world. Though short-lived, the 1918 republic included opposition parties in the parliament and allowed women to vote. It is an oil and gas rich country and if it manages to spend its wealth wisely, Azerbaijan can become a great example for the rest of the oil-rich Muslim world.

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sition groups, with a correct engagement strategy, the US can help move the country in a positive direction. At the same time, many people are many benefiting from the current corrupt, clan based system in Azerbaijan and these forces will try their best to avoid free and fair elections in November, which will be a turning point for Azerbaijan. In fact, since Aliyev suc-
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cceeded his father in the October 2003 presidential elections there have been crackdowns on media and opposition activity; this has led many to wonder whether Aliyev is not fully in charge of his government or whether he himself sanctions these policies.
Иракские власти не ведут никаких операций против группы, которая уже начала террористические действия внутри Турции. И турки не понимают: почему «глобальная война с терроризмом» ведется лишь против групп, угрожающих США и не включает группы, уговаривающие американских союзников.

Так что Куры в Ираке врежде-то устачет независимое государство, которое будет вредить интересам Турции, и оно не будет иметь четких границ и постоянной территории. Этот вопрос был практически решен в 2016 году, когда был создан внеуроческий округ Ирака, в котором проживали несколько тысяч курдов.

В настоящее время США и Ирак продолжают сотрудничать в борьбе против ИГИЛ, однако отношения между двумя странами далеки от идеала. США постоянно упрекают Ирак в недостаточной активности в борьбе с ИГИЛ и требуют от него большего участия в международных операциях. Ирак, в свою очередь, недоволен тем, что США не делают足夠的努力来支持他的反恐努力。}

IV. Турция: растущее недоверие к США

После десятилетий членства в НАТО и стратегического партнерства, отношения США-Турция стали испытывать влияние двух факторов: критика по поводу правительства и действий в Ираке. США также следует глубоко сомневаться в выборах в Кыргызстане, а также в стильем сознавать, что в Кыргызстане мама мусульмане не уничтожате.

Турецкие власти не ведут никаких операций против группы, которая уже начала террористические действия внутри Турции. И турки не понимают: почему «глобальная война с терроризмом» ведется лишь против групп, угрожающих США и не включает группы, уговаривающие американских союзников.

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This is part of the context for the Turkish resistance to support US or European initiatives for democracy in the Black Sea region. Many in Turkey were critical of the US campaign against the Northern Islamic Liberation Movement in the Black Sea region, which will lead to instability and undermine Turkey's security in this region. When the US talks about democracy in the Black Sea region, Turkey hears American naval presence. Turkey is strongly opposed to any foreign military presence in the Black Sea, which it fears will undermine the Treaty of Montreux of 1936, which designated the Turkish Straits as an international waterway but afforded Turkey rights to control territory or influence.

Napalm attacks in Kirkuk on non-Kurds, i.e. Turkmen, which designated the Turkish Straits as an international waterway but afforded Turkey rights to control territory or influence. The US launches against Turkey in 2007 under the name «The Metal Storm» is about a war the West can use to destabilize Turkey. While it is fiction, Turkish and American government sources report that the Metal Storm is about a war happening inside Turkey is a brief look at the best selling fiction in Turkey today, The Metal Storm. Maybe the best example for understanding what is happening in Turkey is «The Metal Storm» which is the much-feared agreement signed at the end of the World War I whereby «Operation Sevres,» which is the much-feared agreement signed at the end of the World War I whereby Turkey is a result of a number of other factors that are beginning to weigh heavily on Turkish-American relations. The American operation against Turkey begins with actual events. The Metal Storm is about a war that is happening inside Turkey is a brief look at the best selling fiction in Turkey today, The Metal Storm.

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psychological campaign against Turkey for some time and uses this opportunity to portray the Turks as aggressors, even though it is the US that launched the operation against Turkey. It is interesting to note that the book makes clear that by that point in 2007, Nicholas Sarkozy had become France’s President, and afterwards the EU ended talks with Turkey, which in turn has moved away from the West. The Turkish government has withdrawn its Ambassador to the US as a result of the Armenian genocide resolution that passes the US Congress. As part of the campaign against Turkey, the US was also portraying Turks as wrong-doers, even though it was the US itself that launched the operation against Turkey. Only a few days ago Sarkozy, who is the most likely candidate to be France’s next President, received a huge applause when he objected to Turkey’s EU membership. The list goes on.

In the book there are two more reasons for the US to launch a war on Turkey. The first is to liberate Istanbul from 500 years of occupation by the Turks and let the Evangelical Church construct the biggest ever church in this city. At secret meeting in Vatican, Turkey was floated as a candidate on President Bush’s list to re-Christianize Anatolia, which has many holy Christian sites. Again, while this theory sounds almost insane, many in Turkey, starting several years before this book was published, have feared an eventual US attack on Turkey. Many in Turkey read this book as a prophetic one. With the US do when many Turks read this book and daily sounds almost insane, many in Turkey do not believe these as fiction because it was considered so insulting. Clearly this language is intended to make the story even more believable.

I have spent a significant part of my testimony on Metal Storm, because it is essential in understanding the Turkish mindset today. What can the US do when many Turks read this book and daily sounds almost insane, many in Turkey do not believe these as fiction because it was considered so insulting. Clearly this language is intended to make the story even more believable.

The average reader in Turkey has difficulty in separating part fact from fiction and reports indicate many Turks purchase books as a protest. In Turkey, many people are not inclined to trust foreign authors. In Turkey, there is no trust in Western media or the foreign authors. Many Turkish people still believe in the Anatolian theory, which is not based on fact but on speculation. Many people are still not able to separate fact from fiction and are not interested in reading books written by foreign authors.

Getus-Turkish relationsations back on track in the Black Sea and beyond requires the Turkish leadership to put an end to the breed of wild and destructive speculation portrayed in Metal Storm. Turkish political leaders need to stop backing any documents that they truly believe the United States would contemplate the outlandish actions concocted by the authors of Metal Storm, who use...
It is impossible to speak about Russian role in the Black Sea region without knowing what Russia is about and its place in the region. For Russia the Black Sea has always been a gateway to the world’s oceans. The region also constitutes a natural bulwark for Russia and it is seen as marked by a bunch of potentially destabilizing factors such as alarming situations in the South.

There are three specific steps the US can take to try to reverse these negative trends and restore a sense of partnership in relations with Turkey. First, together with the Iraqi government, the US needs to find a formula to assuage the Turkish irritation with the continued PKK presence in Northern Iraq. Until and unless the PKK issue is resolved, Turkish-US relations cannot move to a better phase, and Turkey would continue to resist any US initiatives in the Black Sea region.

Second, given the prevalent Turkish view that the US is running a campaign against Turkey, it would be very damaging if the “Armenian Genocide” resolution passed Congress this year. This year is the 90th anniversary of the tragic 1915 massacre and certainly the Armenian Diaspora groups would like to get recognition. However, such a resolution would play right into the hands of the growing set of anti-Americans and ultra-nationalists in Turkey. For the Black Sea region, it would most likely hurt the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement.

Third, the US needs to continue raising Turkish EU membership as part of the transatlantic dialogue and insist that Turkey should be accepted into the EU on the merits. Turkey needs to be assured that it will not be swapped with Ukraine; this certainly is necessary for Turkey to support Ukraine’s (and Georgia’s) ongoing democracy reforms, and make the fundamental mental and institutional changes at home.
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union the Black Sea region has attracted a great attention from the West for many reasons. They are a favorable geopolitical position of the region as a transit corridor between Europe and Asia; its rich oil resources and nearby Caspian regions; the new economic and political cooperation opportunities. After the Iraqi war the Black Sea area has regained its significance due to strategic location near the conflict areas of the Greater Middle East; frozen conflicts in Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan and Russia; increasing concerns about new security threats – terrorism, illegal migration, illegal arms trade, drug trafficking and so forth; changing strategic environment with the Caspian states concept capacity of 50 m. tons a year, which is limited by so forth; changing strategic environment with the Caspian states concept.

And the Caspian gasline (Turkmenistan-Turkey), going around Russia and Iran. In the nearest 10 years Russian supplies will make up 70-75% of its internal consumption. Thus to strengthen its position in the Black Sea area Russia should take on more competitive in terms of a variety of its routes and commercial role there. One of the most important problems for Russia is to promote stability on its southern borders. To do it means to settle the frozen conflicts in Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), Moldova (Transdniester), Azerbaijan (Nagorny Karabakh) and Russia (Chechnya). The problem of the so-called «frozen conflicts» in Black Sea region is a top priority for the main key actors in the region – Russia, the US and Europe. These conflicts inhibit the process of state building as well as developing of a more democratic society. They generate corruption and organized crime and they are a major source of instability within these countries and in the region broadly. Today the situation in terms of their management is following – neither Russia nor the West were able to settle them. One of the reasons is that the roots of these conflicts are very deep and involve historical grievances and the other is the lack of international engagement. There is a strong belief that Russia is a main stumbling block on the way of resolving them and is using the situation in the conflict zones in its geopolitical interests. Gas transportation has become a problem in the Black Sea region recently. Since 1987 Turkey buys Russia's natural gas coming through the territory of Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria. The demand is not met and in 1997 «Blue current» project saw light after corresponding accord was signed between Russia and Turkey. 16 billion square metres yearly supplies by Gasprom are envisaged for the following 25 years. The sea section went from Juba (Russia) to Samson (Turkey). It’s not clear why the both countries chose this project instead of the ground route Izobilny-Batumi-Erzerum, which is cheaper and more secure for environment. Besides «Blue current» emulates Trans-Caspian gasline (Turkmensistan-Turkey), going around Russia and Iran. In the nearest 10 years Russian supplies will make up 70-75% of its internal consumption.

Against this background Russia is facing the same problems as the other members of the region and is trying to solve them on its own. Gas and oil in the Black Sea region have both political and financial implications for Russia. Bearing in mind a great dependence of EU member states on Russian energy supplies the country in order to control oil and gas and be a main supplier in the region must take on a more commercial and competitive role to reach European markets and should develop new routes. At present Russia takes steps to find export routes around the Black Sea straits, for instance the strait of the Sea of Azov. The possibility of establishing a Black Sea pipeline is more likely, with Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria joining Russia in the Burgas (Bulgaria)-Alexandroupolis (Greece) project of TransBalkans route construction (frozen for the moment) around the Straits. One more project under study is Kaki-Birlshibha (Transnet) going mainly through Turkish territory.

Of all ports in the area Russia is left with only two export capable ones Tuapse and Novorossiisk. Their capacities are far from meeting requirements. That’s why makes Russia export 42 m. tons of oil yearly through Ukrainian ports. As a result – increase of export capabilities lags behind oil production growth. A lot depends on the future policy of the Russian government concerning the issue in question. Oil pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan has estimated capacity of 50 m. tons a year, which is limited by resources, and there is the Caspian states concept calling for diversification of delivery routes. Its role will be reduced due to oil deliveries through Kazakhstan for pipeline.

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Speaking about the problem of conflict resolution, Russia each of them has its own complicated genesis and history. Nobody wants to find a local ingredient which is unique for these conflicts. Also we should understand that throughout the rich history of the region, ethnic, cultural and religious conflicts have been experienced with the use of force, often followed by deportations. For most of the last decade Moscow has also sought to maintain its influence in these regions by controlling instability. Some argue that Russian presence in the conflict zones was still and is a stabilizing factor rather than a threat, other claim that Russia policies remain controversial with regards to its actions there.

Currently none of these countries are capable of resolving these conflicts by themselves. To change the situation we should recognize that the Western engagement in the region together with Russia is a precondition for progress. While dealing with the «frozen conflicts» we should bare in mind that due to common historical, religious, cultural roots with these countries having them on their territory Russia is capable of coming as close to the problem as possible knowing much better the grass roots of these conflicts and that one of the main roots of these conflicts are «solved» with the use of «soft landing» with Russia and keeping the «frozen conflicts» while pushing a strategy of intensive policy of engaging Moscow intensely.

To change the situation we should recognize that the Western engagement in the region together with Russia is a precondition for progress. While dealing with the «frozen conflicts» we should bare in mind that due to common historical, religious, cultural roots with these countries having them on their territory Russia is capable of coming as close to the problem as possible knowing much better the grass roots of these conflicts and that one of the main roots of these conflicts are «solved» with the use of «soft landing» with Russia and keeping the «frozen conflicts» while pushing a strategy of intensive policy of engaging Moscow intensely.

Experience of the last decade suggests that an intensive policy of engaging Moscow intensely may be the best way to settle the problem of «frozen conflicts» while pushing a strategy of «soft landing» with Russia and keeping the door open for future cooperation with Moscow. Speaking about the problem of conflict resolution in the Black Sea region it should be also mentioned that currently Russia is witnessing a transformation of the geopolitical environment in the Black Sea region that is distinctly marked by a growing number of international actors in the region. Russian policy towards the area abroad as a whole seems to be an uneasy mix of ideas, blending some Cold Soviet reflexes with the contemporary roles of the international community for relations between independent states. Indeed Russian own transition has been influenced by the US tendency of domination, and a degree of Europeanisation.

This shows that although the borders of former regional complexes have shifted as a result of the problem of establishing regional order, that is a way of settling conflicts and guaranteeing regional security, still remains a priority. Thus the Black Sea region finds itself between the two main regional security complexes as a boundary of indifference. This shows that there is no clear regional order in the Black Sea area for now. On one hand, the EU and NATO order does not cover the whole Black Sea area at present despite the recent creation of a new Euro-Atlantic strategy for the Wider Black Sea region as they still don’t have a clear strategic common policy for the area.

On the other hand, the CIS built up by Russia as a framework of cooperation and as an organization of collective security and guarantees of regional security proved not to be functional, as Russia has never showed a clear interest in solving the security puzzle in the region either. Besides the problem of conflict resolution Russia has not yet fully realized its potential to its southern boundaries or, its southern dimension.

At present the most acute peril for Russia comes from the South, where any spark of tension affects large parts of population. There are drop out forces in the region, often supported by some states. The growing Muslim fundamentalists challenge the Southern flank the most explosive hotbed.

For Russia the situation is unpredictable and prone to exacerbation. The main threat comes not only from Central Asia but also from the Caspian region which is very close to the Black Sea region and that may become one of the spots of the «clash of civilizations» in the area vital to Russia. The region is politically unstable. Organized crime has great clout, the local clans, separatists and terrorist organizations actively compete with each other. The scaled division agreement is still not concluded and that leads to transnational problems of the geopolitical space in the Black Sea region too. It is a place of interaction of different geopolitical actors in the region. Russian policy towards the area abroad as a whole seems to be an uneasy mix of ideas, blending some Cold Soviet reflexes with the contemporary roles of the international community for relations between independent states. Indeed Russian own transition has been influenced by the US tendency of domination, and a degree of Europeanisation.

It is important to note that the Black Sea region is vital to Russia. The region is politically unstable. Organized crime has great clout, the local clans, separatists and terrorist organizations actively compete with each other. The scaled division agreement is still not concluded and that leads to transnational problems of the geopolitical space in the Black Sea region too.
to ongoing stand-off between the Caspian states, pooch and environment pollution are just a few issues on the agenda. The religious and ideological consequences are beyond the scope of this article.

The USA is involved in a way and Russia would hardly confront it directly being tied by anti-terrorist accords (oil is hardly a part of the interest of the USA here) and it’s plausible well join together in case decision is taken to oppose a terrorist threat of any kind. The 9/11 2001 led to the USA direct military presence in areas adjacent to the Russian Southern border. Continuation of the US presence in the Central Asian republics is part of concept, which envisages being as close as possible to the Axis of instability.

Today opposing this threat is a large order. Previously Russia had had a border buffer zone, but today establishing fully guarded border between Russia and Central Asian states is unthinkable. That’s what stipulates necessity to upkeep military potential, to develop cooperation and boost economic support to the countries of the region.

But we still under influence of the perceptions of the past, seeing enemy coming from the West and adopting appropriate ways to wage war. Though it’s becoming more and more clear that it’s the ‘Southern ring’ countries, where the threat comes from.

At the same time the processes of the EU and NATO enlargement threaten to isolate Russia to a greater extent. Russia has no realistic prospect of joining either NATO or the EU. Thus Russia is stuck in some vague EU associate status or a version of FIP designed as an alternative to NATO. The West also does not have a clear vision concerning Russian position on the international arena. Thus currently it seems that there are three plus one players on the international arena – the U.S., Europe, states between Europe that is NATO and Russia. Russia policy right now is to achieve stability in the external environment and a secure position of influence.

The West also does not have a clear vision concerning Russian position on the international arena. Thus currently it seems that there are three plus one players on the international arena – the U.S., Europe, states between Europe that is NATO and Russia. Russia policy right now is to achieve stability in the external environment and a secure position of influence.

To intensify joint fight against terrorism (information exchange, operations against terrorist groups, financial flows control, opposing Muslim fundamentalist ideology). The UN Security Council activity should be intensified, converting the Council into an active tool (by expanding chout of the five members) for the purpose of joint operation in the field of counter-terrorism.

When it comes to nuclear cooperation with the EU and strategic dialogue – it’s logical to focus on economic cooperation with the EU and strategic dialogue (not competition) with the USA. What we’ve had up to now is a lot of talking and few deeds.

What should be done to eliminate mutual suspicions in the relations with USA and NATO?

To set aside hollow declarations and shift to elaboration of ways to take joint decisions, at least in the military field. It’s necessary to transform the military cooperation and boost economic support to the countries of the region.

To start joint assessment of threat while working on military doctrines, to review prospects of joint actions, to develop plans of military operations and to work on the basis of a common vision of the emerging threats and challenges.

Russia is a European country. There are many explanations why we cannot join NATO in the foreseeable future. But deepening and expanding the base, created by the 1997 Russia-NATO Founding Act, and making our relationship mature enough to become a member of the Alliance’s political wing is the only viable option. The present interaction arrangement between NATO and Russia is nothing more than token cooperation to meet the security demands. That’s why it is important to transform the previous discords with NATO into a positive dialogue.

