Homeland Security and Defense

ответственность, безопасность и оборона

I have been in each and every country represented here, in some of them multiple times. In the case of Azerbaijan and Armenia, for example, I was involved in opening up our first defense and intelligence relationship with your countries when they became countries. So, I have spent time in Yerevan and Baku and elsewhere. I see familiar faces from Ukraine. In Ukraine, I feel a little bit like I am at home as I visited a series of Black Sea regional events. As Tad Olstholm introduced me, he said something very important—that I cannot tell you how to organize a government for dealing with terrorism because I am an American. A plot of the story I am going to tell you is that we in the United States have so far failed to organize ourselves very well to deal with terrorism. So I think those of you who are not Americans need to take what I say in comparison with your own situation. We in the United States have been struggling since September 11, 2001 to see how we can configure our governmental institutions and especially our security establishment to deal with terrorism better. I think we regard ourselves as in the very early stages of learning how to do that successfully. We feel we have a long way to go. The reason is that we face one of the most difficult managerial problems I have ever encountered in national security.

We are particularly at a disadvantage as Americans because we have never had in our history, for almost a hundred and fifty years, any internal security threat. All of our security threats have been overseas: World War I, World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and both Iraq wars. The problem of U.S. defense and homeland security has always been solved by two oceans, Canada, and Mexico. But now we face this problem, and it is really a new experience for us. Therefore, we do not have the right institutions, inherited from the last 200 years of our history, to deal with it.

President Bush says we are "at war" with terrorism, and that is a fine political slogan, but we all know it is not a really traditional war. Therefore, our traditional war
MНЕНИЕ ЭКСПЕРТА

In the last year we have learned a lot: how he moves, what we usually do with crime is let the crimes occur and then we catch a person who was trying to commit the crime. You cannot take that approach dealing with terrorism, you have to invent a proper government mechanism for dealing with this problem ourselves so that we can protect our society without having to change our society so much that it becomes unpleasant to live here. I believe, as I was dealing with terrorism long before 9/11, that this issue requires a long-term view.

It is going to take years and years to become good at dealing with terrorism and therefore we have to look beyond Al-Qaeda and it is a serious threat at the moment. But I think Al-Qaeda is going to pass into history, too. Twenty years from now, it won’t be the problem, but there will be other problems.

I don’t think Al-Qaeda will pass into history soon, but I think we will apprehend Osama bin Laden. I think we will be able to track him down and that he will probably be killed. I think he will probably be killed as a result of a military operation.

I don’t think Al-Qaeda will pass into history. Ten to twenty years from now, we will have to invent a proper government mechanism for dealing with this problem ourselves so that we can protect our society without having to change our society so much that it becomes unpleasant to live here. I believe, as I was dealing with terrorism long before 9/11, that this issue requires a long-term view.

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At the time of the anthrax mailings, we had three laboratories, but none of them was very good at anthrax analysis. And you can easily imagine the situation when several people are doing something and nobody is doing it well if you don’t have proper managerial scheme.

Another theory was: Let’s not have a new department. Instead, we will have somebody in the White House (not the president himself) but who has the best analytical team.

Such central tsars always failed in every government. I will tell you why. By the way, there is a joke about tsars that would be understood in your part of the world: “The bears ignore them, and eventually the peasants will kill them.” And that is what has happened to all White House tsars as well, the bears being cabinet officers at the ministries of defense, interior, and justice. They say, “I am an minister and I have my authority from legislation. And who is that bigwig, who is that midget, who is that birocrat who is giving orders to me?” And on the first day, the midget says, “The president gave me the authority to order you what to do.” And the cabinet minister says, “Well, I am not going to do it.” And so the first day the tsar gets to the president, the president calls the cabinet minister and says, “Do what my midget says.” And that works for the first day. The next day, the tsar tells another minister to do something, and the minister says, “No, no. These are the peasants. And they go to the meeting with the tsar, and the tsar says, “I need you to do this, this, and this,” and the sub-minister says, “I cannot do that. The minister won’t let me.” And that is the end of the authority of the tsar. That, by the way, happens not only with cabinet ministers but with everybody. The tsar has no authority from legislation. And his friend was the president. He had the office right next to the president. The cabinet ministers still didn’t listen to him.

3) Protection. This means hardening potential terrorist targets, making them more resilient and harder to attack. For example, we are looking to harden our infrastructure-telecommunications, energy, and so forth-so as to make it more difficu-
t for terrorists to eliminate an infrastructure by attacking one node of an infrastructure.

4) Interdiction. This means attacking terrorists before they attack you. That is what we did in Afghanistan.

5) Response. This means how you clean up after a terrorist incident, so you save as many lives as possible and prevent as much economic disrup
tion as possible.

You can break down each of these into its component parts. But the question we have been wrestling with in our government is: Who should do each of those things? How do we appor
tion and assign functions within the government? I will just describe what we have done so far.

First, let me talk about the federal government in Washington. The first question that arose back in the Clinton administration in the early 1990s is: Whose job is homeland security, just like we have departments for defense, for health and human services, and another one was a private lab-
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tories, two in the Department of Defense, one at the Department of Health and Human Services, and another one was a private lab-

In fact, we now have a new department in the U.S. government, but it does not do the whole job of counterr
terrorism, and rightly so. It has just a piece of a job. It is called the Department of Homeland Security. It does border security. It does emergency management. It does transportation security. But we still have the CIA, the FBI, the Department of Defense, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Department of Energy. All of these guys are still there and the problem remains: Why do you need them? Since Tom Ridge left the White House and went to run the Department of Homeland Security, there is no one telling him where the bears are. Who are the bears? Since Tom Ridge left the White House, the Department of Homeland Security, there is no one telling him where the bears are. What happens when the White House doesn't lead on an issue? Answer: Congress does. And what you see in our Homeland Security program is that a lot of money is doled out by the Congress. And you know how Congress doles out money—according to where it's going to be spent. So, I don't think we have solved the problem in Washington.

The second point is that this is not a problem that can be solved in Washington only. Because if the dis
taster occurs in New York, the people in New York—the police and fire companies—would deal with it because these people are there, they are not in Washington. When we were planning for terrorism at the Atlanta Olympics in 1996, in Washington it was terribly impor
tant to protect the Atlanta Olympics from terrorism. And because the police and firemen would not agree to the vice presid
tinary of the Olympic Games, he was able to take it upon himself to organize us for the Atlanta Olympics. We had all these meetings with Vice President Al Gore, the secre
ty of defense, the secretary of health and human services, and secretary of state. So all these people are together and say, "Look, if we have a terrorist event in Atlanta, you do this and you do that," and we were all proud of ourselves because we had organized our programs in the correct manner and the correct manner.

Then we went down to Atlanta and went to the sher
tiff. And he said, "Thank you very much for your interest in Atlanta’s problem, but I am in charge here. Everything that happens in Atlanta, I am giving the orders. Al Gore, not anybody. This is Atlanta’s Olympics, and not the United States’ Olympics." And he succeeded, telling us to go to hell. So, the lesson of that is that the question is not just the matter for the central government, but for the local government as well.

I will give you another example. Suppose there was, God forbid, a nuclear contamination in Boston, and you want to evacuate the population. It does not make sense for the evacuation plans for Boston to be made in Washington, because the people in Boston have their own evacua
tion plan. You have been to Boston and you know quite well that even Russians cannot drive here, and certainly
ly nobody else could. But it makes sense for Washington

Ridge’s views in our Office of homeland security. And a
order to protect itself from terrorism by itself. It could tackle
terminally as well, because the United States can’t
ternational law enforcement and intelligence officials monitoring their own borders and their bomb-making materials. We can’t do it ourselves. Unilateralism for this mission is not an option. It was an option for Iraq, but it is not an option for this mission. We don’t have the power, we don’t have the resources.

If you look at the problem of homeland security as a management problem, it is a pretty complicated one. We in the United States are only on the early stages of figuring out how to do it. Maybe the countries in this region are already far beyond where we are in terms of their understanding on how to do this in a way which is compatible with their own society. But we in the United States have really just started. My only hope is that we get better fast enough so that we do not have to suffer more attacks before we get good enough. We thought that the Americans had no choice, that they were the only people who could do it. And then you would observe that it was not enough to have just the federal government and local govern
doment, because the telephone system, a lot of transportation systems, and the electricity generation and distribution systems are not owned by the govern
d and private companies own them. And if this infrastructure is to be hardened, the private companies have to do that. So we have to find a way to make private companies pay their role. You do that by giving them money, giving them tax breaks, ordering them to do it by law, or through the insurance system. And we are in the process of figuring that out, too.

Then once you get organized in the United States on the federal level, the state level, the local level, the pub
card, and the private sector, then you have to look internationally as well, because the United States can’t protect itself from terrorism by itself. It could tackle Saddam Hussein by itself. We did not need somebody else. We could have invader and conquered, without the British or anybody else. But we cannot protect our
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Economic Transitions: The Future of the World Economy until the Year 2020

Мне не кажется, что это будущее, но мы наверняка знаем, что в 2020 году каждый из нас в этой аудитории будет на 16 лет старше, чем сегодня. И не только присутствующие здесь, но и политические лидеры во всем мире также будут на 16 лет старше, или умнее. И мы знаем из опыта трансформаций в многих частях мира — от Леонида Брежнева, Михаила Горбачева до Бориса Ельцина, и от Сухарто до главы нынешнего режима в Индонезии, что проявляют определенные изменения в политическом руководстве как минимум в некоторых частях мира.

Например, довольно удивительно наблюдать за процессами, происходящими сегодня в Ираке. Но перед тем как я начну говорить о будущем, я хотел бы сказать что-то о прошлом.

Мое выступление имеет весьма значимую структуру: прошлое, настоящее, будущее. Я немного скажу о дне сегодняшнем. Я не знаю, как обстоят дела в ваших странах, но в моей стране, в США, если вы читаете газеты или смотрите телевизор, то у вас может возникнуть впечатление, что мы движемся от одного кризиса к другому. Когда я говорю «мы», то имею в виду человечество, а также домохозяйства на всем мире. Это общеметр. Сэмс США вы можете вынести впечатление, что мы движемся от одного кризиса к другому, и мы обычно избегаем какого-либо результата, и лишь только мы выживаем, мы получаем из них что-то, что помогает нам двигаться вперед.

Начнем с политической экономической структуры, которую мы изучаем, и которая включает в себя экономические показатели, которые влияют на нас. Было проведено исследование, что за последние 50 лет мы имели средний прирост ВВП в 2,5%, а за последние 20 лет средний прирост ВВП в 2,5%.

Всемирный банк в своей последней работе, опубликованной в 2004 году, говорил о том, что за последние 50 лет мы имели средний прирост ВВП в 2,5%.

Мы знаем, что за последние 50 лет мы имели средний прирост ВВП в 2,5%.

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МНЕНИЕ ЭКСПЕРТА

We have to remember that the world’s population has more than doubled since 1950. But the number of people living in poverty has also declined from roughly 1.2 billion in 1950 to 600 million in 2000. Six hundred million is still a lot of people. There are a lot of people that are very poor, but the point I make is that we have done an incredible job not only growing the world’s economy, but also in moving people out of poverty over the past half-century. Countries were dominated by China and India. Both countries have done very well, and they are still the world’s biggest countries in terms of population. Both of these countries are now doing well, China rather better than India, but India is doing very well except by comparison with China. But these are the places were the largest number of poor people live, and they are now much poorer than they were. I especially mean the Chinese living not in Shanghai or Beijing or in a small town or a village near a big city, but the people in the hinterland that are still very poor. China was the fourth poorest country in the world in 1950. In the hinterland which are still very poor. China was the fourth poorest country in the world in 1950. In the hinterland that are still very poor. China was the fourth poorest country in the world in 1950. In the hinterland that are still very poor. China was the fourth poorest country in the world in 1950. It is worth asking the question: Why is it that this half-century performed so well in human terms, or at least in terms of material well-being? My answer is threefold.

First, I know that it is hard to believe by reading the newspapers, but this has been an exceptionally peaceful half-century. In Western European terms, you have to go back to Roman times to find a peaceful period as long as we have had since 1945. Of course, there have been wars that we all know about because they are all in the media. But this has been, nevertheless, a very peaceful halfway-century by histori- cal standards. And it is worth asking the question: why is it that we are not going to answer, especially in my domain: Why is this the case? And why is it that the clear standoff played some role in this long period of peace?

Second, we have leaned to manage national economies much better that we used to, as we have managed them according to a new concept of managing national economies. It was the Keynesian revolution, named after the theory of the great English econ- omist John Maynard Keynes of the first half of the twentieth century, in which he said “No, it should be the government’s responsibility to manage these economies, and this is especially to avoid events like the Great Depression. And furthermore, we know how to do it by harnessing fiscal and monetary policy.” It is a historical fact that economies have performed much better in terms of growth and stability during this period than in the preceding half century or the two half centuries before then. Here I am talking about major economies— for example, the United States, Europe, and Japan.

Third, this excellent economic performance was possible in the framework of international cooperation that was put in place in the mid-1940s coming out of the Second World War. The postwar planners, mainly American and British, joined later by other countries including the Soviet Union, were determined that an event such as a great depression should not ever happen again. They created the basic framework that we still have today, based on the fact that national gov- ernments are responsible for the micro- and macro- economic management of national economies, but in exercising that responsibility, they should not do so at the expense of their trade partners.

This seemed to be the main lesson of the 1930s. The framework they laid down is embodied in such institutions as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on the financial side. The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an organization that is relatively young, but its principles were laid down in the 1940s in the shape of the Global Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). GATT laid down the basic rules of economic relations of participating countries.

These organizations are not obligatory, but they are real clubs. If you join a club, you sign up to the club rules. In this case, the club rules were: We operate in a cooperative framework, but we are going to compete with one another. It comes to selling goods and services; the poli- cy framework is cooperative, but we are going to compete adversar- ial one, but rather a cooperative framework.

Within this framework, we have dealt with bal- ance of payments crises; we had eight major rounds of trade liberalization. We are now in the ninth so-called dollar round. But it is a continuation of the process that goes back to 1947. The outcomes sug- gest that this framework has served the mankind well. Why? Because we could have done even better, but the idea that the framework itself should be rejected, in view of a kind of perform- ance that I have just talked about, is slightly dumb.

So that concludes my remarks on the past. I want to say just one brief thing about the present. What dis- tinguishes our era-the last few decades from all previ- ous eras of human history? My answer to that question is: We have institutionalized technical change, and this is a revolutionary change in Maman affairs. We have had course have technical change and innovations going way back to the beginnings of agriculture 8,000 years ago. We can go back even to the discovery of fire. The Chinese discovered how to use the compass and paper, and the Arabians invented the Arabic numerals. There have been technical changes throughout the history of mankind. They began to accelerate in the eighteenth century largely again in Europe and in
Britain, especially in agriculture, with selecting breeding of both plants and animals. They continued into the nineteenth century when, as every American schoolboy learns, the major inventions included the steamboat, the typewriter, the telegraph, the screw propeller, the aircraft, and the wireless radio. So we had these inventions, and we had such inventors as Thomas Edison, who has many inventions including the light bulb.

What has happened in recent decades is that we have invented other things, technical change. This will play a great role in the future, for example in 2020, it is hard to imagine what will be happening. So, it is hard to imagine with any confidence and credibility what the world is going to be like a century from now. Sixteen years is enough time so that we can accumulate all the relevant knowledge, and which we can pay for, and which we can pay for to get a good education. 

In the nineteenth century when, as every American schoolboy would have thought, that the major inventions included the steamboat, the telegraph, the screw propeller, the aircraft, and the wireless radio. So we had these inventions, and we had such inventors as Thomas Edison, who has many inventions including the light bulb.

So we have a constant stream of new ideas coming forward-most of them are going nowhere, most of them are dead ends. They are either good ideas or bad ideas, but for one reason or another, they are impossible to realize them. But in this constant flood of new ideas, some are highly practical and indeed become irresistible.

Most of the people in this room are old enough to remember what life was like before the fax machine was invented by the Japanese, but it happened just twenty years ago. It is hard to imagine life these days without the fax machine, and it is now beyond them, even those who were living then, which was not even on the radar screen twenty years ago.

A large number of these ideas became irresistible and were adopted by society. So we live in the world of constant change with many dimensions. But one very distinctive dimension has been the creation of the new technical and economic possibilities that did not exist even a decade or two decades ago, but which, once adopted, changed the way people behave either in their home lives or in their working lives. So, we live in a world of constant change-driven by, among other things, technical change. This will play a great role in the future, for example, in 2020.

I have chosen the date 2020, but it should not be taken that other dates to one to two decades from now. I am going to use a few numbers that are focused on that year. I have chosen this time frame because it is short enough, so it is imaginable. The year 2020 is six years from now. Now we are in 2004, and my guess is everyone in this room can remember what happened in 1988, which is sixteen years in the past. I can remember what happened in 1988 and around 1988. But if you take the year 2100, it is hard to imagine what will be happening. So, it is hard to imagine with any confidence and credibility what the world is going to be like a century from now. Sixteen years is enough time so that we can accumulate all the relevant knowledge, and which we can pay for, and which we can pay for to get a good education. 

So, 2020 is going to be very different from 2004 in some key respects, but the difference is going to be mysterious. There will be surprises. By definition, you cannot forecast a surprise. If you could, it would not be a surprise. There will be surprises, but I am talking about non-surprises-the things that we are thinking of systematically and can forecast.

I can identify three drivers:
1) Demographics, the world population growth;
2) The now all but universal desire for a higher level of income and standard of living, combined with a good knowledge about how to achieve them;
3) Technology.

I am going to focus particularly on technical change in computation and communication, the so-called IT revolution or information technology revo-

lution. But it is only part of what is happening in terms of technical change.

The really distinctive thing about the world in the twentieth century is the huge increase in population. We were 7-8 billion this kind of a concept, but before and we will not have one ever again. The world’s population reached its peak in the early 1960s. Since then, the world’s population is still growing, but it is growing at a rate which is declining every year. Population growth is still going on, and by 2020, the world population will have grown on current UN estimates by about 1.3 billion to 1.4 billion more people. Now it is around 6.3 billion, and it will be 7.6 billion by the end of the year, and moreover, have more than a billion more mouths to feed.

This growth is occurring overwhelmingly in the developing countries, as we call them today. One of the remarkable demographic developments of the last two decades is that countries in the developed world have had very significant declines in birth rates, whereas the rich countries of the world have had very significant increases in population. These rich countries include Western Europe, Central Europe, and Slavic Europe (including Russia and Ukraine), as well as Japan, Germany, and Japan.

EXPERT’S OPINION
ГАРВАРДСКАЯ ПРОГРАММА ЧЕРНОМОРСКОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ – 2004

HARVARD BLACK SEA SECURITY PROGRAM – 2004

APRIL, 2004

HARVARD, APRIL, 2004
EXPERT’S OPINION

Nature. And mankind can conquer nature and improve farms when these religions originated. Of course, there are natural reasons, partly through immigration.

