DEAR READERS:

We offer for your attention the first annual publication on Black Sea Security. In its pages you will find presentations made by world-renowned experts during the 2002 Harvard Black Sea Security Program in Brasov (Romania), Cambridge (USA) and Sevastopol (Ukraine).

The program began in 2001 with the goal of encouraging a regional security system based on cooperation and integration. It is unique in its mission to bring together leading policy makers in the Black Sea region with senior US officers to gain a deeper understanding of issues affecting the region and to encourage problem solving in areas of common interest. The program involves representatives from nine regional countries—Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Turkey and Ukraine—and a delegation of general officers from the United States.

The program aims to:

- Deepen participants’ understanding of global and regional strategy, defense organization, and military reform and restructuring;
- Identify the broad common areas of agreement that exist among the Black Sea nations and expose their these nations’ officials and the American participants to the strong common history and shared values in the region;
- Highlight the specific areas of current cooperation on issues of vital interest to these countries and, at the same time, identify those issues which divide them and present challenges to regional cooperation;
- Expose the regional participants to the free flow of ideas inherent in the pluralistic American system and within the American national security community by engaging them with policy makers who represent a wide range of viewpoints.

The 2002 program hosted 25 regional representatives and 12 US general officers. The regional delegation began the program in Brasov, where the Romanian Ministry of National Defense worked jointly with Harvard to organize a seminar entitled Risks, Challenges and Opportunities in a Time of Transformation. The regional delegates continued on to Cambridge, where they joined the US participants for a nine-day curriculum at the Kennedy School that focused on security issues ranging from energy and international trade to the global war on terrorism. A highlight of the program was a seminar featuring the Minister of Defense of Moldova, Victor Gaiciuc; the Minister of Defense of Georgia, David Tevzadze; the State Secretary of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Victor Bannikh; and the Armenian Ambassador to the United States, Armen Kirakossian.

The 2003 Black Sea Security Program is tentatively scheduled for May 10-25.

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The first characteristic is a new structure of global politics which reduces new lines of conflicts and promotes cooperation among states. During the Cold War, we had a bipolar international system with two superpowers. Now there is only one superpower. Much debate, however, goes on as to whether today’s world is unipolar, multipolar or something else. I would argue that it is neither, but rather a combination of the two. It is a hybrid that one might call a uni-multi-polar system. And this means, I think, two things. First, there is a single super power which is usually able to veto action against a combination of other states. Second, however, the resolution of key international issues requires action not just by the single superpower, but also by some combination of other major states.

Talking about this uni-multi-polar world, it is useful to think of the global power structure as having four lev-
The top three levels of power. If one thinks in terms of this are as important to global politics as the remaining countries, some of which might be called secondary regional powers. The remaining levels contain the secondary powers, includes Britain in its relation to the German and French combination; Ukraine in relation to Russia; Japan and Vietnam in relation to China; Pakistan in relation to India; Saudi Arabia in relation to Iran; Egypt in relation to Israel; Argentina in relation to Brazil; and, perhaps, some other secondary regional powers. The remaining levels contain the remaining countries, some of which are as important to global politics as the top three levels of power.

If one thinks in terms of this structure of global power, it can generate both cooperation between and competition among these countries. When there were only two superpowers, they quite obviously were rivals. As the situation dictated, other rivalries were built within that situation, which can be indicated by thinking of this in terms of three levels (superpower, major regional powers and secondary regional powers).

As the only superpower, the US has global interests and actively promotes them in every region of the world. This, however, brings it into conflict with the major regional powers that view the US as an intruder, and believe they should play a dominant role in determining what’s going on in their region. Natural rivalry exists between the US and the principal regional powers. Within each region, secondary regional powers do not want to be dominated by the major regional powers, and they try to restrict the ability of the major regional powers to shape events in that region. These natural rivalries, deriving from the structure of power, do create the basis for cooperation between the US on the one hand, and the secondary regional powers on the other. Both are interested in curbing the influence of the major regional powers. Thus, to curb China, the US is strengthening its alliance with Japan by supporting Japanese military capabilities. The US maintains its special relationship with Britain, which provides leverage against the emerging power of the United Europe. With the emergence of Brazil as the dominant regional state in Latin America, US relations with Argentina (which have historically been quite antagonistic) are now greatly improved, making Argentina one of America’s closest non-NATO allies. The US also maintains close cooperation with Saudi Arabia in order to counter Iran’s power in the Gulf. Some of these circumstances have ended and others have not, but now an increasing cooperation exists between the US and secondary regional powers.

There is one interesting element in this respect, which relates to actions taken following September 11. The major regional powers that the Bush administration has defined as contractors to wage war on terrorism have, to a large extent, been successful, as has the Bush administration and to varying degrees Russia, China, India, Iran, and Israel. The interesting question is this: To what extent will this cooperation continue, or will the natural rivalry existing in a power structure reassert itself? In some cases, this has already happened. Iran is an important passive collaborator in dealing with Al Qaeda and the Taliban. As soon as the Taliban was defeated, Iran immediately began trying to expand its influence into Afghanistan, undermining the government that the US was trying to establish there. China has its own form of cooperation in the war on terrorism, although it is still concerned about the terrorist activities in Sinchan province in Western China. Russia is still cooperating, although its capabilities are limited. I would suspect that this cooperation, which has resulted from a sense that we share a common enemy, will continue to disintegrate because, in fact, terrorists are not our common enemies. Each of these countries has its own enemy that it is concerned with, whether these are the Chechens, Kashmiris, Palestinians, or others. Consequently, there is very little basis for sustaining that cooperation. These are local conflicts for the US, which is primarily concerned with global terrorist networks, not local ones. I therefore suspect that this partnership will gradually unravel.

The second major characteristic in the global strategic environment (which I discussed in my book The Clash of Civilizations) is that culture has replaced ideology in shaping the identities, affinities and antagonisms of peoples and states. I think it is clear that the most important distinctions among peoples today are not political or ideological or economic; they are culture. People almost everywhere define their
identity in terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs, and institutions. They identify themselves with culture, tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities, nations and civilizations. In this emerging world, local politics is the politics of ethnicity, while global politics is the politics of civilizations that create larger countries in the world-countries made of eight different civilizations. The world-countries made of eight different civilizations. The countries with the second largest economies come from five different civilizations, and the most important are groupings of countries that are, I would argue, the world’s major civilizations.

The West has been and will remain the dominant civilization during the next century, yet some relative powers are occurring as a result of demographic and economic factors-Islam, etc. We see that China and other Asian societies are increasing their role and power in world affairs. Almost everywhere, however, we see the increasing impact of cultural ties between societies that have some cultural commonalities. Old antagonisms that existed during the Cold War lead to the development of new relationships between countries with similar cultures.

Let me emphasize, however, that I am not arguing that culture explains everything in the world of politics. It is simply a good place from which to start. And as one looks at the resurgence of culture and religion as important factors in world politics, one has to be struck by the fact that nowhere has this been more dramatically manifested than in the Muslim world. Surely, one of the most significant social, cultural and political developments in the past decade has been the resurgence of the Islamic conscience; movements and identity among Muslim people exist almost everywhere. In large part, this Islamic resurgence is a response to modernization and globalization, and involves immense numbers of people and organizations. Islamic organizations in country after country have moved in to meet the needs of urban Muslims while providing social support, guidance, welfare, health care, education, and all of the services which Muslim governments often have not provided for their people. In addition, in many Muslim societies the Islamic fundamentalists are the principal opposition movements to pariah, repressive regimes. Moreover, this Islamic resurgence has generated extremists, who express their identity through violence against non-Muslims. They are often unable to express their opposition effectively against their own governments. The Muhajadeens that fought against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan were the core of the group that repeatedly proclaimed it wanted to defeat one superpower. They are now anxious to take down the other. These people often embrace the ultimate wing of Islam that is not shared by the great majority.

In terms of the impact of cultural civilizations and global politics, different groups of countries and different civilizations reacted to the event of September 11. During the 1990s, as a result of this natural rivalry deriving from the global power structure, Europe and America were apart, and there was great concern expressed on both sides of the Atlantic by the increasing controversies and rivalry between the EU and the US. After September 11, the governments and people of the EU became sympathetic and supported the US, rushing in with the Americans for the war on terrorism. This was particularly true for those societies that were closest to the US culturally (Britain, Canada, Australia), who very quickly provided military forces to fight alongside with American forces in the war in Afghanistan. In addition, French, German and other European people have naturally identified themselves with the US and the effort to deal with the terrorist networks. They tend to see the attacks on the US as attacks on themselves.

Among non-western and non-Muslim civilizations-particularly Russia, China, India and Japan-there was another reaction to the attacks of September 11. Their reactions were much more moderate, as were the expressions of sympathy and support. Several of these countries nevertheless cooperated deeply in the war on terrorism, but not to the extent of the European countries. As far as Muslim governments are concerned, almost all of them condemned the terrorist attacks, since those attacks represented a threat from Muslim extremist groups that opposed their own regimes. But they very quickly became increasingly critical of the American military response, and in most Muslim countries the reaction of the populace was divided initially and has become increasingly anti-American. The factors of culture and civilization very directly played a role in influencing the extent to which countries responded to terrorism last year, and the ways in which they responded.

I have been talking about the role of cultural factors and civilization factors in influencing the strate-
The most dangerous conflicts are likely to occur between the countries where the differences of civilization coincide with differences in power. US relations with EU, Brazil and, possibly, Israel are likely to be less antagonistic than US relations with Russia, China, India and Iran.

Kissinger said a few years ago: "What number do you call if you want to talk to Islam? Do you call Cairo, Er-Riad, Ankara, Tehran, Isalmabad, Jakarta or where?" The lack of dominant powers is why division within the Muslim world causes problems for the rest of the world.

Finally, in terms of the role of Muslims in reducing conflicts, the most important factor (which I also mentioned in my book) is that most Muslim societies have large numbers of people between the ages of 16 and 30. People in this age range generally have a secondary or technical education. They are often unemployed and tend either to migrate to the West or join fundamentalist organizations and political parties, Muslim guerrilla groups, and terrorist networks. Young males are the principal provocateurs of violence in all societies, and they exist between communal groups. During the 1990s there were 110 major armed conflicts in which thousands of people were killed. Only seven of those were interstate wars. All the rest were civil wars usually involving conflicts between groups of different culture, ethnicity or religion. We are living in an age that seems to be dominated by conflicts, and to a large degree they involve tension between Muslims and non-Muslims.
in especially large numbers in Muslim societies. The percentage of males between the ages of 15 and 24 is much higher in Muslim countries than in the US or the EU. There is a clear correlation between a large percentage of young people and political instability, rebellion and revolution in these countries. Overall, the Muslim world has about 20% of its population in this age range. This percentage is changing in some countries; in the Balkans, the breech has virtually disappeared. Unfortunately, in most Arab countries—particularly in Saudi Arabia—the percentage of young males is still very high and will cause potential instabilities and conflicts for the years to come.

Turning now to your area of the world, one can say that in terms of culture and civilization, the dividing line between the Muslim world and Orthodox civilizations runs straight through the Black Sea region. And a number of conflicts have occurred in that region between Muslims on the one hand, and non-Muslims on the other. Some of them are still going on. The central feature to note, which is significant in Black Sea security issues as well, is the Russian position as the major regional power. Ukraine, Georgia, Uzbekistan and, perhaps, Turkey are secondary regional powers that often wish to limit Russian dominance. As the major regional power, Russia quite naturally attempts to use its control over energy resources and pipelines to influence other states, to encourage dissident movements in other countries, to maintain its military presence in many countries in the region, and to pursue active diplomacy with such countries as Iran, China and India in order to counter-balance influence in the region.

Defining the relations of the Black Sea countries with Russia is a crucial key to security in the Black Sea area. How these relations will be defined is decisively affected by the relations between Russia and the US. Until recently, there were many issues existing between them: NATO expansion, Russia’s relation to NATO, Russia’s arms and technology export to countries like Iraq and Iran, the control of Russian nuclear weapons, oil development, the location of pipelines, human rights, and the war in Chechnya. All of these issues create problem for relations between the US and Russia. The war on terrorism provided some bases for cooperation, and cooperation is continuing, with President Putin making a very broad effort to improve relations between Russia and the West, particularly the US.

One can see the impact of these changing relations in the US. Criticism of Russia with respect to the war in Chechnya has virtually disappeared in American discussions. But there are indications that the questions of rivalry will resume and some difficulties may appear between the US and Russia. So far, however, the two nations seem to be working in agreement. The relationship between Russia and NATO lies in the method through which Russia will be consulted and invited to participate in NATO decisions. Russia has explicitly withdrawn its objections to the expansion of NATO, at least to Slovenia and the Baltic states. Therefore, we are in a period of good relations between Russia and the West. I hope that this will lead to an improvement in relations between Russia and your countries.

I may be wrong, but I sense there have been two different tendencies in this regard. Some countries (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan from the CIS, plus Greece) have rather close relations with Russia and have oriented themselves toward it. This displays dramatic global changes: Greece, as an ally, has become closer to Russia than to NATO. On the other hand, other countries have become secondary regional powers and others have been more skeptical of Russia. They are tied together by the GUUAM organization, and have in a variety of ways attempted to reduce their dependence upon Russia for oil, and are building proper and quite natural counterbalances. It would be highly desirable for the different tendencies in the Black Sea region to reconcile. All the countries of the region have some reasons to be apprehensive about Russia, but they will have a need to cooperate with Russia.

The following would be desirable for the Black Sea countries:

1) Securing their sovereignty, freedom of action, and economic well-being;
2) Collaborating with one another in security issues and other areas, creating an organization broader than GUUAM;
3) Deepening their cooperation with the US to promote common interests, regional stability, economic reform, and development.

Achieving this collaboration and balance will not be easy, but as long as relations between the US and Russia remain reasonably good, it is possible to make progress in this direction.
Security perceptions and sensitivities in the Black Sea region:

a Turkish perspective

Mrs. Emel Gulden Osmancavusoglu, Professor, Hacettepe University, Turkey

In this paper, I would like to look at the Black Sea region more from a political and economic perspective than from a military perspective and try to raise some questions concerning Turkey’s position vis-a-vis the recent changes in the region. This paper will focus on how regional relations have evolved since the disintegration of the Soviet Union and how Turkey views relates to this region in terms of larger interests.

It is widely accepted that the disintegration of the Soviet Union marked a turning point in Black Sea politics and Black Sea regional developments. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of Soviet Union together drastically changed the strategic environment of the Black Sea region.

One of the most important consequences of the ending of the Cold War has been the transformation of several regions of the world into highly autonomous subsystems in their own right. Two immediate examples are the Balkans and the Caucasus. While, during the Cold War, these regions had been completely stripped of their political and historical personality, today they are fully capable of interacting with the global system and constructing their own ecosystems (considering them as living mechanisms in their own right).

Obviously, the emergence of local conflicts already rooted in interethnic tensions and their indispensable impact on the regional geopolitical balances was just one of the problems that the countries in these regions had to deal with in the post-Cold war era. Fortunately, the
The disappearance of Soviet threat had caused enormous loss of strategic value for Turkey in the eyes of Western allies. It has also contributed to the exclusion of Turkey from the process of European integration.

Similarly, Turkey’s security perceptions have changed dramatically. The strategic withdrawal of Soviet power and collapse of communism in Eastern Europe had an immediate and drastic affect on Turkey. First of all, Turkey is geographically adjacent to the regions where change has been most noticeable. The country also has powerful historical, cultural, and ethnic bonds with the peoples in many neighboring lands that have suddenly found themselves freed from communism and both Soviet and Russian hegemony. Furthermore, the centuries-old common Turkish-Russian border is gone, a development of historic significance for Turkish security policy.

The fragmentation of power in the region surrounding Turkey is directly linked to the strategic withdrawal of the Soviets. The monolithic power of Moscow on the northern and eastern shores of the Black Sea is gone and the littoral is now divided among Ukraine (with the largest part), Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Further to the east, Turkic-speaking republics in Central Asia have been freed from 150 years Russian rule. Except for Armenia, all the newly independent former Soviet republics in the south share several common attributes with Turkey including ethnicity, language, culture, and history.