Normal, business-like relations with the EU is a guarantee of peaceful cooperation with NATO and security of the Western borders. The paperwork of the US, NATO, is not always equal to the task. It’s logical to focus on economic cooperation with the EU and strategic dialogue (not competition) with the USA. What we’ve had up to now is a lot of talking and few deeds.

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RF – европейская страна. Есть много объяснений тому, почему мы не можем вступить в НАТО в обоюдном будущем. Но углубление и расширение базы, заявленной в Закладывающем основы Акте РФ–НАТО от 1997 г. и такое же отношение к принадлежности к политическому крылу Альянса является обязательным.

Текущий механизм взаимодействия НАТО–РФ недееспособен в требуемых рамках. Вот почему важно трансформировать предыдущие нестыковки с НАТО в позитивный диалог.

Нормальные бизнес отношения с ЕС – это гарантирование мирного сотрудничества с НАТО и безопасных границ. Не важно, что декларации о «цивилизационной несовместимости» служат больше наугад, чем на жизнь. РФ – это наш основной торговый партнер. Как было упомянуто, это Европа и РФ, которые теперь ставят энергоресурсы, но и привлекательный крупный рынок и торговый транзитный маршрут на юг. Логично сконцентрироваться на экономическом сотрудничестве с ЕС и стратегическом диалоге (не конкуренции) с США. До сего момента было много болтовни и мало дела. Что должно быть сделано для устранения взаимных подозрений в отношениях с США и НАТО? Нужно отбросить в сторону пустые декларации и перейти к выработке путей принятия совместных решений – как минимум в сфере применения силы НАТО и РФ в их региональных геостратегических интересах.

Нужно начать совместную оценку угроз, разработку объективных доктрины, с целью разработки позитивного механизма взаимодействия на основе «цивилизационной несовместимости».

Для усиления советской борьбы с терроризмом (объективных интересов, операций против террористической структуры, простых контрольных функций, противодействия идеологии мусульманского фундаментализма). Деятельность Совета Безопасности

ЭКСПЕРТНОЕ МНЕНИЕ

Гарвардская Программа Черноморской Безопасности

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The Russian-EU integration is dragging feet and the recent agreement is the best testimony. No doubt, the roadmap accord is very important for further EU-Russia dialogue and EU. But actually it’s a list of mutual wishes and aspirations, not a program of concrete steps. There is little relevance to real interests of the country and its citizens. The two problems intertwined give birth to the idea of breakthrough. It’s high time to define foreign policy goals, transform personnel policy and bring in new people trying to achieve a breakthrough into Europe.

On the part of the EU even potential membership has never been offered to Russia. In turn membership is not a Russian goal either. The fact that Russia is not a candidate significantly weakens aspiration to bring into life a lot of processes that take place at the round table, but as told by Brussels. Greece and Turkey of reforms, to do it not as concluded at the Helsinki meeting of 1997. Nowadays, the road to the EU is very long. Integration of the RF-EU narrows the horizons of many EU options, but it is realized through many serious hurdles and changes, in an peaceful program of concrete steps. Little has changed since the recent agreement is the best testimony. We do integrate into the global world as rapidly as it is ready to take us as a whole and sovereign state. That is not a process to be artificially expedited.

Currently Russia is becoming quite a different country it used to be a decade ago. And the situation in the country is also different today: Russia is a bit stronger and has a more clearer vision of its interests in the near abroad. Seems the country is on the way of coming closer to the understanding that the best way for Russia concerning its policies towards the near abroad is to stop considering near abroad as once the sphere of its influence making the central focus on its economic growth. Maybe it’s more to take time with the EU integration issue and focus on our burning, extremely important internal problems.

The situation in Russia could be drastically changed when the economic growth in the country turns Russia into one of the centers of power on the international arena. This would create many more serious grounds for much better and equal relationships between Russia and the West based on partnership and cooperation not only in the Black Sea region but in the whole world.
American Intelligence Reform
Реформа американской разведки

I’m 68 years old, and I spent more than a majority of my years on this Earth thinking of many of you as being our adversary. And now it is a significant thing that we can sit together and talk about issues of our common concern.

Senator Bob Graham

There are some peculiarities about American intelligence. One is that Americans really don’t like intelligence. That rose out of our earliest history. Second, we didn’t like intelligence because we didn’t think it’s really important for us. We had the East and the big ocean in the West, which are fundamental protectors. 9/11 changed a lot of that reality.

With 9/11 we began to realize that those two oceans were not as much of the security and defense protection that is an imperative for us. Now we have to deal with people we didn’t know much about. They were very asymmetrical to the U.S., and we are going to need a heightened intelligence capacity in order to raise our level of understanding. Finally, as part of dealing with terrorist organizations is the fact that you can’t wait until they act to engage into intelligence. So, since 1947, as the Cold War broke out, we have the Intelligence Community (IC), which is composed of more than a dozen agencies dealing with signals, satellite, and human intelligence (HUMINT). But we have to admit that this system of intelligence does not always serve us well for a couple of reasons.

1. The agencies tried to adapt themselves to new realities within their own responsibility and proficiency. E.g., the National Reconnaissance Office can take the best pictures in the world but they are not always certain of what images to take and where they should be taking them.

2. Our IC has a tendency to be slow to change the perception of the nature of a threat and the status of the U.S. relative to threat's changes. We have put an emphasis on technical rather than HUMINT intelligence as it was relevant and reliable in the Soviet threat period, e.g. for monitoring the activities of the Soviet nuclear submarines and for intercepting important military communication lines. But today’s realities are different. You can look at Osama bin Laden all the time through satellite, and HUMINT intelligence...
The Future of Democracy in the Black Sea Region

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Bruce P. Jackson
President of the Project on
Transitional Democracies and a
director of the Project for the New
American Century

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee,

I thank you for the opportunity to testify before you on the state of democracy in the Black Sea region and the possibilities which the vast democratic transformation of this region presents for US policy. I would like to discuss three major questions:

1. What is the Black Sea region and why should developments there command the attention of this Committee and of US policymakers?
2. Where are the states of the Black Sea region in the development of democratic governance and what factors retard development of a free and prosperous civil society in these states?
3. Given the strategic importance of the region and the threats to the freedom of peoples who profess our shared values, what should be the policy of the United States towards the new democracies around the Black Sea?

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Historically, the Black Sea has stood at the confluence of the Russian, Ottoman and Persian Empires and has been a central theater in the «Great Game», which was played out along its shores throughout the nineteenth century. The contours of the Black Sea region which were established in the competitions between the great European powers in the Crimean War and World War I are still evident today.

Mr. Bruce JACKSON

Founder and President of the Project on Transnational Democracies. The Project is a multi-year endeavor aimed at accelerating the pace of reform in post-Soviet democracies and advancing the date for the integration of these democracies into the institutions of the Euro-Atlantic. From 1979 to 1990, Bruce Jackson served in the United States Army as a Military Intelligence Officer. From 1986 to 1990, he served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense in a variety of policy positions pertaining to nuclear forces and arms control. Upon leaving the Department of Defense in 1990, Mr. Jackson joined Lehman Brothers, an investment bank in New York, where he was a strategist in the firm’s proprietary trading operations. Between 1993 and 2002, Mr. Jackson was Vice President for Strategy and Planning at Lockheed Martin Corporation. During 1995 and 1996, Mr. Jackson was National Co-Chairman of the Bob Dole/Dick Cheney for President Committee. Since 1996, he has been a delegate committed to Governor George W. Bush and chaired the Foreign Policy Subcommittee of the Republican Platform Committee. Mr. Jackson is the Chairman of the Committee for the Liberation of States and Europe. During the 2002-2003, he served as the Chairman of the Committee for the New American Century, a nonprofit corporation involved in educating American opinion on foreign policy and national security.
the European Union. These facts so impressed the heads of state member states of NATO that at the Istanbul Summit in July 2004 the NATO Joint Counter-Terrorism Committee at NATO's headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, to implement a new strategy on the Black Sea region was an essential part of Euro-Atlantic security. 4. It is not, however, only US interests which tie us to the Black Sea region, but also our political values. Both the Rose Revolution in Georgia and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine occurred in countries along the northern and eastern shores of the sea. The possibilities created by these democratic revolutions not only inspired President Bush’s Second Inaugural Address and his recent speech in Bratislava, but they also changed the structure of politics in Minsk, Chisinau and as far away as Almaty, Bishkek and Beirut. Without doubt, the largest and most dramatic democratic changes are occurring in this part of the Euro-Atlantic. 5. Sadly, it is not only our hopes that draw our attention to this region, but also our fears. The most sharp and dangerous fragmentations of the former Soviet Union lie scattered in an arc across the northern shore of the Black Sea. A belt of “frozen conflicts” begins in Transnistria in eastern Moldova and runs through Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia to the mountain heights of Nagorno-Karabakh on the border of Armenia and Azerbaijan. In each of these “frozen conflicts” created in the civil wars of the dying Soviet empire, brutal warfare and ethnic cleansing have occurred and could recur. In Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, with their small populations, the central state has found a home and developed a base for trafficking in weapons, drugs, women and children. These criminal enterprises destabilize the governments of the region, threaten Europe with illicit traffic, and ultimately pose a danger to the United States with their capability and intent to sell weapons and technology to our enemies. 6. Finally, the most negative expression of Russian foreign policy aspirations now occurs along the northern rim of the Black Sea region. Since 2002, there have been given an opportunity by the Committee to testify on the subject of Russian neo-imperialism in what the Kremlin regards as Russia’s “near abroad.” I will not repeat the argument here. Suffice it to say, whether we are intent on protecting new democracies from outside inference and coercion or are simply concerned about the damage
recent Romanian Presidential election for the first time, the issue of corruption dominated the campaign and swept reformer Traian Basescu to victory. Post-election Government has launched a large-scale offensive against corruption in government and business. Forcoming elections in Bulgaria may offer a similar, albeit long overdue, opportunity to accelerate reform. Clearly, Romania and Bulgaria are two democracies whose long-term prospects look extremely bright.

Incidentally, Mr. Chairman, President Basescu arrived in Washington later today for a meeting tomorrow with President Bush and members of the Senate. President Basescu is one of the most eloquent advocates of a comprehensive strategy for the Black Sea, aimed at advancing prosperity and democracy throughout the region. His goal is nothing less than to make the Black Sea “a second Mediterranean” in terms of shared security, economics, and political cooperation.

Turkey achieved an historic milestone on December 17, 2004 when the European Union finally agreed to open membership negotiations. Despite this confirmation of Turkey’s European destiny, there are strong indications that Turkey’s national and geopolitcal identity crisis is far from over and that Turkey may be entering a difficult and problematic stage. In June 2004, in order to maintain some semblance of regional hegemony, Turkey played a key role in blocking the extension of the NATO surveillance operations to the Black Sea. Internally, the ruling AK Party seems to have taken a turn for the worse, characterized by strained anti-Americanism, cultural Europhobia, and a resurgent xenophobia. (The television footage of Turkish riot police savagely beating young women at a peaceful protest for political rights that appeared on BBC yesterday is but the latest of many examples of negative developments.)

In foreign policy, during the term of Prime Minister Erdogan, Turkey has quietly broken its 50-year old strategic relationship with Israel, refused to negotiate with Armenia on the opening of their common border (thereby obstructing negotiations on Nagorno-Karabakh), and demanded of the United States a draconian treatment of the Kurdish population in Iraq. In diplomatic parlance, Turkey has become “unhelpful.”

The most dangerous year for a new democracy is its first year, and for Ukraine the critical period is from today through the Parliamentary elections in March 2006. In this defining twelve-month period, Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko will have to address the criminal conduct of the Kuchma period, define and negotiate the rules of the game for the business community, and make significant progress both within the Action Plan of the European Union’s Neighborhood Policy and in an intensified dialogue with NATO. Any one of these tasks would be formidable, but the new government must accomplish this and more, and do so in such a way that convinces the people of Kiev, Lviv, and Donetsk that they share a common future in a united pro-Western Ukraine. The critical task will be to establish transparent business practices and to eliminate the “grey economy” without resorting to large-scale re-nationalization which would destroy the confidence of foreign investors and dangerously inflame sectional resentments.
The further danger for Ukrainian democracy lies in the hostility of Moscow towards European democracies. The Russian Government has refused to comply with its international treaty obligation to withdraw its troops from the Soviet-era bases on Georgian soil and has acted against the interests of the Georgian people. The Russian Government has enforced a breakaway Georgian region of Abkhazia. Late last year, Russia blocked the OSCE from reinforcing a peacekeeping mission in South Ossetia to ensure that Moscow protects its ability to ship prohibited weapons and explosives through the Roki Tunnel to paramilitary gangs in South Ossetia. And, at the December OSCE Summit in Sofia, Bulgaria, Russia forced the OSCE to close the Border Monitoring Operation, which patrolled the northern border of Georgia with Russia, Dagestan and Chechnya. Russian actions could very well prove to be the death knell for the OSCE; we must ensure that they are not for democratic Georgia.

Despite Russian attempts to destabilize the Saakashvili Government, Georgian democracy continues to mature and was strong enough to withstand the recent tragic death of Prime Minister Zvaniya, who was a mainstay of the Rose Revolution. II democracies could be compared to sports teams, Georgia would be the 1980’s US Olympic hockey team. Like the Lake Placid Olympic team, Georgia should not be winning, except it does. It seems to me that Georgia has the essential qualities of sportsmanship that animated successful democratic movements in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the Baltic States against the monolith of Soviet power; they care more and are willing to work harder for democracy than the reactionary forces are willing to work to restore autocratic rule and criminal enterprise.

In contrast, the other smaller states of the Black Sea regime, Moldova, Azerbaijan and Armenia, retain more characteristics of post-Soviet autocracies than of emerging European democracies. To varying degrees, recent elections have not met European standards. Opposition parties are harassed and opposition candidates are occasion- ally threatened with criminal charges or simply imprisoned. Both civil society and the free press are under duress in these countries, as we can see from the recent assassination of the editor of an opposition newspaper in Baku.

For the most part, the major factors retarding the democratic development of Moldova, Azerbaijan and Armenia are the persistence of fragmented political party systems, the absence of truly free elections, corruption and crime throughout Moldova and the lingering grip of a bruised economy. Although, we should not overlook the fact that democratic development is greater in some parts of Europe. In Ukraine, the democratic revolution is only slightly less well-known than Ukraine’s and is succeeding against even longer odds. Georgia, under the leadership of President Misha Saakashvili, has finished an extraordinary first year of reform, which saw the breakaway province of Adjaria reunited with the constitutional government in Tbilisi. By all indicators, such as its qualification for participation within the Millennium Challenge Account, Georgia is delivering on its commitments to economic reform and the democratic transformation of its society and government. Like Ukraine, however, Georgia has encountered serious and continuing resistance from Russia. The Russian Government has refused to comply with its international treaty obligation to withdraw its troops from the Soviet-era bases on Georgian soil and has acted against the interests of the Georgian people. The Russian Government has enforced a breakaway Georgian region of Abkhazia. Late last year, Russia blocked the OSCE from reinforcing a peacekeeping mission in South Ossetia. And, at the December OSCE Summit in Sofia, Bulgaria, Russia forced the OSCE to close the Border Monitoring Operation, which patrolled the northern border of Georgia with Russia, Dagestan and Chechnya. Russian actions could very well prove to be the death knell for the OSCE; we must ensure that they are not for democratic Georgia.

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III

If I am correct in arguing that the Black Sea region is a arena of enormous democratic potential, but where democracy remains at risk, then the policy of the United States has to be to support new democracies, to dissuade or deter foreign powers from intervening in their development, and to ensure that the Euro-Atlantic initiatives they seek remain open to them. I have six recommendations for this Committee to consider and for US policy generally.

1. Accelerate the leading democracies of the region. The prospects for democracy in the Black Sea region will be substantially enhanced by the formal integration of Romania and Bulgaria in the European Union. Their accession must remain on track for January 1, 2007 in order to convey to the other states of the region that the possibility of new formal European integration exists and that painful reforms have their reward in security and prosperity. The United States can assist Romania and Bulgaria in achieving their goal by pushing hard for judicial reform and strict standards of official conduct. The Department of Defense should make its long-delayed decision on the reprioritization of US European bases to the sites offered by the Romanian Government in the vicinity of Constanza on the Black Sea. Nothing could make more clear that the United States recognizes the unique position of security and stability in the Black Sea region is essential to Euro-Atlantic security.

2. Reform and adapt our institutions to permit the Black Sea region hosting institutions, such as NATO and the OSCE, must be made to perform in service of democracy in the Black Sea littoral. We must reviser the decision to block a South Ossetian Endeavor from being extended to the Black Sea and overturn the archaic Montreux Convention, which is sometimes invoked as the justification for barring NATO surveillance from transiting the Bosphorus. Similarly, we must demand that the OSCE fulfill its peacemaking and monitoring responsibilities throughout the region. Even if we are successful with both NATO and the OSCE, the Black Sea region remains «institution-poor» Regional initiatives, such as the confused GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova) or the moribund Black Sea Economic Cooperation forum have not filled the gap. As a consequence, we should engage with regional leaders, such as Romanian President Basescu, Georgian President Saakashvili, and Ukrainian President Yushchenko, on the formation of new structures for a Black Sea strategy.

3. Confront both Russia and Turkey. Whatever hope we have to accomplish in the Black Sea region will be impossible without understanding and cooperation on the part of these large neighbors. In an effort to improve our approach to Russia, we must demand that the Russian Federation act as the responsible actor for which the international community has longed. Similarly, we must demand that the Turkish Government in the vicinity of Constanza on the Bosphorus. The United States has to be to support new democracies, to dissuade or deter foreign powers from intervening in their development, and to ensure that the Euro-Atlantic initiatives they seek remain open to them. I have six recommendations for this Committee to consider and for US policy generally.

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A New Democracy in the Black Sea Region

New American Century

Bruce P. Jackson
President of the Project on Transitional Democracies and a director of the Project for the New American Century

Speech before the Harvard Black Sea Security Program-2005

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hy is President Bush visiting Bratislava, Riga, Tbilisi and Kiev in the first 5 months of his second Administration? What does this have to do within the context of his discussion of democracy? 10 years ago we did not hear about these places. Why now are all of these visits occurring? What has happened to Europe since 1991? What is happening now? We are in the third phase of a changing Europe. Why have the Black Sea countries become more different in the recent past than they have in their prior history? How have all these changes altered the geopolitics of the Atlantic system since 1989? Finally, I'd like to talk about President Bush's agenda as he is going to visit the Capitals mentioned above in a month. Those are the issues President Yushchenko is talking about in Washington today. So, what are the problems we see in the future?