The United States is interesting among the richest countries, because in the United States, while there has been a lot of growth in population growth, it has been much less dramatic than it has been in either Europe or Japan, or in Canada for that matter. In addition, the United States continues to have over a million immigrants a year, illegal as well as legal, and we do what I think is a remarkably good, though not perfect, job of integrating immigrants into American society, if not in the first generation then in the second or third generation. The demography in the United States stands apart among rich countries, and this country is still growing partly through natural reasons, partly through immigration.

As for the second point about higher standards of living, I don’t know the whole world, but the only folks I know who do not complain about higher standards of living are in the United States and rich Europeans’ children. But everyone else in the world wants higher living standards if not for themselves, then for their children. In fact, this country is still growing partly through natural increase.

We have great religions. Hinduism, Christianity, Islam. Remember, these religions were based on agriculture. It is not a traditional human idea. The traditional idea is that society is either static over time or it is cyclical.

I can’t say that everyone in these religions originated. Of course, there were changes, but there were no trends. Changes were cyclical. There was no long-term trend. In the eighteenth century, philosophical terms changed in Western Europe with the idea of progress, in which instead of having man versus man, it was man versus nature. And mankind can conquer nature and improve his condition over time, and that condition has existed for two centuries proven to be a case. And this idea is so attractive that it is now a worldwide idea.

For instance, even in a traditional and religious society like India, you will find that most Indians want their children to go to school because, as one eleven-year-old kid, when I asked him why he wants to go to school, answered, “I want to be Bill Gates in the future.” This is in rural southern India. This is a kid who has never seen the marketplace. So this idea of progress has become universal, and we now see enough examples of it to know that it is entirely achievable. All you have to do is to establish a stable social system with the right incentives for effort and risk-taking. To accomplish this, most countries will need to tie themselves to the world economy.

Of course, everything is in the details. But what we’ve demonstrated is that you don’t always need natural resources. In fact, natural resources may even be an impediment, particularly having lots and lots of oil. You do not need to have lots and lots of territory, a big army to defend yourself, and so forth. You just need policies that suit the right incentives for effort and risk-taking, and you have to tie yourself to the world economy with its cooperative framework that I mentioned before.

My favorite example is South Korea, although maybe it is just because I know South Korea a little bit better than other countries. Anyway, South Korea is the country that in late 1950s (that’s now almost fifty-five years ago) was dismissed as a hopeless case with no prospects for the future. It had no natural resources, some poor quality of brown coal, and it had a relatively high ratio of population to arable land. Above all, the South Korean people had a Confucian ethic with its reference to the past and resistance to change. But fortunately, the South Koreans proved that we were all wrong, the prognosticators of the late 1950s were wrong.

With all these disadvantages, South Korea has demonstrated a country with a stable social system that has the right incentives for effort, risk-taking, and is tied to world economy can grow 7 percent per year in per capita income, not like 2 percent here [in the United States], during a quarter-century. It is a fantastic achievement. Seven percent a year means you double your national income twice per decade. So since the late 1950s, South Korea’s national income grew almost eight-fold. Still, South Korea is not a rich country yet, as one can compare it with Western Europe, North America, or Japan. But it is now a very well-to-do country, and it is getting richer from year to year. There are at least two dozens cases around the world that have grown 7 percent in per capita income per year in the past two decades.

I know who do not complain about higher standards of living are in the United States and rich Europeans’ children. In this particular respect, the Chinese voluntarily, without any external rewards for economic activity. And China was a total example of a country with the right incentives for effort, risk-taking. To accomplish this, most countries will need to tie themselves to the world economy with its cooperative framework that I mentioned before.

The Chinese voluntarily, without any external pressure, had a radical change in their system in the late 1970s in order to open their economy up, tie it to the world economy, and change the incentive structures within China in order to provide better rewards for economic activity. And China was a total outsider, not a member of these international organizations that I mentioned, until the 1980s, but they saw the possibilities of taking advantage of the possi-


Korea, and Taiwan (which are countries that are not quite in the same rank, but they became much wealthier in the last two decades. None of these countries are replacing themselves through natural population growth, and the natural population growth in these countries without immigration will decline. However, this will not happen in each case during the sixteen years that I am focusing on.

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влияния к мировой экономике с ее механизмами социализма, о которых упоминал выше. Мой любимый пример - Южная Корея, хотя это может потом, что я знаю ее чуть лучше, чем другие страны. Так вот, Южная Корея в конце 1950-х годов (почти 55 лет назад) была признана безнадежным случаем, без перспектив на будущее. У нее не было природных ресурсов, немногого низкосортного бурого угля, а также относительно маленькой территории. Кроме того, народ Южной Кореи жил по конфуцианской этике с ее склонностью к опоре на прошлое и сопротивлением переменам. Но к счастью Южная Корея показала, что все мы ошибались, прогнозы конца 1950-х годов оказались неверными. При всех неудачных предпосылках Южная Корея продемонстрировала, что страна со стабильной социальной системой, с правильными стимулами к работе, разумному риску, а также привязкой к мировой экономике может за считанные годы достичь ежегодного прироста дохода на душу населения в 7%, а не 2% как в США за четверть века. Это фантастическое до- стижение. 7% в год означает удвоение нацио- нального дохода дважды в десятилетие. Таким образом, с конца 1950-х годов национальный до- ход Южной Кореи увеличился почти в 8 раз. Хотя Южная Корея еще не стала опорой в мире, если сравнивать ее с Западной Европой, Северной Америкой или Японией. Но дела в Южной Корее идут хорошо, и она с каждым годом становится все богаче. В целом, в мире имеется не менее 25 подобных Южной Кореи случаев. Китайцы добровольно, без какого-либо внеш- него давления радиального изменили свою систе- му, но не потому, что они позанимались экономикой, “привязали” ее к мировой экономике, а также изменили систему стимулирования внут- рь Китая с тем, чтобы лучше стимулировать эконо- номическую активность. А ведь Китай был пол- ным аутсайдером, не был членом упомянутых международных организаций до 1980-х годов, но он увидел возможность удачно воспользоваться ситуацией. И сейчас Китай на большом подъеме. Будучи огромной страной, Китай в силу опыта в число стран с ежегодным приростом дохода на душу населения в 7% за минувшие два десятилетия.

Для Индии, на мой взгляд, Китай был лучшим примером. Индия за последние два десятилетия продемонстрировала отличные результаты, но весьма медленными темпами. Затем эта страна посмотрела на Китай, и с середины 1980-х годов индийская политика значительно изменилась -
The best example for India, in my view, has been China. India demonstrated some growth for the last two decades, but with very slow rates. Then India saw what was happening in China, and the big change in policy started toward the mid-1980s, and especially in 1991. India is now doing quite well. It is not in a league with Korea or Japan in the 1950s or China today. It can be done.

With these aspirations and the growth of population, a desire for higher income, a desire for more food, energy and other resources, the question is: Can the world supply all the required resources to meet these aspirations of many people around the world with its growing population? My answer is in the spirit of the anti-Rome Club statement, it is an unambiguous “yes.” There will be no shortage of resources in a trade sense. I am not going to say that the world will not have disruptions from time to time. There may be some local turbulence (oil comes to mind). I don’t say there will be no famine, but there will be no famine because of a shortage of food in the world. There will be famine because of traditional reasons—some countries have a lack of physical resources. But in all cases, we should not treat fresh water as something that is provided for almost free.

Curiously, the resource that probably will be pressed the hardest and earliest is fresh water. Of course, this will not be a global problem, but rather a regional problem, and a very important one. In some regions, we are already pressing up against the availability of fresh water: in northern China, the Middle East, and other various parts of the world. So we need to learn how to treat water properly, especially in the conditions of these scarce resources. But in all cases, we should not treat fresh water as something that is provided for almost free.

EXPERT'S OPINION

The event received less public attention in the United States than it deserved. It marked a grand achievement in international security affairs, and it was a bright moment in the history of human freedom. That ceremony capped many years of effort, which began not just a few years ago when new allies formally entered the Membership Action Program, but decades ago, when they were still squarly, and it seemed inescapably, in the Communist bloc. For some of us, the deliberation of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and Communist tyranny was a lifetime project.

As a former student here at Harvard, I benefited especially from the books and lectures of Professor Richard Pipes, who headed the Russian Research Center here. Professor Pipes and I were a part of small minority in Cambridge who thought that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a noble pursuit, not an unrealistic project. Professor Pipes joined the Reagan administration to implement that project, and I had the honor and pleasure of working with him at the National Security Council before I crossed the Potomac River for my first sitting at the Pentagon.


29 March 2004. I attended the White House ceremony at which President Bush welcomed seven new members into NATO: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

This event was part of a series of events that have generated more interest in the United States than it deserved. It marked a grand achievement in international security affairs, and it was a bright moment in the history of human freedom. That ceremony capped many years of effort, which began not just a few years ago when new allies formally entered the Membership Action Program, but decades ago, when they were still square, and it seemed inescapably, in the Communist bloc. For some of us, the deliberation of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and Communist tyranny was a lifetime project.

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29 марта 2004 г. я был в Белом доме на церемонии, где Президент Буш пригласил в НАТО 7 новых членов: Болгарию, Эстонию, Латвию, Литву, Румынию, Словакию и Словению.

Это событие получило меньше общественного внимания в США, чем того заслуживало. Оно символизировало грандиозное достижение в международных безопасностных отношениях, а также стало ярким моментом в истории человеческих свобод. Дорога к церемонии была вымощена долгими годами усилий, которые начались не пару лет назад, когда новые кандидаты формально присоединились к Программе Действий по обеспечению Членства, а десятки лет тому назад, когда они еще, казалось, незаметно и безошибочно сидели в коммунистическом блоке. И для нынешних и наших проектов освобождения Восточной Европы и СССР от коммунистической тирании стал днем всей жизни.

Как бывший студент Гарварда, я особенно много почерпнул из книг и лекций профессора Пайпса, который возглавлял здесь Русский исследовательский центр. Профессор Пайпс и я были частью меньшинства, которое считало, что развивал СССР - это благородная, но нереальная задача. Но профессор Пайпс стал частью администрации Рейгана, чтобы реализовать эту инициативу. Я имел честь и удовольствие работать вместе с ним в Совете Национальной безопасности до тех пор, пока я не пересек реву Потомак и получил свое первое назначение в Пентагон.
Terrorism

Many of us in the Reagan administration thought that the cold war was fundamentally a fight for the freedom, lives, and civil liberties of the United States and our allies. We won the cold war and avoided World War III, a major strategic accomplishment for which the world is a better place. But we find that our lives, civil liberties, and overall security are threatened seriously again, now from other quarters, particularly from Al Qaida, its network of terrorist groups, and their state and non-state supporters.

Promoting freedom for others was a potent element of our strategy for winning the cold war. It also serves as an important element of our strategy for winning the war on terrorism today. Some U.S. policymakers say that by “promoting freedom,” we mean creating systems of government in other countries that look like the American constitutional system. But that is not the case.

The eighteenth century British political philosopher Adam Burke gave us some useful guidance in thinking about the championing of freedom and democratic institutions abroad. Burke wrote at a time when the French Revolution was unveiling throughout Europe. He cautioned against the dangers presented to liberty and human happiness by political abstractions. He warned that successful political institutions are rooted in tradition and rely on organic connections to the local soil and culture. We have to respect the importance of the differences between societies long accustomed to democratic practices and other societies, and these differences highlight for us the magnitude of the task of encouraging democratic development in the latter societies.

Successive U.S. administrations have promoted freedom abroad for a variety of good reasons. Among the principal good reasons for doing so now is the great role that democratic institution-building can play in our strategy on terrorism. We cannot win this war if we do all we can disrupt the networks of terrorist groups. Terrorist groups can recruit and indoctrinate new terrorists faster and far more comfortably than we can counter ideological support for terrorism. The strategic success will be Iraqis creating for themselves a political and philosophical moderation, especially in the Muslim world. Championing freedom can be a crucial contribution here. As the distinguished scholar of Islam, Bernard Lewis said, “The war against terrorism and the quest for freedom are inseparably linked. Neither can succeed without each other.”

That is why President Bush outlined what is called the “Forward Strategy for Freedom in the Middle East.” As he put it, as long as freedom does not flourish in the Middle East, the result will remain a period of stagnation, resentments, and violence ready for export. President Bush does not have the view of a particular governmental structure that suits every person or every society. But he does believe that the aspirations for freedom can be inherited by people everywhere. The societies that are better satisfied are those with hope, stability, creativity, and prosperity.

President Bush often speaks of the sources of the liberal impulse, the God-given desire for personal freedom. But he does not believe in cookie-cutter answers for these complex questions in developing countries. President Bush champions freedom without violating the precepts of Burke. We know from experience that some of the world’s most grave problems can be solved by giving people guidance that allows them to live freely. This has been proven by the development of diverse democratic institutions in the republics of the Soviet empire represented here.

Iraq

The political developments in your countries demonstrate how democracies induce peace and how they can create states that become stronger, safer, and more prosperous. Iraqis are becoming active in run ning their own ministries and government and demonstrating how democracies induce peace and prosperity to their people and do not threaten its neighbors or others.

Handing over sovereign authority to Iraqis involves more than just telling Iraqis to become active in running their own ministries and getting work completed in the Iraqi Governing Council. The Intermediate Constitution in Iraq is the fruit of impressive political skills and of the art of compromise by the Iraqi Governing Council. T. Prime Minister T. Prime Minister Paul Bremer has moved forward to manage their Oil Ministry and other key national ministries, and Iraqis are doing good through over 250 local governing councils.

Mногие из нас в администрации Рейгана думали, что основной Холодной Войны главная борьба за свободу, жизнь и свободные гражданские права США и наших союзников. Мы выиграли Холодную Войну, избавившись от злодея Второй Мировой Войны, что уже является главным стратегическим достижением, благодаря которому мир стал более комфортным местом. Но мы находим, что наши жертвы жертв мира уже и не погибли. В отличие от гражданской войны в Афганистане, где война ведется за свободу и безопасность находится под серьезной угрозой сно ва; сейчас она исходит от другого источника - в ос новном от Аль-Каиды, ее сети Т. Группа и ее государственные и негосударственные спонсоры. Помощь в получении свободы другими была мощным элементом нашей стратегии по достижению победы в Холодной Войне. А сегодня это служит мощным элементом нашей стратегии по достижению победы в войне с Т. Отдельные американские политики говорят, что для нас слова “способствовать демократии” означают создание в других странах систем правительств, которые были бы похожи на кон ституционную систему США. Но это не так. Британский политический философ 18 века Адам Берк дает нам некоторые полезные указания относительно продвижения за границу свободы и демократических институтов. Берк писал это в то время, когда Французская революция проходила по всей Европе. Он предупреждал, что успешные политические институты должны базироваться на органических связях между местным населением и культурой. Нужно уважать различия в обществах, которые в течении веков научились жить определенным образом. Но мы находим, что эти различия подчеркивают величину проблемы по приношению импульса демократического развития в указанных обществах.

Соседние администрации США стремились укрепить свободу за рубежом по целому ряду насущных проблем. Но мы находим, что эти различия подчеркивают величину проблемы по приношению импульса демократического развития в указанных обществах.

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Президент Буш говорит об источниках либерального импульса, Богом данного стремления к личной свободе. Но он не верит в игрушечные ответы на сложные вопросы в развивающихся странах. Президент Буш стремится развивать свободу без противоречия возникшему Берк. Мы знаем из опыта, что отдельные накорененные мировые проблемы могут быть разрешены путем выдачи людям полезных рекомендаций, которые позволят им жить свободно. Это подтверждается развитием разнообразных демократических институтов в республиках бывшей Советской империи, представленных здесь.

Ирак

Развитие политической ситуации в ваших странах демонстрирует, как демократия способствует миру, созданию более сильных, безопасных и процветающих государств, которые не угрожают своим соседям. Того же мы хотим достичь и в Ираке. Стратегическая цель Америки — создать на Ближнем Востоке условия для свободы, которую ценит любой человек и любое общество. Но он не верит в игрушечные ответы на сложные вопросы в развивающихся странах. Президент Буш стремится развивать свободу без противоречия возникшему Берк. Мы знаем из опыта, что отдельные накорененные мировые проблемы могут быть разрешены путем выдачи людям полезных рекомендаций, которые позволят им жить свободно. Это подтверждается развитием разнообразных демократических институтов в республиках бывшей Советской империи, представленных здесь.

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The security situation in Iraq poses a number of serious problems now, as you all know from the newspapers. We intend to proceed with the political reconstruction of Iraq and the turnover of sovereign authority on July 1, 2004, because that can help to improve security in the country. The coalition will not be abandoning Iraq on July 1. On the contrary, the Interim Constitution stipulates that coalition forces remain to help provide security, not only in Iraq but also in the Coalition forces after July 1. The coalition will be pleased to withdraw its forces from Iraq when Iraqi security forces (police, civil defense, the army, and other elements) are ready to handle the remaining security challenges.

The coalition is working to improve the skills, leadership, and equipment of Iraq's new security forces. It will take some time, but it is a crucial mission, and the Iraqis want to be in a position where they can provide for their own security. As President Bush has recently reaffirmed, the United States will see our mission through in Iraq. Success there will contribute importantly to our success in the war on terrorism. The stakes there are high.

First, develop flexibility to contend with uncertainty, since we do not know where and what future military operations might be. We no longer assume that forces will fight where they are based. Accordingly, we are trying to achieve the following:

1. To get agile forces that are easily deployable to help prevent problems from becoming crises.
2. To convince our allies to adopt global, not regional, perspectives regarding the use of force.
3. To have new technologies, new doctrines, new tactics, and relatively small forces to achieve a military result that previously required a far larger force.

The countries represented in this room, and especially the new NATO allies, will play an important role in this aspect of the transformation. Most of your countries are very active in the war on terrorism. Your support to coalition operations in the war is highly valued. Over fifty nations are supporting the anti-terrorism and humanitarian relief operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. It should come as no surprise to anyone that countries that so recently gained their own freedom are at the forefront of the effort to help the Afghan and Iraqi people achieve freedom for themselves.

U.S. Defense Policy

As soon as President Bush came into office, he asked Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld what changes we should make for the United States to properly perform its military missions in the decades ahead. The name given to this task is transformation. The United States, in the 1990s, created the Defense Department to boldly remake itself by changing the way we equip our forces, the way we use them for combat and stability operations, the way we position them around the world, the way we work with our allies and partners, and the way we conduct procurement and other business activities. Some people think of transformation narrowly, as a matter of using new technologies to produce better weapons, but the concept is more comprehensive. A key facet is realigning our global defense posture—the updating of the types, locations, numbers, and capabilities of our military forces, and the nature of our alliances. As the president stated, ‘A fully trained and strengthened military forces posture will underscore the commitment of the United States to collective action and the common cause of peace and liberty.'
Expert's Opinion

Michael IGNATIEFF,
Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, Harvard

I know what you are thinking. You are thinking that it is a really boring topic. Well, let's try to make it less boring by talking about one human right, the most explosive and controversial of the human rights: the right to self-determination. And let's talk about one place, northern Iraq, or as some people would call it, Kurdistan.

One of the crucial questions in Iraq, and in that whole region, is what to do about the self-determination of the Kurds, the largest ethnic minority in the world that does not have a state of its own, and that has millions of citizens in Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Iraq.