In the Balkans, too, an entirely new regional political and military landscape emerged. Fully capturing the spirit of the new geopolitics Graham Fuller remarks that "without history and psychology... the Balkans is meaningless. It is language and myth, not rivers, mountains or raw materials that link the Turkish shores of the Mediterranean to the shores of Lake Baikal over the rivers of Western China- in the real political sense".

On the other hand, the disappearance of the Soviet threat had caused enormous loss of strategic value for Turkey in the eyes of Western allies. It has also contributed to the exclusion of Turkey from the process of European integration.

If the acute awareness of geo-strategic importance of Turkey’s location, inherent fragility of Turkey’s relations with its neighbors given the legacy of history (most were under Ottoman rule) and the relative vulnerability of its ideology of westernization, modernization, and commitment to a liberal political regime faced with deeply-rooted hostility to subservience to the West were taken as the three basic assumptions that have exerted profound and sustained influence on Turkish foreign and security policy choices since the establishment of the republic in 1923, it is obvious that the recent systemic changes would be an important factor in Turkey’s reformulation of its foreign and security policies.

As one leading security expert puts it: "only in times of deep structural change in the world system has Turkey’s strategy been redefined". For the most part, between 1923 and the end of the Second World War circumstances dictated an isolationist and neutral orientation. The end of the Second World War changed that drastically; Turkey joined the western alliance in order to protect itself against the Soviet threat and to safeguard and further consolidate its westernizing, modernizing domestic regime. Today, because the international system has been subjected to another radical structural transformation, Turkish strategy has again been redefined, this time in the direction of greater activism and involvement in regard to the issues and political affairs of surrounding regions.

Therefore, Turkey’s security concerns and sensitivities in the Black Sea region are as follows.

For years the Black Sea region had been viewed as distant frontier of the Western Security system, but now it is part of the Western security system. The recent and most obvious example of this is the so called "historic agreement" signed between Russia and NATO on May 28, 2002 on the creation of a new council giving Moscow a say in decision-making on important NATO security issues. As Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi indicated "the historic nature of this event is that it is the first step towards the total integration of the Russian Federation into the Atlantic Alliance." The new joint council will enable Russia to sit as an equal partner with the other 19 NATO nations and help formulate policy on specific security issues.

The Black Sea was once the place where Turkey felt the Russian threat the most. Now, Turkish security relies on the...
energy corridor the Black Sea provides. Security of the energy corridors is of utmost importance, especially for the transport of Caspian sea energy sources to Western markets. Baku-Supsa, Baku-Novorossisk, Blue Stream, Baku-Ceyhan pipeline is expected to be completed by the end of the year 2005. Although, the Black Sea is not exactly the place where the pipeline is going to be located, the security of Georgia, an important Black Sea littoral state, is a top concern of Turkey.

There are alternative projects for the transportation of Iranian gas to Europe via the Ukraine and Greece. Recently an agreement was signed between Turkey and Greece on the 28th of March 2002 for the construction of the pipeline connecting Iranian gas to Greece via Ankara. In addition, there are also plans for the construction of pipelines transporting Caspian Sea resources to Europe via Turkey and Greece.

Another important factor is the increasing cooperation between the Ukraine and the European Union. The coming to power of a pro-Western government in the Ukraine would mean a lot for Turkey since especially our Ukraine (Nasa Ukraina) is known for its ideas on letting the Crimean Tatars back into their homes and closer co-operation with Turkey in the area. On the other hand, Kuchma’s “For a United Ukraine” will need some sort of a cooperation with our Ukraine in order to establish the government. But, overall Ukraine probably continues to follow a balanced policy towards the West and the Russia.

Turkey supports NATO’s next round of enlargement including the Baltic States, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria. Romania and Bulgaria have unexpectedly catapulted into serious consideration for membership in NATO because of the post September 11 strategic importance of the Black Sea, which could provide a military platform for any widening of the US war against terrorism, according to US, NATO, and East European diplomats. Both Bulgaria and Romania opened up their air space unconditionally and offered the use of all and port facilities. Around twenty US military flights to and from Afghanistan pass over Romanian air space every day. In addition, Bulgarian and Romanian troops are serving as peacekeepers in Kabul and the Romanian government has also offered a specialized mountain unit for service. Both countries have tripled their presence in international peacekeeping missions in the Balkans to free up allied troops for Afghanistan. And a Romanian military facility in the Black Sea city of Constanza is about to become a staging ground for the rotation of US troops in and out of the Balkans and possibly other theaters. As the Romanian foreign minister Mircea Geoana said in an interview: “September 11th transformed the Black Sea into a natural springboard”. Also regarding Iraq, The Bulgarian foreign minister Solomon Passy said the “next time” the United States “asks for support, or needs support, Bulgaria will be an excellent ally”, Turkey and Greece have united behind the candidacies of Romania and Bulgaria, arguing that expansion in the south is critical to the regions security because of transnational crime and instability in places like Macedonia. Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit says “Turkey and Greece has interests in the preservation of the stability in the region” and “NATO expansion, can not be limited to Northern and Central Europe”.

On the other hand, for both geopolitical reasons and energy security, the West has a tangible and growing stake in promoting the security of the Caspian region as well as the stability, sovereignty and prosperity of the new states that emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Conflict and disorder in the South Caucasus and Central Asia could threaten the security and stability of surrounding areas, including Turkey, and affect the domestic evolution and external geopolitical alignments of such key countries as Russia, China, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, India and Afghanistan.

The security of the Turkish Straits is an important source of sensitivity for Turkey. Especially, increasing volume of oil tanker traffic and transportation of nuclear waste from countries such as Germany, Hungary, Korea, and Russia. Environmental security is an important issue that aroused concern for Turkey. Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation is trying to deal with these matters.

Blackseafort is an important creation for the security and cooperation in the Black Sea that Turkey greatly supports. Finally, it is estimated that at least for the next decade the countries of the Black Sea region will generally lack the means and the motivation to acquire weapons of mass destruction which is a favorable situation for Turkish security.

**LINKS**

3. Ibid., p. 72.
6. Ibid., pp. 75-76.
Since 1997, the commanders of all six Black Sea Navies -Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russian Federation, Turkey and Ukraine have decided to contribute to development of friendship and stability in the region by conducting annual meetings. These meetings have as their main aim increasing our Navies cooperation in various fields of activity.

The chiefs of the Navies taking part in these meetings have conducted open discussions on the agreed subjects, listened carefully to each other, and tried to find the best solutions for developing this co-operation. They analyzed the development of co-operation for education and training of the personnel, search and rescue at sea, hydrographic research, technical development, and naval logistics.

The idea of establishing a multinational “on-call” naval force in the Black Sea, with the participation of all littoral states, was brought forward for the first time at the Second Chiefs of the Black Sea Navies Meeting held in Varna, Bulgaria in 1998. This idea got strong support from the
Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Romanian Government, as well similar authorities from the five other littoral countries. The force was designed as a way to bring into life some of the proposed cooperation activities as they fight against dangers at sea, human life protection, and environmental protection.

Efforts of establishing the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group, BLACKSEAFOR, have continued to be the subject of ten meetings of the Experts Group composed of diplomats, naval officers, legal advisors, and other authorized personnel. They tried to harmonize many different opinions and legal provisions of the six littoral nations. It was extremely hard work, and thanks to all these experts, the mission was accomplished. Moreover, the during time working together, experts of Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Ministries of Defense and Navy officers was a real teamwork. It was also a good opportunity to get to know each other better and to enhance the relations among the six nation’s representatives. The signing of this agreement on the 2nd of April 2001 in Istanbul was a clear indication of the littoral states’ determination to bring the BLACKSEAFOR into life. By signing the BLACKSEAFOR agreement, the signatories confirmed that the purpose of this initiative is to contribute to strengthening of regional stability, friendship, good relationship, and mutual understanding among the Black Sea littoral states.

The Agreement enters into force when at least four signatories ratifies it. Until that moment BLACKSEAFOR can be activated only for exercises in order to increase the interoperability of the ships and to train the crews for accomplishing the established tasks. The BLACKSEAFOR agreement has been ratified by three states: Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania. Romanian Parliament ratified the agreement on the 29th of December 2001, and the President promulgated the ratification law.

For a better understanding of how BLACKSEAFOR is working I would like to emphasize some of the most important provisions of the Agreement. The democratic character of this document, which assures the long and fruitful life of this initiative, should also be noted. The BLACKSEAFOR was established in order to contribute to the further strengthening of friendship, good relations, and mutual confidence among the Black Sea littoral states, as well as to improve peace and stability in the region through the enhancement of co-operation and interoperability among the naval forces. The tasks of the BLACKSEAFOR are non military offensive ones: Search and Rescue, Humanitarian Assistance, Mine Countermesures, Environmental protection, Good will visits, any other tasks agreed by all the Parties. The BLACKSEAFOR may also be available for employment in operations mandated by the United Nations or the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The Decision making process is carried out through meetings of Foreign or Defense Ministers or their authorized representatives for political subjects and political aspects of BLACKSEAFOR activities. The Chiefs of General Staffs or their representatives carry out high-level military consultations. The Black Sea Navies Committee is the executive body for control, and overall guidance for the deployment, employment, and other activities of the BLACKSEAFOR. The ships assigned remain at their permanent home base locations, under full command of each Navy. They come togeth-

By signing the BLACKSEAFOR agreement, the signatories confirmed that the purpose of this initiative is to contribute to strengthening of regional stability, friendship, good relationship, and mutual understanding among the Black Sea littoral states.
The Black Sea Navies took an important step forward for strengthening the cooperation and good relations in the region. The experience of first activation period and also the good results of the preparation for the second one give us the certainty of a long and fruitful life of this organization in the benefit of all our countries and Navies.

participation of third state is taken by consensus by the Parties. English was established as the working language for the BLACKSEAFOR. The chain of command reflects the principles of this organization, and it also assures a good response to the military command and control demands. The Operational Control Authority, the commander of BLACKSEAFOR, the chief of staff and staff officers, are annually rotated in alphabetical order among the signatories.

Anyone can monitor all BLACKSEAFOR activity. There is an Internet web site having the address www.blackseafor.org containing the information related to the force. During the activation period, press conferences, meetings with local authorities of the visited ports, other public relations activities are organized, and press releases issued.

After a very intensive operational preparation, BLACKSEAFOR was activated for the first time between 28 September and 16 October 2001, and all six countries allocated one ship each to take part in the activation program. The official activation ceremony was held in the port of Golkuc, Turkey, in the presence of high level personalities, and Turkish Rear Admiral Nusret GUNER was appointed as the first commander of the BLACKSEAFOR. Next day, the group sailed in the Black Sea for the first period of training and official calls in the planned ports. All of us were proud seeing the same colors hoisted on board the ships - the BLACKSEAFOR flag. For the first time in history all six Black Sea Navies were represented in the same naval group by a war ship sailing and operating together. The 2001 activation program was mainly dedicated to make known the BLACKSEAFOR to citizens in all littoral countries and to test the capability of operating together six different nations’ ships. One port of each country was visited: Golkuc, Varna, Constanta, Odessa, Novorosisk, and Poti. There were 73 media representatives that attended press conferences, and 8 national and 10 local TV stations, as well as 14 radio stations from littoral countries promoting BLACKSEAFOR in their programs. There were 12 related newspaper articles published. In each port, contacts have been made with local authorities, 18 officials, and 29 diplomatic representatives were met. And they were not only from littoral states but also from other European and non-European countries, as India for example. Visitors on board BLACKSEAFOR ships were more then 2500 civilians. During the sea periods, various naval exercises were conducted in order to test the capability of the ships to operate jointly. Exercises for communication, maneuvering, search and rescue, and mine counter measures were conducted. All and all the ships sailed 190 hours, 1575 nautical miles and 10 days were spent in port visits. The ships proved to be in good condition at sea and accomplished the approved program despite of adverse weather.

The second BLACKSEAFOR activation is planned for this year between 5th and 28th August. The program has been already approved by the BSNC in April 2002, during the meeting held in Sevastopol. The host nation is Ukraine and Ukrainian Navy Captain Ihor Tenukh was designated and will be assigned as the commander of the force. The group visits the ports of Sevastopol, Istanbul, Constanta, Varna, and conducts a number of naval exercises.

Romania was represented in the 2001 activation by the corvette Adm. Horia Macellariu (265), one public relations officer in the staff on board of the Turkish flag ship, and one liaison officer from the Turkish Naval Headquarters. The commander of the BLACKSEAFOR really appreciated the Romanian ship’s crew and our naval officers for their professional work in the exercises. This year, the Romanian Navy is going to send to the force the minesweeper Slt. Alexandru Axente (30), one logistic officer in the staff on board of the Ukrainian flag ship, and one liaison officer from the Ukrainian Naval Headquarters.

Having all this information on the BLACKSEAFOR it is easy to conclude that the Black Sea Navies took an important step forward in strengthening the cooperation and good relations in the region. The experience of the first activation period and also the good results of the preparation for the second one give us the certainty of a long and fruitful life of this organization and the possible ways that all our countries’ and Navies can benefit.
Since the creation of the Stability Pact in June 1999, countries in the region have gone a long way. Governments in southeastern Europe are committed to Euro-Atlantic integration, market economy and regional co-operation, as well as the peaceful settlement of disputes. Moreover, the economies in SEE have started to show positive developments over the last two years. Private investment flows have recovered, and there is significant economic growth across the region. However, looking in particular at the Southern Balkans, serious security challenges still prevail. They require continued attention by the International community.

The Stability Pact’s greatest contribution to regional security is the building of an effective regional capability to cope with unconventional threats: terror-
ism, organized crime, corruption, trafficking of human beings and drugs, small arms and light weapons smuggling. In this regard, Working Table III has increasingly focused on the area of security sector reform, inter alia, as an addition to the Southeast Europe Initiative’s Common Assessment Paper on Regional Security Challenges (SEECAP). The term security sector includes: security, defense, justice, and home affairs initiatives.

The lack of security, for one state and for its citizens, is a major obstacle to political, social, and economic development.

Until very recently, while security assistance from foreign and defense ministries focused on traditional “train and equip” strategies, development agencies avoided involvement in security sector issues. Little attention has been paid to the appropriate roles of the security sector in the political and economic systems of countries receiving this assistance. It is now widely accepted in the international community that the lack of security, for one state and for its citizens, is a major obstacle to political, social, and economic development. To escape the downward spiral wherein insecurity, spreading crime and underdevelopment are mutually reinforcing, social, economic, governance, and security dimensions of the domestic environment must be addressed simultaneously. Central elements of the security sector reform process are:

- Strengthening civilian management of the security forces: Civilian management is the cornerstone of good governance in the security sector. Without strong and effective civilian institutions and credible and effective civilian leadership, security sector reform will not succeed. It is important to implement the accountability of the security forces to civilian authorities in all the Southeast European countries.

- Encouraging transparency in planning, management, and budgeting: While it is appropriate that some information about the security sector remain confidential, a great deal can be made public without compromising state security. A lack of transparency invariably undermines a country’s long-term economic and political stability more than transparency damages its security. Well-designed transparency measures can be a key factor in improving accountability and promoting responsible implementation of agreed norms and standards. Arrangements to enhance and expand the amount of relevant official information in the public domain will facilitate wider awareness and involvement in efforts to address problems, help increase accountability, and encourage responsible practice.

- Fostering an environment that promotes regional or sub-regional peace and security: Both governmental and nongovernmental actors have a role to play in reducing tension and enhancing mutual security so that local problems do not become exacerbated. Traditionally, security sector organizations have been unwilling to share information both with civilians and across borders. A well-informed civil society sector can play a crucial role in ensuring that security sector organizations are accountable and effective in protecting the national interest. Meanwhile, closer regional co-operation is supported by mutual trust and sharing of information, mainly on non-conventional risks and global threats that have to be approached by joint efforts.

- Prioritizing disarmament, combined with demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatant: These activities can improve the political and economic role of the military and provide an opening for civilian management. They can also make an important contribution to enhancing local and regional security by removing surplus weaponry from circulation. Southeast European countries’ armed forces have been largely reoriented away from domestic politics towards those tasks for which they are most appropriate: national sovereignty, collective defense, and UN or OSCE-mandated peace keeping operations. Efficient police forces are a key element in establishing the conditions for community security. At the same time, increased support is required for border guards and customs officers. Both areas benefit from a regional
approach or from increased bilateral and multilateral coordination and information sharing. Effective and impartial judicial and penal systems have a major role in reducing crime and decreasing the rate of recidivism. An independent and well-organized judicial system serves to protect newly won property rights, assists in the settlement of conflicting land and asset ownership claims, and contributes to community security.