The largest geopolitical change since 1948 is now taking place in the Euro-Atlantic system. The governments that have previously been unchanged for hundreds of years have been overturned in a few weeks in Europe. Black Sea region. Strengthening civil society, the spectrum of democracy support activities. IRI and NDI, to address a wider network of NGOs, such as the National Endowment for Democracy. Closer coordination is essential. We must also challenge our Congressional development aid.的心脏地带的援助。We can now address a wider network of civil society organizations, the spectrum of democracy support activities. IRI and NDI, to address a wider network of NGOs, such as the National Endowment for Democracy. Closer coordination is essential. We must also challenge our Congressional development aid. Chairman, I believe that what is occurring around the Black Sea may be the beginning of the final phase of the completion of a Europe whole and free. Over the five years remaining in this decade, I think that the rapid democratic transformation of Central, Eastern, and now Southern Europe will come to a conclusion, and a new (and far larger) community of Euro-Atlantic democracies will result. While democratic change is ultimately the responsibility of the Black Sea states themselves, the United States has a significant role to play both in supporting and protecting these young democracies. How well we play this role will affect the lives of tens of millions of people and, quite literally, shape the future of the West.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Bruce P. Jackson
President of the Project on Transitional Democracies and a director of the Project for the New American Century

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EXPERT OPINION

and Romania. When we worked with Poland the picture was more a geopolitical competition than it was in Bulgaria. Million people and potentially to 600 Million people. It is an existential threat to these countries. That is a differentiation between three phases of the integration process. The third phase has been always connected to the thesis of the completion of Europe. And there is a question: Are we comfortable reaching the Urals, or are we comfortable reaching the Caspian, and comfortable having Turkey not at the gates of Vienna but in Vienna, ultimately a part of western institutions?

These states are different. These democracies have a far more distant starting point. Many of them have to build a nation before they can build a democracy. The democratic transition process, in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine, is called the Vilnius Group. Finally, a new, third phase is produced by a combination of events. The post-Soviet system reached the Vilnius Group in November of 2003. And in December of 2004 there were two amazing decisions. One was the Orange Revolution in Kiev, and the second on December 17th the EU said that Turkey should ultimately be admitted to join the EU.

The population of the Balkans, the greater Black Sea and the classical Caucasus is over 250 million people; it's twice the size of the Visegrad Group and East Germany all assembled.

There is a rise of nondemocratic Russia. It is much more a clan-based economy to a free market economy is one of the defining characteristics of Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine. There is a differentiation between three phases of the integration process. The third phase was initiated by a combination of events. The post-Soviet system reached the Vilnius Group. Finally, a new, third phase has been produced by a combination of events. The Baltic war was over, and the Balkans started the transition. There was the Rose Revolution in the Caucasus in November of 2003, and in December of 2004 there were two amazing decisions. One was the Orange Revolution in Kiev, and the second on December 17th the EU said that Turkey should ultimately be admitted to join the EU.

The political difference between the Balkans, the greater Black Sea, and the classical Caucasus is over 250 million people; it is twice the size of the Visegrad Group and East Germany all assembled.

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are some more variations, e.g. Romania, Ukraine, competition masquerading as helping the region. There was an anti-GUAM flag. Theirs was a great power (Black Sea Economic Cooperation pact (BSEC). The EU and free markets are intractably connected. Other challenges are in their countries. We believe that free people do believe that a lot of free markets contain criminally minded climbers. A lot of governments do not have...
EU and its new neighbours. Focus on the South Caucasus

EC и его новые соседи.

Акцент на Южный Кавказ

I. Background
II. Looking at the neighborhood from South Caucasus' perspective.
III. EU Policy in the South Caucasus: with focus on the ENP, next steps.

Harri Kamarainen
Adviser to EUSR for the South Caucasus
Harvard Black Sea Security Workshop, 6-10/5/2005, Chisinau, Moldova

Гарвардская конференция по черноморской безопасности, 6-10 июня 2005, Кишинев, Молдова

I. История
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Состоящие – новые соседи

(1) Армения, Азербайджан и Грузия имеют специфические узы и отношения со странами Старого Соседства: Россией, Турцией и Ираком. Сегодняшние отношения основаны на истории, традициях и идеях, формирующих основу стабильного братства Южного Кавказа. Со всеми странами формируются и особые отношения, которые могут значительно влияние в будущем.

(2) Армения, Азербайджан и Грузия, вместе с Казахстаном и Туркменистаном, имеют близкие отношения со странами Среднего Востока и странами Ближнего Востока, включая Иран и Афганистан.

(3) Эти аспекты внешних связей формируются посредством значительного влияния на отношения с соседями. Все три страны имеют общие интересы в вопросах безопасности и экономического развития.

(4) Важным аспектом внешних связей является сотрудничество в вопросах безопасности и экономического развития.

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III. Политика ЕС на Южном Кавказе

Что нового принес в регион СПЕС?

Название регионального СПЕС в июле 2003 стало очередным сигналом необходимости для ЕС иметь более всестороннее понимание и адекватный подход к региону. После 2-х лет работы СПЕС уже можно констатировать ряд конкретных результатов:

- Политика ЕС на Южном Кавказе стала более дружественной.
- ЕС установил связи со всеми региональными механизмами разрешения конфликтов – для того, чтобы помочь ООН, ОБСЕ и Минском Процессу в их усилиях. СПЕС постепенно все конфликтные зоны: Абхазию, Южную Осетию, Аджару и Нагорный Карабах. ЕС готов предоставить помощь в урегулировании конфликтов, в том числе для решения вопросов, которые ведут к нарушению жизни.
- Донорская Конференция была организована под эгидой Европейской Комиссии и Мирового Банка.
- Следующий этап в работе ЕС, направленный на урегулирование конфликтов в регионе.
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III. EU Policy in the South Caucasus

What new has the EUBR brought into the picture?

The appointment of an EU Special Representative for the region in July 2003 was a clear signal of the need for the EU to have a more visible presence and coherent approach to the region. After two years of office of the EUSR one can already identify some concrete results:

- The EUSR policy towards the South Caucasus has become more coherent.
- EU has established links to all regional conflict solution mechanisms – in order to assist the UN, OSCE and Minsk Process in their efforts. EUBR has visited all conflict areas, Abkhazia, South-Ossetia, Apatara and Nagorno-Karabakh. The EU stands ready to provide support to conflict settlement but the parties to the conflicts have to find a solution themselves.
- A Donor Conference for Georgia was organized under auspices of European Commission and World bank in June 2004.
- EU launched its first civil crisis management operation, the Rule of Law - mission in Georgia in summer 2004.
- The Mission will end its operation in July this year.
- Together with the US, Russia and Turkey the EU played a constructive role in the solution of the Agra-conflict.
- Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia have been included in the European Neighborhood Policy.
- At present EU is looking at ways how to support Georgia in the Border Monitoring after OSCE had to close down its BMDC.
- The EUSR is not the only instrument the EU can use to enhance its relations with the South Caucasus. A central role is played by the Presidency, the European Commission with its delegations in Tbilisi and Yerevan and a representation in Baku, the 25 member states with their bilateral programs and the European Parliament.

ENP – European Neighborhood Policy

Main objective is to share the benefits of the EU’s 2004 enlargement with neighboring countries in
Гарвардская Программа Черноморской Безопасности-2005

Стратегия Европейской Безопасности, принятая Советом Европы в декабре 2003, четко обозначает Южные Кавказы как один из регионов, в которых ЕС должен инвестировать «более сильный и активный интерес». Стратегический документ демонстрирует высокий приоритет, который ЕС наделяет формирование своих будущих отношений с соседями, базируясь на взаимных обязательствах относительно принципиальных общих ценностях в сфере верховенства права, эффективного государствования, уважения к правам человека, включая права меньшинств, развитие рыночной экономики и гарантированного развития. Уровень намерений по развитию отношений ЕС к своим соседям примет во внимание размах, до которого обе стороны будут эффективно приняты. Ключевые элементы ЕПС, Доклады Оценки Страны, Планы Действий, Инструмент Европейского Соседства и Партнерства (ИЕСП).

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(1) ИЕСП – Инструмент Европейского Соседства и Партнерства. Это Европейская Безопасность, Стратегия Европы, принятая Советом Европы в декабре 2003, четко обозначает Южные Кавказы как один из регионов, в которых ЕС должен инвестировать «более сильный и активный интерес». Стратегический документ демонстрирует высокий приоритет, который ЕС наделяет формирование своих будущих отношений с соседями, базируясь на взаимных обязательствах относительно принципиальных общих ценностях в сфере верховенства права, эффективного государствования, уважения к правам человека, включая права меньшинств, развитие рыночной экономики и гарантированного развития.

(2) Инструмент Европейского Соседства и Партнерства (ИЕСП) – Инструмент Европейского Соседства и Партнерства представляет собой комплексная замена программ Партнерства и Программы Партнерства по поддержке усилий. В рамках ИЕСП определяются приоритетные сферы и направления действий, а также механизмы финансирования. ИЕСП охватывает все аспекты сотрудничества ЕС и своих партнеров, и включает в себя следующие ключевые компоненты:

- политический диалог и реформы;
- торговля и мера, готовящие Армению, Азербайджан и Грузию к возможному получению статуса в рамках Европейского Союза;
- энергетика и транспорт;
- инфраструктура и инновации.

Таким образом, ИЕСП предоставляет странам-партнерам возможность работать совместно над решением общих проблем, развивая и укрепляя диалог и сотрудничество на различных уровнях. Важно отметить, что ИЕСП охватывает все аспекты сотрудничества ЕС и своих партнеров, и включает в себя следующие ключевые компоненты:

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Таким образом, ИЕСП предоставляет странам-партнерам возможность работать совместно над решением общих проблем, развивая и укрепляя диалог и сотрудничество на различных уровнях. Важно отметить, что ИЕСП охватывает все аспекты сотрудничества ЕС и своих партнеров, и включает в себя следующие ключевые компоненты:

- политический диалог и реформы;
- торговля и мера, готовящие Армению, Азербайджан и Грузию к возможному получению статуса в рамках Европейского Союза;
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U.S. interests in the Caucasus and Caspian regions

Интересы США в Кавказском и Каспийском регионах

Steven Mann

1. National interest.
2. Caucasus and the Caspian region.

What is the national interest of the US in the Black Sea-Caspian-Central Asian region? It involves the following factors:

- having a secure and stably developing region that is not plagued by regional conflicts and threats from terrorism, religious extremism, narco-trafficking or organized crime;
- having democratic societies emerge from the old union.

We do this not out of blind ideology, since it is important to remember: the starting point here is national interest. But we believe there are security grounds for this, that democracies choose not to make war with other democracies, and that citizens don’t freely choose war in almost every case. We have also defined our national interest in supporting this concept to rule of law. Rule of law is more accurate, and democracy has become an overused term. It begins only with elections, although behind them lies much more.

Ambassador Steven MANN

Special Negotiator for Nagorno-Karabakh and Eurasian Conflicts, in addition to his position as Senior Advisor for Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy. As the senior U.S. official responsible for Caspian energy issues, Ambassador Mann has been heavily involved in realizing the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline and in the successful launch of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) line, among a wide range of other Eurasian energy issues. He will continue his Caspian energy responsibilities while acting as Special Negotiator. In 2003, he served on the staff of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq and managed the transition of the UN Oil-for-Food Program to Coalition auspices. Ambassador Mann is a Pennsylvanian who joined the Foreign Service in 1976. He has had a number of Washington assignments, including postings to Moscow, Jamaica, and Sri Lanka. He opened the first United States Embassies in Armenia, Micronesia, and Mongolia and served as the first American Chargé d'affaires in those nations. He has had a number of Washington assignments, including management of U.S. relations with India from 1995 to 1998, from 1998 to 2003, he served as the United States Ambassador to Turkmenistan. In 1985-86, Ambassador Mann was a fellow of the Harriman Institute for Advanced Soviet Studies at Columbia University. He is a 1991 Distinguished Graduate of the National War College. Ambassador Mann was born in Philadelphia in 1951. He holds an A.B. degree from Oberlin College and MA degrees from Cornell and Copenhagen Universities. His languages are Russian and German.

Экспертное мнение
The case is the same with gas. There is our friend Gazprom. At the time of independence the countries found themselves in a difficult position because the Russian company had never let an oil pipeline or gas mains over Caspian resources. And Transneft and Gazprom used and still use this control for charging the high prices for shipping oil and gas. The U.S. policy though is a policy of anti-monopoly, and there is a good reason for this given the way the Russian energy sector acted in the years after independence. The managers of this system used this monopoly power in an economic sense. And it is an uncomfortable fact for the countries of the region to have these important sectors of their economies in control of two Russian companies that are so politically dependent on the Kremlin.

This is a critical issue not only just for the Caspian countries right now but also for Ukraine. The Government of Ukraine has the chance to reevaluate the deals the last government made with Gazprom. And these are complex hidden deals. There is a tran- sit of gas pipelines across Ukraine. And it is impor- tant. It plays a major role as an energy country in this region in plan of its development, although the problems in this region in plan of its development, although the problems facing the region as a whole are very significant. The region has six trillion cubic meters, which again is more than the U.S. or the North Sea have. But on the global scale it is much less than the 262 billion barrels of Saudi Arabia.

In the coming years the largest non-OPEC oil growth in the next 5-10 years is going to come from the Caspian region. And this non-OPEC oil will help to diversify five world energy suppliers and very import- antly for the countries of the region the revenue from this oil can be very powerful in helping the new pro- ductive economies of Caspian countries.

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group of people are making decisions in secret for the benefit of not the nation, not of the region, but for their own benefit and the benefit of small groups in power and pipeline monopolies. What’s the point of all this? The outcome is that you get rich by taking what is already there. Ensured dependence to a natural resource fosters the resource curse exist? The simplest answer is that the more important natural resources were to a country’s economy, the lower its growth rate was. Of 26 oil-rich countries they studied only two had annual average growth above 3%. The one that grew more fast was a 2% a year. Why didn’t the host of poor nations grow much faster? Why does the resource curse exist? The simplest answer is that being dependent on natural resources makes a country less likely to invest in other things that might be economically valuable, especially manufacturing. Environmental degradation and natural resource fuses the illusion that you get rich by taking what is already there instead of creating something new.

Let’s take a look at growth rates of resource rich countries. The World Bank has developed an index for this, the Transparency International perception corruption index, the higher the score the more transparent and honest the country is. Norway has 8,5 out of 10 has the highest growth rate among world’s oil reach countries, Nigeria – 1,6, which is a terrible growth rate in that period. The economic success stories correlate with good governance, and honest business. The economic failures correlate with corruption.

With or without oil and gas in the region there are few critical steps that all the countries have taken for development. The first is investment in human capital, education, and healthcare. Education is critical. There are brilliantly talented people across this region, which have no limit to their potential, given training and educational opportunities. Second, is de-bureaucratization, because it thrives on permit requirements. Third is press freedom. I am not going to talk about human
I am going to make an economic argument, but without newspapers and TV that tells the truth about the country how can decision-makers actually make the right decisions? Of course we need honest statistics, how can they assess the effectiveness of policies? And without honest feedback do you understand what is working well and what is failing? How do people innovate in circumstances like that?

Again, there is a choice of outreach or closure and transparency or secrecy. The choices consist of joining together with other countries of the regions, linking with the global economy or turning back to the closed doors of doing business. Outreach is not only. It is mess. It is not fully predictable. It is sometimes chaotic. But this is one way growth occurs. You can not dictate the course of a nation's development. Last year in addition to my energy work I was appointed as the West's representative to several groups that work to bring conflict settlement to Nagorno Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transdnistria. Do not spend a lot of time trying to interpret the connection of why I am doing energy, and why I am doing conflicts, because it is simply a bureaucratic measure to consolidate two jobs. The conflicts mentioned have been frozen in a sense for a number of years. And that is a small blessing because the most intense phase has stopped. But the larger long-term consequences are still ongoing. And the lack of resolution means that there is a clear presence of the security danger that the conflicts can rage again.

In these weeks there is more shooting along the Karabakh line of contact. And that is an example. Talking about where the conflicts stand and the practical work by Georgia on moving that peace process forward a detailed and very promising proposal to discuss. For years there have been negotiations there. The good news is that President Saakashvili has put the Central Asia peace process back on track last summer. He relaxed the security measures where there were still some ongoing shooting. And that is an example.

The other conflict is the breakaway region of Transdnistria. It is an industrial part of Moldova. Big factories are there, and big steel producers. For a small country it is very well. There are real economic interests. And that is a small blessing because the diocese in Moldova. Big factories are there, and big steel producers. For a small country it is very well. There are real economic interests. And that is a small blessing because the diocese in Moldova.

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I was in Dushanbe at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The good news is that President Ziyavutdinov has put the Central Asia peace process back on track last summer. He relaxed the security measures where there were still some ongoing shooting. And that is an example.

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ble to make any progress for most of 2004. There has been popular support among the Abkhaz for Sergei Bagapsh, despite the Kremlin’s desire to choose someone else, because he is the choice of the Abkhaz. And also on the Georgian side they have a very skilled official named Irakli Alasania who was representing Tbilisi on the Abkhaz question, I believe he is conciliatory. So, we may be seeing modest changes, which have not existed for some time.