The problem is very simple: How do you reconcile the territorial integrity of four states with the desire for Kurdish self-determination present at least since the nineteenth century, but particularly after the First World War—the desire of the Kurdish people who have the characteristics of a common language, common culture, and who sharply differentiate themselves from the Arabs in southern Iraq, from the Turks to the north, from the Iranians to the east, and from the Syrians. Although they live among these people, they feel differences: linguistic, cultural, and historical. How do you reconcile their desire to have a state-to-rule themselves—with the territorial integrity of four great peoples, some of whom are represented in this room?

It is a question of the whole region. It is a controversial subject, especially in Turkey where I just spent some time. Let me give you an example of how controversial this issue is. As I was crossing the border from Turkey into northern Iraq two weeks ago, I had in my files a set of e-mails, whose subject was Kurdistan. The very presence of the word 'Kurdistan' in these papers meant that it was crossing the border from Turkey into northern Iraq, from the Turks to the north, from the Iranians to the east, and from the Syrians. Although they live among these people, they feel differences: linguistic, cultural, and historical. How do you reconcile their desire to have a state-to-rule themselves—with the territorial integrity of four great peoples, some of whom are represented in this room?

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So, what will work in Iraq? An American model? A Canadian model? Some other model? What is possible? What are the aspirations of the Kurdish political leadership? I have been to the Kurdish regions of Turkey and northern Iraq twice. In 1993, I spent a month there. Two weeks ago, I was there for ten days. Let me say that I am not an expert. What I can do is just report what I saw.

What I saw this time is that under the no-fly zone of the last ten years, there are more highways than ever, there is more money than ever, there is more construction than ever, and there is better governance in northern Iraq than ever before. So at a time when most people say that the U.S. policy is failing throughout the region, I want to draw your attention to the fact that there are 5 to 6 million people—namely, the Kurds in northern Iraq—who remain the main supporters of the coalition efforts in Iraq for the very simple reason that their life is better than it was eleven years ago, clearly better. This is not to say they want to have a permanent U.S. military presence in the region. They say: “Thank you, now go home.” But they know their life is better.

Since they have benefited, does this accelerate their desire to rule themselves apart from Iraq? For eleven years, they were ruling themselves apart from Iraq. The Kurds and other groups in the region are afraid precisely because the Kurds in northern Iraq have been successful for eleven years. These Kurds think, “Why do we need these Arabs to the south?” And there is genuine suspicion between the two communities.

What does the Kurdish leadership say? You know that the Kurdish leadership is divided. There is the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) with control of Kirkuk, Zakho, and a part of the Erbil area, and there is the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) with control of Suleimaniya and the Iranian border area. So power-sharing exists between these two Kurdish groups who have fought and killed each other. The Kurds and the Turks were a part of the solution that mediated that conflict. What do these leaders want? Do they have a common approach?

I think there is no doubt that Kurds are more interested in self-rule than shared rule, and the referendum in the Kurdish area has confirmed this. Put another way, they want independence. There is no question about that. The Turks estimate the Kurds’ political leaders want autonomy but they want independence.

But what you want and what you can get are two different things. The Kurds had lived in this region for a long time; their political leadership is very mature. The Kurds had lived in this region for a very long time; their political leadership is very mature.

They have been gassed by the Iraqis, they have been fought by Turkish forces, they have been pushed around by the Iranians, they got a cold shoulder from the Syrians, and they have been told by the Americans that independence is not in the cards. So they have been forced, in my judgment, by external pressures of a consistent kind to conclude that federalism, for the moment, is the limit of their political aspirations.

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The second problem is Kirkuk. As you know, the emotional capital of Kurdistan in northern Iraq happens to be the city of Kirkuk. Like the emotional capital of Israel is Jerusalem, Kirkuk is Jerusalem in this story. All Jerusalems are nightmares, and Kirkuk is no different. Nobody knows who has the ethnic majority in Kirkuk. It may actually turn out to be the Turkmen. In other words, Kirkuk is not just Kurds and Arabs. On the contrary, it probably has the largest Kurdish population in the region. A further complication: the Arabs in Kirkuk were brought there by Saddam. Often the victims were Kurds who were forced from their homes.

This is what we call, in human rights language, “a guilty minority” in Kirkuk—the guilty minority of Saddam loyalists who profited from the expulsion of the Kurds. The Kurds hatred of these Arabs is very strong. The possibility of violence here is very strong. One absolute guarantee of that violence, if you are working there with human rights mission, is the designation of anybody as a guilty minority. An example of this is the designation of the Serbs in Kosovo as a “guilty minority.” The designation of a population as guilty collectively of some crime is a prelude to ethnic cleansing. I told this to the Kurds I met. I like these people, but if you start designating the Saddam loyalists as a “guilty minority,” the people will start sweeping them out. That is a second lever for civil war.

There is a solution to this, as there are solutions to all these problems, which is a referendum in Kirkuk about its future: whether it will be a part of a Kurdish region or not. A revenue-sharing agreement might be an option. Some Kurdish leaders say, “We’d rather have the city than the oil.” Give the oil to the Iraqi state as long as we keep the city.” That is a trade-off too. Whatever. Nobody can have the city and the oil. So there are solutions, but the longer it takes to get a solution, the more it will be a signal for civil war.

So, I’m going to stop here. Basically, I’ve said three things:
1. The Kurdish leadership has made, I think, a historic decision to combine self-rule with shared rule in Iraq institutions.
2. If Iraq collapses, it would give legitimate footing to a claim of Kurdish statehood. But the way to be a better state is to be a good citizen, in my judgment. But all of these political judgments depend on the security situation. If the security situation cannot be stabilized in the south, I think the Kurds will be driven to exit. If the Kirkuk issue is not be stabilized, I think this will drive them to the exit.

Вторая проблема — это Киркук — “эмоциональная” столица Курдистана. Здесь можно провести параллель с тем, что является Иерусалимом для Палестины и Израиля. Все “иерусалимы” — это кошмар, Киркук — не исключение. Это является этническим большинством в Киркуке? Туркмены. Иначе говоря, в городе имеется не только турецко-армянское, но и туркменское население. Но с другой стороны, в Киркуке также имеется, например, самое многочисле- нное курдское большинство в регионе. Все это осложняется тем, что курды в Киркуке были сложены Саддамом. Часто жертвы были курды, которы- х выгоняли из их домов. В Киркуке мы имеем то, что в гуманитарном праве называется “виновным меньшинством” (guilty minority). Таковым его сделали сторонники Садда- ма, которые получали дивиденды от вытеснения курдов. Ненависть курдов к этим арабам очень сильна. Поэтому, вероятность насилия здесь очень велика. Причем, те, кто работает в сфере гумани- нарного права, знают, что абсолютной гарантией насилия является “назначение” кого-либо “виновным меньшинством”. К примеру, сербы в Косово. Коллективная ответственность за что-то преступление явилось препятствием для этнических чисток. Я говорил это курдам. Я люблю этих людей. Но если у этих людей в сознании перевесит ярлык “виновного меньшинства”, то они начнут выгонять арабов. Вот вторая предпосылка для гражданской войны.

Реальным решением мог бы стать референдум в Киркуке о его будущем: остается ли он частью Курдского региона или нет? Другим вариантом может быть соглашение о распределении доходов. Не- которые курдские лидеры говорят: нам лучше город, чем нефть. Отдать нефть Ираку, а нам город. Эта также компромисс. Что никто не сможет иметь одновременно, так это и нефть, и города. Мы ви- дим, что решение есть, но чем дальше их будут вы- бирать, тем выше вероятность гражданской войны. Подведем итог. Моим основными тезисами были следующие:
1. Курдское руководство приняло историческое решение скомбинировать самоуправление и раздельное управление в иракских структурах.
2. В случае развала Ирака появляется реальное решение о самостоятельности Курдского государства. Но хорошее государство — это хорошие граждане. Поэтому подобные политические прогнозы будут зависеть от обстоятельств без- опасности. Если оно не будет стабилизировано на юго, то курды начнут тянуть к выходу. Если вопрос Киркука не будет стабилизирован, то курдским он тоже вряд ли станет.

Итак, теоретически можно объединить самоуправ- ление и раздельное управление. В мировой практике такое было много раз: в Йоханнесбургской, Щелковой ирландской, Щелковой ирландской, Щелковой ирландской, Щелковой ирландской, Щелковой ирландской, Щелковой ирландской, Щелковой ирландской, Щелковой ирландской, Щелковой ирландской, Щелковой ирландской, Щелковой ирландской, Щелковой ирландской.
Expanding the Borders of Europe to the Black Sea Region

This is an exciting and challenging time as Europe continues to rethink and redefine its boundaries and its identity. We have just seen the second round of NATO enlargement, bringing in seven new members, and the European Union (EU) is about to expand to include ten more countries. Only fifteen years ago, most of these countries were locked behind the iron curtain, either as Soviet satellites or captive nations. The United States, NATO, and the EU have played crucial and complementary roles in these countries’ transformation and integration into the Euro-Atlantic community.

NATO and the EU will continue to be the core vehicles for defining European identity. The United States and its allies have transformed NATO’s mission from defense of common territory against the Warsaw Pact to a defense of common interests and common ideals—from preventing aggression in Europe to promoting freedom, extending the reach of liberty, and deepening peace beyond the alliance’s traditional areas of operation.

The EU has transformed itself from a primarily economic union concerned with becoming a single national market to a unique supranational body with geopolitical aspirations and an incipient foreign and security policy. It has become an increasingly valuable partner for the market to a unique supranational body with geopolitical economic union concerned with becoming a single national alliance’s traditional areas of operation.

Aggression in Europe to Promoting Freedom, Extend...
The EU is developing a ‘New Neighborhood Instrument’ to offer ‘Wider Europe’ status to countries on the enlarged EU borders that are not current candidates for accession, including Ukraine and Moldova. We strongly support the request of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan to the EU for expansion of the ‘Wider Europe’ program to the South Caucasus. ‘Wider Europe’ status offers those countries that have demonstrated a commitment to political and economic reform the prospect of a stake in the EU’s internal market.

Building Cooperation, Trust, and Credibility

The ability to cooperate on a regional basis is a critical first step in demonstrating the readiness of countries in the Black Sea region to participate as full partners in the Euro-Atlantic community. We have seen a good start with new institutions under the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) framework and renewed bilateral relationships that have begun to build bridges in the region. These developments have uncovered the vast potential for cooperation on economic, transportation, energy, and environmental issues. As one of the architects of this emerging infrastructure and as the host to the BSEC Secretariat, Turkey has a key role to play in this process.

Regional institutions such as BSEC, the Black Sea Council, and the GUAM provide important opportunities for countries to begin to build trust. Cooperation in regional forums, however, must also be complemented with healthy and open bilateral relationships.

Unresolved conflicts are impediments to true integration with Europe. It is essential to reach resolution on the unsettled conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh, in the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in the Moldovan region of Transnistria, in Chechnya, and in Cyprus. Although politically difficult, Armenia and Turkey need to come to terms with their painful shared history.

Russia also has an interest in greater regional cooperation. Many of these conflicts lie on its doorstep. President Vladimir Putin told a BSEC forum, ‘It is important that the region’s states are ready to act jointly against new challenges and threats to work with our Russian partners to meet these challenges and to promote relationships within the Black Sea region that enhance stability and security.

U.S. Interests and Regional Engagement: Terrorism, Drugs, and Crime

The growing sophistication of terrorists and organized criminals in the Black Sea region requires us to work toward greater cooperation among governments and increased assistance. The United States is increasing its assistance for interdiction and eradication of narcotics, particularly the huge amount of Afghan heroin. By some estimates, the poppy crop in Afghanistan accounts for as much as 60 percent of that country’s current GDP.

We are also supporting regional law enforcement cooperation efforts, such as the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) Center in Bucharest for the countries of Southeast Europe, as well as the GUM and Central Asian centers being put together through GUAM and the United Nations Drugs Control Program (UNDCP). We encourage these groups to link with each other. These kinds of regional cooperation efforts can help combat highly organized criminal activity such as terrorism, trafficking of persons, large-scale smuggling that deprives governments of needed revenues, and narcotics.

Regional cooperation efforts can also benefit from the capabilities of customs and border police through training and the provision of equipment; introducing better technology, such as passport readers, travel documents that are counterfeit-resistant, and United Nations Drug Control Program. We also have seen that criminals and terrorists are not standing still in their attempts to thwart our law enforcement efforts. Our efforts will have to greatly increase if you are to contain these threats.

We also have to address the poverty that is often the root cause of terrorism. In addition, we have to more effectively address the myths that feed terrorism, including the lie that the United States is anti-Islam.

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HARVARD BLACK SEA SECURITY PROGRAM – 2004 ГАРДАРДСКАЯ ПРОГРАММА ЧЕРНОМОРСКОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ – 2004

EXPERT’S OPINION МНЕНИЕ ЭКСПЕРТА
Energy

We have made significant headway in creating an east-west energy corridor from the Caspian to the Mediterranean. We have strongly supported efforts to build multiple pipelines to strengthen the sovereignty and economic viability of the new nation states in the region and to allow the Caspian Basin to contribute new energy supplies to the world market on commercial terms.

The United States has been closely involved from the beginning in shaping the concept of this energy corridor and then helping it come to reality through the construction, now underway, of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, due to begin first shipments in early 2005. Through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the United States is also participating in the broad financing and insurance package that is covering 70 percent of the cost of this $3.6 billion project. We have helped governments in their efforts to ensure pipeline security.

We have also supported the imminent construction of the parallel South Caucasus natural gas pipeline, which will ship cost-competitive Azerbaijani gas into Turkey, from where it will be able to reach European markets.

Security

NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) Program played a crucial role in preparing countries for membership in the NATO alliance and preparing many others to participate with NATO in peacekeeping and peace-support operations from the Balkans to Afghanistan and Iraq. The United States is proposing that PfP now return to its roots: transparency in defense planning, democratic control of defense forces, and capability and readiness to contribute to NATO operations. PfP’s focus should be on the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus.

Since September 11, 2001, the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus have been very helpful in the war against terrorism and in supporting the United States’ Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and NATO’s International Security Force (ISAF) operations in Afghanistan. The militaries of Central Asia and the Caucasus, however, are in general poorly trained, led, and equipped, and their governments are weakened by the lack of democratic and market reforms. These countries also lack adequate resources and expertise to make full use of PfP and to engage NATO effectively.

Given the increased importance of Central Asia and the Caucasus as frontline states in the war against ter-
rorism, NATO needs to do more to reach out to them through PfP. For example, the United States is urging allies to accept the idea of establishing NATO liaison offices in these two regions. Such offices would promote better regional understanding of NATO as well as greater participation by these states in PfP activities.

Conclusion

These are extraordinary times in the Black Sea region. NATO allies now sit on the southern and western shores of the Black Sea, and the alliance maintains robust relationships with all nations in the region. The Rose Revolution in Georgia, the generational changes in leadership in Georgia and Azerbaijan, and other events all signal the possibility of a new chapter for this region and its role in a “Wider Europe.” The political risks are great in transforming this region and taking the steps necessary for real integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. But the greater danger is doing nothing and risk being left behind.

For PfP to leave the Black Sea region behind would be a grave mistake. But to act without an understanding of the region’s political and security dynamics risks squandering the progress already made.

Заключение

Для ЧР наступили чрезвычайно важные времена. Члены НАТО уже находятся на южном и западном берегах Чёрного моря, и Альянс активно развивает отношения со всеми странами ЧР. “Революция роз” в Грузии, общая смена режимов в Грузии и Азербайджане, а также другие события - всё это показатели возможности открыть новую страницу в ЧР и усилить его роль в Расширенной Европе. Политические риски при трансформации ЧР и его интеграции в ЕАС являются значительными. Но ещё больше возрастут угрозы, если не делать ничего и не замечать эти риски.
EXPERT'S OPINION
МНЕНИЕ ЭКСПЕРТА

I am here today to thank you for your contribution, for what you are doing for peace and stability in your part of the world. We in the US have to take advantage of that and need to understand that. You are the members of one team and I am proud of it.

One of the reasons I decided to come and talk to you this morning is a personal one. I believe very strongly that the area you come from is strategically relevant to the present and future of not just the United States, not just NATO, but civilisation as we know it. So your group is very important. I want the United States, not just NATO, but civilization as we know it to work together in the years ahead. And the Black Sea region is strategically relevant in a stable Europe and in the war on terror. You are playing an important role, and you must play an important role in the future.

In my presentation, I want to share with you my thoughts on the processes from ten years ago about the direction we need to go now. That is the foundation for the new NATO and for what I call the new Europe. And I hope you will understand the rationale behind where General Jones, as the new NATO SACEUR, is going.

I have spent twenty-two years outside of the United States, including eighteen years in Europe. When I came back after the fall of Berlin Wall and the Cold War in 1989, when I was a corps commander speaking fluent German and spending all this time in Europe, the US Army in all its wisdom promoted me to four-star general and sent me to Panama (laughter). It was very important, because when I was there in 1990.

When I came back to Europe in 1993 as the SACEUR, my assessment was this: We have a great Europe in transition. Today, these words apply, by the way, to Iraq or Afghanistan. And I thought stability was absolutely critical, not only because only with it can you have progress in your economic life, in the dignity of individuals. And I saw the ways toward stability and democracy. But the challenge here was as follows: As we move toward democracy, what organization is most important in this equation? In my assessment, it is the militaries in your countries.

That is why I wanted to have this interaction with the officers of your countries. I have been bound to you all seven years with a headquarters in Constanta, Romania with integrated command structure, ready to deploys and we do not understand that in the United States.

Who here could tell me what the motto of SEEBRIG is? "One team, one mission." That is what I said to NATO in 1994. And you are one team: you are a very important part of that team.

NATO is not less relevant today than before. There are those in the US who say NATO is irrelevant, that it cannot wage even modest warfare without the United States. Nonsense. NATO is as relevant today as it was in the past, but it has been transforming (long before the United States) its structure and capability at between nations, at nineteen nations, and soon at twenty-six nations.

NATO can and must play a role in the global war on terror, and many of your countries are participating with us in that war right now. You have to understand that this is a war against not just for the United States, but also for civilisation as we know it. We must be smart enough to really assemble not just the political and diplomatic capacity, but also the military capability to work together in the years ahead. And the Black Sea region is strategically relevant in a stable Europe and in the war on terror. You are playing an important role, and you must play an important role in the future.

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NATO can and must play a role in the global war on terror, and many of your countries are participating
of fissile materials that was going on throughout Europe. I saw that as a danger. So my concern here was: How can we refocus this new NATO for the new missions of the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century?

You all know, I believe, that the highest form of emergency in NATO is Article 5. Before 9/11, there had never been Article 5 declaration in NATO. On September 12, 2001, for the first time in its history, NATO invoked Article 5 because of the war on terror. And I will expand on that a little bit more, but I felt in 1994 that if we could have the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Program, if we could develop trust and confidence with the former republics of the USSR, could that help prevent or deter an Article 5 declaration? I would say yes. If we could form combined joint task forces to be able to respond to a crisis before it became a conflict, could that prevent or deter an Article 5 declaration? I would say yes. And if it could counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), would that prevent or deter an Article 5 declaration? I would say ‘yes’.