While the development of appropriate laws and institutions is primarily a matter for the governments and people of each state, the international community should be ready to provide assistance and support in this area and to support information exchange and consultation on relevant experiences and good practice.

The European Commission designed the Stabilization and Association Process for the Western Balkans, which is a major contribution to the Stability Pact. Against this background, complementarities between the Stability Pact and the two main EU strategies towards the region, namely the Stabilization and the Association Process for the “Western Balkans” and the Accession Process for candidate countries that also participate in the Stability Pact (Romania and Bulgaria) need to be enhanced.

Viable solutions can only be achieved through enhanced local ownership. The active role of Southeast European countries in the Pact’s initiatives will be the main recipe for success. In this respect, its leadership’s functions should be transferred more and more to the region.

The very important perspective of the EU membership provides several key references, either from the acquis communautaire or more broadly from standards implemented by the EU member states. For example: Managing border control effectively is a key issue for Southeastern Europe. Many forms of organized crime benefit from the weakness of the system in terms of legal, institutional and logistical conditions. A genuine border control management that contains a strong component of well-equipped and well-trained border guard personnel and co-operation based on the experience of the EU, the UNHCR and the Council of Europe is important in this respect. In addition, the fight against corruption and organized crime in this region is very important for the Working Table, as well as for the international community. In order to streamline ongoing initiatives to fight organized crime, the Stability Pact will establish an executive secretariat in Bucharest to be operational in the region. The secretariat will help strengthen co-operation between the Bucharest-based SECI Regional Crime Center, Europol and Interpol and to assess the legal, institutional, and technical conditions for the exchange of information.

Another important gathering is SEEGROUP, which enjoys important comparative advantages that place it in a rather unique position in the regional security cooperation, including direct support from NATO, allies, and partners.

SEEGROUP has regular weekly sessions and comprehensive regional membership. Its members are all of the countries in the region, including Bosnia, Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which are not yet part of EAPC/PfP.

SEEGROUP currently focuses on three main directions: First, the implementation of the Southeast Europe Common Assessment Paper on Security Challenges (SEECAP) and the security sector reform; Second, the approach to asymmetric threats and related security issues, such as combating terrorism and border control; and third, facilitating coordination with other initiatives and bodies in the region, such as the Stability Pact, the Southeast Europe Defense Ministerial or SECI Center for Combating Trans-border crime.

SEECAP identifies the security challenges and opportunities of the region and strives to intensify and enhance the participants’ common and individual contributions to European security and stability. The first step of post-Milosevic Yugoslavia in towards rejoining the regional security framework was to participate to the SEECAP.

The exercise of south-eastern European Stability Pact and SEECAP prove that sub-regional initiatives can contribute effectively to development and human security across the region. To keep the momentum going, the South-east European countries should look into further concrete steps to promote and enhance regional co-operation where security and stability are natural parts of life in this too long-tormented environment.
In specific terms, the US Government is trying to help create new multiple pipelines for energy exports in the Caspian region, which instead of going south to north, will run in the east-west direction. Why does the US have this policy, and why does the US have ambassadors who are trying to help build these new pipelines?

There are a number of reasons. First of all, the US wants to help bring oil to the market in a cheaper, more efficient way. How much oil is there in the Caspian? If you read the newspaper accounts of five years ago, people were talking about a new Saudi Arabia. They were talking about a wall of money coming into the region. That forecast is over dramatic. Caspian oil represents about 4% of world oil supplies, but that 4% is very significant because it can play the same role in setting oil prices on the margin as the North Sea oil did in the 1970s. The US would like to bring that oil to the marketplace more cheaply for the global economy. There obviously are large commercial opportunities for US business, as well. ACG deposits in Azeri Shirak and Guneshli in Azerbaijan serve as an example. In the next few years, $50 billion in investment will go into these oil and gas deposits. But the fundamental reason to create these new pipelines is to strengthen the sovereignty and independence of the countries of the region. Right now, they are dependent on the Russian energy export system for exporting their oil and gas, and the US Administration believes this leads to an unpleasant economic, and in some cases political, effect. The US, therefore,
would like to give the countries of the region more options for their energy exports.

The Caspian region has very large reserves of oil and gas. In terms of actual numbers, the Caspian nations (led by Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan) have 25 billion barrels of proven reserves. That’s more than the US has, and 50% more than the North Sea has. Additionally, there are as many as 85 billion barrels in possible reserves. And there is one remarkable deposit, Kashagan, in the Kazakh portion of the Caspian Sea, which probably has about 26 billion barrels in its own right. This one deposit has more oil than all of the US. It will start producing oil in the year 2005. In terms of natural gas, its deposits are significant also. Central Asia has proven reserves of 6 trillion cubic meters of gas. Again, that is more than the US and the Northern Sea possess.

These are good reasons for the US government to pay attention to this area, and both the previous Administration and the Bush Administration have done exactly that. US policy toward the states of Central Asia and the Caucasus has been consistent and it rests on two basic facts. First, the US thinks that stable, democratic states from the old Soviet empire are in the best interests of the US as well as the international community. Second, it rejects the idea that the Caspian region is zero sum, that the US and Russia must be in competition in a new great game where the reward is dominance over Central Asia and the Caucasus.

As a necessary foundation for all of this, the US also is looking at economic development, which is also a necessary basis for national security. This is not a complex policy. We think that we and everyone else will be better off if these new nations are peaceful, democratic and prosperous. It brings us back to the oil pipelines and energy exports. A key to this prosperity would be finding ways for the region to export its energy resources.

The ten years since the end of the Soviet period have been difficult years for the local people. The Soviet system had a certain basic level of social protections and benefits, which have disappeared throughout the region without a suitable replacement. In Turkmenistan, for example, the economy continues to decline, no matter what the government statistics say. The uncertain pillars of the economy in this desert country are oil, gas, and agriculture. Oil and gas are making Turkmenistan good money—about $2 billion dollars a year—which is not bad for a country of 5 million people. According to analyses of the American Embassy, the government loses money in agriculture, yet the government continues to increase the harvest. This is the old “vypolnim plan” (former communist slogan: “Let’s fulfill the plan!”) mentality through which one measures success by the growth numbers, not by bottom line profitability. The energy resources coming in should be an indicator of real prosperity for the country, but they are not.

In varying degrees, this situation has been the case throughout Central Asia and the Caucasus. Why has good economic progress not occurred? It is worth looking at economic structure, because it relates so much to the issue of national security. We should ask ourselves what kind of economy we are putting energy profits into. What will happen after we get these energy profits? What would happen if these energy profits would come from the production of energy? From the transit of energy through the country? Looking at the reasons for slow economic progress, three reasons can be given as to why progress has been difficult: failure to invest, corruption, and insufficient law.

By failure to invest I mean failure to put revenues into productive enterprises. In Turkmenistan there is decorative investment, but not as much in productive enterprises such as education and healthcare. It is not an easy test to build a new economy. The US

In actual number terms, the Caspian nations led by Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have 25 billion barrels of proven reserves. That’s more than the USA has, and 50% more than the North Sea has.
since 1991 has tried to assist with billions of dollars of aid. But the greatest sums of capital and a loss-effective investment have to come from good governance.

Corruption needs a little collaboration; otherwise it is a disincentive for economic activity. But I draw a distinction between the low-level corruption necessary for survival between a trafficker who takes two bills from those unlucky drivers on the street, and the corruption of a deputy minister who is building his new European-furnished dacha. I do not intend to criticize low-level working people who are trying to make ends meet. In some cases, the low-level corruption begins to look like a private business sector. One good example is the so-called informal payment people give doctors for services. This payment makes sense because it keeps medical personnel in the health-care sector where they are needed.

At the heart of the development of challenges in this entire area is one issue-rule of law. No government can match the private sector in providing jobs, innovating within society, and doing things efficiently. And if you want private sector involvement, you need investment-whether it’s the man on the corner who puts down money to open a grocery, or a major energy firm starting a billion dollar project. They bring the same benefits of job creation and economic growth, and they demand the same conditions. The big energy companies operating in the region, such as Texaco, Shell, Exxon, and Mobile, demand a stable legal environment. If investors do not have fair and transparent rules to refer to, their risks are much higher, and they are less willing to take those risks. If a government minister can simply come in and take the business that you and your family have worked to build, then why start? If the police, the tax inspector and the customs officials will audit your books every month until they get a payment, then why bother to invest?

Turning back to energy issues, one must acknowledge the importance of having resources, like Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan do. The other half of the equation, however, is getting those energy resources to market, which requires pipelines. The problem is that the major oil pipelines run north to south. The major gas pipelines go from Dovletabad in Turkmenistan, up through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan into the Gazprom network. Another runs from Baku through Makhachkala, and up into the Transneft’ network. Ten years ago, when Central Asian nations gained their independence, control over these pipelines remained in the hands of the old Soviet monopolies. Transneft’ now controls 97% of the oil pipelines in Russia, while Gazprom controls an even greater percentage of the gas pipelines in Russia. What we see
is Transneft and Gazprom seeking profit for themselves at the expense of the producers. Thus, the US is working to create an east-west energy corridor, which will bring this energy out to world markets across the Caucasus and down to Turkey. Right now there are two major energy pipelines on the table, and construction is about to begin. The first will run from Baku to Tbilisi and down to Ceyhan on the Mediterranean coast of Turkey. The ShahDeniz gas pipeline will bring gas from Baku up to Tbilisi and into the Turkish gas network in Erzurum. Baku-Ceyhan is in the final decision-making stages and expects final approval in June 2002, after which construction of the pipeline will start. The partners have already committed $150 million for engineering work, and the pipeline will ship oil in the year 2005. ShahDeniz is also progressing fairly well, and will deliver gas into Turkey in 2005.

The next phase of Caspian energy beyond these corridors looks even more interesting. One aspect of this is to bring Kazakh oil volumes south, and connect with the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. The US is working on a link from Actel in Kazakhstan down to Baku. Regarding gas, Turkmenistan has enormous volumes of it, and it has only one customer: Russia, or Ukraine via Russia. Gazprom is forcing Turkmenistan to take a very low price for its gas. Kazakhstan is going to have large volumes of gas, and Uzbekistan may have a supply. Azerbaijan has significant volumes. Where to export? Turkey and Greece are working together to see if they can link the Greek and Turkish pipeline systems and use them as a means to bring Caspian gas into Europe.

Another piece of Caspian energy is the volume in the Black Sea. Currently, the CPC pipeline is taking oil from the giant Tengiz deposit in Kazakhstan, bringing it to Novorossiysk, Russia, and transporting it through Bosphoros out to world markets. At some point (and we do not know when), Bosphoros will not be able to handle these large volumes of oil. New bypass pipelines will be needed, maybe through Constanza, Romania, or perhaps, from Burgas, Bulgaria down to Alexandropolis, Greece. There are a number of different bypass pipelines that have been proposed, including Ukraine’s efforts to use the Odessa-Brody pipeline.

Caspian energy is all about competition. Competition is sometimes hard and painful, but it is always good. It is not a government commission that will yield an attractive transport terrace; it is the shock of competition that will do this. The competition for investment in the Caspian is not between the counties of the region. The real competition for the Caspian region is in West Africa, Indonesia, and Brazil. These are the areas in which the energy companies are looking for potential investment, and the real competition comes from there.

What makes the energy rich countries Brunei-type, and what makes them more like Nigeria? A study in 1995 by the economists Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner found that the more important a country’s natural resources, the lower the growth rate of its economy. Of all the resource-rich countries they studied, only two were able to grow as fast as 2% a year. Many countries that had poor resources grew much faster. Why does this resource curse exist? The simplest answer is that being dependant on natural resources makes a country less likely to invest in other things that might be economically valuable, especially manufacturing. Natural resource wealth also deprives entrepreneurs-people who might be inventing a new product or opening a shoe factory instead of spending their days figuring out how to get a share of the oil money. In short, the dependence on natural resources encourages the illusion that a country gets rich by using what is already there instead of creating something new.

At the heart of all these economic issues lies the need to ensure the sovereignty and prosperity of the nations of Central Asia and the Black Sea region. It is not clear at all yet which directions these nations will take. Only ten years have passed since their independence, and it is not clear whether the nations will become prosperous, sovereign and stable. One thing we do know is that alternatives to energy exports and energy supplies will be vital to the prosperity of these nations. Returning to US policy, it is very much in the national self-interest of the US to have independent, stable states emerge from the former Soviet Union. Introducing foreign investment into Caspian energy and promoting the creation of multiple pipelines will lead to that end.
It is useful to begin by literally describing what has happened on the military front, at least from the perspective of the US. Reports on the area, whether from Russia, Iran, China or other countries, question whether or not the American military presence in the region is a temporary one present primarily to fight the war in Afghanistan, or whether there are longer term questions that need to be discussed. Just to give you some sense as to why this is becoming an important issue, let me call off the countries where the US either has deployed military forces or has agreements to deploy them. As of May 2002, Turkey, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Georgia,
Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, India, and possibly Iraq (before this US president ends his term) are all countries where the US may deploy land forces, together with a formidable maritime capability in the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean, the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean (with access to the British base Diego Garcia). Several of these deployments (particularly in Central Asia) simply could not have taken place without the concurrence of Russia. Therefore, the key variable in this strategic equation is clearly President Putin’s post-September 11 decision to change Russian policy, which traditionally has been very suspicious of American activity in the Caspian region. Stories out of Moscow about American encirclement do continue, and are increasing in number. The expectation is that improved US-Russian relations will continue at least in the short term. Similarly, while concerns about American encirclement exist in China as well (China, of course, is also concerned about US power in the Pacific), China has supported the US in the war against terrorism for its own reasons.

The one country that is much more ambiguous and remains very important in the context of the Caspian and American policy is Iran, where the government initially supported some of the American actions against Al Qaeda, but has in recent months become very hostile toward it. Iran does indeed fear encirclement, especially since the President’s “State of the Union” speech on January 29, which put Iran with Iraq and North Korea in the so-called “axis of evil.” One of the reasons the Iranians are worried is the talk in Washington about a possible US strike on Iraq; such an action would put US forces on Iran’s doorstep. This new strategic set of dynamics clearly has an impact on the issues that we usually associate with Caspian energy.

Let us now look at the geopolitics of Caspian Basin energy against the background of a changing strategic relationship between the US and the countries in the region. When we talk about the strategic importance of the Caspian, we are really talking about the interaction of world demand for energy, particularly oil and natural gas, and the global supply of these resources. The demand for energy is a function of the strength of the global economy. The more the global economy grows, the more it needs energy. If it slips into a recession—perhaps due to another terrorist incident—demand slows down. One of the reasons the Chinese have been supportive of America’s war against terrorism is that they are very fearful that another major terrorist incident would put the world into a recession at a time when the Chinese economy is extremely vulnerable.

Assuming that growth is continuous for about ten years, it is very important to recognize certain facts. All projections of the future of oil supplies in, say, 2015, can change depending on what happens to supply and demand. It is important to note that in 1995, while most Middle Eastern oil was going to Asia, a certain amount from North Africa and North America was going to Europe. By 2015, a lot more will be going to Europe, and the same goes for the US and Canada. But a huge new surge in oil will head toward Asia, and this is primarily driven by the growing demand on the part of China for imported oil. Conservative estimates five years ago predicted that by 2010, China will need to import $3 million barrels of oil a day, and most of it would have to come from the Middle East or Central Asia. So, the strategic importance of thinking about this is that Asia’s interests in the Middle East are growing. Its interests in Caspian oil as an alternative are also significant.