The final conflict I'd like to discuss is Nagorno Karabakh, which was an autonomous region of the Azerbaijan Republic in Soviet times. Before independence and with independence it has tried to break away from the government in Baku because Karabakh is mostly ethnic Armenian and it has a close affiliation with the neighboring population of Armenia. It's a humanitarian tragedy for both sides. There have been tens of thousands of casualties in this war and more than a million displaced persons, mostly in Azerbaijan. And Armenia occupies not merely Karabakh but a full range of territories around Karabakh itself. Leaving aside Karabakh, right now Armenia occupies about 13% of Azerbaijani territory. Negotiations have been continuing for 15 years. The sides came very close at a 2001 and Russia led meeting in Key West in 2003, and there has been essentially no progress for years after that. But in the past year on Karabakh for the first time since 2001 and now in 2005 we are seeing actual substantive progress and a new round of negotiations. I am one of the mediators in this. We work as a part of the so-called Prague process under the auspices of the Organization for the Security and cooperation in Europe. And the Prague process has continued in the absence of the Moscow process. I am the American mediator. The elements will include some sort of Armenian troop withdrawals, some way to address the question of Karabakh's affiliation, international peacekeepers, security assurances, opening of borders and reconstruction assistance. And among very tough issues are the Latchin corridor and the city of Susha.

Concerning Russia, I believe there are three factors at work. The South Caucasus is a number one priority that occupies Russian history and Russian thought. And its background makes it difficult in some circles in Moscow to recognize the laws of the South Caucasus in the independence period. Second, Russia has security concerns given North Caucasus separatism and terrorism. In order to achieve a broadly defined security, it wishes to extend control into the South Caucasus. Third, there is a powerful economic interest at play between Moscow and Karabakh, and South Ossetia. And I can say the same for Transnistria.

So, the international community is working toward the settlement of these conflicts. The direction of the future is toward enlargement of cooperation and security ties. This is the direction of history. And we are seeing this across Eurasia as transit links develop, and as societies, countries define new ways to link together. C conflicts may be frozen now, they may be quiet, but they are not hidden, it is not complex. We take seriously the humanitarian concerns given North Caucasus separatism and terrorism. In order to achieve a broadly defined security, it wishes to extend control into the South Caucasus. Third, there is a powerful economic interest at play between Moscow and Karabakh, and South Ossetia. And I can say the same for Transnistria.
The Orange Revolution in Ukraine

The Orange Revolution in Ukraine has changed the art of impossible in the former Soviet Union. That is high praise and this is a great triumph, but it is also a colossal responsibility for Ukraine.

James Sherr

Многие ждали от успехов Оранжевой революции в смысле реализации надежд, которые она породила. Многие ждали не только от Украины, но и от всего Черноморского региона (ЧР), включая Российскую Федерацию (РФ). Поэтому Одесскую революцию следует принять не только как катализатор политических перемен в Украине и странах, прилегающих к ней, но и как катализатор политических перемен в всеми ЧР, включая Российскую Федерацию (РФ) и Беларусь. Кроме того, Оранжевая революция демонстрирует нечто такое, что в будущем не может быть оценено в основном на геополитическую, а не геостратегическую сторону. Однако результаты Оранжевой революции в значительной степени зависят от того, насколько успешно в государстве и в обществе будет реализованы реформы. Важно, чтобы реформы были не только моральными, но и политическими, чтобы они не были абстрактными и не приводили к новой власти. Кроме того, Оранжевая революция должна быть не только политической, но и социальной, чтобы она могла привести к изменениям в обществе, а не только в политической сфере.

Джеймс Шерр

A great deal depends on the success of the Orange Revolution, and on the fulfillment of the hopes that it generated. There is a lot that depends on Ukraine, the Black Sea region as well as the Russian Federation (RF). The Orange Revolution demonstrates something that has always been true: that the greatest influence on Ukraine’s geopolitical environment is Ukraine itself. Ukrainians do not enjoy hearing that since Ukrainians righteously have very high expectations of others, particularly in the West. Ukrainians are greatly influenced by the EU, NATO and Russia, but they do not enjoy hearing that since they have very high expectations of others, particularly in the West. Ukrainians are greatly influenced by the EU, NATO and Russia, but they do not enjoy hearing that since they have very high expectations of others, particularly in the West.

Viktor Yushchenko and his government were both right to power to change the nature of the system that has governed Ukraine since 1991. That is true however that they have the greatest influence on their own place in the region, and not others. Viktor Yushchenko and his government were both right to power to change the nature of the system that has governed Ukraine since 1991. That is true however that they have the greatest influence on their own place in the region, and not others.

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Oranжевая революция в Украине обозначила искусство невозможного в Европе. Советский Союз. Это очень высоко оценено, это триумф, но в то же время это и колоссальная ответственность за Украину.

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Джеймс Шерр
Mr. James SHERR  

Fellow of the Conflict Studies Research Centre, which is part of the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom. (The CSRC, until 1993 the Soviet Studies Research Centre, conducts independent, unclassified research on the basis of primary—and largely Russian-language—sources). He is also Lecturer in International Relations at Lincoln College, Oxford, a consultant to NATO and the EU on Ukraine and was a Specialist Adviser to the House of Commons Defence Committee during the last parliament. He is the author of approximately 100 publications on Russia, Ukrainian and European security. Born in New York in 1951, Mr. Sherr holds British and US citizenship. He graduated from Montclair High School (New Jersey) in 1969 and in 1974 received a BA summa cum laude from Oberlin College (Ohio). In 1983 he was appointed Director of Studies at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, London. Since 1995, his primary responsibility at CSRC has been to inform the Ministry of Defence, NATO and interested parties about Ukraine's development, external relations and security. He plays an active part in NATO led discussions, the UK-Ukraine Ministry of Defence Programme of Cooperation, as well as a range of projects initiated by Ukrainian official bodies and NGOs. He has been published extensively in Ukrainian journals and is a regular contributor to the Ukrainian weekly Nezavissyma Gazeta. He is a regular participant in several Black Sea regional forums, as well as the Harvard Black Sea security program.

For two months since the Orange Revolution, all the decisions have been made by individuals, not the whole society. Now that the Orange Revolution has taken place, after two months, there is a serious question here of legitimacy. Let me remind you of the Orange Revolution as a framework in which it is possible for him to dismiss incompetent military officers but that he cannot remove civilians who are either incompetent or who are trying to abstract and sabotage his ideas since a significant number of countries do not allow civilians operating state services and in being in state services to be dismissed.

There exists a basic issue here of legitimacy, and it is the fact that as the Orange Revolution was gaining its momentum, lots of people, some very influential, some simple ordinary people, operating in state structures climbed on board this machine. Those people essentially wanted the Orange Revolution to be confined to the minimum, to the rectification of the most flagrant and dramatic abuses of the past and many of these people have no interest in reform. That is, as long as they are there, and whether openly or not openly expressed, it is still the case in Ukraine, as it has been in the past in every institution there is a struggle between those who wish to see changes and those who do not want them. Moreover, there are three questions that have to be raised about critical issues. The first critical issue is leadership. Who understands leadership and who is providing it? Leadership is a direct and very practical quality. Does President Yushchenko understand leadership or does he simply understand inspiration, which is a remote and visionary quality? Does Yulia Timoshenko, the Prime Minister, understand leadership, or does she confuse leadership with control? She is doing her best to control everyone, the Prime Minister can possibly control 50% of decisions will be made by bureaucrats, and 100% of them are to be implemented by bureaucrats known as "The bureaucracy of the Cabinet of Ministers". Has it changed?
No. It is growing smaller or larger, looking at the so-called administrative reform in Ukraine! Not only there, but also in what is used to be called the President's Administration. It is quite a time that the President level talked to level about a struggle between the Prime Minister Timoshenko and some other Minister or Mr. Poroшенко, Secretary of National Security and Defense of Ukraine, but these discussions obscure the fact that in any system the power is exercised by bureaucrats. If you come to power without seeing that bureaucracy then your intentions will not be realized, and real changes will not take place.

The second issue is about plans. I might be the first person to say that this government should not be critici
cized for coming in to power without plans. You cannot reproach them for curbing counterшpower psychologically prepared for the possibility of power. So, you cannot criticize for coming in to power without plans. You cannot reproach them for curbing counterшpower that in his entire life he has been acquainted with three policemen. The new Security Service of Ukraine has absoluteш corruption as a matter of necessity.

If you look at the most critical moment, which I believe I know best, the so-called power ministries (security and mili
tary sector) then I have to say that with a significant excepшtion of the Ministry of Defense (MoD), the new leadership of these organizations does not demonstrate that it understands either their complexity or their high-profes
sional reform. The new Minister of Interior Lutsenko has absolutely no background in this sphere. He has admitted that in his entire life he has been acquainted with three policemen, that his ordinary people see corruption as a matter of necessity. And the Parliaments of Ukraine, conditioned where corruption is a matter of choice rather than a matter of necessity, are not going to connect it to the core reality in a country which is now as democratic as Ukraine has become. The core reality being that this is the problem for the average person. The average person does not have the expertise to understand why changes should be carried out by professionals. Why are some of these problems present? I would have at least two explanations. The first is that the people who are in power now are people who were in power then, in a system of power they are encouraged to replace. To be sure, most of them left that system sometime ago and did so on the basis of corruption, and of course a great many have done that later on the basis of personal interest and opportunism, which further complicates matters. But even those who left that system because of corruption are part of the culture of that system. And they are not entirely free at it. Most of them also have the view of the ‘verkheshch’ (of people who sit on the top, who can understand the technocratic answer to a problem or a question). The second explanation is that this problem is incompletely seen, that is to say, not entirely seen, that it is not done in the correct way, that it is not properly understood, that it is not properly perceived, that it is not completely understood even by those who should understand it. And if you have spent your entire life up here, it is very difficult.

There is the second problem, that being the legal cul
ture of the country, which is fundamental, and does not differ from the legal culture in Russia. I mean that there is an obsession about regulating every-
thing through normative documents and checks. At a recent seminar, which I participated again, many high-ranking people were saying: «We share your analysis, and not only all the contradictions as are, but also the obstacles which are supposed to be tackled.»...
Advancing Euro-Atlantic security and democracy in the Black Sea region

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: I am grateful for the opportunity to appear and testify in this important hearing on a region that has surged to salience in debates on U.S. foreign and security policy and strategy: the broader Black Sea region, new frontier in the advance of Euro-Atlantic security and democracy. My presentation will succinctly identify the interests of the U.S. and its friends in the region, threats to those interests, and steps the U.S. can take to promote its security and democratic goals together with its friends in the region.

Interests

The Black Sea region forms the hub of an evolving geostrategic and geo-economic system that extends from NATO to Central Asia and Afghanistan, and as such is crucial to U.S. interests in the larger Black Sea region.

The Black Sea region is a strategic area where the interests of the U.S. and its friends are closely linked and where the U.S. has a strategic interest in ensuring stability and prosperity.

In terms of security, the Black Sea region is a key area for the U.S. to consider in its efforts to promote stability and security in the region.

In terms of economics, the Black Sea region is a key area for the U.S. to consider in its efforts to promote economic development and prosperity in the region.

The Black Sea region is a key area for the U.S. to consider in its efforts to promote democracy and human rights in the region.

In terms of political and security interests, the Black Sea region is a key area for the U.S. to consider in its efforts to promote stability and security in the region.

In terms of economic interests, the Black Sea region is a key area for the U.S. to consider in its efforts to promote economic development and prosperity in the region.

In terms of democratic interests, the Black Sea region is a key area for the U.S. to consider in its efforts to promote democracy and human rights in the region.
antiterrorism efforts. It provides direct strategic access for American and allied forces to bases and theaters of operation in Central Asia and the Middle East, and allows US and NATO forces to use transit routes for Caspian energy supplies which are key to our European allies’ energy balance in the years ahead.

Countries in the Black Sea region, such as Georgia and Azerbaijan, are vitally interested in combating terrorism in all its forms. For both Georgia and Azerbaijan, participation in an anti-terrorism coalition is a means to strengthen security arrangements.

Friends and Partners
American and overall Western interests in this region require stable, reform-capable states, in control of their own borders, safe from external military or economic pressures or externally-inspired secessions, secure in their function as energy transit routes, and capable of supporting U.S.-led or NATO coalition operations. Those interests can only be sustained if the region’s countries develop good governance, with functioning democratic institutions and political processes resistant to corruption or hostile manipulation, and if they are protected by international law and Western-led security arrangements.

Thus, effective state- and democracy-building and strategic interests are twins sides of a common set of U.S. and Euro-Atlantic interests in the Black Sea region. By the same token, security threats to countries in this region and actions that undermine their sovereignty run counter to those interests.

Within this region, Romania and Bulgaria became providers of security and contributors to coalition operations even before accession to NATO. Their role in providing security to the region itself.

Mr. Vladimir SOCOR
Senior Fellow of the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies (IASSP), based in Washington, DC, and a columnist for Wall Street Journal Europe. He formerly was a senior research analyst with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in Munich, and prior to that a professor of history and political science. He currently writes for The Jamestown Foundation from Munich. His concentration entails the non-Russian former republics of the ex-Soviet countries and ethnic conflicts.

Dрузья и партнеры
Интересы США и, в целом, Запада к ФР, включая членство в НАТО, требуют компетентных государств с функционирующими демократическими институтами и политическими процессами, которые будут неприемлемы коррупции, вмешательства и манипуляций, а также

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of any foreign gunmen, their suspected accomplices, or radical Islamist militants. With U.S. assistance, Georgia cleaned up the Pankisi Valley in 2002-2003 and so far has stayed free of them. For its part, Azerbaijan gave radical Islamist organizations no chance to make inroads into the country. Successful development of Azerbaijan as a Muslim secular state is also a shared interest of that country and the West. This goal has good prospects of fulfillment in Azerbaijan’s society characterized by religious tolerance and receptiveness to Western models. The success of pro-democracy movements, known as Rose and Orange Revolutions, in Georgia and Ukraine recently is seen by many as potential—

able to be replicated in Armenia, but unlikely to be dupli-
cated in Azerbaijan or Moldova. In these two coun-
tries, democratization will likely follow an evolu-

donary path. Last week, Presidents Mikhail Saakashvili of Georgia and Viktor Yushchenko of Ukraine, meeting with Moldova’s president Vladimir Voronin, announced their readiness to work with him toward completing Eastern Europe’s third wave of democratization -- that in the broad-

Black Sea region. Mr. Voronin and his team, com-
munists in name only, have reoriented Moldova westward and are resisting what they describe as "Russia’s attempts at re-colonization." These presi-
dents along with Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan are scheduled to meet again next month in Moldova with Ukraine’s president to discuss Moldova’s read-

diness to meet again next month in Moldova.

Security Threats:
Old, New, Newest

The region’s Western-oriented countries are facing a wide spectrum of threats to their security, mainly from Russia and its local profligates. The overarching goal is to thwart these countries’ Euro-Atlantic inte-
gration and force them back into a Russian sphere of dominance. The scope, intensity, and systematic appli-
cation of threats has markedly increased over the last
ty-ear, as part of President Putin’s contribution to the shap-
ing of Russia’s conduct. These may be described as old, new, and newest—types of threats. The “old-type” threats stem from troops and bases stationed unlawfully in other countries, seizures of terri-
itories, border changes de facto, ethnic cleansing, and cre-

ation of heavily armed proxy statlets. Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan are the targets of such blackmail.

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Frozen Conflicts

The Black Sea region is the most conflict-

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The "newest-type" threat to security can be seen in Russia’s assault on electoral processes, some months ago in Ukraine’s presidential election and in recent weeks in Moldova’s parliamentary elec-

tions (and meanwhile even in loyalist Abkhazia). Using massive financial, mass-media, and covert action means, Russia has sought to influence the outcome of elections or hijack them outright in order to install its favorites in power.

Closely related to this is the export of the Russian model of governance, characterized by a symbiosis of neo-KGB structures, organized crime, state bureaucracy, and government-connected big business. In all of the situations described above, security and democracy are equally at risk.

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оверestimate the practical value of Moscow’s contributions; and to ignore Russia’s outright obstruction of U.S. efforts in a number of cases, something that they would seem to confirm the Kremlin in its dangerous expectation that strategic partnership with the U.S. should entail acceptance of Russian troops on “peacekeeping” and conflict-resolution in the “post-Soviet space.” This is an ingredient to sphere-of-influence rebuilding. It is crucial to avoid the perception (let alone the fact) of a Russia-U.S. or Russia-West division of peacekeeping and conflict-management spheres, or an informal partition of countries’ territories. Strategic partnerships cannot be long sustained with rump countries vulnerable to armed secessionist pressures across uncontrolled external borders.

It is high time to move this issue to the front burner of U.S. security policy. Preferably in synergy with NATO and EU countries, the U.S. is best placed for promoting conflict-settlement solutions that would consolidate the region’s states in strategic partnership with the U.S. Turning the broader Black Sea region into a policy priority need not compete with the priorities assigned to other areas. On the contrary, stabilization of this region would entail incomparably smaller resources compared to the risks posed by the conflict complications in countries like Afghanistan, or emergent initiatives in the broader Middle East. The fact is that a secure and stable Black Sea region is necessary for sustaining those U.S.-led operations and initiatives.

**CFE Treaty, Istanbul Commitments**

Russia has openly repudiated its obligations under the 1999-adapted Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe and Istanbul Commitments (twins parts of a single package) regarding withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia and Moldova. The OSCE, custodian of those documents, has cooperated with Russia in evasively them. Troop withdrawal deadlines were postponed and then removed altogether; preconditions to withdrawal were attached where the troop withdrawal was to have been uncondition- al; excuses were found for retaining some Russian troops in place where the withdrawal was to have been complete; wide verification loopholes were tacitly accepted; heavy weaponry — costly designated as “unaccounted-for” was transfer-limited equipment — was transferred from Russian’s arsenals into those of the separatist enclaves, the creation of Russian-staffed separate armies, and the requirement of host-country consent (to the stationing of foreign troops) being floated. Since 2002, Moscow has rejected the very notion that it had made “commitments” in Istanbul to withdraw its troops from Georgia and Moldova. The OSCE itself all along termd those Russian commitments only “politically binding,” as distinct from legally binding, i.e., not binding in practice. All these concessions notwithstanding, the OSCE is no longer able since 2003 even to cite its own 1999 decisions, because Russia has easily vetoed such references in the organization’s routine year-end resolutions. Realistically speaking, the Istanbul Commitments are dead.

Since 2004, moreover, Moscow threatens to destroy the OSCE by blocking the adoption of the organization’s budget and terminating certain OSCE activities. Russia does not want to kill the OSCE, but rather to harness and use the weakened organization. Under these circumstances, no one can possibly expect the OSCE to resurrect the Istanbul commitments, let alone ensure compliance with them.