So this is what I gave to the major subordinate commanders and the North Atlantic Council in March 1994 as my interpretation of what was needed in this new NATO. And this was the instruction I received from the high guys’ summit in January 1994, where all the heads of states were meeting. And they approved PfP as well as the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF).

I took it to another level. I combined the two projects together. I said if we could train partners so that they could have the same doctrine, standards, and techniques as NATO, that would help us to do missions together, because the January Communiqué said that the partners would do missions together, like peacekeeping, humanitarian, or other missions, but beyond that. We do not have to station forces, just do the tasks of operations together. That was the driving point for what we needed to do in NATO, and that was what I felt later on in the US European Command (EUCOM) as a niche to underpin and support. That was not easy for me, because many EUCOM officers were thinking narrowly—we were there to do two major theater wars, and that was it. But the majority of my great commanders understood the importance of that niche, and we had joint task forces of various nations that could deploy rapidly throughout the entire theater. This was the vision in 1994. It is taking place right now. You-your countries—are a vital part of this. I wanted to show you that it is critically important to go forward together.

There are the North African and Mediterranean initiatives also going on. Can we extend this PfP concept of joint forces, military-to-military primarily, to the northern part of Africa, in the north of the Mediterranean?

In 1994, I started the so-called Mediterranean Dialogue. It included Morocco, Egypt, all the way to Israel, Jordan, and that whole littoral region. A great opportunity—not just to station forces, but to share those common values and ideas. Your generation will have to determine whether all of this will be a success or not.

The US should also think: how can we improve interoperability? The force structure in Bosnia comprised 36 nations under three multinational divisions: one French, one British, and one American. Those 36 nations under my command worked together, deployed 60,000 troops (including airborne troops from Russia) in a winter campaign in the worst terrain in Europe over forty-five days. That is what NATO can do. And what nations did we have with us? The PfP nations, NATO, Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, and others.

A NATO country that was extremely important was Turkey. It provided a great plus for us in working with the new countries. In general, Turkey is very, very important in the Trans-Caucasus.

What was a trial for me was when I had Greece and Turkey contribute forces for the Implementation mon values and ideals. If we do, that makes for a tremendous opportunity for us.

My friends in the US think we got into Afghanistan because somehow all of a sudden it had this great love for the United States. We got into Uzbekistan because it was a member of PfP since 1996. We do not understand that. And we must understand it. We must understand that PfP goes all the way to the Chinese border. Something that we must understand in my command was that, in order to leverage, but to work with, them to share common values and ideals.

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For the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia. These countries were also a part of SEEBRIG. And my goal was to make them work closer together and to develop the trust and confidence between them.

The new SACEUR is very much interested in this, and is looking beyond. He also has another program that I started back in the early 1990s, which many of you are aware of, that was known as the out of area Agreements, but the ministers are not. And that is the State-to-State Partnership Program (SSPP). For example, the country Georgia is aligned with the US state of Georgia, Poland is aligned with Illinois, the Czech Republic is aligned with Texas, Ukraine is aligned with California, and so on. Nearly 35 states of the US are aligned with counties in Europe. These ties include governors’ visits, business people’s visits, and national guardsmen and reservists’ visits. That has been going on for ten years. That is a part of the engagement strategy, which is good both now and in the future. I assure you that General Jones supports this.

So where does that lead us? What is General Jones doing now in Afghanistan? In part, he is trying to demonstrate NATO’s continued relevance. Same with Iraq. There is no issue with NATO with regard to terrorism. And so NATO is in Kabul now with its command and control structure, and it is demonstrating its relevance to global security and the war on terrorists. They are having difficult time meeting the force requirements within NATO, but they are meeting them. There was an attempt to move beyond Kabul, and there is an operation going on. Can NATO move out of Kabul to the wider countryside? The answer, I think, is yes it can. And it is now trying to generate the force to do that. This will spread NATO beyond Kabul and the wider countryside very soon.

NATO’s need to transform its military is one of the extremely serious issues. The Prague Summit of 2002 reinforced the need to transform the military, including the alliance’s ground surveillance, precision, striking, replenishing, and strategic airlift capabilities. NATO is taking steps to do this. I think it will happen at the Istanbul Summit in June. It is extremely important that NATO makes those decisions.

16. The NATO command structure today has three commands. You know about regional commands: North and South. This will be changed to three joint task force commands: North, South, and the third one will be in Lisbon. And the ‘Allied Command Transformation’ (Allied Command Operations). The SACEUR now has the responsibility for land, sea, and air operations for the entire area. An admiral in Norfolk, Virginia commands the Allied Command Transformation. And he is working very hard to get new capabilities so they can match the requirements of the 21st century. So this new organization builds on the foundation from ten years ago that I talked about. It keeps evolving.

For those who think that the US is going to pull out of Europe, they are wrong. After the Berlin Wall came down we went down to 320,000 US forces in Europe. Then we came back in 1993-1994, we went from 320,000 to 100,000 troops. We may go from 100,000 to even less than that, and we may relocate some of those forces throughout Europe due to the new concept called “Styker Brigade.” So we are not just diminishing the forces; we are transforming and modernizing them. We may change the structure because of the situation, but not our commitment toward Europe.

Concerning the question from a Georgian representative: What is old Europe and what is new? That question is nonsense. Nothing divides us. We are one Europe. What we share in 64 nations of the PfP are our common values and ideas. That is not only tanks, ships, and planes. Our real strength is not in guns alone, but in the shared ideas what we are fighting for. When you understand what democracy is, freedom and a better life for your people – it may take five years or fifty years. But it is worth defending. As General Jones said, and indeed, I am not going about old Europe and new Europe. I think Europe has a clear role to play, to the Ursals and all the way across the Ursals. Together, we can be wonderful war fighters, but we have to understand what we are fighting for. It is not just for our homeland. It is trying to understand whether we can create a better life based on shared values and ideas is extremely difficult only to show in the plans of the requirements, but with naries simplified. They battleovsky waits for us to carry them into the Kulkan. And I am sure, this is very soon. The cooperation between NATO and our countries is still not as close as it should be.

The NATO in transformation – one of the extremely important issues. The Prague Summit of 2002 reinforced the need to transform the military, including the alliance’s command structure, precision, striking, replenishing, and strategic airlift capabilities. NATO is taking steps to do this. I think it will happen at the Istanbul Summit in June. It is extremely important that NATO makes those decisions.

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The Middle East Conflict

Bлижневосточный конфликт

This conflict for you might be a relief as you are not doing so bad in the Black Sea region. So why is the Middle East conflict so hard? Why has it been going on for so long?

One of the German political scientists said about the Middle East region: “There is too much history by too little history.” That is a problem, and the real problem is how could you put two states into an area that is only fifty miles wide? As you have come from relatively huge countries, you can understand this is a small area. This problem of lack of geography and too much history aggravates the overall problem even more.

Each side can call on history as its advocate. Israelis can say: “This problem is not about the 1960s, the Six Day War, and the winning of the West Bank and Gaza. It goes back to the days Israel was born in 1948. The very day it was born, it was attacked by five Arab countries, long before the West Bank issue even existed. The problem is not the West Bank and Gaza, but really a kind of Arab rejectionism of Israel’s very right to exist.”

The Arabs would point to the decisions of the Arab League Initiative (although it gathered for the first time in 2002, which is fifty-four years after Israel was born). However, as the Arab states have come together for a peace initiative, they would point to the Islamist-Hamas and Islamic Jihad-who have not accepted the idea of a Jewish state larger than the size of Tel Aviv. They will point to the history saying that the problem is not the West Bank and Gaza. The problem is much deeper. It is the very existence of Israel that is not accepted. The Palestinian side would say the problem was born in the year of occupation in 1967.

So, why does the world care, why is this problem taking so long to solve? These two peoples share similar language. They do not share a similar religion, they argue about religious sites, and they don’t even think of the other religious history. For example, the area called al-Aqsa Mosque in the heart of Jerusalem had two Jewish temples at the very same place before the existence of Islam. When you ask Yassir Arafat about it, he does not know they even exist, but historians, would say they did. So, in fact, they do not share any sense of common destiny or common past. And Israelis, frankly, are even less aware of some of their religious sensitivities.

David MAKOVSKY, Director of the Project on America, Israel, and the Peace Process, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy

The Middle East Conflict

МНЕНИЕ ЭКСПЕРТА

Вопрос можно сложнее относиться к этому конфликту, т.к. дала в нашем Черноморском регионе (ЧР) обстоять не так плохо. Но вам на- верняка интересно узнать, чем так сложен конфликт на Ближнем Восто- ке (БВ)? Почему он длился так долго?

Один немецкий ученый сказал о БВ конфликте: “Здесь так много истории, но так мало земли.” И действительно, как разместить два государства на территории в 100 км шириной? Вы живете в относительно крупных странах и поймете, насколько это маленькая площадь. Именно проблема малой географии и крупной истории еще более накаляет проблему. Каждая сторона конфликта вспоминает о дважды. Израиль говорит: “Проблема не в 1960-х гг. и не в 6-дневной войне с захватом Западного берега и сектора Газа. Проблема появилась в день зарождения Израиля в 1948 г.” Именно в день его появления на него напали 5 арабских стран, задолго до того, как возникла проблема Западного берега. Да и проблема-то заключается не в Западном береге и Газе, а в отвержении арабами самого права на существование Израиля.”

Арабы же препятствуют решения Инициативы Арабской Лиги, хотя она впервые собралась в 2002 г., т.е. почти 54 года спустя после появления Израиля. Однако, арабы в государстве Израиля в 1948 г. береми в городе его появления на него напали 5 арабских стран, задолго до того, как возникла проблема Западного берега. Да и проблема-то заключается не в Западном береге и Газе, а в отвержении арабами самого права на существование Израиля”.

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EXPERT'S OPINION

Site. People forget this. Anyway, the shattering of the partnership has been shattered. You have had violence ever since. Four big riots broke out and it is holy to us too.” And next thing you know, it happened for such a short period that if you try to solve the violence. Then George Tenet had a plan before he was a head of the CIA. And then a guy called Anthony Zinni, who was the head of United States Central Command (CENTCOM), had a plan. And the last one was the Road Map. It is still active. But there is another new version of it. But all four plans have failed. Arafat was a living symbol of the failure of all the security services.” At the same time, President Bush was welcoming him at the White House, there was a ceremony in Aqaba with the King Abdullah of Jordan, there were four different peace plans that people may have forgotten about within last few years. One was named after George Mitchell, who was appointed to try to solve the violence. And George Tenet had a plan before he was a head of the CIA. And then a guy called Anthony Zinni, who was the head of United States Central Command (CENTCOM), had a plan. And the last one was the Road Map. It is still active. But there is another new version of it. But all four plans have failed. Arafat was a living symbol of the failure of all the security services.” At the same time, President Bush was welcoming him at the White House, there was a ceremony in Aqaba with the King Abdullah of

One phenomenon is that there has been violence taking the minds of both sides. There have been 280 suicide-bombing operations, and this had made life hell in Israel. This kind of relentless frequency is combined with an unbelievable proximity. You have a sense of distances, it is like from here to the other side of the street. Arafat, I mean the distance is very tight. Let's say from ten attacks from Bethlehem, nine had been against Jerusalem, just miles away. All the attacks from Matsura in the city of Nablus to the city of Tulkarm were just seven miles away. In total, we had 280 suicide-bombing attempts. You had hundreds of people killed, and it turned people crazy, as with the World Trade Center and the Pentagon attacks on 9/11.

The second phenomenon is that there have been peace plans over the last fifteen years, beginning with the presidency of George Bush Senior. There were four different peace plans that people may have forgotten about within last few years. One was named after George Mitchell, who was appointed to try to solve the violence. Then George Tenet had a plan before he was a head of the CIA. And then a guy called Anthony Zinni, who was the head of United States Central Command (CENTCOM), had a plan. And the last one was the Road Map. It is still active. But there is another new version of it. But all four plans have failed. Arafat was a living symbol of the failure of all the security services.” At the same time, President Bush was welcoming him at the White House, there was a ceremony in Aqaba with the King Abdullah of

HARVARD BLACK SEA SECURITY PROGRAM – 2004

ГАРВАРДСКАЯ ПРОГРАММА ЧЕРНОМОРСКОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ – 2004

HARVARD, APRIL, 2004

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Jordan, a ceremony with President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. It does not matter, Arafat still controls the security forces. And when Mahmoud Abbas, known by his patronymic Abu Mazen, failed, and Abu Mazen gave a speech in a closed session that was printed in a leading newspaper Al Hayat, he said: "Arafat is a sabotage man. There is no chance. The security services are under his control again with little variations but basically under his control as he gives them the money to buy their loyalty."

And then the Europeans who have been supporting him said: no more, that’s it.

But I would argue that the rationale of this two state solution remains, even amid the lack of trust. I believe that among leading Palestinians not all are revolutionaries. One of the mediators told me: “When he cares about history, he can make a compromise. But he cares about history, he can make a compromise that can be written in Arab history.” But the Palestinians do want a state.

The Israelis also have an interest in it, I would say, stopping the two ‘ticking clocks’ that are going off now in the Middle East in the Arab-Israeli arena. One is the ticking clock of suicide bombings, as I mentioned. The second clock is the demographic issue that needs to be looked at.

Israel was established as a Jewish state, and 80 percent of the 1967 border of Israel are Jewish. But if you add the West Bank and Gaza into the mix, and even after adding a million immigrants of the former Soviet Union that came in the 1990s from many countries you come from the Jewish population in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza would be probably a minority by the year 2012, according to demographers. And that might lead to what I call a ‘two-part approach.’ How do you deal with these two clocks?

If you are a prime minister of Israel, whether you are from the right, the center, or the left, you have to defuse both ticking clocks. I think this approach can lead us to a new variant of the Road Map, which seems to me better than the erection of a security fence/disengaging from Gaza plan. To me, those two moves are part of one strategy, which is basically partition without participation.

Otherwise, how do you foresee the post-Arafat era? I have had many military people that came up to me and said: “Why spend a lot of time and money when killing Arafat would make life much easier?” Why should we be waiting for his biological death? I believe as long as Abu Mazen was trying to outflank Arafat, Arafat can outflank the outliers. The Israelis are afraid if they touch Arafat, they would radicalize the situation. There are also many red lights from Washington with U.S. troops in Iraq. America has many troops in Iraq, and we don’t need the Israelis now go for Arafat now. That’s another level, but the Israelis even without his consent do not touch him. But the Palestinians complain about it all the time. And I keep telling them: “You want self-determination, then determine it.” But they have not done it.

My bottom line is this: What I see going on now is a strategy of the Israelis and the Palestinians to not solve, but managing it in a reasonable way until the post-Arafat era. Israelis want to get out of Gaza, set back the demographic clock for a million of Palestinians there. And so there is a broad support for withdrawal from Gaza. Now Mr. Sharon is trying to get that support from his own Likud Party. May 2 will be a historic moment. That, in my view, will create a new baseline for dealing with the West Bank. Likud for the most part is against territorial concessions. Now Sharon is saying: “I’m the guy who started the settlements; this party is not allowing settlers to have a veto over our party’s positions.”

But certainly this is a very historic time, and there have been a lot of controversies after Sharon’s meeting last week with Bush. But certainly it is helping Sharon, especially after his party approval, I think. But between now and May 2, there might be a lot of new players in the Israeli and the Likud Party would be very upset. People in Israel might say, “We have to have new elections.”

There is another part of the strategy (and I have spent a month researching this topic), Where does demographic meet geography in the West Bank? Where do these people live? And I have found something interesting. The idea of the security fence becomes a huge reality now. To me, the more moderate and liberal people in Israel, while the more conservative were working against it because they said, “We have settlers on the other side.” That is the logic of the fence. And therefore, the settlers oppose it. But on the other hand, the overwhelming majority of Israelis (84 percent, and I have never seen such a huge percentage) said: “Build the fence We don’t want suicide bombers coming into our cities.”

You don’t expect Israelis to protect the Israelis against Hamas. On the other hand, Israel has to go after Hamas terrorists, and not just to defend itself against infiltrators. Then there was a new variant of this idea: “Ok, the fence is working, but you build it somewhere else.”

Here is the problem. With the fence being modified, and also with the quiet “fence diplomacy” coming out of the Bush White House to modify the fence, луются на это все время. Я говорю им: “Вы хотите самоопределения, так самоопределение, мне – не то”. Но они ничего не делают.

Подводя итог выступлению, я бы сказал, что нынешняя проблема заключается в том, чтобы управлять арабо-израильским конфликтом. Именно не разрешить конфликт, а управлять им и используя регион в лице Ирака, который находится в нерешенном состоянии. Именно не разрешить конфликт, а управлять им и используя регион в лице Ирака, который находится в нерешенном состоянии. Именно не разрешить конфликт, а управлять им и используя регион в лице Ирака, который находится в нерешенном состоянии. Именно не разрешить конфликт, а управлять им и используя регион в лице Ирака, который находится в нерешенном состоянии. Именно не разрешить конфликт, а управлять им и используя регион в лице Ирака, который находится в нерешенном состоянии.
perestroika the state. 99% (!) of Palestinians with the end of the peace process, there will be no peace. And in a certain way, the fence will be 100% effective, but it could be 95% effective and save lives. At the end of the day, it is a stopgap measure until the post-Arafat era, when everything will be in a different position. If there were no war, there would be no fence.

Therefore, these two ideas of a fence and withdrawal from Gaza together are a part of one strategy that I call “partition without partnership” trying to create the two-state solution when both sides don’t want it. The answer is: “No way. You don’t know Ariel Sharon.”

Some people, even here at Harvard, say that Arafat is a criminal, that he should be tried for war crimes. But with these two ticking sounds going off (a suicide bomber clock and the demographic clock), the Israeli people are forced to say: “Do something, do anything, but find solutions for refugees, and those sorts of things.”

Nicely, even here in the Middle East, saying that Arafat should be tried for war crimes is a contradiction. Given a crisis situation, the only way to square this circle is a fence. And in a certain way, no fence will be 100% effective, but it could be 95% effective and save lives. At the end of the day, it is a stopgap measure until the post-Arafat era, when everything will be in a different position. If there were no war, there would be no fence.

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The Directorate of Intelligence (DIA), which is devoted to analysis of all kinds of intelligence data, from open to clandestine sources;

3. The Directorate of Science and Technology, which works in between the two other directorates and is particularly concerned with technological aspects of intelligence collection.

These three directorates are under the control of the DCI. He decides who will be in charge of these directorates and the personnel promotions for people and decides what basically will be happening in these directorates. For example, in the run up to 9/11 when there was some pressure from the White House on the DCI (and through him on to the DO) to get rid of Osama bin Laden, it was the DCI who made the decisions not to do so.