At the same time, this phenomenon is occurring with Russia’s exports, which are increasing. Russia is becoming an important exporting country, while China is becoming an important importing country. Incidentally, both of them will have increased interest in the Caspian region in future years—a region I refer to as a “strategic energy ellipse.” This ellipse goes from southern Russia through Kazakhstan, through the Caspian and down through Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. It contains over 70% of the world’s proven oil and over 40% of the proven gas reserves. Therefore, it is obviously an extremely important piece of real estate. Currently, the Persian Gulf is more important than other areas in terms of oil supply; this is where all the developed oil fields are, and where oil is very easy and cheap to extract from the ground. In Iraq, which has really been in a state of war since 1980, they are producing nearly 3 million barrels of oil a day under very difficult circumstances. If Iraq were ever to
change its government, it could probably increase its production form 3 to 4-5 million barrels of oil a day within a matter of years. This area will remain forever important if only for the amount of oil that is in the ground and is fairly cheap to extract.

The Caspian also has a great amount of oil in the ground, but getting it out and to the market demands a high price. Herein lies the debate. The first thing concerns ownership. Until the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Caspian was essentially controlled by Iran and the Soviet Union. Today, five countries are jockeying for control of the basin, and there have been many proposals as to how to divide it up. There are two other issues. One is the sea resources on the sea bed (primarily oil and gas) and the resources in the sea itself (fish, caviar, etc.). The other issue is transportation-Who has control over routes and sectors in the Caspian?

As of today, four countries (Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) are pretty much in agreement that they should divide the resources on the bottom of the Caspian according to a sectional plan that would allow them to use the resources for their own development and not oblige them to share with other nations. The Iranians strongly object to this division because in the old days, they had half of the resources for themselves. In fact, in the summer of 2001, there were incidents where Iranian gunboats tried to prevent Azeri pipeline and construction workers from drilling in areas where Iranian borders have not yet been demarcated. There is a lot of debate about ownership. There are also questions about the Caspian’s geography and environment, because there have been plans to build pipelines across the Caspian from Kazakhstan to Turkmenistan to Baku. The problem is that laying pipelines on the bed of the Caspian could be environmentally very dangerous because this is an earthquake zone, and because there is already a huge amount of pollution in the Caspian.

When it comes to extracting resources, there are large discovered reserves in the general region. There are enormous amounts of natural gas in Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. The problem is the lack of infrastructure for getting the oil out. One reason is very simple: There are no major facilities around the littoral of the Caspian that have the high-technology industry that is necessary for developing huge oil-drilling facilities and wells. If one compares the Caspian with the North Sea, which in 1970s and 80s became a very important area for oil and gas development, he will see a great difference in the number of major ports. The North Sea is surrounded by the modern ports of Britain, Germany, Holland, Denmark, France, Norway and Sweden; it is an extremely advanced region of the world. The Caspian, in return, has almost no surrounding ports.

There have been major problems in getting the infrastructure in place to actually develop the Caspian’s oil and gas fields. The climate in the north of the region is not conducive to year-round operations (it is either extremely hot or extremely cold, with lots of ice in the winter). But this problem can be overcome. It is primarily a logistical issue that money can solve, but it makes sense to develop such expensive facilities if the price of oil remains high. In the case of either a recession or the discovery of other huge fields that could be developed with less expense, the difficult Caspian fields might not warrant a billion dollar investment. Right now, the price of oil is good.

Another problem, beyond money and infrastructure, is politics, which is where things really get interesting. One of the problems with the three countries having most of the resources (Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan) is that they do not have access to the sea. This is very rare in the history of the oil industry. Virtually all major oil producers that the world has known since the 1890s have had direct access to the world’s oceans: Russia, the US, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Indonesia, etc. But these three countries do not, and there has been a huge debate over the last ten years about the methods to get the resources to market. Dozens of proposals have been discussed, and some of them have actually been translated into projects. There have been proposals, for example, to take oil all the way to China because China wants it. There have been proposals to take oil and gas through Afghanistan. There was an American company called UNICOL that wanted to do a deal with the Taliban back in 1990s to get oil and gas to Pakistan and India through Afghanistan. The Iranians have dozens of proposals to bring the oil and gas south, since it has easy
access to the Asian market. The US has blocked this proposal for political reasons. There are also proposals to take the oil to the West either through Turkey, Armenia, Georgia or Russia. Some of these routes are becoming a reality.

There are some other risky dreams on the part of the key producers. Among the options going to the West, there is one very important pipeline that has actually been built, which is just now coming into service. It is called the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) and extends from Tengiz, Kazakhstan to Novorossiysk, Russia. It was built with many ups and downs and was a cooperative venture with much American money and much Russian construction work, ideas and plans. It is finally complete. The port in Novorossiysk will be the transit point for distributing the oil to the world market. The criticism of this pipeline has two aspects, including a financial side. First, it goes through the territory of Russia, which is not extremely stable, especially because of the Chechnya problem. Second, there is no market for oil in Novorossiysk, so it has to get out somehow. The oil must pass through the Bosporus, but the passage is very narrow and the Turks have been extremely critical of increasing oil traffic there because they genuinely fear an environmental catastrophe. Therefore, there have been many proposals about how to get the oil form Novorossiysk to the market without going through the Bosporus. There were plans to bypass the Straits, to take it from Bulgaria to Greece, or to go through Romania to the north and south-to Trieste, or from Odessa, Ukraine to join the major Russian pipelines to Europe and the West. All of these plans have some credibility, and all of them cost a lot of money. Imagine loading oil onto the ships, then unloading, loading it into pipelines, then again onto the ships, and so on. It starts to get very expensive. There are interesting proposals coming from Ukraine to use its potential pipeline. It has an advantage, since oil would go straight into an existing pipeline system.

The main competitor of these pipelines and the various routes is another pipeline that has not been built yet, but which is under serious discussion now. Some western companies, particularly the British company BP, are putting huge amounts of money into an engineering study to see if the envisioned pipeline can be built at a reasonable cost. This pipeline is the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan. Its first obvious advantage is its exit on the Mediterranean, without passing through Bosporus. But there are also concerns in addition to its cost, particularly the stability of Georgia and the Middle East. As I understand, the engineering studies suggest that the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline could indeed be built at reasonable cost, but no one is sure what the final cost will be, and who is going to pay for it. Oil companies want subsidies from Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, but these governments are reluctant to provide too much.

Adding to the controversial nature of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline is an American plan that has existed for many years now. In order to ensure that there is enough oil to make the project profitable, the US intends to supplement the oil coming out of Azerbaijan with oil coming from both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, which would arrive to Baku on the sea-bed of the Caspian, join up with the pipeline, and create much larger capacity. Since the TPC pipeline is already open and taking Kazakh oil, the question is: Can the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline be economically viable if it relies solely on Azeri oil, or will it have to have oil from Central Asia? The good news from the oil industry point of view is more and more oil is being discovered in Kazakhstan. Many people would argue that if the politics were right and conflicts would not worsen, both pipelines could probably make a profit.
Yet another pipeline—one that deals with gas rather than oil—is the proposed gas pipeline "Blue Stream" that Russia wants to bring to Turkey on the bed of the Black Sea. The idea here is to feed into the growing Turkish market for gas. Other countries (Iran, Egypt) also want to bring gas to Turkey because they see a big market there. The problem is that Turkey is going through an economic crisis, and the expectations for growth may not be as high as were forecasted several years ago. Second, the project would require a remarkable engineering feat. Gazprom is cooperating with an Italian company and ENI to conduct engineering studies of "Blue Stream." They say that the initial studies suggest that it is, in fact, possible to lay the pipeline, because the Black Sea provides the necessary depth. If the technology proves to be effective, it opens up many pipeline opportunities in other parts of the world—for example, in various parts of the Mediterranean that have deep water.

All these issues have interacted with the Western problem: How will the oil reach the West? And what about getting it East? China, is one of the crown jewels in the energy business. India and China account for 2 billion people, many of whom constitute a growing middle class that likes appliances and is increasingly addicted to automobiles. They need a lot of gas and oil, and there is no end in sight. People are very expectant, but the problem is—as always in this part of the world—how to get it there. If you think that Afghanistan was a problem under the Taliban, imagine putting a pipeline through Pakistan right now, when India and Pakistan are in a nuclear standoff over Kashmir. Would you invest in an Iranian gas pipeline program that would export gas to India via Pakistan at this point of time?

It’s very important to remember there is a big difference between oil markets and gas markets. Oil is a universal commodity that commands a pretty universal price worldwide. Oil is very easily moved in a wheeled barrel, on a tanker, through a pipeline, on a train, on a bicycle. Natural gas cannot be moved in such ways, although it may be possible in the future when there are changes in liquids technology. Gas is much more difficult to move, and it does not command the word-wide price. The price of gas varies greatly from market to market. Therefore, if you are an investor, you are not going to spend billions of dollars developing expensive gas facilities—whether to transport the gas by pipeline, or to liquefy it and put it in a liquefied natural gas carrier—unless you are sure that the market is going to exist, remain stable, and pay off over a 10-20 year period. Investment decisions on gas, therefore, must be made based on very different circumstances than those used for oil. This is one of the problems.

The Iranians are finding and getting a market for huge amounts of gas. Iran exports virtually no gas now, which is one of the reasons the Iranian economy is in such trouble. What the Iranians do export is oil, and they have proposed a very sensible scheme. Iran wants to bring oil from the Caspian to its northern port, bringing it by pipeline out to its main refineries in the north. Why?—Because Iran uses a lot of oil. It produces about 4 million barrels a
day, but consumes at least 1 million barrels a day. So the Iranians have proposed bringing oil in from the north, and refining and using it in the northern part of the country, where the population is concentrated. Then, from the oil fields in the southern part of Iran, the government will offload the equivalent amount of oil and sell it to the market. The result is something of an “oil swap.” The advantage is that only minimal transport is required, and the facilities for unloading the oil are already present. The Iranians argue that we can promote production in the Caspian at a much lower cost, rather than build huge pipelines like Baku-Ceyhan and Tengiz-Novorossysk.

The problem is that the US has essentially vetoed all pipelines through Iran and all gas pipelines out of Iran, except the one to Turkey, over which Turkey has ultimate control. The reason is that the US and Iran are not very friendly at this period of time. This is a perfect example of how the “economists of energy” are always trumped by the “politics of energy.” One can devise a perfect and sensible plan, but if the US says no, it is in trouble. If there is a war going on, it is in trouble. If a future war is going on, it is in trouble also. The key questions involve the future relationships between major geopolitical players and how those relationships influence the growing energy infrastructure and its needs. There are several key relationships worth considering:

1. US and Russia: Will the US and Russia continue to work closely together, or will Russia become increasingly suspicious of America’s long-term interests and objectives in Central Asia and the Caspian region? A continuing positive relationship would benefit everybody. Growing suspicion could set back all sorts of cooperative ventures, and complicate efforts to win the war on terrorism and to collaborate on future energy projects.

2. US and Iran: Iran was put on the “axis of evil” because of its support for terrorism, particularly terrorism against Israel. It was included also because the US believes Iran is developing nuclear weapons, even though it has signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The big problem is terrorism: If the Iranians were to stop supporting Palestinian terrorism, the US would think again about Iran and could even negotiate with the Iranian leadership on a whole array of issues, including the nuclear ones. But until the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, we are unlikely to see improved relations between the US and Iran, which means the US will continue to veto all pipeline routes going south and southwest. Therefore, the Baku-Ceyhan, the CPC, and the routes to the West have an advantage at this time.

3. Turkey and Russia: There are historic rivalries and suspicions in Russia-Turkey relations. At the same time, there is huge potential for cooperation and development, and the Black Sea might become very important. How the conflicts in the Caucasus are resolved will have a profound impact on the future of Russia-Turkey relations. And, indeed, the US has a big interest in this. The more uncertainty there is about Georgia, the more difficult it is to justify massive investments in Baku-Ceyhan. On the other hand, if there is greater cooperation between Russia, the US and Georgia over security issues, it makes Georgia even more attractive as a route to bring oil and gas to the market. Much depends on what happens in the next 2-3 years with respect to regional conflicts.

This sort of analysis simply could not have taken place before the break-up of the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union existed, there was a barrier between north and south and between cooperative ventures. Getting Caspian energy to the market was never discussed. All this has now changed.

The second big change is September 11 and the resulting war on terrorism. The real questions now are whether or not the US, Russia, China, Central Asia and the Caucasus will continue to see it in their interests to define terrorism in a way that allows them to agree to stop it; and whether they continue to agree to limit the spread of weapons of mass destruction. These agreements mean establishing control over many facilities in the former Soviet Union where there are radioactive materials that could spread out. According to Graham Allison’s words from his latest book, “These are all critical factors which are likely to influence the stability of the region. And the stability of the region will determine whether or not, in a last resort, businessmen will want to put money into projects to get energy to market.”
Of course, addressing the question of the Black Sea area poses a series of challenges in itself like: what precise geographical area can be included in the Black Sea region or to what extent the Black Sea area has an identity of its own? There is also the question of the effectiveness of this kind of cooperation from the point of view of trade liberalization and economic growth. The answers to these questions may vary considerably, however the majority of analyses on the Black Sea Area are converging in recognizing the comprehensive security relevance of The Black Sea Economic Cooperation. It is an institutionalized form of coop-

I would first like to thank the organizers of this event for the inspired topic chosen and for inviting a representative from a ministry with the word "integration" in its denomination. Indeed, the basic notion we will address here is the various aspects of the integrative phenomenon and the relevance of its comprehensive security. In this respect, the Black Sea area represents an example of the emergence in Europe of what has been called "the new regionalism". Characterized by its loose and flexible structures, it is a tailor made form of cooperation and integration for the countries sharing the geographic proximity but having to overcome the massive heterogeneity in terms of ethnicity, cultures and, last but not least, the development of economic and socio-political structures.

For a structured EU policy to the Black Sea Area

Mr. Silviu JORA, Director of Cooperation and Communication with Member and Candidates States Directorate, Ministry of European Integration, Romania
eration aimed at integrating a highly heterogeneous area facing a wide range of security challenges. Hopefully, this "experiment" will be used as a framework for the Pan European Architecture as well as a Pan European Strategy where the EU will hold most of the responsibility. Thus, the central goal of this paper is to advocate for a more active, more coherent and more structured EU approach to the Black Sea Area.

First, I will try to highlight the shift in the BSEC rationale from a kind of alternative to the EU into a complementary process towards EU integration. This appears clear today as the EU is on its way to embracing a major part of the Black Sea Coast and maybe the whole area in a couple of decades. Then I will present the newest approach of the EU towards the region and the reasons for further strategic improvements. Having in mind the central topic of this seminar, I will devote several paragraphs to the EU’s new approach on security challenges and conflict prevention. The conclusion is intended to give a policy-oriented “flavor” to the paper by suggesting several points for future EU policy in the region.

Obviously, I am solely responsible for the ideas expressed in this paper. They do not involve, in any way, the official position of Romania or of the institution I come from.

The new European architecture now takes shape after a decade of post-Cold War experience with three main features:

- Organizations such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe have expanded in geographic coverage, but have not been able to deepen their operational roles;
- The leading European or Euro-Atlantic institutions, namely the EU and NATO, which are attractive for accession candidates to the East, require long pre-accession periods and tough examinations;
- The new European regionalism, which, besides the geographical and conjunctural reasons, seems to have a double rationale, reactive and active.

The reactive aspect compensates for the thinness of the pan-European organizations and the exclusiveness of the leading institutions. The active aspects develop networks of cooperative activities that bridge the remaining political divides of the wider Europe. This rationale seems solidly founded. However this is not a static matter, since the enlargement of the leading institutions is gradually taking in increasing parts of the regions in question. As EU membership process advances there will be an increasing overlap between EU regional and other policies and the new European regionalism.

In this context, the Black Sea region has some common features with the other regions, but it is unique in that although it has a regional organization- BSEC-, it has not been the target of a specific EU regional initiative.

The Black Sea region has some common features with the other regions, but it is unique in that although it has a regional organization- BSEC-, it has not been the target of a specific EU regional initiative.
characterized by bilateralism. This initially imposed certain constraints on the EU’s relations with the Black Sea as a whole in the early 1990s. The need for greater engagement was not recognized until the late 1990s. As “Agenda 2000” stated “the importance of regional co-operation will increase as the Union enlarges, so that no dividing lines are drawn on the European continent”.

In this context, the EU has come to realize that the Black Sea has a specific role in overcoming the divisions of the Cold War.