Meanwhile, the U.S. and NATO governments collectively take the position that they would not ratify the CFE and Istanbul agreements (which Moscow wants ratified) until Russia has complied with the Istanbul Commitments. This form of leverage has, manifestly, proved too weak to induce Russia to withdraw its troops from Georgia and Moldova. Russian officials scoff at calls for troop withdrawal based on the Istanbul documents. It is high time for Georgia and Moldova to go beyond the OSCE to international organizations, and argue the case for Russian troop withdrawal on the basis of national sovereignty and international law. The U.S., along with the Euro-Atlantic community, should place these issues prominent on the agenda of U.S.-Russia, NATO-Russia, and EU-Russia dialogues, and not just at summit time (as has been done occasionally and feebly thus far) but also on a regular basis until this legitimate goal is achieved.

**Предисловие**

Окончательные решения по вопросу о выделении средств на поддержку проекта должны быть приняты на основании детального анализа финансовых потребностей и ресурсов, а также исходя из приоритетов развития стран СНГ.

**Гарвардская Программа Черноморской Безопасности**

Гарвардская Программа Черноморской Безопасности - это международная инициатива, направленная на развитие безопасностных отношений в регионе Черного моря. Она объединяет усилия ведущих организаций, включая НАТО и ОБСЕ, а также ученых, политиков и экспертов.

**Гарвардская Программа Черноморской Безопасности - 2005**

Гарвардская Программа Черноморской Безопасности 2005 года - это важный шаг вперед в укреплении безопасности и стабильности в регионе. Она играет значительную роль в предотвращении конфликтов и укреплении сотрудничества между странами.
Regional conflicts in the Black Sea Area

Региональные конфликты в Черноморско-каспийском регионе

<table>
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<tr>
<th>№</th>
<th>Vladimir Socor</th>
<th>Senior Fellow, Jamestown Foundation</th>
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<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Let’s start with the definition of the Black Sea Region (BSR). The Black Sea Region is of primary importance for Western countries, including those locked in conflicts. The current state of play in conflicts and in settlement efforts</td>
<td>Речь на ГАРВАРДСКОЙ Программе Черноморской Безопасности-2005</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>Russia’s role in these conflicts. The performance of international organizations. The vitality of Europe’s future energy balance is dependent on energy transit from the Caspian region. It is extremely interested in bringing the BSR into one form or another, which remains to be defined then determined, into the Euro-Atlantic (EA) system. From a Western standpoint, the BSR functions as a crucial 2-way corridor for energy transit from the Caspian region to Western consumer countries in Europe. This is representative of the American interest, and it is not an accident that the U.S. is actually in the forefront of promoting energy transit projects in the BSR, including for Caspian energy. Western Europe will be. But it will be actively more than the consumer countries in Europe. The U.S.</td>
<td>1. Определение Черноморско-каспийского региона (ЧКР). Определение общих интересов его стран, включая находящихся в состоянии конфликта. 2. Текущее состояние конфликтов и попытки их урегулирования. 3. Роль России в этих конфликтах. 4. Оценка деятельности международных организаций. 5. Продолжения по урегулированию конфликтов или возможные подходы и решения.</td>
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<td>Energy supply diversification policy lies in the BSR. It is extremely interested in bringing the BSR into one form or another, which remains to be defined then determined, into the Euro-Atlantic (EA) system. From a Western standpoint, the BSR functions as a crucial 2-way</td>
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Supply: The Reagan Administration's rational for doing that was what I mentioned a moment ago.

This issue is of permanent interest. It is not tied to any particular era, either in the Soviet period or not. I describe the BSR as a 2-way corridor. The other direction, of course, is strategic access for NATO forces or American-led coalition forces to the Greater Middle East (GME). The most direct access to parts of the GME runs through the BSR. If the U.S. establishes the term not a "permanent presence" but "open-ended presence" in Central Asia and Afghanistan then the most direct access root passes through the BSR. We all remember how important it was during operation "Enduring Freedom" that the BSR countries, including Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan, granted blanket passage rights, both air and over land, for U.S.-led forces. And that was crucial. So, this is how the 2-way corridor functions.

On the margins of this region there is the little country of Moldova, which does not lie on any particular transit corridor either eastward or westward, but it shares, what it is frequently overlooked, a 450 km long border with enlarged NATO and the EU. In terms of approaching solutions on Transindusria and the whole issue of political governance in Moldova, the question arises: "Who will determine and shape the political and security order of this very long EA border?"

Such are the interests at stake. I would argue that all these elements I mentioned are part of a common Western interest in the region and of regional countries. Developing of direct ties anchoring the region to the EA world is beneficial both to the region's countries and to the EA community. This anchoring process by itself is an important one and I speak unhastedly concerning Western interests despite recent and obvious to all disagreements within the EA community because there lies an irreducible core of common Western interests that undoubtedly survive and to the GME. Those are parts of that bedrock of EA community because there lies an irreducible core of common interests that undoubtedly survive recent and obvious to all disagreements within the region's countries and to the EA community. This region to the EA world is beneficial both to the region to the EA and to the GME. The most direct access to parts of the GME runs through the BSR. This control must be not relaxed; the continuous interest and concern, both on the part of the West and the BSR countries, particularly since 9/11. In the BSR the new types of threats are largely under control. Thanks, in part, to effective work by law-enforcement agencies in the BSR countries, and by active support from the West, predominantly from the U.S., both politically and with very serious investments. With joint efforts these new types of threats are largely under control. Thanks, in part, to effective work by law-enforcement agencies in the BSR countries, and by active support from the West, predominantly from the U.S., both politically and with very serious investments. With joint efforts these new types of threats are largely under control. If the U.S. establishes the term not "permanent presence" but "open-ended presence" in Central Asia and Afghanistan then the most direct access root passes through the BSR. We all remember how important it was during operation "Enduring Freedom" that the BSR countries, including Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan, granted blanket passage rights, both air and over land, for U.S.-led forces. And that was crucial. So, this is how the 2-way corridor functions.

I term new threats. All these types of threats are in one way or another present and dangerous in the four regional conflicts we are concerned with.

By the newest threats I mean new approaches by Russian policymakers. President Putin himself several times and at论坛 has explicitly and I speak unhastedly concerning Western interests despite recent and obvious to all disagreements within the EA community because there lies an irreducible core of common Western interests that undoubtedly survive any temporal political disagreement. The conflicts we are concerned with are all a legacy of the late Soviet and post-Soviet period. They have not been properly addressed for almost a decade and a half since the demise of the Soviet Union. The reason it is not properly addressed in the West is that which I mentioned at the beginning of my presentation. More so, new and old conflicts that concern us are themselves part of a wider spectrum of threats that the BSR countries are faced with. In the other context, there are old, new, and what...
was Russia's first deputy general prosecutor, whose name was Vladimir Kolesnikov. When he first appeared on the scene to mediate between the two groups he was reluctant to reject his real identity. And when asked what was his real name, he said “Call me simply Vladimir Illich” [like Lenin].

With regard to the Russian, he follows policy that I would call the paradigm of “control and stability”. Moscow policy is premised on maintaining instability at a controllable level, to play various regional actors, one against the other, and then use some actors against the interests of others. Sometimes these tactical alliances can be shifted. Russia also exports, perhaps not deliberately, but by outcome of Russian policy a special model of governance that crystallized during Vladimir Putin's Presidency. It involves coalitions of state security services, state appointed Captains of Industry (who replaced former Oligarchs and gangsters), of regional officials, organized crime. These are four sets of players that are coalicing in the type of governance that has taken shape in Russia under President Putin. It is this type of governance that Russia tends to export in the secessionist enclaves with the exception of Karabakh, and I am compelled to qualify that.

The negative effects on three levels. First, it creates a “Problem-shifting” coalition of local officials who have a vested interest in continuation of the status quo as well as in torpedoing negotiations. Their position is that negotiations consist of those designed to “reform” state institutions, but that are not controlled by Moscow. The second negative effect is that while the legitimate states, Moldova, Georgia and to some extent Armenia, are beginning to reform their internal politics and economies they are beginning to draw closer to the European standards of governance and economic regulation. At the same time, the old Russian-exported system becomes more deeply entrenched in secessionist enclaves. This means that the gulf between the legitimate state and the enclaves is deepening. The more the legitimate states reform themselves, and that is what we want them to do, by a pervasive act, the more they face the deepening gulf between themselves and the Russian protectors.

The third undesirable result is that the existence of these enclaves themselves is an enormous drag on the economy of legitimate countries, and their ability to reform their public life. It was through these enclaves time of paralel可是的四选一。1990年莫斯科大学一个学生叫弗拉基米尔·伊里奇·科列斯尼科夫。当被问及真实姓名时，他说“请称我为弗拉基米尔·伊里奇”（像列宁一样）。

关于俄罗斯，他遵循这样的政策，即所谓的“控制和稳定”。莫斯科政策的背后是建立一种特定的治理模式，这在弗拉基米尔·普京总统的任期内形成。它涉及由国家安全机构、由前寡头和黑帮构成的行业的领导人（取代了前寡头）、地方官员、组织犯罪。这些是四个组成的权力联盟。

负面效果有三个层面。首先，它创造了一个“问题转移”联盟的当地官员，他们有强烈的兴趣继续现状和阻碍谈判。他们的立场是，谈判是为改革国家机构，但不受莫斯科控制。第二，尽管合法的国家， Moldova, Georgia and to some extent Armenia，开始改革其内部政治和经济，但它们与俄罗斯保护国之间的鸿沟正在加深。

第三个不良结果是，这些分离地区的存在给合法国家的经济形成巨大拖累，以及它们改革公共生活的可能性。是通过这些分离地区。
 INCLUDED FOUR: THE OSCE, THE EU, AND FRANCE. INTERESTINGLY, THAT IN THIS MECHANISM IS CALLED THE “MINSK GROUP” BECAUSE IT WAS CREATED MORE THAN A DECADE AGO IN MINSK, BELARUS. THIS GROUP HAS ACHIEVED ABSOLUTELY NOTHING, AND THERE IS NO WESTERN PARTICIPATION.


A COUPLE OF WEEKS AGO THE EU APPOINTED ITS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR MOLDOVA, A DUTCH DIPLOMAT. HIS BACKGROUND IS STRIKINGLY SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE SOUTH CAUCASUS A RETIRED DUTCH DIPLOMAT WITH EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE IN SERVICE IN MOSCOW.

OBVIOUSLY, THESE ARE SIGNALS ADDRESSED TO RUSSIA ATTEMPTING TO PACIFY RUSSIA, AND TO SUGGEST TO RUSSIA THAT THE EU IS NOT sending any hot heads to the region. BUT Nevertheless the signal is wrong. IT ONLY ENTHUSIAZES Russia TO ARGUE THAT THE EU HAS NO BUSINESS INTERFERING WITH A PERCEIVED ZONE OF RUSSIAN DOMINANCE. SO, THESE CHANGES WERE RIGHT, AND IT IS IMPORTANT FOR ALL OF US TO AGREE.
In the BSR the heavy lifting was not yet done. Nevertheless, the conflicts in the BSR are not as deeply entrenched as they were in the Balkans. The conflict in Chechnya has been more dynamic than those in the religious nature. This is a very good auguring development. Local or secessionist conflicts are inseparably linked to the presence of Russian intervention military forces in the BSR. It is impossible to solve these conflicts without, as a primary example, ensuring the implementation of Russia's international obligations to withdraw troops from Moldova and Georgia. In the last two years or so the issues of Moldova and Georgia have become preeminent issues in European security. They have been discussed intensely and permanently at all levels, both governmental and non-governmental. This model was tested in the Commonwealth of Independent States, and it has been made it even into the media limelight. It is an unprecedented situation. Many were despairing as recently as two years ago that these conflicts would not only be forever, but would underwhelm and pushed off the agenda. But they are now on the agenda. And that is a situation that favors a serious attempt to conclusively resolve these conflicts.

First it is necessary to update the implementation of the Istanbul agreements by which Russia has to withdraw its forces from Moldova and Georgia. The Istanbul agreements are practically dead because Russians believe that these commitments are only politically binding, meaning that there is no domestic, and no international obligation.

International law and national sovereignty carry far greater weight. The time has passed for Georgia and Moldova to bring those arguments to international organizations, not just to the OSCE. Because Moscow does not care what has been set within the walls of the OSCE, to the North and other organizations that have greater impact than the OSCE does.
How can we approach the political settlement? Not only what a political settlement should look like, but also approaches that can be taken to reach a political settlement that is not alike. Each one of these conflicts has its own characteristics. No two conflicts are alike, – Confucius said. Any approach must fit the specifics of each conflict. One approach that has been suggested is federalization, e.g., for Moldova and Georgia. This solution was as old as 10 years when Yevgeny Primakov (former Foreign Minister of Russia in 1997-98) proposed that approach. But Azerbaijan and Georgia had already rejected it. Moldova accepted it in a way that does not have any legal basis because it is not mentioned in any official document; it was not ratified by Parliament. There is only a memorandum of understanding of 1997. But it is important to examine this proposal for federalism very closely because it is resurfacing now from Russian government-connected analysts. It is resurfacing with regard to Georgia and Moldova. It is a very peculiar type of federalism, which would first of all be guaranteed politically and mainly by Russia. Russia would receive a form of oversight rights regarding the constitutional arrangements of such federalism, and would also guarantee such federalism with troops in place. This is one peculiarity about this particular concept. The other one is that the secessionist enclaves will receive decision making powers in the central government. We have seen this in Moldova, through other negotiations dating back to 1997 and included in the Kozak Memorandum of November 2003. But even after Moldova had rejected the Kozak Memorandum, the Kozak Memorandum of November 1997–98. Azerbaijan and Georgia had also rejected Moldova’s proposal, which, at the time, was based on OSCE acquis. Federalism would guarantee Russian political and military guarantees and the decision-making role for the secessionist enclaves in the central governments. Those are the two major peculiarities of federalism. The labor resonates as nice and it sounds democratic, but the devil is in the details.

Another approach has been suggested. Self-determination. It is applicable at the theoretical level, especially with regard to Karabakh. International law and international jurisprudence has codified the self-determination of the people. With regard to South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria, however, these concepts do not apply. In Transnistria the single largest ethnic element is Moldovan (51% of the population). In Transnistria is a Russian enterprise, it is Russian secessionism, and it is Russian-led. Russians are only the third largest element in Transnistria behind Moldovans and Ukrainians. So, the concept does not work in Transnistria. It does not work in South Ossetia, because 1/3 of the native populations are Georgians and 1/3 of the population in Abkhazia because the current makeup of the current Abkhazian population is a result of ethnic cleansing. Prior to the war Georgians constituted 44% of the Abkhazia’s population, and the Abkhaz’s only 17%. But it became a majority following the ethnic cleansing of the population with the assistance of the Russian troops. And so the self-determination of people is applicable in one case, but not applicable in the other 3 cases.

This is why, last week, the Russian news agency «Regnum» published an extremely interesting article, that the duration of which was little more than a minute, proposing a brand new concept: Self-determination of States: Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Because self-determination of people is not applicable in those situations, the article proposed that Russia should promote the self-determination of these states in the form of final separation from the legitimate states, unification in one form or another, and association with Russia. Why was it important for «Regnum» to publish this lengthy article? The main shareholder of the Regnum news agency and up until a week ago its Director Modest Kolerov was appoint ed Putin’s Envoy for Relations to Russian citizens and compatrois outside Russia’s borders with primary focus on South Ossetia. Now it is Modest Kolerov’s news agency. I was very struck by this new concept of self-determination of states applied to Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia through the mouthpiece of a state and regional news agency. I wonder whether in the future it will be just the footnote of history or whether it presages a policy shift. The next suggested approach is autonomy. Autonomy covers a wide spectrum of possibilities. Promises of autonomy may or may not be acceptable to the other party depending on how it is phrased and who is actually submitting them, and up to the point how they perform down the road in negotiations. Autonomy covers an infinity of possibilities. People in one part of the world are autonometric, it was not represented even with regard to governance issues of the autonomous entities, nor were they represented with regard to the Central Government in Moscow.
The OSCE and the conflicts in the South Caucasus

OБСЕ and закавказские конфликты

**Helikki Talvitie**
EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus

**Speech in Harvard University, 21 October 2005**

When the process leading to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) was launched in the late 1980s, no one really knew how well timed the conference was. There were signs of a gradual easing of tensions between the East and West. The West was starting to mature to the thought according to which the Conference could be recognized in Europe, provided that the East first accepted the idea of interference in states’ internal issues especially if warranted on account of the human rights situation. I attended the first CSCE Conference in Ottawa in spring 1985 only a few months before the Helsinki Declaration according to which the OSCE became an international organization without a referendum. The new tasks were related, above all, to the building of the core elements of democracy for the New Independent States, born on the ruins of the Soviet Union. Political upheavals triggered off crises and conflicts, which gave new challenges to the OSCE. The OSCE was used to create mechanisms that could help the parties of conflict to solve their problems. The primary mandate of the first field missions, launched in 1992-1994, was to assist states in human rights and minority problems, border control and the development of free and fair elections. A new and long process had started, which is still continuing in several countries even today. It is worth noting that all the new states joined the OSCE immediately after becoming independent. Another alternative would have been to accede to the Council of Europe, but the instruments available there did not correspond to the OSCE in all respects.

The OSCE has not given up its principle of consensus. The biggest change has taken place in its relations with other organizations and international actors. The enlargement of the European Union has enhanced the importance of the Union within the OSCE – of the 55 member states of the organization, 25 speak with one
EXPERT OPINION

FACULTY BIOGRAPHIES

Mr. Heikki TALVITIE

Co-chairmanship of the OSCE and the Minsk Process

One of the OSCE’s principal contributions to peace has been the provision of advice to the political leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia in their efforts to find a solution to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. An initiative with a view to solving the conflict was made during the OSCE Summit in Helsinki in March 1992. With the explicit consent of the leaders of the warring, Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia acted in the region not only as a guarantor, but also as a major provider of arms to Armenia and, more specifically, to Nagorno-Karabakh and its people.