So the DCI commands the CIA. But that is a small part of intelligence community and a small part of its overall budget. There are also elements of the intelligence community in federal departments:

- The Department of State has the Bureau for Intelligence and Research that is a part of the intelligence community and contributes to intelligence community products;

- The Department of Energy, which has supervisory nuclear laboratories in Los Alamos, Livermore, and so on, is concerned with nuclear matters;

- The Department of Treasury also has a couple of intelligent elements. The Coast Guard recently shifted to a new Department of Homeland Security, but before 9/11 it was under the Treasury. And the Secret Service is still under the Treasury - it deals with protecting the president and fighting counterfeit activities;

- The Defense Intelligence Agency;

- The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI);

- Some structures providing services for final intelligence products are chaired by the DCI and deal largely with U.S. internal security;

- The National Security Agency (NSA), the largest and most expensive single unit in the intelligence community, which conducts communication intercepts, signals intelligence, and produces target reports;

- The National Reconnaissance Organization (NRO), which administers overhead reconnaissance, satellites, and other elements;

- The Defense Mapping Intelligence Agency, which used to be called the Defense Imagery and Mapping Agency; it takes the products the NRO produces from the skies and analyzes them in terms of maps and pictures that are usable;

- The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), a very small counterpart to the CIA; it is organized somewhat the same way as the CIA, it has its own analysts and its own Defense Human Intelligence Service (DHIS) connected to the CIA Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Service;

- The U.S. armed services, each of which has its own intelligence element. Their representatives also sit on the committee that produces finished intelligence products.

Almost all of these organizations are under the control of the Department of Defense. They answer to the Secretary of Defense, and they use his budget and not the budget of the DCI. That may be a good system, though not perfect. I am almost certain that the 9/11 Commission and myself are going to recommend that either more power will be given to the DCI or that there will be somebody called the Director of National Intelligence with actual budgetary authority as well the command authorities over all these Defense Department agencies. Will the Congress do it in the end? I don’t know.

Anyway, this is what we mean when we speak of the U.S. intelligence community. Once again, I emphasize that the United States intelligence community is superb in almost everything it does. It is superb at collecting information in any conditions and in areas of interest to U.S. government. Collection capabilities are stunning in terms of signal intercepts and overhead imagery, as well as in the ability to go beyond that not just to get pictures and intercepts, but also to supplement them with information from human sources. These are people who have been recruited by the clandestine service, who are inside governments or organizations abroad where you are obtaining the information. Open sources contribute what the data is true, and it is detecting and analyzing the information about foreign military forces.

Obviously, it makes mistakes. There is one that has been in the headlines in the last few weeks, which is about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. But what I always say, and military people would probably share my view on this, is that mistakes might happen on one side or on another side, but in preparing for a campaign or preparing forces, you know what the data is true, and it is always better to overestimate than to underestimate. In general, the U.S. intelligence community is terrific at gathering this kind of information. It was not very good at penetrating the secrecy around the Soviet Union and the Soviet satellite forces. Contrary to that, now it gets superb data for military commanders, and it is possible for a commander in the field to really have a practically comprehensive
The problem with international terrorism is one that really began to concern the U.S. government in the 1960s with airline hijackings, mostly hijackings on flights to Cuba. This concern increased in the 1970s when there were a lot of Palestinian terrorist organiza-
tions’ activities outside the Middle East. Again, the concern of the U.S. government in the 1970s, and the even greater concern in the 1990s, led to the abnor-
mal U.S. military presence in the Middle East.

Of course, that was the worst answer of all when the United States had sent marines into Lebanon in the early 1980s in the belief that they would help to stabilize the situation with the civil war there. Instead, they came to be viewed as part of one side rather than impartial. They lost the popularity they had at the beginning. They retreated back to their barracks, and then a suicide bomber came into the barracks in Beirut and killed 240 U.S. Marines. There were simultaneous attacks against the French, who lost about 60 people at the same time.

In the 1980s, there was the Lockerbie case as well as other terrorism cases. Libya was clearly identified, by the communications intelligence mostly taken in Europe, as a sponsor of terrorism in the mentioned case—the case of Pan Am Flight 103 in Lockerbie, Scotland. So in the 1980s, the concern about terrorism became to be something that the intelligence commu-
nity was asked to do. That was not an easy assign-
men. That, of course, was the same result for the United States was weak in its capacity to imagine that the future is different from the past. If you look at predic-
tive materials that have emerged from the community, not just from the CIA but also from the DIA and other elements, they tend to be straight-line extrap-
lations. They were pretty good in analyzing evi-
dence from the past, and then they made straight extrapolations. Still, they are not good at imagining things that might be different, that there might be some break in the pattern. It is a large bureaucratic organization that is not so imaginative. That kind of thinking tends to be done in smaller groups, more individually than collectively. So this is something that the intelligence community has not done well.

In addition, the U.S. intelligence community has not been good at analyzing the consequences of inter-
national events for domestic affairs. When I say this to Dick George Tenet or someone like that, their response is, “We’re not allowed to do that. Our assignment is to analyze things abroad, but we are not permitted to ana-
lyze things in the United States.” In the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations, and until the early begin-
ing of the Clinton administration, there was one thing these administrations had in common. For exam-
ples, they would get a report from the intelligence com-
munity on something the Soviet Navy was doing. They had conditions and areas newly of interest to the gov-
ernment. In a place where the intelligence community has accustomed and developed resources (human resources and so on), knows how to get into the com-
munication system, knows what pictures to take, it is well adapted for intelligence. But in places where the sources are not very good, not adjusted for changes, and not equipped, we see obvious weak-
nesses that were illustrated on 9/11.

The navy was not inclined to respond quickly. This is sim-
ple a weakness in collecting and analyzing information on conditions and areas newly of interest to the gov-
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zom, военными командирами поступала и поступает всесторонняя информация, которая позволяет эф-
ективно защищать весь имеющийся техно-
логический потенциал. И в этом плане и думать, что разведка США является непревзойденной любой другой разведкой мира в истории человечества.

11 сентября продемонстрировали огромные РС. Это было верно названо разведывательным прорывом. И он показал, что в США слабо представили разницу между прошлым и будущем. Если судить по очеви-
дным, прогнозным документам, представленным аме-
риканской разведкой нажаке 11 сентября, то все они имели ненужную тенденцию к экстраполяции. Это в ос-
новном было нагромождение произошедших фактов,
а также прямых экстраполяций. Но в них не так хоро-
шо раскрывались возможные отличия от прошлого, т.е. того, что образчик может претерпеть определен-
ные изменения. И это неудивительно: крупные бюр-
кратические организации вряд ли могут проявлять творчество. Это сверхъярким небольшим группам, ин-
дивидуальными структурами, нежели коллективным. Так что именно это стало одной из недоработок РС.

Кроме того, РС не смогло правильно проранжировать-
вствовать последовательных действий. И когда я го-
ворил о планности ЦРУ Джорджу Бушу или анало-
гичной фигуре, то они отвечали: “Нам это не раз-
решал делать. Ваша задача — анализировать то, что произошло по последней линии, но нам предстои-
ять что-то внутрь США. Это не наше дело.” В ад-
министрациях Кеннеди, Джонсона, Никсона и вича-
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It was created accidentally, as an idea that occurred in the mind of a former head of economic analysis at the State Department. He said, "I could go and pursue people who did this."

The other part of the intelligence community that has the biggest share in thinking about terrorism is the FBI. It was really not important to whom this job was assigned, but it was important that it was in the hands of people in the FBI. And the FBI is represented, as well as the CIA, in the CHD.

There were others who were represented in the CHD. The Office of the Secretary of Defense was represented by an assistant secretary for special operations and low-intensity conflicts (SOLIC). Someone was a deputy assistant secretary, and it was never an important job in the Department of Defense. It was really not important to whom this person reported, but he was present at the meetings at the CHD and at Department of Defense on terrorism.

One of the things we see in retrospect that illustrates the points I made earlier about weaknesses is the inability of the intelligence community to analyze the past. Did the intelligence community ask itself if aircraft might be used as weapons, whether a passenger airliner or a military jet? No. But let’s go back to the marines’ barracks in Beirut. Conceptually, it gave us an example in which an explosive vehicle was used as a weapon. Then you have terrorist hijacking the TWA flight. Then we have a case when terrorists seized the Achille Lauro cruise liner and killed Americans on board. So the seizure of planes is something that becomes characteristic in the 1980s. Then we had another TWA plane blown up by bomb on board, the Pan Am flight blown up over Lockerbie, and another TWA flight blown up. And that is an interesting case because the plane was blown up by a very small bomb placed on board. It went off over the feet of a Japanese wheel, and destroyed the aircraft, but it also turned out to be a test device. The terrorists tested the device that passed screening at the airport.

Then we had terrorist acts on the United States. The first was World Trade Center bombing in February 1993. It was a bomb loaded with TNT that was put underground in the World Trade Center garage. When it blew up, it killed six people, injured a very large number of others, and caused very serious damage. Analyzed afterward, it was clear if the bomb had been designed and placed slightly differently, closer to the basic structure elements of the building, it could have done real turmoil.

This case also helps to illustrate an analytical problem. It was a New York FBI Field Office case. They conducted their investigation the way they always do. They have a done a superb job of investigating the whole thing, but it was the way they looked at the damage to find a fragment of the vehicle for identification. They were able to identify that it belonged to a car rental agency in New Jersey. They also found a guy who rented it. They succeed in opening a trial. And the FBI had done a wonderful job of making sure that the vehicle was not used to pursue the terrorists beyond their field station.

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1998. The United States responded by launching cruise missiles against bin Laden’s training camps in Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan, which was believed to be producing nerve gas.

And then in late 1999, we got a warning that terrorists wanted to blow up an airport. This warning did not just come out of the blue, but because we arrested somebody. Customs officers picked up a guy, an Arab coming across from Canada into the State of Washington. He had a lot of explosives and a map of the Los Angeles International Airport. We thought this was bin Laden. Furthermore, we had more information saying that more than one hijacking of a U.S. airplane was planned, and this group wanted to use it for flying into something.

In early 2000, we detected a meeting in Kuala Lumpur of people, some of whom were connected to the 1998 East African bombings. One of these individuals was actually involved in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. So accidentally, we found out connections between the World Trade Center case, Al Qaida, and this meeting in Kuala Lumpur.

Shortly after that meeting, Al Qaida intended to hit a U.S. destroyer, the U.S.S Sullivan, by blowing it up. Fortunately, it did not happen. But the terrorists changed their plan to carry this out later. Shortly after that, there was an attack on the U.S.S Cole, which killed seventeen sailors.

On September 11, we got a call from the fire department about a fire which had broken out. They found that beside the fire there were explosives and bomb equipment, so they called the police. The police came, and so did the local security service. The latter said: ‘Hey, there is much for the police. The police came, and so did the local security service. The latter said: “Hey, there is much for the police.”

Then you had the National Intelligence Estimate, a product made by the entire intelligence community, which described a new kind of terrorism that we have to be really worried about: not state-sponsored terrorism, but terrorists who do not have a negotiable objective. Part of the theory was that earlier terrorists had the illusion of power, and they were building along that line. And then in late 1999, we got a warning that terrorists wanted to blow up U.S. airliners over the Pacific, which would have killed several thousands of passengers. They also had other plans, including assassinating Pope John Paul II, which came out of a priest: blowing up airliners; and hijacking airliners and flying them into CIA Headquarters, the Eiffel Tower, and other targets.

The American specialists had found explosives, trigger mechanisms (Casio watches), and special igniters, which looked like ordinary glasses. We get the same thing in Minneapolis where the FBI Field Office in Phoenix that said: “We are worried about Middle Easterners who were seeking pilot training in the United States, and it looked like they were not very interested in taking off and landing.” We get the same thing in Minneapolis where the FBI Field Office reported about a Saudi who was also looking for pilot training for big planes like Boeing 747s. Again, he was neither interested in takeoffs or landings, nor in those who were interested.

And then we have 9/11. There was a minimum number of dots because the intelligence community had found the most of these dots, which had prevented many other bad things from happening. Especially, we have to mention the FBI. The FBI was basically concentrated on a whole array of domestic cases. There were bombings going on once a week that were linked to some Arab-American organizations, like the guy linked to the explosion in Oklahoma City. There were many other confusing things. Anyway, when you look back, you will find in the background of 9/11 the fact that the U.S. intelligence community, with its many other pieces of the puzzle, was just not very good at imagining and setting up hypotheses.

If you analyze U.S. opportunities and the consequences of all these actions, you will see that after the second attack on the World Trade Center in 1993, the FBI Office in Phoenix sent a memo to the FBI Headquarters saying: “The FBI was worried about Middle Easterners who were seeking pilot training in the United States, and it looked like they were not very interested in taking off and landing.”

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East African bombings in August of 1998, almost immediately the U.S. government had conclusive evi-
dence that bin Laden had ordered these attacks. We
had communication intercepts, we had caught some
guys who confessed to their involvement. It is quite
interesting, given the fact that the suicide bombers are widely used in terrorism, that we got most of our
information from these very same people.

In these Africa embassy bombings, there was a guy who
had been recruited by bin Laden to carry out the explo
sions to the front part of the U.S. Embassy in Kenya. It was
his job to get out (another guy was driving the truck), to
overpower the guard, to open the barriers for the truck
to get into the compound, and assess the building. He
got out of the truck and went to the guard, but he left
his gun in his jacket, and the driver crashed through the
barrier and headed toward the front of the embassy.

This guy who attacked the guard saw this happening and
ran away. It wasn't cowardly, it was religious. As he
explained, the Koran forbids suicide. You can only com-
mit suicide in the course of performing your holy duty.
And he did not need to commit suicide. This is a tiny
aspect of Islam that we do not understand very well.

You had perfect evidence that Osama bin Laden
was involved. President Clinton authorized the use of
cruise missiles for counterattacks, because that was
deemed to be the only feasible option. The special
forces had actually been preparing for doing
cruise missiles for counterattacks, because that was
considered the only feasible option. The special
forces had actually done something like the ground
in Afghanistan, it actually had
the mockups of bin Laden's headquarters in
Afghanistan, but for a variety of reasons, the
military establishment was that there was a waste of
time, and the intelligence community were the memories of "a
big difference between the information and actual deliv-
erance of bin Laden's whereabouts. In each instance,
many instances in which there was pretty good evi-
donation of the Chinese database.

As an agency for local criminal prosecution. It has
always had its powerful headquarters, a set of prior-
ities, and punishments for people who do not obey
these priorities. But the actions are all out in the field.
Except for a very small bunch of people who occupy
important positions in the headquarters, big jobs are
done by special agents in the dark, particularly in big
cities. Most people do not want to push papers at FBI
Headquarters; they want real cases in the field.

The Clinton administration was criticized as a very
basic organization for an emergency. Before World War II, the United States
had nothing like the CIA. During World War II, a new
organization called Office of Strategic Services (OSS)
came into being. It enlisted a lot of people who wanted
to imitate the British. And we set up something like the
British Secret Service—a Secret Operations Executive
(spying, sabotage). But the OSS’s main component
did not exist in the British system or in any other service.

It was made up of a very large number of assessment and
analyses groups-mostly scholars, many of them from the
European origin, from universities and think tanks
throughout the United States. All these people came as
volunteers out of their private lives: lawyers, business-
men, and so on. It was a great adventure, and they
enjoyed that great job. Then the cold war began to
develop. Within a few years, the government decided to
cut the OSS a few years ago, when this organization, which many believed was a Soviet rehearsal for World War III. Since then, the CIA has obviously become a
career organization over time. People spent their whole
lives and careers there. There are some drawbacks with
the CIA. For instance, polygraph tests. They are not
always very useful, as we have a whole parade of Soviet
spies who passed lie detector tests. But this is a lesson,
an experience that everybody shares. In addition, the
CIA was made up of a very large number of assessment and
assignments; all of these traits trace back to its time as
a volunteer organization. This is particularly true of the
DI, which was originated by the people who came
from the universities as volunteers. The DI still looks upon itself as essentially a kind of intelligence within
the government that should not face outside interference

The NSA, which has the components of the
Department of Defense, originated as a subordinated
spy agency within the intelligence community. Code-
breaking is something that the United States had been doing
before World War II. This was not a very high-status
career line in the military, and it was not terribly
rewarding. The NSA retains some of these character-
istics in the fact that they are very important to the
big picture.

The second element of the history which helps to
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**EXPERT’S OPINION**

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the golden age” in the past. For the FBI, it was the period of

get the job of analyzing the Soviet strategic forces. These experiences have an effect on organiza-

tions. They made these organizations cautious before the 9/11 attacks. The FBI was very cautious. The CIA was equally cautious engaging in covert operations. In the question of assassinating bin Laden, they insisted on it when they refused to kill him.

These weaknesses in imagination and knowledge in newly interesting areas and in capacities have emerged, in my judgment, without help from foreign partners. We collect knowledge, but we are still not understanding European affairs very well, unlike the Europeans do. The same is true about the former Soviet Union, where the Russians do it pretty well. But there is a problem with the U.S. intelligence community is difficulty in recruitment. There is a terrible world recruiting people with different backgrounds, especially because they do not want to be spies or face counterintelligence problems. Bringing in people who are very different from those who are already in the organization, whose background and interests are different from people already in the organization, and arranging the promotion line for them is a far from easy task, which can be done but in the long term. Because of legal barriers, which will not entirely come down, the U.S. intelligence community does not have incentives to analyze very sensitive issues.

So, the logical recourse is on the allies and part-

tners. It is a case when I look back at the collection of intelligence warnings about terrorism—just take a look at this Presidential Daily Brief that was declassified and published a couple of weeks ago. Every piece of information of what bin Laden was doing against the United States comes from foreign servic-

es, every single line of it came through the FBI.

To deal with this new set of problems, I cannot see any single most effective formula that will work in future decisions. It is largely dependent on close relationships with security services and other elements of public service in foreign countries on the areas newly of interest to us and, in some cases, to you.

**Specialized Capabilities**

Jennifer MORDONEY,
RAND Corporation

Prior to my major topic, I would like to talk a bit about the utility of the Black Sea Security Program from the Department of Defense perspective. The Department of Defense Project on International Security Cooperation is focusing particular on three goals: to build relationships for security cooperation (that is why we are all here today); to build capabilities; and to promote access to personnel (after you make good contacts here, you can pick up a phone and call a partner whenever crisis arises). And I think Harvard’s Black Sea Security Program generally addresses two of these goals, and two of three is not bad from the Department of Defense’s perspective. I have been participating in these programs for number of years, and I think they are very valuable for promoting friendships, relationships, and access.

Talking about niche capabilities, I have to say that I have devoted a lot of research to it as part of a global study by the Department of Defense. I have been working for this study for about a year now.

In my presentation, I would like to consider the following five analytical questions:

1. What is a niche capability? What are some discrepancies in the field? What are the criteria for determining a niche capability that a country can provide for a coalition operation? Should one be specialized in something or not?

2. Why should a country make an effort to develop niche capabilities or specialized capabilities?

3. What kind of capabilities should be developed for domestic purposes and/or for potential use with coalition capabilities? Or can niche capabilities and specialized capabilities be used in both contexts? Should a country feeling security threats only be ready to deploy niche capabilities within a coalition operation?
EXPERT’S OPINION

What kind of niche capabilities do the Eastern European and Eurasian partner countries either currently have or wish to bring to the table? What are the niche capabilities currently in high demand by the United States and by NATO? NATO is tending to look at more high-tech capabilities from NATO allies, whereas the United States and other countries are tending to look at more high-tech potential for potential NATO members. What do these countries have? What do they bring to the table? Can they provide any help when the alliance has security needs? Do they have technical capabilities that other NATO Partnership for Peace partners do not necessarily have?