In 1997, the European Commission in its Report to the Council affirmed that “Enlargement will further increase the Black Sea region’s significance to the European Union. The EU has a major interest in promoting political stability and economic prosperity in the Black Sea region and stimulating the development links both within the region and with the EU.” The same report also stated that the Black Sea region constitutes an area of increasing strategic importance for the European Union. With a population of 190 million, the region could provide an important market for EU goods. Furthermore, it is a vital transit route for energy resources to Europe. In the late 1990s the BSEC has been observed by the EU as a stabilizing factor in a volatile region as its significance for access to Caspian and Central Asian energy resources has increased. Therefore, modernization of the regional infrastructure in energy and transportation facilities has taken priority in the EU’s emerging strategy towards the Black Sea region. Apart from the energy, transport, and communication facilities connecting the Black Sea to Europe, regional commercial co-operation and the creation of favorable conditions to attract EU and foreign investment, sustainable development, environmental protection, and nuclear safety areas, have been emphasized as priorities.

Since 1997, EU representatives have also been participating in meetings of the BSEC as observers. It can also be said that the “Black Sea synergies” were developed in the framework of the EU Community assistance programs to stimulate regional co-operation and development. Thus, since 1997 the question of the EU’s involvement in Black Sea cooperation, and the opportunity of an institutional link to the BSEC in particular, are reviewed systematically. Today, the EU’s official position is that its cooperation with the BSEC should proceed on an ad hoc basis, without institutional links. This was the reply of Commissioner Patten to the invitation by the BSEC to the EU in early 2001 to establish observer status, leading later to more developed institutional links.

The reasons for this cautious reply may have to do with the complexity of the EU’s existing set of bilateral links with BSEC member states. For example: Greece-Member State, Bulgaria and Romania-Europe Agreement (Negotiating candidate), Turkey-Association Agreement (Non-negotiating candidate), Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine (Partnership and Co-operation Agreement).

There is also a huge heterogeneity of the EU assistance programs and policies in the area. Thus, the negotiating accession candidates, Romania and Bulgaria, receive economic and technical assistance from the EU through the PHARE, SAPARD and ISPA programs aimed at preparing them for EU membership. Turkey has a special financial protocol with the EU. The non-candidates states of South East Europe, including Albania, are beneficiaries of the CARDS program of financial and technical assistance. The CIS states are beneficiaries of the TACIS program. However, the distinctions between these programs are very clear. First, the amounts allocated to the different categories of countries vary enormously. In the EU’s financial perspective 2000-2006 enlargement candidates will receive almost 1200 euros/capita, Western Balkans countries in excess of 200 euros/capita, while the former Soviet republics will receive 13 euros/capita on average.
Second, different EU aid programs provide different types of assistance. While assistance to the candidate countries includes significant amounts of investment support, aid to the CIS countries is primarily in the form of technical assistance. This allocation of economic assistance, while slowly reducing the economic disparities between the enlargement candidates and the EU, does not reduce the growing socioeconomic gap between the countries of enlargement candidates and the countries from the former Soviet space. However, solutions to such problems can hardly go as far as unifying all these different programs. Therefore one solution would be to create separate budget lines to service specific needs.

The EU’s cautious response may also be caused by the fact that it is also not so clear what the underlying priorities of existing BSEC member states are, notably over how much room they are willing to give the BSEC for initiative. At the same time, the more recent accent placed by BSEC on a project-oriented approach, calls for a strengthened cooperation with the EU as several of the core functions of the BSEC are being handled by ad-hoc arrangements outside the BSEC, as is the case for the environment (Black Sea Environment Program), transport (TRACECA), and energy issues. Thus, the effectiveness of these projects would improve with a conscious and joint determination by both the BSEC and the EU at working in a more coordinated manner.

Among the EU’s strategic interests in strengthening the effectiveness of the BSEC, we can identify that:

- The EU is set to become a major Black Sea actor, who’s future member states account for half of its coast-line, with the perspective of Bulgarian, Romanian and Turkish accession. It is not a question of whether, but when the EU enters the Black Sea, with much EU legislation and policy due to be adopted by the accession candidate states even before accession. As these states become EU members, their interests become axiomatically EU interests.
- The EU is concerned about the negative security effect that the exclusion of some neighbouring states from the EU accession process would determine.
- The EU has an interest in securing the energy supplies that the Caspian basin might offer thus avoiding the excessive depend-
ence on Middle East supplies, or on declining North Sea production. This calls for cooperation and political stability surrounding the transport routes for oil and gas.

- The EU investment in environmental policies in its new member states would be substantially wasted if they did not fit into a coherent Black Sea environmental program.

- The EU is interested in resolution in the several conflicts in the Caucasus region and in this respect the BSEC is a framework that can facilitate this, as it already maintains multilateral collaboration between some nations of the region that do not at present have cooperative bilateral relations (Armenia-Azerbaijan; Armenia-Turkey).

- The EU involvement in the Black Sea cooperation can constitute a proper framework for achieving many of the bilateral goals the EU has with the major actors in the area. Thus, at the geo-political level Black Sea regionalism appears to be uniquely significant compared to other regional dimensions as it involves three very large European actors (Turkey, Russia, Ukraine) with the EU as the possible fourth, in a quite balanced and non-hegemonic setting.

In supporting the idea of a coherent EU Black Sea policy, we can mention that in spite of a tendency to prefer organizing its relationships with states of the wider Europe on a bilateral basis, the EU has sponsored or supported several multilateral regional initiatives like the so-called Barcelona Process in the Mediterranean, the Northern Dimension in North West Europe, and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe.

At the same time, EU involvement in the BSEC is currently limited to national governments, with Greece as a BSEC member and four other EU states (Austria, France, Germany and Italy) as observers. Also the EU participation in BSEC has so far been as an "invited guest", with the European Commission participating as an observer on an ad-hoc basis.

In this context we can make a short comment on the possibility for the EU of having either observer or membership status to the BSEC:

- The observer status would require little complicated negotiation. As an observer, the Commission would have the right to speak, but not to vote. Nor would it contribute to the budget. In practice formal observer status would presumably mean participation in the numerous BSEC Working Groups.

- If the membership status will be considered in the future, as a member of BSEC the European Commission would be entitled to vote, which would be a significant matter in cases where BSEC initiatives overlapped with EU policy. The Commission would also contribute to the BSEC budget, which today is very small. Membership could also be the occasion to make some special operational support for BSEC programs and projects, preferably through a separate budget line because of the complications in putting together elements from different existing EU aid programs.

According to the BSEC document "Platform for Cooperation between the EU and the BSEC" a political dialogue between the BSEC and the EU can be established. In this respect, the document envisages high-level meetings between the BSEC Chairman in Office and the EU Presidency, preferably at the ministerial level.

- The European Parliament could also consider giving PABSEC observer status in the European Parliament. The European Parliament has a standing invitation to participate in PABSEC meetings as an observer.

- The growing emphasis on BSEC as a project-oriented organization, provides the EU with the option of playing a more active role in the BSEC without membership in the BSEC, through the European Investment Bank (EIB) becoming a member of the BSTDB.

ASPECTS OF SECURITY AND CONFLICT PREVENTION

It has been acknowledged that the Black Sea area is marked by sources of conflict of all kinds, including several military hot-spots as well as the non-conventional threats like terrorism and drug trafficking. In this context, in an area where the UN and OSCE involvement produced mixed results, the EU’s new approach on conflict prevention and crisis management might be highly beneficial in “securing” the area.

The list of means at the EU’s disposal for the prevention of conflict is long: development co-operation and external assistance, trade policy instruments, humanitarian aid, social and environmental policies,
diplomatic instruments and political dialogue, co-operation with international partners and NGOs, as well as the new instruments in the field of crisis management. Through these means, the EU is already heavily engaged in conflict prevention. At the same time, for improving the effectiveness of its actions, the Commission adopted a Communication on conflict prevention (2001), reviewing the main instruments in this field and putting forward recommendations for specific actions. Building on this Communication the Swedish Presidency launched the initiative to develop an EU Programme on Conflict Prevention. In this context, the Commission is currently in the process of reviewing its Country Strategy Papers from a conflict prevention angle. This means that the risk factors are now systematically checked.

The new approach recognizes the multifaceted links between post-conflict peace-making and conflict prevention, as well as between relief, rehabilitation, and development. The 2001 Communication proposes a two-pronged strategy, distinguishing between long-term conflict prevention (‘projecting stability’) and short-term conflict management (quick reaction). In particular, it recognizes that preventing the occurrence of conflict in ‘dysfunctional states’ and ‘politically fragile countries’ entails rebuilding ‘failed states’, strengthening democratic institutions and improving governance systems. Thus, the promotion of democratic governance becomes an important tool for preventing, managing, and resolving political crisis and, in extreme cases of political instability and uncertainty, violent conflict.

Concrete recommendations were put forward in the Commission’s Communication, notably to improve early warning mechanisms and CFSP instruments such as the political dialogue or the use of EU Special Representatives. Also, an important step was taken with the adoption of a Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM), allowing for quick initiatives in peace building, reconstruction and development.

In conclusion, we can envisage several points that the EU should focus on in order to face the challenges and opportunities of the Black Sea Area:

- Strengthening and diversifying the dialogue. The EU-BSEC dialogue must be conducted in a more structured form. It also must imply not only the governments and the private sector, but also the socially relevant groups, political parties, industrial associations, trade unions, and academic institutions.
- Support political and economic reform. The EU has to further provide support to strengthening democratic institutions in the area. Democratic values such as pluralism, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms need to take root in the Black Sea region.
- Invest in BSEC projects. The BSEC is in the process of identifying, designing and developing concrete projects for the region. Through the different EU financial instruments operating in the region; PHARE, TACIS and MEDA, the EU is already involved in fostering regional co-operation. However, the present “case by case” support of various BSEC initiatives should be accompanied by a more systematic involvement and eventually by a separate budget line for uniformly assisting the area.
- Contribute to regional security. Making peace is more than resolving conflicts. It has to be backed by structural reforms, which promote political trust and concepts that turn former opponents into partners. While developing effective crisis management tools, by effectively supporting the BSEC actions the EU will contribute to the most effective confidence building measure, which is the mutually beneficial economic co-operation.
- Contribute with a coherent environment strategy for the Black Sea. The EU is the single largest collateral contributor to the Black Sea environmental projects through its PHARE and TACIS programs. These contributions should be increased in value, volume, and form. The EU may extend programs for this region as a corollary to its Meda programs. A unified program with a separate budget line for assisting the Black Sea Environment, eventually using the BSEC framework, can also be taken into consideration.

The long-term interest of the BSEC members is joining the EU. In this sense, the EU active promotion of regional co-operation in the Black Sea Area is to be seen as part of a transition strategy towards European integration. In this sense, the BSEC should be regarded as a preliminary and complementary co-operation process for joining the European integration as part of an overall Pan-European strategy.
A MODEL OF COOPERATION
Southeastern Europe Defense Ministerial (SEDM) Process

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During recent years, but mostly after September 11, one word has become a symbol of all these scientific gatherings. It is “cooperation,” and it is indeed a magic word whose meaning is nowadays deepening and gaining new dimensions. If in the past, policy makers acknowledged it as the best option and a wise way of coping with threats, today we have to admit that cooperation is a must. The SEDM will be used in this paper to trigger a discussion on the future of Southeastern Europe in general and how the achievements of cooperation in this area can serve as a model for other regions of the world where uncertainties and instability are still threatening to boil over.

In 1996 when it was initiated, the SEDM process raised a few eyebrows. At that time, little else besides limited contribution to IFOR could be counted as regional military cooperation. Skeptics questioned the political will of the countries located in an area where, for decades-in spite of huge investment by the international community in

This presentation will try to present the world of regional cooperation and its benefits using the Southeastern Europe Defense Ministerial Process (SEDM) will be used as a model.
terms of political energy, military might and economic aid—life was torn by war, ethnic rivalries, economic underdevelopment and social stagnancy.

In 2002, however, SEDM is already a consolidated process that has gained international recognition and appreciation. It had the privilege of opening doors. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, defense ministers in Southeastern Europe not only acknowledged that they can set out a common agenda, but also that they could do more to reverse the region’s image as Europe’s “powder keg.” They demonstrated that a new cooperation framework was necessary and could be created. The SEDM initiative was the first to enable the SEE countries to promote the principles of regional ownership and responsibility. A functional SEDM cooperation pattern finally emerged and a genuine SEDM community came to life.

From the very beginning, SEDM focused on practical projects in the field of defense, with the understanding that confidence-building measures should go beyond mere political declarations. Some examples are: the Southeastern Europe Simulation Network (SEESIM), the Satellite Interconnection of Military Hospitals (SIMIHO) and the Engineer Task Force (ETF). Moreover, several areas of cooperation were explored simultaneously. This approach helped SEDM nations go even further to establish the Multinational Peace Force Southeastern Europe (MPFSEE), the first multinational peace force to exclusively comprise nations from Southeastern Europe. Furthermore, seven of the ten SEDM nations gave a new dimension to defense diplomacy and created a military instrument (the multinational brigade-SEEBRIG) that truly demonstrated the willingness of the countries in the region to take responsibility for their own security. Sailing through the difficulties and setbacks incumbent to every beginning, the military personnel from seven nations proved in a dedicated effort that interoperability between SEEBRIG countries is an achievable goal. The brigade declared its operational readiness to NATO and the EU in May 2001, but in order to be deployed in a peace support operation under UN or OSCE mandate, it still needs to be fully operational, adequately equipped and trained. The brigade’s Communication and Information System (CIS) has to be finalized, the officers from the headquarters need to be trained (and will be trained, as of the end of 2002) in NATO/PfP exercises in order to improve their military skills and become interoperable with NATO forces.

The day when SEEBRIG will be asked to deliver what it has promised will come sooner rather than later. On the day that SEEBRIG is called to “fight for peace,” nations of Southeastern Europe will be able to prove the clear advantages of sharing burdens and benefits on a sub-regional level in a pan-European context.

When the world was shocked by the “security earthquake” of September 11, and concerns for strengthening the international coalition against terrorism was on top of the agenda, the SEDM community could not stand aside. SEDM nations wanted to prove that beyond their current instruments, they could do more for the medium and long-term security of Southeastern Europe. They wanted to prove that they have established a powerful and adaptable process capable of acting when new risks and threats are emerging at their doorsteps. The terrorist attacks in the US have caused a rapid globalization of security awareness and emphasized more than ever that a common threat requires a common response.

Why were SEDM nations so quick in shaping up a response? Why were they so determined to do something after September 11? We must not forget that in some parts of Southeastern Europe, the most successful business is organized crime and illegal trafficking of all kinds—drugs, human beings, weapons. And the effects are far-reaching. We must not forget that organized crime is a major source of financing for terrorism. So, not surprisingly, we must...
all admit that this is a major threat to all of us; it is not just “something that happens to other people.” SEDM nations promptly reacted and a new initiative came to life in October 2001 under the Romanian Chairmanship. Its aim is to explore opportunities for defense/military support to WMD counter-proliferation, border security and counter-terrorism. This initiative broadens the scope of SEDM and provides the framework for enhanced regional cooperation to deal with asymmetric risks. Perhaps this initiative is a small step compared to other projects in the region, but it shows the determination of SEDM nations to get involved and to be part of the international effort giving impetus and visibility to what we are trying to do now that we all must learn “to think the unthinkable.”

To conclude, it is clear by now that the SEDM process has been a success story because it managed to leave behind the contradictions, the competition and the invisible but ever-present dividing lines that for so long have separated SEE nations in the past. The SEDM process has generated specific common rules and policies and calls for responsibility and serious commitment from the member countries. Further cooperation within the SEDM framework can improve security and stability not only in the participating states, but also in the entire region. Cooperation in Southeastern Europe is having an ever more powerful impact not only on domestic policies in the member states, but also on their approach to the international security environment by promoting a new culture of political, social and military cooperation.