In winter 1995, Sweden asked Finland to follow it as one of the co-chairs of the Minsk Process together with Russia. At first, Finland was not very interested because of its previous role in the region. Even so, President Martti Ahtisaari and the leadership of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs asked me if I was willing to assume the functions of one of the co-chairs of the Minsk Process together with Ambassador Nyberg. I

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В Гарвардской программе Черноморской Безопасности 2005

Таргьан Кузтаев

Министр иностранных дел Армении Армен Мирзоян, руко водитель МИД Финляндии обратился ко мне с просьбой стать сопредседателем в посту сопредседателя Минскского процесса. Эти предложения были обсуждены на уровне внешнеполитических ведомств, но на данный момент еще не принято окончательное решение.

Мне было предложено присоединиться к уже существующему составу обеих сторон, а также содействовать в поисках возможной развязки карабахского узла. Для этого было представлено несколько концепций, которые предусматривали, по сути, создание нейтральной зоны, где бы можно было развивать экономическую деятельность.

Однако, на мой взгляд, данная концепция не является наиболее перспективной. Вместо этого предлагается создание специальной зоны, где бы можно было обеспечить безопасность и стабильность. Важно подчеркнуть, что это не означает отсутствие политического вмешательства, а скорее наоборот — его активное участие.

В процессе переговоров было сделано несколько основных выводов. Во-первых, необходимо учесть интересы всех сторон конфликта, чтобы обеспечить их устойчивую стабильность. Во-вторых, необходимо создать механизм управления зоной, который бы обеспечивал ее безопасность и эффективную работу.

В-третьих, необходимо создать систему мониторинга, которая бы обеспечивала прозрачность и открытость зоны. Важно также подчеркнуть, что данная зона не должна быть использована как зона для размещения военной техники или военных баз.

Кроме того, необходимо учесть интересы местного населения, которое будет проживать в зоне. Важно обеспечить их безопасность и защитить их права.

В целом, я считаю, что данная концепция является перспективной и должна быть реализована в ближайшее время. Это будет способствовать стабилизации ситуации в регионе и обеспечит безопасность всех сторон конфликта.

и запрет на применение вооруженного силы. В государстве не хватило нерешенности вопросов, которые были бы в достаточной степени значимыми. Но какова бы ни была причина, она могла быть связана с тем, что люди не могли дать ответ на вопрос о том, как все-таки достичь урегулирования. Это сформировалось в виде того, что люди не могли смириться с тем, что их жизнь может стать неизбежностью.

**The OSCE and South Ossetia**

В своем отчете, представленном в 2005 году, представители ОБСЕ пришли к выводу, что в Южной Осетии существует серьезная проблема, связанная с проблемой независимости. ОБСЕ посчитала, что проблема независимости является серьезной проблемой, и что необходимо предпринять шаги по ее решению. ОБСЕ также призвала к созданию международного механизма, который бы мог урегулировать данную ситуацию.

**Georgia and Russia**

Грузия и Россия, как и другие страны, также существуют в этом конфликте. В данной ситуации ОБСЕ играла важную роль в урегулировании конфликта. ОБСЕ также призвала к созданию международного механизма, который бы мог урегулировать данную ситуацию.

В заключение, хотелось бы отметить, что вопрос о независимости Южной Осетии остается актуальным.Необходимо предпринимать шаги по его решению, чтобы обеспечить стабильность и безопасность в регионе.

**The OSCE and the promotion of democracy in the South Caucasus**

После предоставления ОБСЕ в 2006 году, оно уделило большое внимание вопросу демократии в регионе. ОБСЕ также призвала к созданию международного механизма, который бы мог урегулировать данную ситуацию.

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European Council naturally plays a significant role in see that they have access to instruments through establish a state where all citizens feel at home and minorities Rolf Ekus has done. Georgia is in the mid...
The OSCE Monitoring Mission – was discontinued in early 2005 at the request of Russia. In order to prevent any security deficit on the border between Georgia and Russia after the withdrawal of the international monitoring mission, it is possible to continue the presence of observers of the OSCE in a different form – by changing the nature and mandate of the OSCE operation in some other form – by reinforcement of stability.

One of the most significant field operations OSCE conducts in Chechnya. Operations were launched in December 1999, when the mandate was expanded twice, in 2001 and 2002, to cover also the border regions between Georgia and Ingushetia and between Georgia and Dagestan. An OSCE monitoring mission has been overseeing also the border between South Ossetia and Georgia. In the present situation, when the combat against terrorism is active, it is clear that the OSCE has a great responsibility in this and that its success contributes to the reinforcement of stability.

The OSCE Monitoring Mission was based in Tskhinvali and was expanded in early 2005 to include also the border between Georgia and Russia. The OSCE's mandate was changed in 2004, which is why in 2005 it was decided to continue the presence of OSCE observers in this area in a different form – by reinforcement of stability.

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The OSCE and the EU in the South Caucasus

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The European Commission has been represented in the South Caucasus as from the early 1990s. The Commission's activities have been focused on establishing contacts with the three countries of the region and to promote dialogue, and, in cooperation with the OSCE, the development of reconstruction projects that promote the resolution of the conflict and cooperation between the parties.

In the practical discharge of the functions, the Special Representative for the South Caucasus is the head of the OSCE Mission in the South Caucasus. The Mission is responsible for coordinating the EU's activities in the region and for implementing the initiatives taken by the Special Representative in the region. The Mission is also responsible for coordinating the EU's activities with those of the OSCE and other international organisations.

The OSCE and the EU in the South Caucasus

The OSCE and the EU in the South Caucasus
Turkey-EU relations

ОТНОШЕНИЯ ТУРЦИЯ-ЕС

A short look at the past of Turkey-EU relations will be useful to understand how acrimonious it was for these relations to arrive at the point where they stand at present. Major milestones in Turkey's accession process to the EU. Major milestones in Turkey's relations with EU are as follows:

- Turkey first applied to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959, shortly after the establishment of the Community. Turkey is therefore the very first country to have applied to become a member of the EU.
- An Association Agreement with the EEC is signed in 1963. This Agreement envisaged Turkey's full membership in the European Union after the completion of the Community. Turkey is therefore the very first country, which has applied to become a member of the EEC.
- Turkey applied for full membership of the EU in 1987.
- A Customs Union is established between Turkey and the EU in 1996.
- During the EU Council held in Helsinki in December 1999, Turkey is designated as a «candidate State desiring to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to other candidate States».
- The Copenhagen EU Council decided in December 2002 that «if the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfills the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accessions negotiations with Turkey without delays.»
- On the 6th of October the EU Commission issued its regular Progress Report on Turkey. It pointed out in this Report,

that Turkey sufficiently fulfills the Copenhagen political criteria; and
- that it recommends to start accession negotiations without undue delays.

On 17 December 2004, the EU Council decided to start accession negotiations with Turkey on 5 October 2005. This relatively long history of Turkey-EU relations indicates that Turkey's accession to the EU is not a subject that came out of the blue and all of sudden. It is a result of a long, laborious and protracted negotiations and preparation.

The Process after 17 December

The process will now continue according the following timetable:

- The Framework for Negotiations. The Commission will prepare three documents in the aftermath of the EU Summit of 17 December 2004, namely:
  a) Framework for Negotiations,
  b) Third Pillar (cultural dialogue),
  c) Accession Partnership.

- The nature and the content of these documents will be as follows.

- Framework for Negotiations

  The EU Commission will draft a document that is called a «Framework for Negotiations». The Commission contemplates to make it ready to be submitted to the EU Council before the end of June 2005. This document will outline the negotiating position of the EU with Turkey. We expect that the Commission will consult Turkey during the drafting stage of this document as it has done in the case of other candidate countries.

- Third Pillar

  Third Pillar is a new concept in EU enlargement policy that foresees the establishment of closer relations with the EU and its institutions. The process will now continue according the following:

  a) that Turkey sufficiently fulfills the Copenhagen political criteria; and
  b) that it recommends to start accession negotiations without undue delays.

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  - Third Pillar

    Another document to be drafted by the Commission will pertain to the Third Pillar of the recommendations submitted by the Commission to the Council. The Commission had

EACUF Biographies

Mr. Yasar YAKIS

Born in Akçaoca in 1938, former Turkish Foreign Minister Yakis holds an undergraduate degree from Anbar University’s Political Sciences School and joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1962; served as Turkey’s Permanent Representative and Ambassador to the United Nations-New York in 1998; speaks French, English and Arabic; became a Member of Parliament from Düzce; married and has six children.

Г-н Яшар ЯКИШ

Родился в 1938. Бывший Министр иностранных дел Турции, закончил университет Акчака, факультет политических наук и поступил в МИД в 1962. занимал пост Посла представительства Турции в Постоянном комитете ООН в Нью-Йорке, в 1998 владет французским, английским и арабским языками; стал Членом Парламента от партии “Дизиз” (Düzyüz), женат и имеет шесть детей.

EC Expert opinion

EXPERT OPINION

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- Turkey first applied to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959, shortly after the establishment of the Community. Turkey is therefore the very first country to have applied to become a member of the EU.
- An Association Agreement with the EEC is signed in 1963. This Agreement envisaged Turkey's full membership in the European Union after the completion of the Community. Turkey is therefore the very first country, which has applied to become a member of the EEC.
- Turkey applied for full membership of the EU in 1987.
- A Customs Union is established between Turkey and the EU in 1996.
- During the EU Council held in Helsinki in December 1999, Turkey is designated as a «candidate State desiring to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to other candidate States».
- The Copenhagen EU Council decided in December 2002 that «if the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfills the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accessions negotiations with Turkey without delays.»
- On the 6th of October the EU Commission issued its regular Progress Report on Turkey. It pointed out in this Report,

that Turkey sufficiently fulfills the Copenhagen political criteria; and
- that it recommends to start accession negotiations without undue delays.

On 17 December 2004, the EU Council decided to start accession negotiations with Turkey on 5 October 2005. This relatively long history of Turkey-EU relations indicates that Turkey's accession to the EU is not a subject that came out of the blue and all of sudden. It is a result of a long, laborious and protracted negotiations and preparation.

The Process after 17 December

The process will now continue according the following timetable:

- The Framework for Negotiations. The Commission will prepare three documents in the aftermath of the EU Summit of 17 December 2004, namely:
  a) Framework for Negotiations,
  b) Third Pillar (cultural dialogue),
  c) Accession Partnership.

- The nature and the content of these documents will be as follows.

- Framework for Negotiations

  The EU Commission will draft a document that is called a «Framework for Negotiations». The Commission contemplates to make it ready to be submitted to the EU Council before the end of June 2005. This document will outline the negotiating position of the EU with Turkey. We expect that the Commission will consult Turkey during the drafting stage of this document as it has done in the case of other candidate countries.

- Third Pillar

  Third Pillar is a new concept in EU enlargement policy that foresees the establishment of closer relations with the EU and its institutions. The process will now continue according the following:

  a) that Turkey sufficiently fulfills the Copenhagen political criteria; and
  b) that it recommends to start accession negotiations without undue delays.

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  - Third Pillar

    Another document to be drafted by the Commission will pertain to the Third Pillar of the recommendations submitted by the Commission to the Council. The Commission had

EACUF Biographies

Mr. Yasar YAKIS

Born in Akçaoca in 1938, former Turkish Foreign Minister Yakis holds an undergraduate degree from Anbar University’s Political Sciences School and joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1962; served as Turkey’s Permanent Representative and Ambassador to the United Nations-New York in 1998; speaks French, English and Arabic; became a Member of Parliament from Düzce; married and has six children.

Г-н Яшар ЯКИШ

Родился в 1938. Бывший Министр иностранных дел Турции, закончил университет Акчака, факультет политических наук и поступил в МИД в 1962. занимал пост Посла представительства Турции в Постоянном комитете ООН в Нью-Йорке, в 1998 владет французским, английским и арабским языками; стал Членом Парламента от партии “Дизиз” (Düzyüz), женат и имеет шесть детей.
suggested a Three-pillar strategy for Turkey, namely a) sup-
port for the reform process in Turkey; b) rules pertaining the con-
duct of accession negotiations with Turkey; and c) sub-
stantial participation in the EU decision-making and cultural dialogue, bring-
ing the people together from EU member states and Turkey. Turkey attaches great importance to this last pillar that is also
called third pillar, because there are some misperceptions regar-
ding Turkey in certain quarters of the EU public opin-
ion. Turkey expects that some of these misperceptions may be
corrected through this dialogue. The Commission will
issue this document towards the end of June 2005.

Accession Partnership Document

The Accession Partnership is a document issued regularly by the Commission for the candidate coun-
tries. The very first version of this document was issued for Turkey in March 2001. It was drafted
according to the decision of 1999 Helsinki Summit of the EU, which provided that Turkey should benefit
from the pre-accession strategy that is made available
by the EU for all candidate countries. It con-
tained a long list of measures that Turkey is expected
to take for the start of negotiations. An up-dated ver-
sion of the document was issued in April 2003. Now
the Commission will issue a second up-dated version
of this document in November 2005. Turkey expects that
the last version of the document will not con-
tain any reference to subjects on which measures have
already been taken by the Turkish authorities or
the measure are in the pipe-line. Furthermore, it
expects that new items will not be added to initial list.
Otherwise, this exercise may become something like
the Rock of Sisyphos of the Greek Mythology.

Progress Report on Turkey

Last version of the Regular Progress Report on Turkey
was issued on 6 October 2004. The Commission will issue
in November 2005 the subsequent version Report at the
same time as the Accession Partnership Documents.

Screening process

Not linked directly with the drafting exercise of the doc-
ument (that I mentioned so far), there is another process that
is crucial for the start of the negotiations namely the screen-
ning process, that is to say, comparing the Turkish legislation
with the EU acquis communautaire. The Regular Progress
Report on Turkey issued by the Commission on 6 October
2004 recommended to the Council to start the screening
process at the same time as the accession negotiations. In
its decision of 17 December 2004, the EU Council kept silent
on the question of the starting date of the screening process.
Therefore there is a slight vagueness on the exact starting
date of the screening process. However, Turkey believes that
it is ready to start the screening process at any time, because
this process is already under way for Turkey since more
than four years. It was not called «screening process» because,
between 17 December 2004, the EU Council had not yet offi-
cially decided to open the accession negotiations. Therefore,
it was called a «process of detailed scrutiny». This process
was launched at the meeting of the Association Council on
11 April 2000. Whatever way it was called, it achieved sim-
lar tasks as in the screening process.

Eight committees were established to carry out
detailed scrutiny in the following fields:
1. Single Market and competition,
2. Agriculture and Fisheries,
3. Trade and Industry,
4. Economic and Monetary issues,
5. Statistics, movement of capital,
6. Communication, Environment, Energy and Trans-European networks,
7. Regional Development, Employment, and Social Policy,

29 chapters of the acquis were distributed to these
countries. On 26 September 2004, the European Commission
announced that it had begun the process of screening in the candidate
countries. Since 2000, Turkey is forwarding regularly to this
program detailed information regarding the progress achieved under each of the 29 chapters of the acquis.
In other words, since the year 2000, Turkey has been doing partly what the other candidate countries were
doing as part of their accession negotiations.

Tasks for Turkey

Turkey has committed itself to solve the outstanding
issues of signing the customs protocol with the last 10 coun-
tries that joined EU in 1 May 2004, including Cyprus. This
is an obligation for Turkey stemming from the Association
Agreement signed in 1963 between Turkey and the EEC.
This Agreement provides that Turkey undertake the same
obligations towards the new member countries when they
join the EEC (now EU). Turkey will abide by these commit-
ments. It will do so by pointing out that the extension of

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wants to be one of the major players in the global scene, it helps strengthen the EU’s role as a global actor. If the EU promise to ease the economic embargo that they are imposing on the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, it will make it easier for the EU to build and expand its role in the Balkans and the Central Asia. I do not want to suggest that the EU is weak in these areas, but it may need to pursue a more aggressive policy in order to maintain its influence in the region.

The process of EU accession negotiations for Turkey is a complex and difficult one. Turkey knows that negotiations will be tough, long, and painstaking. More will be required from Turkey than from previous candidate countries, because of its size, economic difficulties and its belonging to another culture.

Possible contributions of Turkey’s membership to EU

Turkey’s accession to the EU poses significant challenges and opportunities for both parties. Turkey can bring unique strengths to the EU, but it also faces significant obstacles.

Unique features of Turkey make it a special case in the Islamic world. Turkey’s Constitution and its role as a bridge between Europe and Asia makes it a unique country for the EU. Turkey has strong economic and cultural ties with the EU, and its membership would help to strengthen the EU’s role as a global actor. If the EU promise to ease the economic embargo that they are imposing on the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, it will help to strengthen the EU’s role as a global actor.

Turkey is a country with a predominantly Muslim population. But it is also a secular country. Secularity in Turkey is not only a principle enshrined in the Constitution and protected there, but it is also a principle that is widely accepted in Turkish society. If the EU promise to ease the economic embargo that they are imposing on the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, it will help to strengthen the EU’s role as a global actor.

Turkey is aware that negotiations will be tough, long, and costly. More will be required from Turkey than from previous candidate countries, because of its size, economic difficulties and its belonging to another culture.

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Turkey contributes to the ongoing rapprochement between Europe and Asia and hence helps extend modern values in regions neighbouring Turkey.

Given the environment that I tried to describe so far, the negotiations may start soon after the screening work is completed in certain easy chapters where Turkey seems to be ready.

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next decades. Turkey's population is much younger as compared to the EU average. Half of Turkey's population is under the age of 24. The same age group constitutes 30% of the population in most of the EU-15 countries. I understand that the situation is more critical in the last 10 countries that joined the EU in May this year. The same age group constitutes 30% of Turkey's population. There are at present 3.5 million Turks working in the EU countries. 2.5 million Turks have worked in the EU countries and now came back to Turkey. They are adapted to a great extent to the living and working conditions in these countries. These figures and proportions indicate that Turkey may contribute to the solution of EU's problem of aging population. Turkey is the sixth biggest economy of Europe. Therefore Turkey's accession will increase considerably the economic size of the EU.