The Partnership Capabilities Commitment (PCC) was the document adopted at the NATO Summit in 2002. It identifies specific capabilities that NATO was looking for from its member states—not Partnership for Peace partners, but just the new invitees and the current NATO allies—in order to increase the effectiveness across the broad range of military operations and, particularly, those outside the NATO context. The capabilities that PCC identifies are mostly technical in nature, such as air-to-air refueling; more sophisticated nuclear, biological, chemical defense and consequence management (NBCD&CM); precision-guided munitions. Are the allies able to do these things? Is it not necessary that we think the United States is looking for capabilities outside of the NATO coalition context?

I think even now the United States government and Department of Defense are asking the wrong question: What do our partners have? I think it is more useful to ask the question: What do we not have? How do you cultivate these capabilities through training, exercises, bilateral workshops, and so on? We have a lot of tools available to do that. We have to ask the right questions.

What have we done over the course of the last year? My team has identified those needed capabilities from our friends and potential coalition partners. RAND is making recommendations that the United States and our neighbors should do. What have you done? How do you cultivate these capabilities through training, exercises, bilateral workshops, and so on? We have a lot of tools available to do that. We have to ask the right questions.

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HARVARD, might think that Special Forces are a glorified

HARVARD BLACK SEA SECURITY PROGRAM – 2004

June 2004

MНЕНИЕ ЭКСПЕРТА

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From the United States perspective, this approach will help to ensure that bilateral exercises-training events-take place. A broader political dialogue is taking place on what kind of capabilities we want to see more of, or in what sphere the alliance needs a partner country’s expertise. These are three arguments from the United States perspective.

From a partner country perspective, what I have heard partner countries say in the field is the following. First of all, developing a niche capability allows the country to showcase a particular capability and build its international prestige. But it depends on how something is performed. A great example is the Czech Republic. It has been invited by the Greek government to provide a nuclear-biological-chemical response unit to be on standby during the Olympics. This shows that niche capabilities can be used not only for operations, but also for special events. The Czechs who are leaders in nuclear-biological-chemical niche capabilities can not only show their abilities, but train others as well. It can also be a model for defense and security reform.

As many of your countries are facing difficult times in security reform, why not concentrate your attention on a particular piece of the defense structure that can further serve the interests of broader defense reform? For instance, Ukraine has its Rapid Reaction Force. As a result of the Georgia Train and Equip Program (STEP), a newly created brigade in Georgia can serve as an example for broader reform of that country’s security and defense structures. Kazakhstan has a peacekeeping battalion, which can also serve for further reform within the country’s security structures.

The development of niche capabilities could also bring some economic benefits. For example, the United Nations pays very well for the peacekeeping capabilities it uses. And many countries develop this niche capability in order to be able to deploy it with a United Nations mission.

Those were the arguments from our partners’ perspective and what I have heard in the field to motivate the United States and NATO partners to develop their niche capabilities.
decide what it wants to do. Nobody could stop us, so we should just go ahead, and we should not listen to the institutions like NATO or the United Nations that were developed during the cold war. We should simply do what we want because others have no choice.

This idea had become popular in some parts of the United States. I think the danger of this view is that it misunderstands the way the world politics have been changing. The previous theory of American exceptionalism had thought that American strength in the following sense: it failed to see the changes that have occurred in world politics as a result of globalization, as well as the democratization of technology due to the information revolution. Globalization simply means that there has been a great increase in the interdependence of countries across the oceans. There is nothing new about globalization. What is new is that it has become more rapid and deeper than it has been in previous centuries.

And much of this was illustrated by the events of 9/11. In the case of Afghanistan, for example, if you asked Americans in the 1990s what their view was on Afghanistan, they would say things are dreadful in Afghanistan, but it is a long way away from us. But what we discovered on 9/11 was that dreadful conditions in a weak country “at the end of the world” could matter to us very much if that country became a failed state of terrorist camps. The other thing that was happening in the end of the twentieth century, at the same time when globalization broke out, was the information revolution and the tremendous decline in the cost of information technology. If you look at the cost of computing and communications from 1970 to 2000, they dropped in cost more than 1,000 times. A little device I use to illustrate this phenomenon, which was previously reserved in napping the notion that, microprocessor technology today is available to almost anybody. It was very restricted is available to almost anybody.

In the twentieth century, at the same time when globalization broke out, the information revolution and the tremendous decline in the cost of information technology had a tremendous impact on the world’s information technology. Globalization simply means that there has been a great increase in the interdependence of countries across the oceans. There is nothing new about globalization. What is new is that it has become more rapid and deeper than it has been in previous centuries.

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Another example could be satellite photography. In the 1970s, it was a great secret that the United States and the Soviet Union had developed satellites that could take pictures of the Earth with 1 meter resolution or so. And the United States and the Soviet Union spent billions of dollars on this. Today, anyone can go on the Internet and get a 1 meter resolution photo commercially available at about $79.

This capacity, which was previously reserved just for governments, is now available to non-governmental actors. But some of those non-governmental actors are terrorist national and transnational groups. If you think that, even at today’s prices, in the context of these changes in technology, you will find that terrorism is not new, but its capacity to communicate across jurisdictions and to use technology has greatly increased.

If in the twentieth century terrorist organizations killed hundreds of people (the worst terrorist event in the twentieth century was the bombing of an Air India flight that killed 329 people), by September 11, 2001, that number increased to 3,000 people. And it is not science fiction to imagine that a terrorist might be able to get a hold of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which could lead to the killing of hundreds of thousands or millions of people.

Again, it is not a new development in the world’s history when a pathological individual or a group can kill millions. Hitler and Stalin both killed millions. But to be able to do that, they needed the apparatus of a totalitarian state to be able to do that. Now you can imagine a non-governmental group being able to kill without the apparatus of government. This is a profoundly new development in world politics, and a new type of threat as well. In light of this type of threat, the United States has changed the focus of its national security in September 2002 and issued its new National Security Strategy that said that the greatest threats we face are not for governments, but are for non-state actors. The terrorist is a non-state actor, and the apparatus of a non-state actor is much more difficult to control than the apparatus of a state actor.
Иногда, если вы хотите попробовать иностранный язык, не говорите неправильные фразы. Октябрь является очень хорошим месяцем для изучения иностранных языков. Иначе, если вы хотите говорить на другом языке, не говорите неправильные фразы. Октябрь является очень хорошим месяцем для изучения иностранных языков. Иначе, если вы хотите говорить на другом языке, не говорите неправильные фразы. Октябрь является очень хорошим месяцем для изучения иностранных языков.
Iran’s Role in the Black Sea and Caspian Region

Brenda SHAFFER, Director, Harvard University Caspian Studies Program

This is my fourth year working with the Black Sea Security Program and I really enjoy this forum. I definitely see it is becoming more and more serious program for the speakers as well as the participants. Therefore, I am proud to be part of this.

First, I will tell you a little bit about Harvard’s Caspian Studies Program. It focuses on the Caucasus, Central Asia, Iran, and Turkey. In addition to academic research and policy research, you can find all our publications on our website. We also try to bring students and officials from the Caspian region to Harvard both for degree programs and executive programs like the one you are in, and also to bring officials to present here and to consult with our academics. For instance, next week we will be hosting Azerbaijan’s Deputy Foreign Minister Aras Azimov, and he will also be a part of this program. For the future, we are looking for political resources in Central Asia and Turkey and you will find all of this on our web page.

Getting back to my main topic, I will give you a little bit different picture from that given by Professor Samuel Huntington. My presentation has the following plan:
1. The current situation in Iran.
2. Iran’s relations with the United States.
3. Iran’s relations with Russia.
4. Iran’s policy in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

The Current Situation in Iran

Iran is not a Black Sea state, but it seriously affects your region. This is similar to the way that the United States is not a Caspian state, but its impact there is very great. Iran is right next to your region, and it is an important factor in U.S. policy.

Iran’s Role in the Black Sea and Caspian Region

Я уже четвертый год работаю с Гарвардской программой Черноморско−
каспийской безопасности. И мне очень нравится этот форум. Я реально вижу, как он становится все более серьезной программой; также поднимается уровень выступающих и участников. Поэтому я горда тем, что являюсь его частью.

Для начала, несколько слов о ГПКИ. Она занимаетесь Кавказом, Центральной Азией, Ираном и Турцией. Все наши академические, политические исследования и публикации вы можете найти на веб−сайте ГПКИ. Также мы стараемся привлекать студентов и официальных лиц Каспийского региона в Гарвард, как для получения учебных степеней, повыше-ния квалификации (аналогично вашей нынешней программе), так и для того, чтобы послушать высокопоставленных чиновников, обмениваться мнениями с учеными. Например, на следующей неделе мы будем принимать заместителя министра иностранных дел Азербайджана Араз Азимова. Он выступит и перед вами. В ближайшие дни мы планируем расширить базу наших участников на Центральную Азию и Турцию. И я надеюсь, все это вы сможете найти на нашей электронной странице.

Что касается моего выступления, то я представляю вам несколько иную картину по сравнению с той, которую дал профессор Сэмюэль Хантингтон. Моя презентация имеет следующий план:
1. Текущая обстановка в Иране.
2. Отношения Ирана с США.
3. Отношения Ирана с Российским Союзом.
4. Политика Ирана в Центральной Азии и на Кавказе.

Текущая обстановка в Иране

Иран не принадлежит к Черноморскому региону (ЧР), но эта страна серьезно влияет на него. Точно
toward the Black Sea and Caspian Sea regions. Other important players in the region are of course Russia and Turkey, but today I would like to talk in more detail about Iran.

In talking about Iran, we basically touch upon security issues or threats that emanate from Iran. But in considering all the information, we have to remember that this is an election year in the United States. A U.S. President does not like to die a political death in an election year. He wants to talk about domestic issues. Unfortunately, this president also already has to focus on many foreign issues, such as Iraq, international terror, and so on. So, this is not a year when he really wants to confront Iran or other security issues, or has political resources to do so.

So you will not find it surprising that this year we have a sort of acceleration in Iran. Iran is trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially nuclear weapons. Precisely a year ago, it was less convenient for Washington to address this issue. So to me it is not surprising that we have to say discuss United States for- eign policy in terms of "before November" and "after November," meaning before and after the U.S. presidential elections.

In this context, a country has a very unstable regime and situation right now. It has a high unemployment rate as well as serious social, economic, and ideological problems. Iran is also a multietnic state. Iran is full of Persian music, food, and so on. But what percentage of Iranians are Persians? Iran is half non-Persian. This is similar to the situation twenty years ago when we talked about the Soviet Union as 'Russia' and 'the Russians,' despite the fact that the USSR was populated by Armenians, Uzbeks, and so on. The same thing is true about Iran. Only half of Iran’s population is Persian.

Given these considerations, you will better understand Iran’s activities, for instance, in the Caucasus. The largest ethnic minority in Iran are Azerbaijanis, who make up a third of Iran’s popula- tion. This is a major factor that influences Iran’s rela- tions with Azerbaijan. Iran and Azerbaijan are inter- connected. In fact, the Supreme Leader Khamenei’s native languages are Turkish and Azerbaijanis, not Persian. So when he visits Istanbul for example, he addresses people there in Turkish.

Iran is a multietnic state, and almost every eth- nic minority is a state in a state over the border from Iran. And the majorities in these other states are ethnic minorities in Iran. In the southwest of Iran, you primarily have Arabs. Right next door is Iran. What kind of population do we find in north- west Iran? Kurds and Azerbaijanis. Turkey and Azerbaijan are next door. You also have Marshad, which has a majority Turkmen population. Across the border are Uzbekistan and Pakistan.

So the domestic and ethnic situation in Iran is very complicated. As a defense minister of Iran, you would have a very hard job, no matter what is going on. In terms of domestic stability, this past year and especially in Iran concerning Parliament. The ruling leadership disqualified most of the reformist candidates for Parliament. So basically the elections became a farce and were not really very meaningful. Before the elections, Parliament was at least a kind of place where the regime allowed people to let off steam: people could speak publicly and promote some policies. After the crisis, Parliament became an empty place, not even a place where the regime could let the public have some air.

This adds to the instability in Iran. In the short run, it seems like hardliners became stronger in the Parliament. But in terms of overall instability, the situation has become even more unstable. On the other hand, such factors as the multimedia environment, the uneasy economic situation, and international iso- lation are pressing down on the reformists in Iran.

Is religion a unifying factor in Iran? Maybe most of the Americans incorrectly assume from what we see in the news that religion is a unifying factor in Iran that also adds stability to the country. Is it? I think there are two points to make here. Theoretically, it is a huge problem if American poli- cymakers, and Americans in general, assume that there is a common identity between, say, half of the population group of people. I think Americans tend to look at such things in religious terms. Look at how America frames the Russian-Chечен conflict. How nationalistic government. And big government of this type is a big government with ethnic minorities in Iran. To the west of Iran are the main minorities including Kurds and Azerbaijanis. So, he very meaningful. Before the elections, Parliament was at least a kind of place where the regime allowed people to let off steam: people could speak publicly and promote some policies. After the crisis, Parliament became an empty place, not even a place where the regime could let the public have some air.

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Iran's Relations with the United States

Basically, I think Iran’s strategic position has improved immensely in the past two years thanks to the United States. Up until November, I do not think the U.S. will do much to address security concerns in Iran. As you can guess from my sarcasm, I do not think Washington has analyzed the situation correctly, because it has never taken seriously the situation that is good for it. After November, especially if the same government is in power in Washington, things might be different. The Iranian state clearly supports international terror that works against the United States and its allies. Iran clearly is trying to acquire weapons. And if you read this week’s news, Tehran has arrested Iranian officials because they sold nuclear secrets of Iran to a foreign government. So we have a new case emerging here, it is a kind of Abdul Qadeer Khan situation involving sales to a Western intelligence agency. But clearly even more evident is the fact that Iran is continuing to develop its projects on heavy water and nuclear reactors, started in June, basically denouncing all of its commitments from October 2003 in terms of stopping uranium enrichment. So, it is clear that Iran will be a target for policy after the November election.

Here is the question: How did we get the situation where the United States and Iran have such poor relations? I don’t think it has anything to do with history, the hostage crisis, ideology, or religion. In March 2000, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, during the Iranian New Year celebration, unilaterally removed some U.S. sanctions against Iran, and they have never offered an unconditional renewal of dialogue with Iran. It was rejected by Iran. Why did Iran reject this offer? I think if you look at pure power politics, if you are Ayatollah Khamenei, you are a spiritual leader, you are the highest guy in line, and you have people that do not really like your policies, especially with relation to the United States. And you think to yourself: “OK, I will sacrifice relations and trade with the United States for my own salvation.” This is kind of a shift. So, I think from purely domestic considerations Khamenei really has no incentive to renew dialogue or cooperation with the United States. I think from Iran side, as long as its regime is in power, it may try to do something, t to try to play some signals that it wants relations. But I don’t think it is going to be so possible for this regime—not because of ideology, but simply because of domestic politics.

are Chechens described in U.S. newspapers? Even before this latest round of negotiations, they were described as Chechen fighters, nationalist fighters, Islamic rebels, Islamic fighters, and so on. The Russian soldier, however, is never framed as an Orthodox Christian soldier. We frame him according to his citizenship — as a Russian, even if he is a Tatar or some other ethnicity.

Religious identities have no huge political momentum even in Turkey, if you ask. “Where do you from?” I guarantee that two generations of people in Istanbul will tell you they are from the Red Sea or some city. The same happens in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Morocco, and elsewhere. People bind their political identity with their city, region, and so on. Here in the U.S., we need to better understand that religious or even ethnic identities are not necessarily a primary identity for people.

What has an impact on political and religious identities? Within these divisions, if there is a political necessity, political leaders can break down these identities further. For instance, most Americans are Christians. But if there is some political reason, they can be divided between Protestants and Catholics. If there is some kind of political agenda is useful to leaders, we could divide in that way.

In general, talking about religious societies, we are talking about the most religious society in the world, based on where people choose to go to religious institutions on a weekly basis willingly and not by necessity a primary identity for people. Our political identity, our political identity with our city, region, and so on. The same happens in Uzbekistan, Istanbul will tell you they are from the Red Sea or some city. The same happens in Uzbekistan, Tadжикистане, Maroko and so on. People are divided based on where they go to religious institutions, and that is a very religious country.

I think in the past twenty-five years in Iran, we have seen, what some Iranians have told me, “Shite Islam has been dropped through the mud by corrupt muffins.” So, they have not done much for the promotion of religion in Iran. In the past twenty-five years, Iran has become a more secular society.

And what has happened in the past two years? Most of you are military people, strategic people. You understand when enemies are fighting each other. You will understand that Iran has had two major security threats: Saddam Hussein and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Probably its next security threat will be Chechens. Therefore, Iran’s strategic dream is not only to have Saddam Hussein and the Taliban neutralized, but also to be able to gain from neutralizing these threats.

This means, relatively in the past two years, if one of the top two men in Iran is Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, you are a spiritual leader, you are the highest guy in line, and you have people that do not really like your policies, especially with relation to the United States. And you think to yourself: “OK, I will sacrifice relations and trade with the United States for my own salvation.” This is kind of a shift.
Iran's Relations with Russia

Iran's relations with Russia are another factor. Basically, these relations occur in the nuclear sphere. Up until a year ago, I would say that Iran-Russia relations were strategic. This is very important for us to know, whether all of Iran's relations with foreign powers are based on ideology, religion, something else. Iran had excellent relations with the Soviet Union before its collapse. In 1989, there was the first serious agreement on cooperation between Iran with the Soviet Union (not even with Russia). Especially in the conditions of an evolving unipolar world, Iran is important to other powers in the world. But I think Russia and Iran's relations have improved immensely in the past, from 2000 forward and especially with Vladimir Putin coming to power in Russia, and certainly since 2001. Russian and Iranian cooperation in the Caspian Sea has changed completely in terms of their borders. Iran's relations with Azerbaijan have changed, which in Iran are seen as very problematic. There was a sort of cooling of the Russia-Iranian cooperation. But still, very strong strategic issues tie them together.

Iran's Policy in Central Asia and Caucasus

In Central Asia, the Caspian, and the Caucasus, we have to note the religious ties between these peoples. Many of them are Shiites. Here we can discuss a model of relations. I think it can apply to a lot of analytical work on other issues. What we see in this sphere is a kind of contrast to what has been presented by Professor Huntington in his extremely important, monumental book, The Clash of Civilizations. His basic thesis is if you look at these conflicts in a comprehensive way, all these things (conflicts) are religious. We are saying that conflict or cooperation is a systematic way with these conflicts. And who do you think is the only country in the Caspian region who strongly believes that religion has something to do with foreign policy? Obviously, the Islamic Republic of Iran writes the word 'Islam' on its flag and looks like its goal is the exporting of Islam, promoting solidarity with Muslims, and the like. But if you analyze its policy, you will see that there probably is no country less Islamic in its dealings than Iran.