So why not export this successful model as broadly and quickly as possible and extend it to other parts of the world? New concepts should be urgently developed which are adequate to address emerging realities and especially emerging security risks. Strengthening multilateral links and commitments between its members, the SEDM process is living proof that countries in the region, NATO allies, candidates and partners alike can work together. And maybe they are tired of being seen as powerless actors in their own backyard. And maybe they are tired of being always a “day late and a dollar short” when it comes to their own security and stability. SEDM nations are determined to prove that where there is a will there is a way.
FRIENDSHIP UNDER THE NATO UMBRELLA

Dr. Burak AKCAPAR, NATO international secretariat, Turkey

In this presentation I will review what I see as the possible implications for the Black Sea region of NATO’s various cooperative security ventures and NATO’s evolutionary steps in the run-up to the Prague Summit. I will not go into specifics of regional politics in the Balkans or the Caucasus. My views on conflicts anywhere-frozen or active—I’ll keep to myself. Instead, I’ll take a bird’s eye view of reigning issues and look to future in conceptual terms.

I should recall my usual disclaimer. I’m a NATO officer, a Turkish diplomat, a member of Kraainem bridge club, and supporter of the Besiktas football team; but my words are meant to reflect my personal views alone.

First the basics: NATO does not have regional political strategies, which I think is a shortcoming of the Alliance. Not even for the Balkans, where NATO and Partner forces have been deployed in crisis management and peacekeeping operations. There was and is no so-called NATO strategy for a region. Therefore, as we learn about what happens in NATO and consider the implications or potential applications elsewhere, we’re more or less on our own, and a bit in the dark.
The absence of regional strategies is not due to the failure of NATO Allies to agree on such documents or approaches. It is instead because NATO, as we know it, doesn’t operate as such. In fact, I personally see this as part of NATO’s evolution. NATO had an overall strategy until 1991, which aimed to deter and defend allied territory while forcing the hand of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries to engage in dialogue with Allies. This was a semi-introvert strategy, socially speaking. More socialization existed rather in other fora, such as the OSCE. In 1991, this changed as NATO’s strategy was amended to include a more extrovert and forward-looking “cooperation” element. In 1999, NATO’s Strategic Concept—namely its overarching strategy document—has acknowledged an actively cooperative approach to security. Thus, NATO’s Partnerships with the PfP and EAPC countries, its special relationships with Russia and Ukraine, as well as the Mediterranean Dialogue (altogether called the Partnership) were elevated to the ranks of “fundamental security task” for the Alliance. This was at the same time an acknowledgement of what Dr. Solana and Lord Robertson have been saying: “Instead of being focused on a single mission-collective defense against an adversary, NATO has turned into a motor of Euro-Atlantic security cooperation and a catalyst for political change.”

NATO may be the most powerful alliance in history, but it is definitely not able to solve all the problems in the world. This perhaps should be my starting point. NATO might have developed significant capabilities and instruments to promote and project peace and security, but their application is meaningful only if countries want to benefit from them. NATO does not operate in a vacuum or a different setting than other international organizations. The problems of proactive or preventive application of assets and capabilities is common to all and needs no reminding here; although I should note that on issues that are within its mandate, NATO has offered a particularly good formula to make decisions and act on them.

I will look at two such instruments, Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Southeast Europe Initiative (SEEI), with the same caveats. They do not aspire to be the comprehensive cures to everything. They do not dare to answer all prayers. They are not the only shows in town, the only players, or one-person shows. They operate in particular contexts supporting, enhancing and complementing other fora and other initiatives. Understanding what these instruments can and cannot do should be preliminary before one deliberates on what they can offer in the Black Sea context.

On to PfP, the Partnership for Peace. Partnership for Peace is the crown jewel of NATO’s cooperation strategy with non-member countries in the Euro-Atlantic geography. It is a unique security cooperation arrangement that brings together 19 current Allies with 27 current Partners. It’s predominantly a military cooperation program between Allies and individual Partners, and all Black Sea countries are party to it. It has a political roof, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, which provides for a multilateral consultation and cooperation mechanism.

I should not go into detail on PfP, because the news is that it will be revisited in Prague. Instead, let me hazard a few thoughts about this review that will bring this most successful security cooperation program, apart from the NATO alliance itself, truly into this century. This review will have a profound impact on the subject matter of this seminar, although at this moment nothing is decided and things looks as confusing as the title of my presentation.

I’ll explain not by fortune telling, or sanitizing the discussions underway in Brussels, but instead by referring to the points that were made at a brainstorming meeting early on in the review process that brought together all the negotiating parties. These points, I think, delineate what ought to come out at the end of the review. All participants agreed that PfP has been uniquely successful in promoting security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region. However, there was a need to revitalize the political momentum behind PfP, and the Prague Summit proves to be an opportunity to revitalize the Partnership. PfP was launched as an ambitious project and enhanced repeatedly with the same spirit. The same ambitious approach should mark our comprehensive review. Particularly, three factors require us to conduct a comprehensive review of the Partnership:

- Terrorism, which has demonstrated its proportions with the attacks against the United States and has blurred the lines
between internal and external security, necessitating a more inclusive approach to security;
- Enlargement, which concerns 10 aspirant Partners and may impact dramatically on the composition of the Partner countries and the issues in PfP;
- European Security and Defense Identity/Policy, which creates new requirements to accommodate the emerging relationship between NATO and the EU.

Looking at the review from the angle of continuity and change, elements that are likely to endure in the Partnership post-Prague Summit would include the following:
- Focus on military capabilities, interoperability and defense reform appear to be deeply anchored in PfP with continuing relevance.
- PfP review should build on the successful examples of regional cooperation. SEE Group and the SEECAP were highlighted in this context, and participants suggested exploring their potential for application in other parts of the Euro-Atlantic region.

Looking at change however, a number of issues stand out. There is a necessity to address a broader array of challenges and risks to our security, which require different emphases than to date. It was stated that the old way of conceptualizing security died with the terrorist attacks, as it became obvious that events far from the homeland-security of energy transportation corridors, migration and refugee problems elsewhere, etc.-are now part of security thinking.

Functionally, the new challenges also bring new areas of cooperation. It was underscored that NATO and PfP should consider how they can offer added value in areas such as border control, energy security and the fight against terrorism. PfP cooperation should address transnational risks and challenges, such as organized crime and illicit trafficking, which feed terrorism. Since September 11, it has become all the more evident that internal and external security are inextricably linked.

Among the recommendations widely voiced by several participants were centralizing national security establishments and redefining relationships between ministries and agencies within a state; cooperating and interacting with the armed forces, internal security forces, gendarmerie-type forces; promoting national and multinational interoperability and coordination among such forces; and broadening PfP cooperation to the full scope of the security sector. Force planning, training and weapons systems should also be adapted to reflect this broader agenda.

Geographically, there is a manifest need to concentrate more on Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Mediterranean Dialogue countries, and perhaps even others, in addition to BiH and FRY’s participation in PfP. Institutionally, there is a requirement for closer, deeper and more systematic cooperation among various international organizations including the UN, OSCE, EU, and sub-regional cooperation fora.

There was broad agreement that existing PfP instruments and initiatives provide a rich basis to build upon. The task is more to develop and adapt these tools to suit the new circumstances in which PfP should operate. An idea that attracted significant attention was the development of broader and deeper dialogue in PfP to enable more feedback to and from NATO on a wide array of issues of concern to NATO and partners. In certain respects, this idea recalled the NATO-partner discussions on the Individual Partnership Programs; or, for the non-experts, the documents NATO and its individual partners develop, which list the PfP activities that they will conduct together and include the forces the partners declare for NATO-led crisis management operations. Broader cooperation and interests may warrant resuscitating these meetings with a new and broader focus. It was stated that such an approach would also benefit NATO by providing more information and insight to familiarize the
Alliance with specific issues of concern. I think it would be a good step for PfP to institutionalize individualized but comprehensive consultation and cooperation strategies with each willing partner that detail the objectives of cooperation and what we intend to do jointly to deliver on these objectives. This is essentially a NATO plus 1 approach, and it should provide ample opportunities particularly to countries in the Caucasus for closer consultation and cooperation with NATO.

However, there was much emphasis also to explore regional and functional grouping and action plans. Options for the relationship between Allied and Partner members of such regional or functional groupings could be explored, bearing in mind the SEEGROUP experience within NATO/SEEI. An idea to accommodate such variable geometry was to develop Partnership Action Plans to structure joint action in specific issues of interest. Specifically, a Partnership Action Plan against terrorism was proposed, which I think holds much promise.

In sum: PfP will concentrate more on Central Asia and the Caucasus; NATO will want to know more about its partners; it will be more active in supporting reforms in the security area; it will be active in promoting regional cooperation in other regions, in addition to the Balkans; and last but not least, PfP will hopefully be more comprehensive in its approach to security. Key security issues that have been left underrated in PfP cooperation, such as asymmetrical threats, security sector reform, security agencies other than the armed forces, and arms control could now be subject to the 19 plus 1 approach taken up individually with partner countries.

This concurs roughly with the evolution of NATO’s role in the world. NATO Ministers stated in December last year that the upcoming Prague Summit will be a historic one, which would change NATO irreversibly in many respects. Of paramount importance in Prague will be...well, not enlargement. Rather, it will be the future of NATO itself. After September 11, NATO has realized that the security environment does not only call for better peacekeeping and crisis management in the Balkans; but that the world is still not safe to NATO allies even after Mr. Milosevic is gone. NATO countries have realized that they lack some of the essential capabilities and emphases required to fight the contemporary challenges to security, starting with terrorism and all the factors that feed into it. Prague, hopefully, will be when NATO will take decisive steps to remedy these shortfalls. These may include initiatives to develop capabilities in such areas as defense against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attacks; but also, and I think as significantly, perhaps a shift towards collective capabilities in WMD defense and consequence management. Also, how NATO mechanisms would support “coalitions of the willing” should be worth anticipating.

But the Prague Summit will also be about enlargement. NATO will enlarge. It will admit new members. It’s my personal bet that its boundaries will reach the western coasts of the Black Sea. Two southeastern allies, Turkey and Greece, will be connected to Central Europe with the addition of Romania and Bulgaria. This too will have implications for the subject matter of this seminar.

With that, I can refer to NATO’s primary regional cooperation promotion tool. NATO’s SouthEast Europe Initiative is a series of programs and initiatives aimed at promoting regional cooperation and long-term stability in the Balkans. It was launched at the Alliance’s 1999 Washington Summit during the Kosovo air campaign. The Initiative was designed to add to NATO’s already extensive cooperative relationships with partner countries through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). In addition, it included countries that did not belong to these institutions and programs, Bosnia and Herzegovina and (at
the time) Croatia, and foresaw the eventual extension to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, when circumstances would permit.

Instability and conflict in Southeastern Europe (which is geographically sandwiched by one NATO member in the north—Hungary—and three in the south—Greece, Italy and Turkey) have posed direct challenges to the Alliance’s interests during the past decade. In response, NATO has been obliged to take measures to ensure that crises do not destabilize neighboring countries and, in addition to the SEE Initiative, is currently leading three peace-support operations in the region, in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia), in Kosovo and in Macedonia.

An important characteristic of the SEEI has been that initiatives and programs were conducted under regional leadership and ownership. In order to promote this objective, the North Atlantic Council endorsed a comprehensive set of ideas to promote regional cooperation and stability in the region and proposed them to the regional countries. To simplify the formula, this has worked as follows: I give you an idea, you agree to take political ownership and lead, and I support you practically and politically. A good example is the SouthEast Europe Security Cooperation Steering Group (SEEGROUP). Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Italy, Romania, Slovenia, Macedonia, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States established the SEEGROUP, with a rotating chair among Balkan partners, to support cooperation in the region. Austria, Yugoslavia and Switzerland joined the group later on. The SEEGROUP has been instrumental in developing regional approaches. The latest example is the Framework Guidelines it developed on exchanging border security liaison personnel among the countries in the region in order to support the common endeavour to combat organized crime, terrorism, and illicit trafficking of humans, narcotics, arms and illicit material (SEESTAFF). Currently, it is working on an agreement to exchange information on sensitive and non-sensitive early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management (SEECHANGE).

A major achievement—one of the most significant, alongside the establishment of the SEDM and the SEEBRIG and the signing of the Charter on Good Neighborly Relations—is the SouthEast Europe Common Assessment Paper on Regional Security Challenges and Opportunities (SEECAP). This is not an academic document; it was agreed to by the Foreign Ministers of all countries in Southeastern Europe, including the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The SEECAP was developed in accordance with the formula I’ve summarized above: I give the idea for you to take ownership of and lead, and I support you in return. SEECAP is a comprehensive overview of the security environment in Southeastern Europe that lays out common perceptions of security challenges, as well as opportunities for participating countries to cooperate in addressing them. The document is action-oriented with a robust follow-up section, and forms a basis for security-sector reform in the region.

Recently the North Atlantic Council, encouraged by the success of this document, agreed that this model for harmonizing security perceptions and charting a way ahead to resolve them cooperative-ly should be considered in other regions as well. Does it have an application in the Black Sea basin, or in the Caucasus, or in Central Asia? I think that, instead of giving you a shopping list of all the good things that we’ve done, I will now hazard a few personal thoughts and try to seek out some answers.

At an EAPC seminar in Baku toward the end of last year, we discussed specifically the lessons learned from regional cooperation experience in the Balkans. I will share some of our conclusions. First, regional cooperation is the order of the day. It’s the language we speak. Remember the Helsinki Final Act and how we used its language in our discourses, how it shaped diplomatic parlance, how its principles have shaped international relations. Regional cooperation is becoming something like that, and no one in this world can ignore the call for its development. It is not a luxury; it is a diplomatic must, although I immediately recognize that it is not advanced in similar degrees in various parts of the Euro-Atlantic geography, and many times for good reason.

The second lesson is that regional cooperation does not occur only in areas where things are fine and seamless. The Balkans is a good example. Regional cooperation in the Balkans progressed when the region was marred with deep suspicions and all sorts of perceived and self-tailored historic baggage.
NATO’s SEEI and the Stability Pact were launched when NATO’s operation in Yugoslavia was still under- way, when there was active armed conflict in the region.

The third lesson is that regional cooperation starts from the region. There must be some level of desire on the part of the regional countries to think beyond conflict and perceived histories. Cooperation must be regionally owned to progress and succeed.

Fourth, the regional lead is essential. In addition to more apparent reasons, regional leadership also demonstrates and promotes responsibility. It allows countries to articulate their preferences as lead countries in harmony with others who may or may not be as interested in a particular project. It gives that fifteen minutes of fame to every country in the region, and teaches the others to trust the lead nation in particular projects.

Fifth, there is a role for international organizations in advancing regional cooperation. NATO is one such organization in areas that are of interest to it. There may be others too. At any rate, the involvement of such organizations provides political backing, international recognition and attention, and transparency to the outside world. This is particularly true when regional countries have integration prospects.

There were more lessons in Baku, but let me start wrapping up by comparing these key lessons learned with the prospects in the Black Sea. First, I think the Black Sea basin is a better geographical reference for regional cooperation than the southern Caucasus. It brings together all the key players, and it involves countries that have developed international experience and expertise in promoting multilateral and internationalist cooperation schemes. The countries around the Black Sea are tied up in a common future and common issues. And there is already an important set of examples of regional cooperation, including the landmarks BSECO and BLACKSEAFOR. All the countries in the region are NATO or PfP countries and members of the EAPC forum. This only gives me hope that the regional cooperation discourse is being substantiated in the region already, and there is much, much more to be done.

Second, the region as a whole has definitely not solved all its problems. One such unresolved issue is a potential big problem for regional cooperation. Neither the Helsinki process nor the SEE processes could have worked properly in the presence of unresolved territorial ambitions. The starting point should be the acknowledgement of each other’s territorial integrity and political independence. Resolution of territorial disputes and development of a Charter on Good Neighborly relations are urgently needed for the region alongside bilateral agreements. Otherwise, regional cooperation will perhaps not be altogether hindered, but will constantly be checked and limited by these frozen conflicts.

Third, international organizations do have a role to play, but currently there is no prospect for Euro-Atlantic integration, or membership in NATO and the EU for most of the regional states. Regional processes and international organizations, therefore, would operate in a less favorable environment that lacks integration incentives. That said, there are other benefits that these organizations can nonetheless provide—enhancing security by helping institutionalize and consolidate progress in bilateral and multilateral cooperation, or helping develop regional capabilities to deal with major security challenges, or helping to further harmonize security perceptions, or (perhaps most important) helping massively in the essential reforms and assisting economic development.