Turkey has a customs' union with the EU since 1996. Industrial commodities circulate between Turkey and the EU countries free of customs duties. This demonstrates that Turkey's free market economy will be able to compete with the economies of the EU countries. Turkey's economy will not have major difficulty in adapting itself to the economic conditions of the EU countries.

On the other hand Turkey's big population is a big labour market. It will be a large and very important market for the consumption goods produced by the industries of the EU countries.

Is Turkey's Accession a Threat? Now I turn to various scenarios that attempt to present Turkey's accession, not perhaps as a potential threat, but at least as a debatable subject. I would like to refer you to a report published by Ms. Kirsty Hughes, on behalf of a group that attempts to examine more closely the impact of the population. The Size of Turkey

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The Size of Turkey

One of the subject debated in the report is whether the size of Turkey too big? Turkey's population of 70 million, expressed as relative population, equals 12.8% of the population of the selected EU countries. It is interesting to note that to the relative population of the EU, some of the member countries contributed 18% of their population in each of the last 10 years. This means that the relative population of these countries is 18% of the population of the EU countries put together. Therefore, yes it is a big country. However, what we have to discuss here is not the size of the country, but the economic size of Turkey. The economic size of Turkey is big, but its economy relatively smaller. Let us examine more closely the impact of the population.

Table 1: Total Population: Various EU member states and candidates, and total EU 25, EU 27 and U 28; UN estimates 2003−2050

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>82,476</td>
<td>81,599</td>
<td>79,145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>60,144</td>
<td>61,275</td>
<td>64,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>63,503</td>
<td>60,050</td>
<td>57,083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>57,423</td>
<td>59,557</td>
<td>64,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>16,149</td>
<td>17,123</td>
<td>16,954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>38,587</td>
<td>37,337</td>
<td>33,004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>52,627</td>
<td>54,876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>71,325</td>
<td>89,899</td>
<td>97,759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total EU 25 (incl. Turkey)</td>
<td>544,187</td>
<td>544,422</td>
<td>544,422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>10,318</td>
<td>10,470</td>
<td>10,516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>60,144</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
<td>71,325</td>
<td>89,899</td>
<td>97,759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total EU 28 (incl. Turkey)</td>
<td>555,743</td>
<td>576,842</td>
<td>570,832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey as % of EU 28</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 shows the UN population estimates for selected EU countries. Today, Germany's population constitutes 18.1% of the EU-25. The UN estimates that Turkey's population will stabilise at around 97 million before 2050. Turkey's own estimates are that it will stabilise at around 82 million long before 2050. However, for the sake of discussion, let's suppose that UN estimates are more likely. The last line of the table shows the evolution of the proportion of Turkey's population as a percentage of the EU-28. The relative importance of Turkey's population is % 12.8 now it will be % 14.4 in 2015 and % 17.7 in 2050. If Turkey's forecasts prove to be accurate and Turkey's population stabilises at around 82 million, the relative importance of Turkey's population in the total EU population will be % 14.4. In other words, it will never reach the level of relative importance of the present German population. Nobody claimed so far that the relative importance of Germany's population posed a threat for the EU. Why, in this case, the relative importance of Turkey's population would be a threat for the EU? Why, in this case, the relative importance of Turkey's population would be a threat for the EU?
a country whose population's relative importance is less than that of Germany will pose a threat?

Furthermore, Turkey’s economy is much smaller than its demographic size. It is the second largest of Polish econ-
omy. Therefore, in the economic decision making process, Turkey cannot play a role commensurate with the size of its
country. This is an advantage for the EU, because a country that has a big population but a small economy has a
stabilising effect, since it will not overbalance in the balance while it may counterbalance the weight of other countries
that have both a big population and a strong economy.

Free movement of labour

Another debate is on the possible pressure that Turkey’s population of about 70 million inhabitants may put on the labor market of the EU countries.

The experience of earlier enlargements demonstrated that such a concern is not justified, because such an influx did not take place during earlier enlargements. For instance, it was claimed before Spain’s and Portugal’s accession to the EU that, after their accession, workers from these countries would encroach the labor markets of the industrialised EU coun-
tries. Actually, what happened was exactly the opposite. The number of available jobs increased in the new member coun-
tries, because of considerable increase in investments. As a consequence of this, not only Spaniards and Portuguese
stopped moving towards more industrialised countries of the EU, on the contrary, those who were working in the industri-
alised countries started to go back to their country of origin, leaving more room in the labor market for the citizens of these industrialised countries. There is no reason why a similar development will not take place after Turkey’s accession.

The direction of the flow of unemployed workers will depend on a variety of factors, including the level of unemploy-
ment in Turkey and in the EU countries.

**TABLE 2: Employment rates and unemployment – EU and Turkey, 2002**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total employment rate</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Unemployment rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>82.8</td>
<td>89.2</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>75.3</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU15</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU25</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** Eurostat. Employment rate is the proportion of the total age-group 15-64 in employment (full and part-time)

### Уровень безработицы

Table 2 shows unemployment rates in Turkey and selected EU countries. It is, at present, slightly higher than in EU countries and almost half of the unem-
ployment rate of Poland. Other conditions being equal, it is more likely that an unemployed Turk will prefer to stay in Turkey, in his traditional family environment, rather than living in an alien environment without a job.

Another factor that will affect the flow of labour migration is the location of existing Turkish communities in the EU countries. Turks will prefer to look for a job in a country where they have relatives or compatri-
ots. These are, according to the order of the size of the Turkish communities, Germany, France, Austria, Nether-
lands, UK, Belgium and Denmark.

**TABLE 3: Turkish Population in Selected EU Countries, 2000**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Thousands</th>
<th>as % of total foreign population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1998.5</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>208.0</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>134.5</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>100.8</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** OECD – Not including those of Turkish origin who have taken a citizenship of country of residence.

### Размер турецких коммун

Table 2 illustrates the extent of the Turkish communities in selected EU countries. Hughes estimates that the propor-
tion of Turkish workers that will emigrate to the coun-
tries of EU-25 will remain around 0.5 % of the entire population of Turkey. This proportion will be higher than 0.5 % in countries like Germany, France and Austria; and small-
er than 0.5 % in other countries where there are no size-
able Turkish communities. Another study carried out by a group of Dutch economists concludes that this average percentage will be even less than 0.5%.

Many experts in this field believe that Turkey is more likely to export young and skilled portion of its popu-
lation because of the competitive advantages of the Turkish and EU labour markets and because of the higher unemploy-
ment rate among young and skilled workers in Turkey.

Majority of researches carried out in this field indicate that the labour migration from Turkey to the EU coun-
tries will be relatively low and with a positive economic impact on the EU economies. I will argue later in this presentation that, given the proportion of young popula-
tion in Turkey, the EU countries will have to encourage more influx of Turkish labour rather than to limit it.

### Уровень безработицы

Table 2 показывает урон безработицы в Турции и ряде стран ЕС. В настоящее времени, немного выше, чем в некоторых странах ЕС, составляет урон безработицы в Польше. При других данных усло-
виях, более вероятно, что безработный тюрк скорее предпочитает остаться в Турции и в традиционном семейном окруже-
нии, чем жить в чужом окружении без работы.

Другой фактор, который будет влиять на поток трудовой миграции – это расположение существу-
ющих турецких коммун в странах ЕС. Турки пред-
почтут искать работу в стране, где есть родствен-
ники и соотечественники. Это, исходя из размера турецких коммун, – Германия, Франция, Австрия,
Нидерланды, Великобритания, Бельгия и Дания.

**TABLE 3: Турецкое население в отдельных странах ЕС, 2002 г.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Страна</th>
<th>Тысячи</th>
<th>% от всего населения</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Германия</td>
<td>1998.5</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Франция</td>
<td>208.0</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Австрия</td>
<td>134.5</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Нидерланды</td>
<td>100.8</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Великобритания</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Бельгия</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Дания</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ИСТОЧНИК:** OECD – не включая тех турок турецкого происхождения, которые приняли подданство своей страны пребывания.

**Условия турецких коммун**

Таблица 2 иллюстрирует размер турецких коммун в отдельных странах ЕС. Хаоо оценивает, что доли турец-
ских рабочих, мигрирующих в страны ЕС-25 оста-
ют в пределах 0.5% от общего населения и в 2025 г. Эти цифры будут еще выше, как Г ермания, Франция и Австрия, и меньше 0.5% в других странах, где нет значительных турецких коммун. Другое исследо-
вание, проведенное ведущей группой экономистов, прихо-
дит к выводу, что эта цифра будет даже ниже 0.5%.

Многие эксперты в этой сфере считают, что Тур-
ция вероятнее всего будет экспортировать молодых и квалифицированных представителей населения из-за
сравнительных преимуществ рынка труда Турции и ЕС, а также большего уровня безработицы среди мо-
лодых и квалифицированных рабочих в Турции.

Большая часть исследований, проведенных в этой об-
ласти, демонстрирует, что рабочая миграция из Турции в стране ЕС будет относительно низкой и с положительным экономическими эффектом для экономики стран ЕС. Кроме того, что учитывая долю молодого населения Турции, страна ЕС будет делиться еще споспособствовать большому потоку турецкой рабочей силы, несмотря ее ограничение.
**Exper. Opinion**

Transition periods

Finally on this subject, the accession negotiations will be conducted under various chapters including free movement of labour. Countries that have concerns will have ample opportunity to raise this question at that stage and, if they feel uneasy, they will be able to ask transition periods for the free movement of labour from Turkey to their country.

Parliamentary representation

Third source of concern was the number of seats that Turkey will occupy in the European Parliament (EP). Yes, Turkey will rank among the countries that occupy the highest number of seats. But, instead of talking about an abstract concern, let’s see what will actually take place when Turkey occupies such a high number of seats. Is it going to be a destabilizing factor or on the contrary a stabilizing factor?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** EP and own calculations.

Table four shows the number of seats in the EP. At present Germany occupies 13.5% of the seats in the EP of EU-25. With Turkey as a member, the share of both Turkey and Germany will become 11.2% of each of the seats. If one country that controls 13.5% of the seats does not cause any concern, there is lesser reason for concern for another country that controls only 11.2% of the seats. Furthermore, members of the EP do not always vote on the national lines. I will not enter into the details of the potential impacts of Turkey’s accession on the voting pattern in the Council, because it is a question of a more technical nature. However, one may say that Turkey’s accession will play more stabilizing role on the overall balances.

Persecuting periods

Similarly, if one pays attention to the fact that, with Turkey as a member, EU’s borders will extend to the unstable areas of the Middle East and Caucasus and suggested that Turkey should be kept outside the EU as a buffer zone. Turkey made it crystal clear on several occasions that it is not prepared to assume such a role. If Turkey remains outside the EU, it is only natural that the new role that Turkey will assume will not be part of the EU Foreign and Security policy but its independent foreign policy. Furthermore, if Turkey is kept outside the EU, it may not remain a stable country as it is at present. In other words, it will not constitute a buffer zone, because the instability will come right to the EU’s immediate borders.

Apart from this, the EU can influence better Turkey’s external and internal security policies and foreign policies if Turkey is a member, because these policies will be drawn up as part of the common foreign and defence policy. The EU cannot have the same influence if Turkey remains out of the EU.

**Conclusion**

Accession negotiations with Turkey will definitely take several years. The opening of negotiations for each one of the 36 chapters will be subject to benchmarks to be determined by the Commission. Furthermore the opening and temporary closure of negotiations on each of the 36 chapters will require the unanimous decision of the Intergovernmental Conference. It other words every member country will have the right to block further progress in the negotiations. And finally, when the negotiations are closed on all of the chapters, each of the member countries will have to ratify Turkey’s accession either through a parliametary decision or a referendum.

We cannot forget what will be the balance of powers in the world at that time, we cannot foresee what role Turkey could be asked to play together with EU in volatile regions of the world such as the Balkans, Middle-East or Caucasus. We do not know to what extent the worries expressed by some Turks-sceptics will materialize.

When there are that many unknowns and that many safeguards to stop any unwanted course of events, it is hard to understand why some people still regard Turkey’s accession as a potential threat.

**Foreign policy and security issues**

Some observers draw the attention to the fact that, with Turkey as a member, EU’s borders will extend to the unstable areas of the Middle East and Caucasus and suggested that Turkey should be kept outside the EU as a buffer zone. Turkey made it crystal clear on several occasions that it is not prepared to assume such a role. If Turkey remains outside the EU, it is only natural that the new role that Turkey will assume will not be part of the EU Foreign and Security policy but its independent foreign policy. Furthermore, if Turkey is kept outside the EU, it may not remain a stable country as it is at present. In other words, it will not constitute a buffer zone, because the instability will come right to the EU’s immediate borders.

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**Vestnaya politika i voprosy bezopasnosti**

Ряд наблюдателей обращает внимание на тот факт, что в случае вступления в ЕС, его границы расширятся на нестабильные регионы Ближнего Востока и Кавказа; поэтому предлагается держать Турцию вне ЕС в виде своего буферной зоны. Несколько раз Турция весьма четко дала понять, что она не готова принять такую роль. Если Турция останется вне ЕС, то единственныйовой и единственной ролью Турции, если она останется за рамками европейской внешней политики, будет проведение независимой внешней политики. Более того, если Турция останется вне ЕС, она может и не останься стабильной страной на свету. Другими словами, она не сможет быть буферной зоной, т.к. нестабильность придет прямо на границы ЕС.

Кроме того, благодаря вступлению в ЕС, Турция и ЕС смогут эффективно вести внутреннюю и внешнюю политику безопасности, т.к. эта политика станет частью общей внешней и оборонительной политики. ЕС не сможет иметь такое же влияние без Турции.

**Заключение**

Конечно, переговоры о приеме Турции в ЕС займут несколько лет. Начало переговоров по каждому из 36 параметров потребует однородного решения Парижской конференции. Другими словами, каждый член ЕС будет иметь право блокировать дальнейший прогресс в переговорах. И, наконец, когда переговоры по всем параметрам, каждый член ЕС должен будет ратифицировать вопрос приема Турции либо парламентским решением, либо референдумом.

Мы не в состоянии предсказать баланс сил в мире к тому времени, мы не можем предвидеть роль Турции, которую могут попросить работать вместе с ЕС в нестабильных регионах мира, напр. на Балканах, Ближнем Востоке или Кавказе. Мы не знаем, какой размах приобретут обеспокоенности, выдвинутые рядом турко-сkeptиков.

Когда имеется множество неизвестных, хотя оно же га- рантировать и недопустимо нежелательного хода событий, то трудно понять, почему некоторые люди все еще считают прием Турции в ЕС потенциальной угрозой.
The Black Sea region – the eve of the EU’s next political storm or the Shining Sea of stability?

Иногда, мой пост предоставляет мне благоприятную возможность, подкрепленную мирным преобразованием бывших коммунистических экономик, и помогла ввести и отменить непопулярные экономические и социальные реформы поддерживаемые и в некоторых странах Западной Европы. На перспективу нынешним членом ЕС. Два других государства принадлежат к нынешним членам ЕС: Украина и Беларусь. Из 12 государств-членов ЧЭС, только Греция является нынешним членом ЕС. Два других государства принадлежат к нынешним членам ЕС: Украина и Беларусь. Из 12 государств-членов ЧЭС, только Греция является нынешним членом ЕС. Два других государства принадлежат к нынешним членам ЕС: Украина и Беларусь.

Ambassador Japaridze enjoys a distinguished career as a diplomat, educator and international businessman. Most recently Georgia’s Foreign Minister, Ambassador Japaridze was also Georgia’s National Security Advisor to both President Eduard Shevardnadze and Acting President Nino Burjanadze since 2002 up to 2003 and for eight years his country’s first Ambassador to the United States. Ambassador Japaridze’s diplomatic and professional interests have been focused on issues relating to the national security of Georgia (and the Caucasus in general) and he has developed a unique perspective of the political, developmental and economic issues facing his increasingly important region.

Amidst Ambassador Japaridze’s accomplishments as a Georgian diplomat were the development to the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Agreement, later known as BSEC; and Georgia’s participation in this entity, Georgia’s involvement in the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, coordinating Georgia’s efforts at the United Nations relating to national security and conflict resolution issues, including the situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Currently Ambassador Japaridze is Secretary General of Black Sea Economic Cooperation organization.

In the months that have passed since the referendum last year in France and the Netherlands, there has been an avalanche of debate about the future of Europe. This debate must necessarily be centred within the European Union. But that debate, and the actions and policies that eventually emerge from it, will have a profound and fundamental impact on the future of the Black Sea region, so perhaps I can be allowed certain observations from a Black Sea perspective.

In recent years, Europe has made some brave, bold and controversial moves, and none were so brave, bold or controversial, as it turns out, as the last enlargement to incorporate 10 states in Central and Eastern Europe. That enlargement, and the prospect of future enlargement into the Balkans and Black Sea region, is said to have been a factor behind the rejection of the European Constitution by voters in France and the Netherlands.

Ассистент Дю, это для тех, кто интересуется о ЧЭС. Оно не является нынешним членом ЕС. Два других государства принадлежат к нынешним членам ЕС: Украина и Беларусь. Из 12 государств-членов ЧЭС, только Греция является нынешним членом ЕС. Два других государства принадлежат к нынешним членам ЕС: Украина и Беларусь. Из 12 государств-членов ЧЭС, только Греция является нынешним членом ЕС. Два других государства принадлежат к нынешним членам ЕС: Украина и Беларусь. Из 12 государств-членов ЧЭС, только Греция является нынешним членом ЕС. Два других государства принадлежат к нынешним членам ЕС: Украина и Беларусь.

Адми́нистрато́р Тедо Джа́паридзе (Тедо Джа́паридзе) — генеральный секретарь организации Черноморского экономического сотрудничества (ЧЭС), постоянный международный секретарь в Тбилиси, Грузия. 