Let's look at rhetoric, and compare what Iran is saying and what it is doing. There were three major policy choices Iran had to make in the Caspian region. One was Soviet break-up and appearance of three new Muslim states. The second was Chechnya. The third was Nagorno-Karabagh. These were three policy dilemmas at Iran's borders for which Tehran had to take a choice. Up until 1989, Iran had a really good relationship with the Soviet Union, especially in the nuclear, economic, and military fields. But suddenly in 1989 and the 1990s, we saw demonstrations in Baku, Shiite population uprisings, and Muslims in Central Asia began calling for their independence. And Iran has a policy dilemma: Should it support these Shiite Muslim movements, or should it continue its cooperation with the Soviet Union? What was Iran's choice? It cooperated with the Soviet Union until its final days. The Iranians were the last foreign visitors to Moscow before the Soviet break-up.

In Chechnya, there are a group of Muslims struggling for their independence. It is not just a religious conflict. It is primarily a national conflict, although religion is certainly a part of this struggle. In the last year or two, there has become an even more prominent symbol of the Chechen's struggle. Look at the situation on a human rights level. You have a situation where tens of thousands of innocent Muslims have been killed or displaced by Moscow. But on the other hand, Iran has its economic and military cooperation with Moscow. Where has Tehran stood in this conflict? With Moscow. You can the compare statements of the United States, the Council of Europe, and Russia, and see the differences. And Iran, I think, will find that Iran is the most sympathetic toward Russia. It officially says that Russia has the right to protect its territorial integrity and to fight against terror. You could not get those statements of support for Moscow from Washington or Brussels, but you do from Tehran.

In fact, Tehran has gone further. I have read some articles on how Iran has cynically used Chechnya to promote its foreign relations with Moscow. You see that every time there is some sort of uprising or an increase in the amount of air attacks on Chechnya where hundreds or even thousands of civilians have been killed in a matter of a week, you see military delegations going from Tehran to Moscow to get more support for their nuclear program or for military deals. And it is calculated. You can see that at almost every Muslim...
The third political dilemma is that a war was actively fought until 1994 between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the border of Iran. Therefore, clearly every step Iran takes in this case is a very calculated policy. Armenia is a Christian nation, while Azerbaijan is basically Shiite Muslim. Iran is supposed to be a center of support for Shites around the world. If you look at American newspapers, what is of interest to Iran and Iraq? Shia brothers. With Nagorno-Karabagh, you have a conflict that has the status quo. “Christian Armenia” occupied 18 percent of “Shiite Azerbaijan’s” territory, which led to over 800,000 Muslim refugees. Where is Iran in this conflict? Khojaly. Who does it support? Again, you see Tehran making a very material security consideration in the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict. A prosperous, stable Azerbaijan on Iran’s border could potentially be a problem for Iran, especially bearing in mind Iran’s own Azerbaijani minority. But who does Iran support in the conflict? Armenia. If you look especially at trade and roads, you can see that there is no consideration of security.

So, it is very important that we think of these conflicts as not really about religion, but about Iran’s policy dilemmas. For instance, it was just a clear strategic consideration that keeping Azerbaijan involved in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabagh was good for Iran. And these conflicts are really not about history, either. For example, the relationship between Russia and Turkey is a model example of how two big neighboring and distant countries can be in conflict. Here again, it is not about history.

Iran uses Islam instrumentally. Iran really could be Canada or the United States or even Russia in the sense of being a multiethnic state that allows a place for many ethnic identities. If Iranians were allowed to have a supra-ethnic identity like Canadians or Americans, they would probably be Canada or the United States or even Russia in the conflict. And history, either. For example, the relationship between Russia and Turkey is a model example of how two big neighboring countries can be in conflict. Here again, it is not about history.

But the success of the regime of the Islamic Republic is that is has not allowed Iran to become “Iranistan.” Iran was turned into Persia. The regime has not allowed minorities to open schools with instruction in their minority languages. Also, the presence of Iranian members of parliament was condemned by the local press for speaking in Azerbaijani in the Parliament. But there is still a place for everyone to live in Iran.
The Black Sea Region’s Perspectives

Do the eleven members of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) organization see the Black Sea as a region? Yes. Do the eleven members of the BSEC see that the Black Sea region should become more coherent and strengthened? I would say yes. Both of these answers are very encouraging, but they are also far from the point, because there are two other questions that I think are much more important.

First, how many governments in the Black Sea region would say that the region could provide the framework, should it be developed, that would serve the region’s own interests? The charitable answer is very few. How many governments in the Black Sea region place the priority of strengthening the region over other priorities? Once again, the charitable answer is very few.

The fact is that the Black Sea region, like Eurasia as a whole, is being divided between two very different dynamics of integration and poles of influence: one draft regional group (Russia), and another one outside (the United States and the EU). These poles and dynamics focus attention at the national level, but not in the region as such. This is still the case even as newer threats have emerged, particularly after September 11, 2001. The threat that is politely called the “war on terrorism” in the United States, although I prefer to call it less politely “terror war”, is now a large concern to the Russian Federation, Turkey, Greece (although Greece is far less vulnerable), and, to an increasing extent, to Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania as well.

But for most Black Sea states, the main obstacle to the region’s stability, not to say its particularities, is seen to be the policies of the pole inside the region—the Russian Federation. And it is perceived in contrast to the pole outside the region—the EU and, to a lesser extent, NATO.

So, my first question regarding the Russian Federation, which is a part of the BSEC and a member of the region: What is the Russian perception of the Black Sea region? On one level, the Russian perception is one of a region that could and should be led by Russia. On the other level, it has fundamentally changed since 1992 when the then very liberal Russian Foreign Ministry wrote an influential policy paper that said that the Russia
EXPERT’S OPINION

HUNGARY IN NATO

Vencernja v NATO

Andras SIMONYI, Hungarian Ambassador to the US

The Black Sea Security Program is of great importance for developing the relationships. NATO has never been an end in itself. It has always been viewed by me and other Hungarians as a tool, an instrument, a framework, a structure to support this transatlantic relationship.

I will discuss with you the Hungarian experience, which is a bit of everything. It is a bit of success story; it has its ups and downs. And I am not trying to say that we are a country that has miraculously gone through this process. It was a very difficult and painful process being in the first group of countries that came into NATO after the fall of the iron curtain. However, you are lucky that you have not gone through the same pains as we did.

I cannot tell you how happy I am to see here the representatives of Bulgaria and Romania here, the countries who have just recently become NATO members, and whose membership to NATO we have always supported. And we will support the future enlargement of NATO because it, we think, is right for our country and right for the rest of the world.

How did we come to the phase of enlargement? What were the hard- ships afterwards?

I think these questions are very important to you. I am a great believer in the future of the transatlantic relationship. I do not think there is an alternative to the United States and Europe holding hands on new threats and challenges that are and will be considerably different from those we faced not even fifteen years ago before the systemic changes in Eastern Europe, but also considerably different from threats and challenges of five years ago, which were more related to the transition period. The transition from dictatorships to democracies presents the type of painful process being in the first group of countries that came in into NATO after the fall of the iron curtain. This process was a very difficult and painful one. It was a very difficult and painful process being in the first group of countries that came into NATO after the fall of the iron curtain. However, you are lucky that you have not gone through the same pains as we did.

The last point is that the NATO and EU enlargement will not stop where it is. We are not in a business of having fancy and well-to-do neighbors to the

Therefore, I want to make the following statements.

First, while 9/11 struck the United States, it struck all of us who believe in the same values, who believe in the freedom of movement, freedom of people, free economy, free society—basically the freedom of the individual. That is why we Europeans cannot afford to pretend that 9/11 was only a hit on America. It was a hit on the whole transatlantic community and beyond.

Second, as far as Hungarian security concerns, we are highly dependant on how efficient NATO will be. Europe, which is now in a process of building a new defense identity and defense capabilities, is not to be an alternative to a strong transatlantic alliance. As world changes, we Europeans will probably make it better with more of our contributions. We want to be a solid partner to the United States in managing world issues, we need to be better about doing our part.

Third, Hungary has become a European Union (EU) member, although I wish this would have come earlier. It was like a present not arriving in time for Easter. But it is okay. I think that the best thing that has ever happened to the world is that Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia are joining the EU, thus expanding the geographic scope of the EU toward the east. And it will not stop there. The countries present here today will already benefit from the fact the EU has arrived in our countries. It is getting closer to you, and the best deal for you is prosperity, stability, and democracy on your borders. This is good news for all of you as you have come from a region that is facing difficulties in its transition, but a region that is bravely facing these threats and challenges—whether they involve security, the economy, or health, or relations with the EU.

The last point is that the NATO and EU enlargement will not stop where it is. We are not in a business of having fancy and well-to-do neighbors. We are highly dependant on how efficient NATO will be. And we will support the future enlargement of NATO because, I think, it is right for our country and right for the rest of the world.

Although NATO was a gift to the countries who have just recently become NATO members, and whose membership to NATO we have always supported. And we will support the future enlargement of NATO because it, I think, is right for our country and right for the rest of the world.
EXPERT’S OPINION

HARVARD BLACK SEA SECURITY PROGRAM – 2004

ГАРВАРДСКАЯ ПРОГРАММА ЧЕРНОМОРСКОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ – 2004

I also want to make a comment on the Russian Federation. Russia and NATO have come a long way, but still have a long way to go. As far as we are concerned, the NATO-Russia Council is now working pretty well. It is a great setup-we have always thought that it would be a bad idea if the Russian Federation was left outside of NATO. And I think this is really a good solution. The Russian Federation is already in a structure of cooperation with NATO. I also want to say that I remember going through debates and arguments with some Russian bureaucrats as we were preparing for our membership in NATO, and we were not very happy about that. I kept saying: "Look, the same thing happened to the Russian Federation that happened to the Black Sea region: prosperity and security have arrived to Russia’s borders." 

There are countries that are in NATO that represent developed economies. And they border the Russian Federation. I have the feeling that the Russian Federation has understood that. That is why I am so pleased to see that recent NATO enlargement did not cause any major problems in our relationship with Russia.

Hungarian-NATO Accession: Lessons Learned

NATO was something that we in Hungary really hated in the beginning. Why? Because of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Program. We knew that PfP was invented to keep some countries out of NATO. In Hungary, however, it turned into an instrument that helped NATO to prepare for enlargement. And it has also helped us to prepare for enlargement. It has prepared our military get ready for accession to NATO. Today I see that without PfP, Hungary would not be able to go through the accession process as smoothly as we did. We would not be able to integrate our military into NATO joint structures. It is more important, meanwhile, that PfP has developed into something quite essential. So by the time Bulgaria, Romania, the Baltics, Slovakia, and Slovenia came into NATO through the same door, they were probably more ready for the job than we were.

Today’s task is the reform of your own armed forces before you get into NATO. Do not try to do it afterwards. And do it fast, because you have to realize that the problem will not go away as time goes by. The process will be even more painful if you delay. What you do not do before NATO membership is much harder to do after it. Here I refer to downsizing, restructuring, retraining, and retraining. Frankly, I think that countries that came in after us in NATO accession are in better shape than we were. The fates of others are not as pretty well. It is a great setup—we have always thought that it would be a bad idea if the Russian Federation was left out of NATO accession in a better shape than we were. The fates of others are not as pretty well. It is a great setup—we have always thought that it would be a bad idea if the Russian Federation was left out of NATO accession. It is because we tried to figure out a way how to do it without anyone setting that example before for us. So that is one lesson. The second lesson: once you are in and you have your homework done, continue doing your best, because NATO should be kept up effectively. NATO has to be kept up as an organization that is able to move, where the military are prepared to move together and where interoperability does not stand in the way.

How should we face challenges if we are not ready to change? Who would think several years ago that NATO countries would be involved in peace enforcement in Afghanistan, Iraq, or elsewhere? And I am personally pleased that NATO has taken on a major role in Afghanistan. I also believe that NATO will have to take a major role in Iraq sooner or later.

I would add that the future for NATO is really about niche capabilities. Without them, NATO expansion is a waste of resources. It would be a waste of resources, for instance, for Hungary to try to build a miniature copy of the German or even the U.S. Army. We don’t need the air force, the army, and all kinds of other staff. But when other can do those things better, we should look for something that we Hungarians can do better than others. Hungary can well contribute to the network of capabilities in Europe and to its European allies with its engineering capabilities. So it is really a waste of money, resources, and capabilities if you do not concentrate on a niche capability that you can do best, a niche that can give you visibility and is needed. If you have your niche capabilities are appropriate and important, it is a guarantee that you cannot be circumvented in the NATO accession process and you will have proper visibility. If you have these capabilities, you will have proper participation in NATO. And if you have proper participation, you will have a "say" in the decisions of NATO.

Civilian-Military Relations

In conclusion, let me say few things about civilian-military relations, which are key. Do not follow the example that Hungary went through. We

HARVARD, APRIL, 2004

APRIL, 2004
Frozen Conflicts in the Black Sea-South Caucasus Region

Замороженные конфликты в Черноморском и Южно-кавказском регионе

Vladimir SOKOR, Senior Fellow, Jamestown Foundation

Если замороженные конфликты (ЗК) в кон- тексте евроатлантических (ЕА) интересов в данном регионе. Это сравнительно новый контекст, который возник во время второй половины 1990-х гг. и который стал очевидным для экспертов после 11 сентября, хотя еще не охватил дипломатическое сообщество За- падного мира.

Рассмотрим ЗК с запада на восток. Это Приднестровье, Абхазия, Южная Осетия и Нагорный Карабах. Эти конфликты проявились в последние годы существования СССР и усугубились в первые послевоенные годы. Вначале Запад их рассматривал как сиюминутный, затмившийся, академический и провинциальный вопрос, которым занималось малое число региональных или западных специалистов-историков. Большинство западных стран тогда относились к ЗК как к рос- сийским проблемам. А к национальным государствам, от которых отказались повстанческие анклавы, сложно долго относился исключительно как к советский сфера влияния, к которой Российская Федерация (РФ) стала проявлять первоочередной интерес. Даже в конца 1990-х гг. и после 11 сентября, главные западные державы и ЕА организации, например ЕС, пытались формировать свою политику по отношению к этим конфликтам через призму отношений с РФ.

Этот подход, однако, сменился усилением ЕА ин- тересов в Черноморском регионе (ЧР). Территория между ЧР и Каспийским регионом (КР) с Южным Кав-
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corridor. 2. It is a unique transit corridor for Caspian oil to Western
consumers, primarily in the EU, but also
beyond. Although the Black Sea region is now located at
the periphery of the Euro-Atlantic world, it is already
functioning as a hinterland for the Euro-Atlantic
community, a staging area for projecting power, influence,
and values further to the east. This region is now a
Euro-Atlantic borderland, and it is even in the process of
becoming a Euro-Atlantic hinterland.

From a strategic perspective, this region should be
treated as one unit, from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea.
The security of this region is indivisible because it func-
tions as one unit with respect to strategic access eastward
and to energy transit westward.

Frozen conflicts in these regions interfere severely with
the pursuit of Euro-Atlantic interests. This is why it
is imperative for Western policymakers to tackle these con-
flits and to resolve them in ways that will strengthen the
nation-states of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and
Moldova in ways that make them viable, functioning part-
ers in the Euro-Atlantic community in pursuit of the com-
mon interests of our continent a moment ago.

Let me now briefly review the current state of play in
each of these conflicts, proceeding in geographical order
from west to east.

In Transdniestra, the eastern part of which is Moldova,
we have troops of the Russian Federation wearing
two types of uniform since 1991: the “local” one and the official
uniform of the Russian Federation Army. Troops in the lat-
ter category number about 2,000 in Transdniestra, and the
Transdniestra Army is about 8,000 strong, which is
stronger than Moldova’s legitimate army and has been
formed through transfers of weapons and personnel
directly from the Russian Federation’s former Fourteenth
Armies into the Transdniestra Army. The Transdniestra Army
is a Russian force in all but name. So, these approximate-
ly 2,000 Transdniestra troops are classified as security
troops, internal security troops, and border troops. How-
ever, these forces are better armed, trained, and
staffed than the Moldovan Army.

The current prescription for resolving the conflict in
Moldova would involve turning the country into a federa-
tion. According to the existing federalization projects,
this would mean creating existing accessionist leaderships
in Transdniestra, granting it a share of power in the central
government of Moldova, and placing the federation thus
formed, including its constitutional arrangements and the
khaz (OAK) process since it is still functioning in the present
time, acts as a geo-strategic, geo-economic system close-
ly linked to the Euro-Atlantic community and performing
two vital functions:
1. Strategic access from NATO/Europe to Central Asia
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Grant’s diplomatic achievements in 1999–2000 established the “pentagonal framework”: Tbilisi, Tskhinvali, the Russian Federation, Moldova, Transdniester, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the OSCE. The current status of the OSCE's work, however, is somewhere between deadlock and major progress.

The OSCE's role is significant, as it provides a platform for negotiation and a mechanism for conflict resolution. Its influence on the geopolitical landscape is substantial, as it can provide a neutral ground for discussion and a framework for agreement. However, the effectiveness of its work is dependent on the willingness of its member states to engage in meaningful dialogue.

In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, the framework is more balanced. The Minsk Group, under the auspices of the OSCE, has been working towards a resolution since 1994. However, the effectiveness of its work is dependent on the willingness of the parties to engage in meaningful dialogue.

In Abkhazia, the situation is different. The OSCE is formally in charge, but its influence is limited. The conflict has been ongoing for over 20 years, and there is little prospect of a resolution in the near future.

In Transnistria, the situation is similar to that in Abkhazia. The OSCE is present, but its influence is limited. The conflict has been ongoing for over 20 years, and there is little prospect of a resolution in the near future.

In Georgia, the situation is different. The OSCE is present, and its influence is somewhat greater. However, the effectiveness of its work is dependent on the willingness of the parties to engage in meaningful dialogue.

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The legitimate states during these years evolved with certain degrees of political and social pluralism, as well as opening to the West. However, at the same time, the secessionist states are isolated internationally, being run in a highly authoritarian fashion, and are militarized. These enclaves also reproduce the Russian manner of the fusion of political leadership, organized crime, and intelligence networks closely linked to the Russian Federation’s intelligence networks. With the secessionist enclaves functioning as facto states, the Russian model of legitimate states have a chance to become viable nation-states and attractive integration partners into NATO and the EU. It is therefore necessary to break out of the existing political settlement frameworks.

Let’s review and survey these conflicts from west to east again. Moldova now forms a 500 kilometer sector of the new Euro-Atlantic border. Yet the existing political settlement framework in Moldova, the settlement concept, mirrors the situation of the 1990s with the Russian Federation as a paramount actor. If you look at the map of the eastern border of Romania, which is the western border of Moldova, it is a 500 kilometer sector. To the west of that border, NATO and the EU are in charge. All of the Balkan conflicts have been solved with Western forces, or are being solved with Western forces on the ground-with NATO and the EU in charge, with Bulgaria and Romania already in NATO, and other Balkan countries having the clear prospect of joining NATO and EU over time.