Unmistakably, there is growing interest and involvement of international organizations in the region. This appears to be true also for NATO. The Black Sea is only on the margins of EU engagement or weight, but NATO—with its established means and tools, enhanced relations with Russia, Ukraine and other partners, including neighboring allies whose numbers are now growing—could do more. In this context, I’d be the first supporter of ideas like a stability regime for the region, a NATO Black Sea initiative, and a Black Sea Security Forum.

Mr. Chairman, this has been a snapshot of my views for Black Sea’s potential in regional cooperation. Much more can be said. But to sum up, regional cooperation in the Black Sea is, I think, essential for Euro-Atlantic security at large, and above all for the well-being of the peoples of the region. To conclude on a light note: It has been up to me to say it; it is up to you to act upon it! After all, recall the formula for the SEEI: I will give the ideas, you will take responsibility, and I will support you.
These two meetings will largely define the successes and failures of Russia and its defense establishment to integrate with the United States as a partner, as well as with NATO. The European Union also will be concerned, since the Russia-EU relationship depends on Russia’s relationships with the US and NATO.

This transition, or transformation, which is now taking place in Russian foreign policy, is not universally accepted by the Russian elite. It is very clear that the established policy represents the sentiments of Vladimir Putin, and that large sections of the Russian military and political elite are unhappy about it. This difference of opinion shows the progress Russia has made within the broad public, but in the end it is a problem of policy makers and analysts. In a final analysis, the state of affairs suggests that the extent to which Russia, the US and Western Europe will cooperate depends on the relations between forces within Russia.

RUSSIA
Global and regional aspects of the situation

Stephen Blank, Professor, Institute of the U.S. Army War College

When one studies Russia as an actor—a very important one, given its size and potential—in the Black Sea region, he also must consider Russia in a general sense. Russia at the moment is in the middle of a transition. Next month is the summit, which will be followed by the meeting in Rome between NATO and Russia.
The Russian transition is both mental and political. Let us compare the different world outlooks of Primakov and Putin, as they have both become clear since September 11. Primakov emphasized multipolarity and Russia’s global role. Putin is now emphasizing partnership and integration with Europe, while rarely discussing multipolarity. Whereas Primakov emphasized Russia’s political and military potential, Putin and his team emphasize neither a need to reconstruct Russian economic power, nor a need to use Russia’s relative regional economic superiority in the CIS and Europe.

Much has been written about the use of the energy factor in Russian foreign policy, such as Russia’s attempts to create a pipeline bypassing Ukraine and leading to the EU. An equally important point that is not discussed is Putin’s grand design to use Russia’s geographic position between Europe, Asia, Scandinavia, the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea to make Russia the hub of many large and major infrastructures that will strengthen Russian economic power relative to its neighbors. This design will integrate Russia more closely with Europe and the EU, and will cause surrounding regions to feel greater economic dependence on Russia.

This transition from “Primakovism” to “Putinism” also entails a fundamental reorientation of the typical military threat assessment. Looking at the published Russian doctrines of 2000—the draft defense doctrine, the actual defense doctrine, the foreign policy outline, and the national security concept—one notices that they place priority on domestic threats, but also emphasize military threats from operations like those in Kosovo, and from terrorism in Chechnya. One can see a general effort to use the military card more bluntly, such as putting tactical nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad and making threats to attack Afghanistan. The defining characteristic of Putin’s foreign and defense policy is its hostility to the US, which is viewed as encroaching on virtually every aspect of Russian global interests. The key issues are NATO enlargement, the threat the Kosovo operation posed to Russia, missile defense, and now the heightened influence of NATO and the US across the Caucasus and Central Asia.

What this means for Russia domestically is that an increased reliance will be placed on Russian police and military organs to defend the nation against the mentioned threats. This is taking place in the context of Yeltsin’s failure to establish a truly democratic regime of civilian control over the military and police organs. Since September 11, however, much of this has been put to rest. First of all, we have seen a real partnership between the US and Russia in the war on terror. This partnership takes the form of intelligence cooperation and logistical support for the Northern Alliance and the new government in Afghanistan. Russia also has intended to ease the world’s opposition and criticism over the war in Chechnya. The new strategic relationship with the US does not emphasize missile defense as the most important issue, and instead focuses on the nature of reductions in offensive weapons.

The second part of Russia’s integration is the partnership treaty with NATO that was signed in Rome. On the one hand, the treaty gives Moscow something it has long wanted: a functioning mechanism by which it can attempt to influence NATO. On the other hand, the treaty provides Russia only limited influence, and the influence is limited to broader questions of terrorism, non-proliferation and civil emergencies. Russia does not have authority to question NATO’s internal decision-making process.

The third aspect of this partnership is the growing relationship with the EU, encompassing energy issues, transportation issues, the Shengen regulations, and Kaliningrad.

The fourth aspect is Putin’s opposition to American temporary military presence in the Caucasus and Central Asia. I emphasize temporary because EU and NATO spokesmen have said publicly that they expect a withdrawal of US forces when the war in Afghanistan
is over. Also, the total number of US forces in Central Asia and those intended to train Georgian and Azeri forces is not large. However, especially in Central Asia, American air bases will need to be defended by army troops. I believe that many of them will stay in Central Asia for a long time after the war.

The above discussion refers to the global, or macro, view of the Russian strategic situation. The regional level, however, is of particular importance. As Putin stated in his most recent speech to the Duma, “The main focus of Russian foreign policy is its partners in the CIS.” At other times, he has said the states of the Commonwealth are natural allies of Russia. I don’t think Putin is giving up on the idea of creating a more dependent relationship between these states and Russia. However, he cannot use the Russian military as an effective force to bring this about until the military is reformed, which is one of the most intractable issues in Russia today. Because of current military straits, Putin allowed the US to come in, as there is no other way to deal with the terrorist threat. Putin is resorting to other tactics that place greater emphasis in the Black Sea area and Central Asia, such as the use of the “energy weapon,” control over pipelines, and the growing capability of Russian oil and gas companies to penetrate and invest in both East European and CIS energy companies. There are many examples of this: in Turkey-the Blue Stream project; in the Balkan states-the Southeast European pipelines, such as the one from Varna to Burgas; Gazprom’s investments in Europe and Lukoil’s intention to participate to the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. As a Hungarian diplomat once remarked, “We don’t know if this is a foreign investment or a foreign policy.” Chances are it is probably both.

Using the economic assets that Russia has available, Putin has also supervised the integration of Russian police abroad and occasionally organized crime elements, along with business organizations. As has occurred in many places in Eastern Europe, such as in Bulgaria and Lithuania, the SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service), the FSB (Federal Security Service), Russian businesses, and some elements of the Russian Mafia have joined their powers to influence and obtain desired results that are beneficial to all.

Putin’s policy is obviously very different from the one in the 1990s, but there are some similarities as well. Some of the similarities are: the war in Chechnya (which is going nowhere); growing signs of antidemocratic tendencies at home; growing use of the police; a tight grip on the media; and the lack of democratic control over the police and military, which allows their intervention in domestic politics (including Chechnya).

The most dangerous example is the constant temptation of the Russian army to invade Georgia, where there are hundreds of thousands of uninvited Russian “peacekeepers.” Here comes to mind the Russian proverb: “an uninvited guest is worse than a Tatar.” The presence of Russian troops could expand the war in Chechnya, undermining Russia’s integration with Europe and the US, and ultimately create a drawn out war that Russia cannot win. The troops keep the pressure on Georgia, but, as a Russian general who was here in February told me, we have not put enough pressure on Georgian President Eduard Shevarnadze.

Russia can play these games with regards to the Black Sea states-Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, and to some extent Turkey due to the fact that many of them suffer from similar kinds of domestic problems and pathologies. It can also be noted that almost all these areas have terrorist problems and conflicts of the type that we very often see in failed states with illegitimate governance. This is not only true in the Black Sea, but also in Columbia, Argentina, and Afghanistan under the Taliban. In some of these places, like Afghanistan and to an extent Chechnya, we have the so-called “black holes.” Chechnya is in even worse shape than Afghanistan because it does not have an organized narcotics economy whereas Afghanistan had one for many years.

This illegitimate governance manifests itself in corruption-governments that cannot guarantee security for their citizens, economic failure, criminality in government, an enormous gap between rich and poor, a lack of democratic procedures, ethnic rivalries within the states (such as in Georgia, Azerbaijan, some parts of Ukraine, and Turkey), and insufficient democratic control over the use of the armed forces. Georgia is a perfect example because of the constant tendency on the part of the Georgian authorities (or people acting in the name of Georgian authorities) to try to use paramilitary or Chechen forces in order to suppress the Abkhazian threat. This brought
the Russian Army in to help during October and November of 2001. As a result, a major crisis occurred—one that is still going on—compelling the American forces to come in as advisors and to try to calm things down.

It is also clear that many of these states generally were flourishing with corruption and criminality and had become traders in drugs, conventional weapons, women, and eventually nuclear materials. The most troubling aspect of this is that in several of these states there are secessionist movements that have successfully created what we might call quasi-states, such as Transdniester, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno Karabakh. These regions function somewhat like states, but on a much lower level, and in all cases they still enjoy the support of Russia. This means that at the regional level Russia is as effective in destabilization as it is in stabilization. Marxists call this a dialectical relationship. It proves very contradictory for Russia, as it is fighting terrorism and at the same time supporting secessionism and all the evils associated with ethnic conflicts.

The danger lies in this region precisely because all these aspects create conditions for internal war and external intervention. Moreover, we are now seeing a tendency in many of these places for growing mass and elite dissatisfaction for governments that had performed badly in the 1990s. Examples include the Bulgarian elections that threw out the government, the Turkish economic crisis that created much dissatisfaction and problems for reform, the Ukrainian elections which Kuchma lost, the cabinet crisis in Georgia when the Ministry of the Interior tried to censor the press and brought on mass public uprising, and major demonstrations in Moldova. We also see dissatisfaction in Central Asia, including the cabinet crisis in Kazakhstan and Niyazov’s cutting of the entire elite in the security field, indicating that something is rotten there as well.

Therefore, at the regional level we have an area which is in a very precarious position and very vulnerable to oppose the threats of ethnic war, economic and political crises, and illegitimate succession, as there is no recognized or effective means of succession in places like Georgia and Azerbaijan. In Armenia there have been coups in the past, and there possibly will be more coups in the near future. Although elections took place in Ukraine and Russia, we saw that the Russian elections were short-circuited in 1999-2000, and in 1996 Yeltsin simply bought the election. So therefore, we have incomplete democratic relations in the region as well as political vulnerabilities of many different types. This potential for regional crises could disrupt the attempted partnership of the US and Russia, and relations between Europe and Russia. For example, the OSCE is urging Russia to get out of the bases in Moldova and to evacuate the Georgian bases, but Russians are dragging their feet, continuing to support the secessionists throughout the region and creating tensions in these areas.

Thus, in the final analysis, regional security in the Black Sea, the CIS and Southeast Europe as a whole depends on three factors that we cannot precisely assess today. The first is the domestic regeneration of each of the states into a politically viable, economically progressive, and hopefully democratic state. That alone would prove most important for integration with the West and for dynamic stability. The second factor is the creation of a lasting coalition between the states, since for the most part they are in favor of reform and integration along Western lines. That helps to determine the third factor—whether or not a Western expansion partnership with Russia could lead to joint and constructive management of regional security problems. It is very clear that the Caucasus region, for example, is and will be increasingly more prominent on the European security agenda, both for NATO and the EU. It is now an open question whether a partnership between those organizations, the US and Russia would be capable of introducing constructive and cooperative opportunities that would help to improve the situation in the Caucasus and to assist the cooperation between and cohesion of the different Caucasus governments.

If Russia is willing to play a role, it will be welcomed. But in the final analysis, given NATO and EU enlargement and the current importance of these areas to NATO, the EU and the US, if Russia is unavailable or unwilling to play a constructive role in regional security, then NATO and the US will go ahead on their own. The outcome may or may not be a desirable, but it appears as though this is the direction in which we are moving. In other words, to manage regional crises in these areas, the West wants Russia to do what it can to help resolve all issues, but if necessary, it will work without Russia.
The Black Sea security environment: new strategic challenges

Mr. George Cristian Maior, PhD, Secretary of State for Euro-Atlantic Integration and Defense Policy, Ministry of National Defence of Romania

I am delighted to address this audience as a guest speaker after I enjoyed the opportunity to moderate a fruitful dialogue between those who might be called to devise and implement a new vision of the Black Sea area. Therefore, the aim of my presentation is to briefly review the present security situation in the region and explore possible trends for its future development.

During the East-West confrontation, the area had a "negative" strategic relevance, since it was at the frontier between opposing military blocks. It was a frozen arena in geopolitical or political terms, inhibiting the normal dynamics stemming from genuine international cooperation. Indeed, what confined the Black Sea area to its Cold War strategic profile was the fact that ideological competition prevented it from playing the role of a dividing line as well as a bridge among three continents, with all advantages and difficulties drawn from such a location. The internal balance of an area with significant potential for development was altered and the term "Mediterranean" never applied to the Black Sea. Today's historic opportunity is to reverse this trend and recover if not rebuild a genuine
Black Sea identity as a strong component of the emerging Euro-Atlantic security architecture.

During its history, the Black Sea area has been both a bridge and a dividing line between populations, cultures, empires, and continents. Gheorghe Bratianu, a famous Romanian diplomat and historian, said decades ago that the Black Sea problem is more complex than it seems at first glance. It is indeed about an almost closed sea, which communicates with the Mediterranean only through the tiny opening of the straits. However, the Black Sea deserves the label of “open sea” due to the big rivers that flow into it, as well as to the intricate network of continental routes that reach its ports. It can also be considered a “turning platform” of extensive commercial traffic. The cultural diversity present on its shores is living proof of the Black Sea bridging character between Europe and Asia. To this day, this analysis preserves its essential relevance.

A few questions might rise in this context. Firstly, is security cooperation possible in the Black Sea area? Secondly, have countries in the region reached an acceptable level of mutual trust that enables them to develop joint security projects? And last but not least, what kind of involvement and security investment does the area need from the international community? I will try to briefly answer these questions.

From a modern strategic perspective, securing the area and promoting a climate of peace and stability would diminish a whole range of conventional and non-conventional risks to Europe’s security. Military threats to sovereign airspace, organized crime, terrorist networks or illegal trafficking of armaments and sensitive materials are among existing security challenges. One thing is clear, though: What is bad for the Black Sea area is bad for Europe, and what proved beneficial for Europe’s security could also fly for the Black Sea area.

Common perceptions and a common understanding of security challenges and opportunities—encompassing political, military, economic, human, social, and environmental aspects—can be the basis for a comprehensive approach to security and stability in the Black Sea area. It worked in Southeastern Europe and has become an essential part of a genuine SEE security understanding. Setting out perceptions, expectations and agendas shared by all Black Sea riparian countries is an achievable goal. No state or international organization can deal alone with the emerging security challenges. A concerted effort towards security and stability is needed. In addressing these challenges, regional and international cooperation is indispensable.

We might also need a flexible framework to approach these issues. The sense of regional ownership that SEE initiatives have developed, and the awareness that nations ultimately have the responsibility for promoting peace in their adjacent environment are major achievements that could be extrapolated to include the Black Sea area. Ultimately, developing a security concept for the region is, I think, in everybody’s interests. Predictability should prevail over security uncertainties, and resources could be wisely managed. All riparian countries are interested in promoting confidence and security building measures around the Black Sea. They are convinced that mutual trust is one of the first steps towards eliminating conflicts and disputes.

One should consider the link between development and security in the Black Sea area. The economic and social development of the Black Sea riparian countries and the level of their interaction in developing economic, environmental, scientific and technological programs are preconditions for regional security. Economic cooperation is one of the
most effective confidence building measures. Leveling the economic wealth among participating states could be the value added to the peace dividend. The Black Sea Cooperation Organization comes in support of this theory. The BSEC has proved itself a forum where the participating states put aside their differences to undertake joint economic projects for their mutual benefit. It has proved to be a regional arrangement where economic motives transcend political conflicts. People think twice about creating political tensions if they know it will harm their economic benefits. The Black Sea area is a market of more than 50 million consumers. Oil and gas should stop being a reason for competition and become a trigger for economic cooperation as a catalyst for security.