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AMONG AMBASSADOR JAPARIDZE’S ACCOMPLISHMENTS AS A GEORGIAN DIPLOMAT WERE THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BLACK SEA ECONOMIC COOPERATION AGREEMENT, LATER KNOWN AS BSEC; AND GEORGIA’S PARTICIPATION IN THIS ENTITY, GEORGIA’S INVOLVEMENT IN THE ORGANIZATION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, COORDINATING GEORGIA’S EFFORTS AT THE UNITED NATIONS RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION ISSUES, INCLUDING THE SITUATION IN ABBAKHZA AND SOUTH OSESETIA. CURRENTLY AMBASSADOR JAPARIDZE IS SECRETARY GENERAL OF BLACK SEA ECONOMIC COOPERATION ORGANIZATION.
The popular fear of a wave of immigration - or "social dumping" as some have termed it - from East to West may certainly have played a part. The perception of an unemployed workforce by low-wage "Polish pluckers", "Turkish kebabci", "Georgian nannies" or "Moldovan mechanics" seems to have stuck a sensitive public chord. And as every politician knows only too well, "perceptions are reality." So if recent events suggest that the perception in certain Western European states is that economic and social threats emanate from the east, what is the perception when one looks at developments in Europe from that very region?

Many commentators have emphasised that enlargement has been perhaps the most successful European policy since the 1950s, when the first moves to create a European entity cemented the reconciliation of France and Germany.

Perhaps that is only a perspective of Europe's political and media elites. But it has certainly worked in the 10 accession States, where the prospect of EU membership has clearly underpinned the peaceful transformation of former communist economies, and helped to introduce and entrench democratic values.

That enlargement did not directly affect the Black Sea region. But the next one - if there is a next one - will. Of the 12 Member States of the EU, only Georgia and Ukraine are not in the bloc. Two others - Romania and Bulgaria - are in a formal process to accede to the EU in 2007 or 2008. Accession talks with Turkey began last October. Serbia is covered by more distant, broader EU commitment to the Western Balkans.

"Real" prospects of joining the EU in 2007 or 2008. Accession talks with Turkey began last October. Serbia is covered by more distant, broader EU commitment to the Western Balkans. Ukraine has made no secret that it sees its future in Europe. So too has my own country, Georgia. All 15 EU States that are not on a direct accession path are subject to the still-evolving European Neighbourhood Policy that seeks to reward, in some still ill-defined way, countries that embrace "European norms and values." The only exception is Russia, which one could argue already has a "special" strategic relationship with Europe.

It is perhaps ironic that, at a time when many people in what I will call "established Europe" are so disenfranchised with the European project, that its allure and attraction continues to exert such power and influence over its "near abroad." Let me, as an example, talk about my own country.

Georgia has never appeared on any list for accession. Yet the European flag flies alongside Georgia’s national flag in front of Parliament and other public buildings. We can do so because it is also the official flag of the Council of Europe, which we are a member of that flag, and because there are no EU officials or politicians to support Georgia’s hopes. It is no publicity or public relations stunt. It flies there because it serves a psychological anchor in a country which has been wrecked by civil war and economic collapse. The Black Sea region is fast becoming a strategic energy corridor to Europe. The inauguration of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the South Caucasus gas pipeline later this year will serve not so much the United States, one of its main backers, but European refineries and drivers. And it was built to European technical, environmental and social standards by a largely Black Sea workforce with the help of mainly European engineers and experts. New projects to link up natural gas pipelines from our region to the main European gas grid will bring additional sources of supply from the Caspian, and perhaps beyond, into European homes and factories, thus diversifying and helping to secure vital sources of supply.

Some look at the Black Sea region as a political and economic Black Hole. I see instead a potentially vibrant market of more than 150 million people. I see it as a producer, consumer and exporter of much needed resources. I also see it as a source of a new generation of enterprising businessmen, inured by the European model. But my vision depends on partnership and cooperation.

At a time when established Europe engages in an inevitably introspective debate on future enlargement, we must not lose sight of the very real and tangible benefits that can flow now from stronger engagement between Europe and the Black Sea region, especially in the economic arena.

As I mentioned earlier, the Neighbourhood Policy is the main vehicle for direct engagement between the EU and Black Sea States without a direct commitment to eventual accession. That policy is still evolving. But even before the French and Dutch referenda cast such uncertainty over future relations, I detected some disquiet about the policy from within the Black Sea region. Some complain that the action plans are too prescriptive, too presumptive, too "top-down" and far too detailed. Some gripe in the region even suspect that it is just a bureaucratic ploy to keep countries quiet that might otherwise be lobbying more vociferously for membership.

nobody would have missed the significance of the outcome.

I am sure that there is a certain temptation to close down discussion of the future enlargement of the EU. Many commentators have expressed the view that enlargement has been perhaps the most successful European policy since the 1950s, when the first moves to create a European entity cemented the reconciliation of France and Germany.

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"Real" prospects of joining the EU in 2007 or 2008. Accession talks with Turkey began last October. Serbia is covered by more distant, broader EU commitment to the Western Balkans. Ukraine has made no secret that it sees its future in Europe. So too has my own country, Georgia. All 15 EU States that are not on a direct accession path are subject to the still-evolving European Neighbourhood Policy that seeks to reward, in some still ill-defined way, countries that embrace "European norms and values." The only exception is Russia, which one could argue already has a "special" strategic relationship with Europe.

It is perhaps ironic that, at a time when many people in what I will call "established Europe" are so disenfranchised with the European project, that its allure and attraction continues to exert such power and influence over its "near abroad." Let me, as an example, talk about my own country.

Georgia has never appeared on any list for accession. Yet the European flag flies alongside Georgia’s national flag in front of Parliament and other public buildings. We can do so because it is also the official flag of the Council of Europe, which we are a member of that flag, and because there are no EU officials or politicians to support Georgia’s hopes. It is no publicity or public relations stunt. It flies there because it serves a psychological anchor in a country which has been wrecked by civil war and economic collapse. The Black Sea region is fast becoming a strategic energy corridor to Europe. The inauguration of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the South Caucasus gas pipeline later this year will serve not so much the United States, one of its main backers, but European refineries and drivers. And it was built to European technical, environmental and social standards by a largely Black Sea workforce with the help of mainly European engineers and experts. New projects to link up natural gas pipelines from our region to the main European gas grid will bring additional sources of supply from the Caspian, and perhaps beyond, into European homes and factories, thus diversifying and helping to secure vital sources of supply.

Some look at the Black Sea region as a political and economic Black Hole. I see instead a potentially vibrant market of more than 150 million people. I see it as a producer, consumer and exporter of much needed resources. I also see it as a source of a new generation of enterprising businessmen, inured by the European model. But my vision depends on partnership and cooperation.

At a time when established Europe engages in an inevitably introspective debate on future enlargement, we must not lose sight of the very real and tangible benefits that can flow now from stronger engagement between Europe and the Black Sea region, especially in the economic arena.

As I mentioned earlier, the Neighbourhood Policy is the main vehicle for direct engagement between the EU and Black Sea States without a direct commitment to eventual accession. That policy is still evolving. But even before the French and Dutch referenda cast such uncertainty over future relations, I detected some disquiet about the policy from within the Black Sea region. Some complain that the action plans are too prescriptive, too presumptive, too "top-down" and far too detailed. Some gripe in the region even suspect that it is just a bureaucratic ploy to keep countries quiet that might otherwise be lobbying more vociferously for membership.
But a pause for political reflection should not become an excuse for a lack of engagement, especially in the economic sphere. In fact, one can argue that a political pause makes it even more imperative to ensure the economic continuity and stability of the region between Europe and the Black Sea region. Our economic interests are inextricably intertwined, irrespective of our political affiliations.

There also needs to be a security dimension that upholds greater economic efforts, as stability is of course a pre-requisite to development. Again, this is perhaps best done through a joint mechanism tied to the Neighbourhood Policy.

That all of us in both Europe and the Black Sea region are facing uncertain and perhaps even irrational times, is patently obvious, while the outcome of the pipelines working group, to help ensure that a political pause makes it even more imperative to increase engagement between Europe and the Black Sea region and more widely in Europe. If the referendums in France and the Netherlands, which are common to most countries in the region. Aside from energy developments, flows of foreign direct investment into the Black Sea region are lamentably low by international standards, and much of those investments that have been made can be attributed to the fact that the recipient countries are among those engaged in the EU accession process.

Such a business coalition could tackle impediments to increased investment, by lobbying and encouraging individual states to lower or remove structural and other barriers to trade. It could also be used to help remove barriers in the energy networks, throughout the region that would bring together all interested companies and business people, including those from the four unrecognised entities in our region. The outcome will most surely be in the long-term interests of Europe.

It could help foster a better overall economic climate by helping countries to enact policies that encourage much informal and unregulated economic activity to shift into the formal sector. The widespread informal economies in many of our member states are a lifeline to many people in recent years, but as flourishing as they may be, they also provide a fertile ground for corruption as well as robbing the States of much-needed revenues that could be harnessed for development.

On the energy front, we could form a joint pipeline working group, to help ensure that a pipeline, which is put in place for energy needs in the region, will not become an excuse for a lack of engagement, especially in the economic sphere. In fact, one can argue that a political pause makes it even more imperative to ensure the economic continuity and stability of the region between Europe and the Black Sea region. Our economic interests are inextricably intertwined, irrespective of our political affiliations.

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We have a common vision. And the building blocks of that vision are primarily economic at this stage. That is surely in both the interests of Europe and the Black Sea region. It is the process of engagement, not necessarily the product, which is so crucial at this time. We at BSEC, are willing to work together for the practical and pragmatic projects that are in the interests of both Europe and the Black Sea region, especially in relation to the Neighbourhood Policy.

We also sincerely hope that the commitments that have been given to several of our member states remain in force and are fully implemented from both sides. Europe’s “frozen frontiers” and to contain chaos and Africa or Asia, but from an urgent need to patrol response to crisis and disasters in faraway places in

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The people of the Black Sea region understand perfectly well why current circumstances may have compelled Europe to have pushed the pause button; but pause, at least according to my Oxford Dictionary, does not mean “stop.” And there is no pause button when it comes to the desire of millions of people in the Black Sea region for peaceful reform, democracy, stability and security, the very things that Europe so eloquently stands for, and which it has so successfully cultivated across other parts of the continent. So pause if you must, but as you pause, please bear in mind that in a potentially volatile region such as ours, with its unresolved conflicts and still emotionally raw alliances, there are always forces at play that only desire is to push the re-wind button of history.

would be ironic. No, that’s not the right word. It would be tragic if one day a common European defense and military policy should emerge not in response to crisis and disasters in faraway places in Africa or Asia, but from an urgent need to patrol Europe’s “frozen frontiers” and to contain chaos and instability in its Near Abroad.

So let’s not be consumed by specific structures, outcomes or end games. Let’s just get on with the job. Let’s embark on the journey. And who knows, we may all be pleasantly surprised when we arrive at our eventual destination.

Thank you very much. ■
one moment. A neutral country has to assure its own security, and the main tool capable of that is the Armed Forces, which are international and humanitarian at the same time. For example, Switzerland, a country with a status of neutrality over a century, has a very mobile and good equipped Army and a brilliant system of the reserves training. And it is not going to fight with nobody. For these reasons we have to discuss not only the necessity of the Armed Forces, but about how does it have to be and what functions does it have to have.

As a result of that, the Conception of the military reform was elaborated, and adopted by the Parliament in 2002. This is a conceptual, strategic plan. Today we are on the second stage of its realization and all documents adopted by the Government, reflect main missions for the 2005-2008 period. Their realization is interconnected in getting to the main larger - create a modern and good equipped Army by year 2011. When we speak about the reform of the national security system, we cannot divide missions in first or second priority. This is like in the car: broken and the car stops. The same in our situation - all tasks are solving in complex, because everything is inter connected. For example, how can we speak about the cooperation between different military branches, if the communication gear is out of date and does not meet current standards? Therefore, working on improving the first, first of all, is connected with control of the Armed Forces. By the modernization and reorganization way of the Anti Air Defense, we do the same in other branches, if the communication gear is out of date and does not meet current standards. Such tasks are very important. Whenever we speak about national security, it is about the cooperation between different military branches, not only from technical but also from humanitarian potential, simply wasn't involved in the process of the National Army of Moldova, which, having a tremendous scientific potential, is ready to contribute to realization of some projects. One of such partners became the Academy of Science of Moldova. And the same as with the communication gear, the representatives of the Academy of Science of Moldova, ready to contribute to realization of some projects, are branches, if the communication gear is out of date and does not meet current standards.

To conclude, I would like to mention that we had a number of meetings, in this direction, with the representatives of the different companies and organizations, which are ready to contribute to realization of some projects. One of such partners became the Academy of Science of Moldova, which, having a tremendous scientific potential, simply wasn't involved in the process of the National Army of Moldova. We hope that with its help it will be possible to solve a number of programs not only from technical but also from humanitarian side, that are included in the military reform plan. Everything has to be done in complex, because successful mission accomplishment in final depends on cooperation of all structures of the state. In the conception of the military reform it is planned that by 2011 the state will allocate for the military needs up to 25% GDR. But, to that figures we will come step by step, according to missions that are planned for each step of the military construction. For example, the percentage that I was mentioning earlier, is motivated by the fact that the process of modernization and reorganization of the units will finish the completion of the military units based on the contracted volunteers and we will finish the process of the exchanging the military vehicles and equipment with the new examples. So, to the figure of 2.5% we will come step by step, increasing the military budget every year.

Military budget for this year is about 9.5 mln USD and it is 0.4% of GDR. This amount covers just one third of the real necessities of MOD. Of course we would like to receive more funds, but we are aware of the difficult situation in R. Moldova. Current budget is a social one: 61% of it is to be spent for the salary, food, lodging, etc.

I did not tell that we cannot solve those problems. We work them out, solve most of them even with the limited financial possibilities. However it is not easy at all, we do all possible to avoid useless waste of money. There have been made analyses and have been determined directions in which we could be able to save money. As an example of saving money could be the rationalization of the communal expenses by reducing the number of military camps and objects that are not being used by the military personnel. In parallel we also will look up other ways to obtain necessary funding. We plan to invite foreign partners to participate in realization of the programs, which are not so important and other.

What do we lack for an ideal army - bigger budget, modern equipment, and professional personnel? In my opinion, no country can have ideal army. There are always some problems, for example, to solve problems, which are connected with control of the Armed Forces. There are also some other problems. I think, that we need more training, and not only in our own country, but also in foreign countries. But I would like to mention that we have a number of agreements, in this direction, with the military academies in R. Germany, France, Italy and another countries. Such training is very expensive, but it is also very important. Of course, we need to learn the best experience of the others. Some countries, for example, have training programs in foreign countries, and we have to pay for the training and other activities. It is very expensive. But I would like to mention, that we can learn from our mistakes, and not only our own, but also from the others. It is important to learn from the others.

In conclusion, I would like to say, that we have to make some efforts, to improve the professional qualification of our military personnel. In my opinion, no country can have ideal army. There are always some problems, for example, to solve problems, which are connected with control of the Armed Forces. There are also some other problems. I think, that we need more training, and not only in our own country, but also in foreign countries. But I would like to mention that we have a number of agreements, in this direction, with the military academies in R. Germany, France, Italy and another countries. Such training is very expensive, but it is also very important. Of course, we need to learn the best experience of the others. Some countries, for example, have training programs in foreign countries, and we have to pay for the training and other activities. It is very expensive. But I would like to mention, that we can learn from our mistakes, and not only our own, but also from the others. It is important to learn from the others.
системы только на 3,79% от численного состава Национальной армии. Тем не менее, это означает оценку мер по оптимизации структуры частей и учреждений армии. К 1 января 2009 года будет завершен процесс restructuring, в рамках которого будут работать только 7,5% от численного состава Национальной армии. Следовательно, по всей стране будет действовать новый социальный проект: введение нового уровня безопасности военнослужащих. Более того, в некоторых частях будут работать только те люди, которые не получили в свое время назначение, а также теми, у кого есть необходимые средства сейчас, а не в обозримом будущем. Вступив в должность, я с удивлением узнал, что не все проблемы были решены: большая часть зданий в армии была обветшала, и люди, которые ее населяли, нуждались не только в замене оборудования, но и переоборудовании зданий под общежития, или, получив один раз квартиру, сейчас претендуют на еще одну. Поэтому сейчас предпринимаются все возможные меры для исправления этих ситуаций. Несмотря на то, что в этих условиях работа военнослужащих является некоммерческой, для нас обеспечено их жилищное благополучие и социальное благосостояние. Это касается также и социальных условий. В городе Кырк-Арык очень много молодых офицеров: поэтому сейчас предпринимаются все возможные меры для исправления их жилищных и социальных условий. 

Многообразие проблем, которые мы должны решить, сводится к одной простой аксиоме: армия, это то место, где люди работают для защиты своей страны. Поэтому нужно создать им соответствующие условия. Last year 90 young active officers decided to leave the army. The situation with NGO corps is not better. The main reason for leave is social care problems. That is correct, social problem is a very acute one, even taking into the consideration the recent years steps for its improvement, we still have lots of work to do in this relevant area. The main problem is logging for the personnel. The queue to receive an apartment is about 750 families, and some of them are in line for over 10 years. Many of them are desperate to receive anything. Also the number is growing annually, so we are trying to fix it with also possible and impossible means. In this order we draw more directions first, duty apartments, which are to be issued to personnel during their active duty with the right to have a personal apartment after 10-15 years. We, army leadership will do everything possible for that, planning to build several houses, and several military hotels with the decent human conditions and facilities.

Meting hotels of course we mean first of all the NCO core we are trying to support. This is our weakest link in the military chain. We do not tolerate use old school style and considering them our main professionals.

Secondly, we are considering giving up some military training centers to companies, which can provide us with new apartments now.

Third, I order to review the long queue in order to except cases for illegal cases. Along with housing, where is another big one: wages. We discuss that problem at high levels, and personally I think it is not right that a lieutenant receives too little for such a difficult and responsible job as a platoon leader.

I think that a situation like that is no longer to be tolerated, so the leadership of the Ministry of Defense is working out possible solutions for the radical social improve in the army. We can discuss a lot about reform, but all we have come to one simple thing: army is first of all, people. Namely those people provide security and peace of the country. So, we have to create such living and service conditions to the people that, regardless of situa tion, a military man would say to himself and his son: ‘this service is worth to dedicate my life for’.
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Mr. Sergei KOPOPULY

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