Then you draw the line at Romania’s eastern border. In Moldova, you have the Russian Federation in charge and only Russian troops on the ground. So, the Russian Federation is clearly dominating and manipulating the political settlement framework and represents a concept that empowers the citizens of the Russian Federation that could conceivably capture the country in the near future, especially if the country could become a flat domino effect of the Moldovan condition. Local pro-Western groups, the pro-Western political opposition, and civil society groups propose this description as a Russian protectorate. In fact, the 500-kilometer long red line would be drawn west of Moldova in that case. That represents one-third of the entire links of the new Euro-Atlantic border that now runs along the western frontier of Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova. Moldova holds one-third of that. Therefore, it is the West, the United States, NATO, and the EU, and not the Russian Federation, who should shape the political and security order on the new Euro-Atlantic border. The Russian Federation is 1,000 kilometers away. We should shape the political and security order on our border.

At this point, Azerbaijan represents a somewhat different case. They are more closely related with the Russian Federation. President Vladimir Putin has personally initiated the policy of conferring Russian citizenship and Russian visas privileges to the residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; authorizing Russian entities to take over Georgian state properties in Abkhazia and South Ossetia; establishing direct transportation and communication links with the two enclaves controlled directly through Russian forces or using Russian Federation proxies; and controlling the Georgian side of the Russian-Georgian border in the Abkhaz and South Ossetia sectors. This clearly moves toward integrating those two territories into the Russian Federation against the will of the people, but the methods being used amount to de facto integration.

With respect to Georgia, at least until the change in Georgian leadership, the policy of the Russian Federation was openly adversarial. It has sought to acquire and exert Russian leverage on Georgia, and manipulate the territorial issue. But the same kind of paradigm is also at work in the Russian Federation’s relations with Armenia. Armenia is the Russian Federation’s ally. Yet, Russian policy, especially through arms deliveries and other military cooperation programs, in fact ensures Armenian territorial gains inside Azerbaijan. So, this is a case that shows how the territorial issue can be manipulated not only with respect to a target country (like Georgia), but also with respect to an allied country like Armenia in order to ensure Russian political control.

How could all this be changed? What would be the new formats that would be consistent with Western interests in the post-Soviet space?

In the case of Moldova, the pentagonal format is completely useless as it is based on a fatal Soviet and Russian legacy. If the United States and the EU joined this format in order to internationalize it, they would inherit this rotten legacy, accumulated in this format during the last twelve years. The answer is to allow this pentagonal format to with-er on the vine, so to speak, and to gradually transfer discussions of the most important issues into different channels: Moldova-Turkey, Moldova-U.S., Moldova-Uzbekistan channels, and Moldova-U.S. channels. Then after some time passes, we could combine those channels together into a new format. The same is true for South Ossetia, where the same pentagonal format that exists in Moldova isolates Georgia. The answer should be similar.

With respect to Abkhazia, the transition to a new format would be more difficult because the UN is already involved. The Friends of Georgia have accepted the invitation to act together with Russia and Georgia in that nominal UN process, the Geneva Process, that does not really have any practical effect. It exists, though, in practice.

In my view, the best answer with respect to Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts would be U.S. mediation and involvement in all the arrangements of the most important issues into different channels: Russia-U.S., Russia-Azerbaijan, Russia-Armenia to begin with. As for Abkhazia, the triangular format currently in place is the best answer, to begin with. As for Nagorno-Karabakh, the triangular format currently in place is the best answer, to begin with. As for Abkhazia, the triangular format currently in place is the best answer, to begin with. As for Nagorno-Karabakh, the triangular format currently in place is the best answer, to begin with.
But more than 200,000 are not deployable. So we cannot faces a shortage of deployable forces for the purposes of general (and, of course, the United States in particular) would prolong the Russian Federation’s peacekeeping commitments in the Balkans, hypothetical operations in the Greater Middle East, and contingency planning for the Black Sea region. And we should defend their interests and their personal partnership dialogues with NATO. The EU last year seemed on the verge of becoming a peacekeeping actor in the Black Sea region, and planned a peacekeeping consolidation operation in Moldova. This agreement means that EU peacekeeping operations would use NATO assets, which usually come from the NATO level, but actually are U.S.-provided assets. This arrangement ensures a measure of U.S. control over the planning and conduct of EU operations. This is the basis for how the EU is taking over in Bosnia and has taken over in Macedonia.

So, U.S. approval was secured on that basis, but the proposal was shut down by the French, German, and Italian governments not literally, but by an overwhelming set of calculations for bilateral relations with the Russian Federation. So, the initiative from the EU was put aside. It formally was “on the table”, but actually was blocked by the three governments. The Black Sea region is at lower risk and would like to make the case for peacekeeping or peace consolidation efforts in the Black Sea region. And I would like to make the case for peacekeeping or peace consolidation efforts in the Black Sea region by NATO, clearly with U.S. participation and, hopefully, under U.S. command. The Black Sea region is at lower risk and would require lower-cost operations, unlike the operations in Afghanistan. In other words, an operation in Black Sea region would truly be payoffs of global importance. By consolidating this region and engaging it into the Euro-Atlantic world, we could obtain permanent access to the Greater Middle East and Central Asia, and secure permanently the transit routes for Caspian oil and gas, which will be crucial to Europe’s energy balance in the years ahead.

NATO will hold a summit in late June of this year in Athens. In NATO, peacekeeping is not allowed to fail. And I think, once again, we need to address this. If NATO in general (and, of course, the United States in particular) faces a shortage of deployable forces for the purposes of peacekeeping. But as far as our European allies are concerned, this shortage is artificial and ought to be very temporary, if our allies are serious in finding a remedy.

For a year ago Germany, this country has more than 200,000 troops in uniform, standing forces that are not deployable. Germany at present deploys, I think, 10,000 troops in various operations in the Balkans and other regions.

But more than 200,000 are not deployable. So we cannot really talk about deployable forces as long as the great bulk of forces are not deployable because of under-spending on the Black Sea region.

То is why I am convinced that the Russian Federation should get its peacekeeping consolidation operation in Moldova. And I am hoping that this operation will be crucial to Europe’s energy balance in the years ahead. NATO should hold a summit in late June of this year in Istanbul. Major decisions may be taken into consideration
EXPERT'S OPINION

Action Plans (IPAPs) of a type that would pave the way for a gradual attraction when the Baltic states and then with the Balkan states, the dual candidacies of three small and vulnerable countries.

The strategy for NATO can and should be developed in two stages. The stage that, in my view, should be ushered in at the Istanbul summit is the anchoring of Georgia and Azerbaijan to NATO, in response to their stated aspirations. This anchoring can be done through strong IPAPs, opening the way to MAPs at the next stage and for some sort of security assurances. Some influential Azerbaijani policymakers are talking about the desirability of Article 4 type security assurances short of Article 5 guaranties, naturally. We ought to be more enthusiastic in promoting anchoring Georgia and Azerbaijan to NATO, while all the while keeping the door open to Armenia.

For conclusion, I would like to mention a matter that could become very prominent on the agenda of the NATO summit, which is closely connected to the frozen conflicts in our region-not directly, but indirectly. This is the question of preventing the Treaty of Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and Russia's Istanbul commitments from dissolving. Major NATO actors are not yet certain whether they will include these issues in the NATO summit agenda, and if so, in what way. I suspect that this will not be determined perhaps until the very last moment or perhaps until the very start of the Istanbul summit.

But the situation is as follows. At the OSCE summit in 1999 (the last summit the OSCE was ever able to hold), the adapted CFE Treaty was approved. This treaty, in case it is ratified, will legally bind once ratified by the states-parties. At the same time, as part of the same package of the CFE Treaty, the Istanbul commitments of the Russian Federation were adopted at the OSCE summit of 1999. What does this mean for Georgia and Armenia?

In Moldova, the Russian Federation had to remove all treaty-limited equipment by 2001 and withdraw all troops completely and unconditionally by 2002. But most of the Russian Federation's Fourteenth Army, including treaty-limited equipment by 2001 and non-treaty-limited equipment by 2001 and withdraw all troops completely and unconditionally by 2002. In 1999 (the last summit the OSCE was ever able to hold), the adapted CFE Treaty was approved. This treaty, in case it is ratified, will legally bind once ratified by the states-parties. At the same time, as part of the same package of the CFE Treaty, the Istanbul commitments of the Russian Federation were adopted at the OSCE summit of 1999. What does this mean for Georgia and Armenia?

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Ashton B. Carter is Ford Foundation Professor of Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. Prior to his appointment to the Defense Science Board, he served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, where he was responsible for national security policy concern-
ing the states of the former Soviet Union (including their nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction), arms control, counterproliferation worldwide, export controls, and over-
sight of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and missile defense programs; he also chaired NATO’s High Level Group. He was twice award-
ed the Department of Defense Distinguished Service Medal, the highest award given by the Pentagon. Carter continues to serve DoD as an advisor to the Secretary of Defense and as a consult-
ant to DoD’s Science Defense Board. From 1998 to 2000, Carter served in an official capacity as Senior Advisor to the North Korea Policy Review, chaired by William J. Perry. Before his government service, Carter was director of the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government and chair of the editorial board of International Security. Carter received bachelor’s degrees in physics and in medieval history from Yale University and a doctorate in theoretical physics from Oxford University, where he was a Rhodes Scholar. Carter’s current research focuses on the Preventive Defense Project, which designs and promotes security policies aimed at preventing the emergence of major new threats to the United States.

Richard Cooper is Maurits C. Boas Professor of International Economics at Harvard University. From 1963-1976 he taught at Yale University. He is a member of the Tri
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director of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (1992-93). He served in the U.S. army, and after his military service, he taught at the London School of Economics as a Marshall Scholar, and earned his Ph.D. at Harvard University. His most recent books include Boom, Crisis, and Adjustment (with others) and Environment and Resource Policies for the World Economy.

Douglas Feith is the Under Secretary for Defense for Policy. His responsibilities include the formulation of defense planning guidance and forces policy, Department of Defense relations with foreign countries and the Department’s role in U.S. Government interagency policy making. Before President George W. Bush appointed him in July 2001, Mr. Feith was for twelve years the dean of the graduate school at George Washington, D.C. law firm of Feith & Zell, P.C. From March 1984 until September 1986, Mr. Feeth served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Negotiations Policy. Before becoming Deputy Assistant Secretary, Mr. Feith served as Special Counsel to Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle. Mr.
Feith returned to the Pentagon to work for the National Security Council in 1981. Feith received his J.D. degree from Harvard Law School in 1972. He has worked on international law and foreign policy in Congress, in the Pentagon, and on the White House staff. Feith has contributed hundreds of articles to books, journals, and newspapers, and has appeared hundreds of times on television and radio.

Michael Ignatieff
Michael Ignatieff is the author of a dozen books on war and society. He has traveled to, lived in, and worked extensively in 25 countries, and has lectured at over 200 universities and colleges, on four continents. He has been a fellow at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, the Harvard Black Sea Security Program, the Centre d’études et de recherches internationales, the London School of Economics, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.

Elizabeth Jones
Ambassador Elizabeth Jones was sworn in as Assistant Secretary for European Affairs on May 31, 2001. She served previously as Senior Advisor for Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy after having served in several capacities in the Middle East, South Asia, Europe and Germany. She was Deputy Chief of Mission in Bonn, Germany (1992-93) and in Islamabad, Pakistan (1988-92). She headed the Economic Section of the United States Mission in West Berlin (1985-88). She served as Deputy Principal Officer in the U.S. Interests Section in Baghdad, Iraq (1979-80).

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David Makovsky
David Makovsky is a fellow at The Washington Institute and director of the Institute’s Project on America, Israel, and the Peace Process. He comes to Washington as an award-winning journalist who has covered the Middle East more than 180 times in the last ten years. He is also the editor of the 18th Annual Washington Institute Policy Study, “The Middle East: From Anarchy to Authority.”

George Joulwan
General George A. Joulwan is President of ONE TEAM, Inc., a strategic consulting firm, and sits on several corporate boards of directors. He was a Second Lieutenant in Germany during the Cold War when the Berlin Wall was built and a Lieutenant General commanding V Corps in the Field’s Gap in Germany when the Berlin Wall and Iron Curtain were torn down. During his six years in Washington he served in the Pentagon for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and was Executive Officer for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the White House he was Special Assistant to the President of the United States. General Joulwan also served from 1990-93 as the Commander-in-Chief (CINCUS) of US forces in Central and South America. His final assignment, from October 1993 to July 1997, was as the Commander-in-Chief, United States European Command (CINCEUR) and as the 11th Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) since General Eisenhower. He was the architect of the Bosnia operation and for 18 months was the overall military coordinator for the Washington-based Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Forces (SFOR/SIFOR) implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement. He was directly involved in establishing the Partnership for Peace program and was the first Director of the Partnership Coordination Cell at SHAPE in Mons, Belgium. General Joulwan is a distinguished professor at the National Defense University and was the former Den Professor for National Security Studies at the United States Military Academy at West Point. He currently serves on the Defense Policy Board, President’s Board on Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense Regional Centers Committee, and the Joint Military Intelligence College Advisory Board. He is on the Executive Committee of the Council on Foreign Relations and on a panel on the Council on Foreign Relations.
Joseph Nye
Joseph S. Nye, Jr. is the Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He received his bachelor’s degree in Government at Harvard University in 1956. He also worked in three government agencies. From 1977 to 1979, Mr. Nye served as Deputy to the Under Secretary of State for Security Forces and Policy of the National Security Council and the Chief of the National Security Council Group on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In 1993 and 1994, he was chairman of the National Intelligence Council, which coordinates intelligence estimates for the President. In 1994 and 1995, he served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. A Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and of the Academy of Diplomacy. Mr. Nye has also been a Senior Fellow of the Aspen Institute, Director of the Aspen Strategic Group, and a member of the Executive Committee of the Trilateral Commission. He has served as a Director of the Institute for West-East Security Studies, a member of the advisory committee of the Institute of International Economics, and the American representative on the United Nations Advisory Committee on Disarmament. He has been a Trustee of Wells College and Radcliffe College. In addition to teaching at Harvard, Mr. Nye also taught at the University of Geneva, Oxford, and London. He is an honorary fellow of Exeter College. Oxford. He has lived for extended periods in Europe, East Africa, Central America, and traveled to more than 90 countries.

Ernest May
Ernest R. May is a professor of history at the University of Washington. He joined the Harvard University faculty in 1971. He was a member of the council of the Foreign Relations of a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He has been a consultant at various times to the Office of the Secretary, the National Security Council, the National Intelligence Council, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Smithsonian Institution, and committees of the Congress. He is a member of the Board of Visitors of the Joint Military Intelligence College. In addition to teaching undergraduate courses on the Cold War and the Vietnam War and undergraduate and graduate courses on the history of international relations, Professor May teaches in the John F. Kennedy School of Government courses on reasoning and policy-making.

Jennifer Moroney
Dr. Jennifer D.P. Moroney, Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation, primarily manages projects for the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Intelligence Community. Currently, she is leading two projects and supporting several others that focus on such issues as cyberspace, network-centric warfare, WMD proliferation, the EU, and NATO. She also oversees regional security projects for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Dr. Moroney previously worked at RAND, where she was responsible for NATO-Russia/Ukraine portfolio. She was a NATO Fellow from 1999-2001, a short-term scholar at the Kennan Institute in 1999, and a Rotary International Scholar from 1997-1998. She is currently an adjunct professor and Research Associate in the Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University, and a frequent speaker at academic and professional conferences in the US and Europe. Dr. Moroney received her Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Kent at Canterbury, United Kingdom in 2000.

Brenda Shaffer
Brenda Shaffer is Research Director of the Caspian Studies Program at Harvard Kennedy School of Government. She received her Juris Doctor from Harvard Law School in 1986 and her B.A. from the University of Michigan in 1981. She joined the faculty at Harvard in 1995 and currently teaches courses on Central Asia and the Caucasus and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Prior to coming to Harvard, she was a Senior Fellow of the Aspen Institute, Director of the Aspen Strategic Group, a member of the Executive Committee of the Trilateral Commission. She has served as a Director of the Institute for West-East Security Studies, a member of the advisory committee of the Institute of International Economics, and the American representative on the United Nations Advisory Committee on Disarmament. She has been a Trustee of Wells College and Radcliffe College. In addition to teaching at Harvard, she also taught at the University of Geneva, Oxford, and London. She is an honorary fellow of Exeter College. Oxford. She has lived for extended periods in Europe, East Africa, Central America, and traveled to more than 90 countries.

BIOGRAPHIES OF SPEAKERS
James Sherr

James Sherr is a Fellow of the Conflict Studies Research Centre, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. (The CSRC, until 1993 the Soviet Studies Research Centre, conducts independent, unclassified research on the basis of primary—and largely Russian language—sources.) He is also Lecturer in International Relations of Lincoln College, Oxford, a Consultant to NATO on Ukraine and was a Specialist Adviser to the House of Commons Defence Committee during the last parliament. He is the author of approximately 100 publications on Russia, Ukraine and European security. Born in New York in 1951, Mr. Sherr holds British and US citizenship. He graduated from Montclair High School (New Jersey) in 1969 and in 1974 received a BA summa cum laude from Oberlin College (Ohio). Following several years as a post-graduate student, he became a tutor and supervisor at St. Catherine’s College, Oxford. In 1983 he was appointed Director of Studies at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, London. Since 1995, his primary responsibility at CSRC Sandhurst has been to inform the Ministry of Defence, NATO, EU and other interested parties about Ukraine’s development, external relations and security. To this end, he has made approximately 40 visits to Ukraine. He plays an active part in NATO led discussions, the UK/Ukraine Ministry of Defence Programme of Cooperation, as well as a range of projects initiated by Ukrainian official bodies and NGOs. He has been published extensively in Ukrainian journals, and the Atlantic Council of Ukraine has published a two volume anthology of his articles. He also collaborates with the Moscow Carnegie Center and the Geographical Institute, St. Petersburg State University, on Ukraine.

András Simonyi

Ambassador András Simonyi is Hungary’s Ambassador to the United States. Ambassador Simonyi is a career diplomat and an expert in trans-Atlantic relations, European security policy, military reform, and NATO enlargement issues. He has served in numerous high-level posts in the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including the first Hungarian Permanent Representative to the NATO Council, the Head of the Hungarian Liaison Office to NATO in Brussels, and the Head of the Ministry’s Nordic Department. Ambassador Simonyi was intimately involved with NATO’s campaign in Kosovo, the IFOR/SFOR operation in Bosnia, Hungary’s admission to NATO, and the so-called Central European Initiative. Before being appointed to his current position in 2002, Ambassador Simonyi ran his own consulting company, Danison, Ltd. In addition to his native Hungarian, Ambassador Simonyi speaks English, Danish, German, Dutch and French.

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Vladimir Socor is Senior Fellow of the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies (IASPS), based in Washington, DC, and a columnist for Wall Street Journal Europe. He formerly was a senior research analyst with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in Munich, and prior to that a professor of history and political science. He currently writes for The Jamestown Foundation from Munich. His concentration entails the non-Russian former republics of the USSR, CIS affairs and ethnic conflicts.

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