Before approaching the security in the Black Sea region as a product of different regional evolutions, let us have a look back to September 11, 2001. It was a “transforming momentum”: the post-Cold War era itself came finally to an end. The complex interaction between traditional nation-states and non-state actors is generating a redistribution of rules and roles on the international scene with huge implications in the security area. September 11 thus opened a new phase of international relations. Only combined efforts to create security in the region lead to greater stability. A stable region means less confrontation and more military, political, diplomatic and economic cooperation. The goals are highly desirable and easily defined, but the means of achieving them less so. For us, the question is how to build a more prosperous and secure Black Sea area. It is important to answer this question by identifying old and new risks for the security and stability of the area and the means to counter them. This implies common efforts to assess the security landscape, to recognize the problems, and then to identify the methods to address them.

This should entail international collaboration in many fields, motivated by but not limited to counter-terrorism; also transnational law enforcement, intelligence sharing, police cooperation, energy markets development, etc. We must develop policies, institutions and norms to cope with these trends. This is not as simple as creating international or regional institutions; some of them are in fact already in place. It entails a variety of means that have to take into account the specificity of the region.

The national defense policy is more and more entangled with
requirements of collective security. During centuries of turmoil—hopefully now banished from history books—the Black Sea became the scene of conflict, a border area of clashing ideologies and incompatible visions of the future. Today, the situation is different because for the first time, the Black Sea is surrounded by modern sovereign states rather than rival imperial structures, and cooperation has a better chance than ever to prevail over confrontation. Security cooperation in the Black Sea area is possible, as the BLACKSEA FOR proved. But more could be done in the following directions:

- Cooperation in harmonizing civil military relations and developing effective mechanisms of democratic civilian control of the armed forces. Some of Black Sea area countries have gained more experience than the others in this field and can share it;
- Cooperation in protecting communication lines that unite the countries in the Black Sea area;
- Cooperation in the field of civil emergency and environmental protection.
- Further promotion of multinationality as the organizing idea that would shape regional response capabilities and mechanisms. In Southeastern Europe, this idea is already successfully implemented and BLACKSEAFOR could be a basis to build upon.

A new approach in terms of security policy requires really operating with a new definition of security. Such a definition has to take into account a wide variety of risks based on diverse factors ranging from the presence of immature social structures characterizing the processes of democratization, to state and local perceptions of security.

These developments call for new security concepts and policies reaching beyond the limits of the traditional bilateral and multilateral forms of cooperation, or giving them a new substance.

It is against this background that I would like to launch the idea of a Black Sea Security Forum. What I have in mind is a framework that would provide the riparian countries with opportunities to jointly address regional security issues by taking stock of previous experience. At the same time, this new framework could enable participating countries to streamline their efforts in addressing new security risks. This Forum would facilitate the dialogue on security matters among governmental and non-governmental organizations of countries in the Black Sea area. It might also facilitate cooperation in education and among academic institutions as a long-term investment. Furthermore, such a Forum could provide decision makers with solutions for security problems that need a comprehensive approach and far-reaching responses.

We can build the political momentum for such an endeavor starting from the realities that emerged after September 11. The development of a security policy aimed at building stabilization mechanisms with a preventive effect increases the importance of peaceful and cooperative means requiring a dense network of economic, commercial and cultural links, each of them virtually designing forms of shared mutual confidence and dependencies. Expanding security by developing cooperative mechanisms must be regarded as closely linked to the overall change of the international security environment.

A Black Sea Security Forum would not be a new institution. It would merely bring together interested nations that believe Euro-Atlantic security is indivisible. However, interested nations share the view that establishing effective regional conflict prevention and crisis management capabilities and mechanisms is required to complement broader arrangements. The experience gained by countries in Southeastern Europe and the participation of these nations in the PfP program might be helpful in implementing such an idea.

As I mentioned in the beginning, a new vision is required for the Black Sea region. Improved security and enhanced stability are only a part of it. This vision could entangle ambitious though achievable goals such as finding the right place for the Black Sea area within the emerging Euro-Atlantic security architecture. It is reasonable to assume that nobody will come to solve our problems. However, the involvement of international organizations is beneficial, since it would foster the feeling that the international community cares about our problems. Regional ownership should therefore be the overarching principle. Assimilating patterns of cooperation viable in other areas could help us all consolidate good neighborly relations with the aim of enhancing regional security and stability.
Ukraine's contribution
to the development of co-operation with the Black Sea states

Viktor Bannykh, State Secretary of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine for International Co-operation, Colonel-General

The cooperation of the Black Sea states is aimed at transforming the Black Sea region into an area of peace and stability through enhancing economic ties and developing neighborly relations between the states. The recent emphasis on issues surrounding the Black Sea region is explained by the large-scale projects to provide new transport and energy through Eurasian corridors.

The strategic importance of the region primarily lies in its transit function. The region is located at the crossroads of the developed European regions and the mineral and labor rich Middle Eastern areas, and extends further eastward to the Indian Ocean and the East Asian markets. From the other side, the Black Sea region connects Northern and Eastern Europe with the Mediterranean Sea region, thus shaping the economic and political interests of Europe, Asia, and Northern Africa.

Geopolitically, the given region features a somewhat chaotic and destructive nature. Casting a retrospective glance, one might conclude that the region lacks a solid and influential geopolitical core, which is a result of the domination of external forces. The states of the region could never wield significant political powers while seeking patronage outside or maneuvering between the existing forces—Western Europe, the Ottoman Empire, Russia, and Iran—, which were competing for political primacy in the region by using Black Sea resources to their advantage. Once declared independent, however, the states of the region recognized such a situation as unacceptable.
Therefore, the following alternatives emerge-either each state decides to alone withstand any challenges and threats from outside, or all the states find joint ways to consolidate the region from inside through a merging of their interests. As a defense officer, I take to heart and fully understand the importance of issues related to security and stability in the Black Sea area, where we have an extensive list of common, unresolved problems-both internal and external-which demand joint efforts for resolution.

The Black Sea region, with its geopolitical status, economic potential and flurry of activity, is of paramount importance to the future of European nations. On the one hand, the given region is recognized to be a profitable bridge along which to transport energy resources and realize the economic and political interests of European and Asian countries. On the other hand, the region harbors certain unsettled conflicts that make it unstable and explosive. Some negative trends and processes are underway within the region, slowing its economic development and creating a number of threats in international and regional security. The states of the region face conflicts (Georgia-Abkhazia, Georgia-Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Moldova-Pridnestrov, and Chechnya) with consequences such as an increase in forced migrant flows, illicit trafficking of weapons and drugs, an intensification of criminal elements, and international terrorism. In spite of the fact that most of the mentioned conflicts have experienced a period in which a cease-fire was possible, none of them ultimately has been settled. There is another meaningful circumstance that should be kept in mind: the given region is now surrounded by former and new nuclear or nuclear-aspiring states.

The menacing "security vacuum" is now on the agenda. To stabilize the situation, it is necessary to join the efforts of all the region’s states in order to make the most out of the regional and international services available. To attain stability and enhance confidence and security within the Black Sea area, Ukraine uses a wide range of political, economic and military activities, pursuing its foreign policy in these three directions:

1. Economic cooperation within the framework of GUUAM, primarily in the development of transportation and communication corridors.

For Ukraine, the development of regional and transregional cooperation is among the top priorities of foreign and economic policy. The official Kyiv believes that GUUAM priorities-which were determined at various summits, including those in New York and Yalta-sufficiently reflect the interests of all GUUAM member states. The first of these priorities is to establish the Euro-Asian transportation corridor and develop transportation, energy and cultural cooperation.

Taking into consideration the economic and cultural orientations of the member states and a number of internal and external factors, no multilateral military cooperation within GUUAM is envisioned. Any contacts and connections between the GUUAM member states at the military and political, purely military, and military and technical levels are beyond the scope of this organization, which deals with the bilateral level only.
2. Peaceful settlement of conflicts in the region.  
When it comes to the settlement of a conflict, Ukraine’s position is to endorse the OSCE principles, especially those related to sovereignty, territorial integrity, the immutability of state borders within the region, the non-interference of any third parties, and the execution of peace-making operations based on a specific mandate of the OSCE or the United Nations. 
Presently, Ukraine has two missions of military observers in the Moldova-Pridnestrovie (10 persons) and Georgia-Abkhazia (6 persons) conflict areas. Such ongoing conflicts demonstrate the necessity to provide a reliable system of collective regional security. Such system could perform the following fundamental functions:
- Pool efforts with the goal of maintaining stability in the region;
- Ensure unimpeded functioning of the existing and prospective transportation corridors;
- Organize, based on UN or OSCE mandates, international military operations and humanitarian actions aimed at localizing and neutralizing conflict areas;
- Provide information on ship or plane wrecks which might threaten a contamination of territorial waters, economic zones, or coastlands of any involved parties;
- Carry out search-and-rescue operations.

3. International cooperation in military and naval fields.  
Ukraine’s naval cooperation should be considered strategically important, particularly given the increasing international value of the region due to its transportation and energy corridors. On April 23-25, 2002, the sixth session of the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation took place in Kyiv. At Ukraine’s initiative, the session adopted the Document on Security- and Confidence-Building Measures in the Naval Field in the Black Sea. Among today’s key elements of the regional system of collective security is the BLACKSEAFOR-the Joint Naval Operations Group of the six Black Sea states (Bulgaria, Georgia, Russia, Romania, Turkey, and Ukraine)-, established pursuant to the appropriate agreement signed in Istanbul on April 2, 2001. A good tradition is the participation of Ukraine’s officers and naval divisions in multinational naval exercises-such as “Sea Breeze,” “Cooperative Partner,” “Cooperative Support,” “Peace Fairway” and “Black Sea Partnership”—which are carried out in the Black Sea.

The bilateral naval cooperation between Ukraine and the other Black Sea states is gradually gaining momentum. The Navy Forces of Ukraine and the Black Sea Navy of the Russian Federation carry out their joint exercises every year, focusing on training, assisting ships in emergency situations, and search-and-rescue operations. There is an accord reached between the Defense Ministries of Ukraine and Georgia in matters related to Ukrainian assistance in the set-up of the air-defense system around Tbilisi. Future officers from Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan are educated in Ukraine’s higher military education establishments. Since the year 2000, soldiers and officers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine have been educated in the College of Foreign Languages and Academy of Land Forces and trained in the “Partnership for Peace” Training Center in Turkey. Future officers from Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan are educated in Ukraine’s higher military education establishments. Since the year 2000, soldiers and officers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine have been educated in the College of Foreign Languages and Academy of Land Forces and trained in the “Partnership for Peace” Training Center in Turkey. There is an accord reached between the Defense Ministries of Ukraine and Georgia in matters related to Ukrainian assistance in the set-up of the air-defense system around Tbilisi. Future officers from Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan are educated in Ukraine’s higher military education establishments. Since the year 2000, soldiers and officers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine have been educated in the College of Foreign Languages and Academy of Land Forces and trained in the “Partnership for Peace” Training Center in Turkey. There is an accord reached between the Defense Ministries of Ukraine and Georgia in matters related to Ukrainian assistance in the set-up of the air-defense system around Tbilisi. Future officers from Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan are educated in Ukraine’s higher military education establishments. Since the year 2000, soldiers and officers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine have been educated in the College of Foreign Languages and Academy of Land Forces and trained in the “Partnership for Peace” Training Center in Turkey. There is an accord reached between the Defense Ministries of Ukraine and Georgia in matters related to Ukrainian assistance in the set-up of the air-defense system around Tbilisi. Future officers from Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan are educated in Ukraine’s higher military education establishments. Since the year 2000, soldiers and officers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine have been educated in the College of Foreign Languages and Academy of Land Forces and trained in the “Partnership for Peace” Training Center in Turkey. There is an accord reached between the Defense Ministries of Ukraine and Georgia in matters related to Ukrainian assistance in the set-up of the air-defense system around Tbilisi. Future officers from Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan are educated in Ukraine’s higher military education establishments. Since the year 2000, soldiers and officers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine have been educated in the College of Foreign Languages and Academy of Land Forces and trained in the “Partnership for Peace” Training Center in Turkey. There is an accord reached between the Defense Ministries of Ukraine and Georgia in matters related to Ukrainian assistance in the set-up of the air-defense system around Tbilisi. 

Thus, in pursuance of national interest, Ukraine prefers the policy of searching for mutually acceptable and beneficial solutions by means of bringing into accord the national interests of the Black Sea states with a plan to transform the region into an area of peace, security and cooperation.

Once again, I welcome you and present to all of you my compliments. I would like to see the debates of this symposium result in a definite and unambiguous determination of not only the security threats in the Black Sea region—which are appearing now and may continue to appear in the future—but also of collective methods to overcome such threats. Whether it is necessary to set up new structures or to improve and develop the existing ones, with which the European states and international organizations must assist, I hope that our work at this forum will answer these most complex of questions.
Terrorist threats in the Black Sea region

Mytko Zaprianov, Department of Information of the Ministry of Defence of Bulgaria, Deputy, Chairman Colonel

The September 11 tragedy in the United States proved another turning point in world history. The globalization of terrorism and its connections with the criminal world around the globe have made this phenomenon the gravest and the nearest of all challenges to democracy and today’s civilization. The emergence of this asymmetric threat displays that it has no borders and proves that no state can be protected from it, regardless of economic and military power.

Present-day terrorism is associated with actions of radical religious, criminal, and ethnic groups and organizations that strive with the help of violence to destabilize state institutions, attain specific goals, and affect global public opinion by popularizing certain political or religious conceptions and creating the feeling of uncertainty. Opposing this threat is complicated by the fact that terrorists feature no moral setbacks, disregard human values, and apply means and methods which result in non-combatant slaughter, grave economic after-effects, and bad psychological implications.

It is possible that terrorists will make another step across the threshold in their strategy to cause huge damage and slaughter of the innocent by resorting to the use of unconventional weapons. Indeed, obtaining materials and components to begin manufacturing chemical and biological weapons—including radioactive ones—is not an unsolvable problem for terrorist organizations.

The transformations that terrorism as a phenomenon has started to feature bring to the foreground the necessity to reevaluate security risks globally, regionally and nationally, and
to undertake coordinated preventive actions against this phenomenon. In this context, what must be emphasized is the increased significance of the Black Sea region to global security due to its geopolitical location, the dynamics of ongoing processes, and the region’s role in the formation of transnational transportation and energy corridors.

Within this debate, it would be useful to ascertain the originality of the sources of the terrorist threats in the Black Sea region. There is no doubt that sources should exist beyond the regional dimension because of globalization trends. What keeps this threat alive are the instability and lack of statehood in certain adjacent regions, the escalation of religious extremism, increased global stratification, etc. It is necessary to note that terrorism is not closely tied to any religion or nation; neither does it fit the “poor versus rich” axis. Roots of terrorism feature exceptionally different natures, beginning with personal qualities and extending to ideological and religious beliefs and the pursuance of specific political goals. Therefore, it is rather hard to foresee possible terrorist acts.

The Black Sea region features the following specific qualities:
- Some conflicts are not ultimately settled and some areas are potentially critical of the emergence of religious extremism;
- Aggressive separative aspirations;
- Economic instability and social problems;
- Illegal sales of weapons and illicit trafficking of drugs and people;
- Actions of paramilitary groups;
- A large number of refugees and within-country displaced persons;
- Anti-globalistic sentiments.

Among the prerequisites for the emergence of terrorism in the region are ethnic antagonisms, consisting mainly of aspirations for independence, the demand to redraw existing borders or territories, and the desire to form new states. Such antagonisms are expressed in a steadfast manner and in some cases are entangled with the religion factor. Terrorists try to justify their actions by hearkening to the struggle for religious and human rights. The feeding environment for terrorism within the region also includes challenges related to the formation of statehood in certain countries, the lack experience with democracy, lowly living standards, etc. Another remarkable quality of the region is that some territories uncontrolled by state institutions are used by terrorists for the purpose of preparing attacks and committing a wide range of criminal acts.

In addition to the points mentioned above, the close proximity of the Black Sea region to unstable areas featuring organized crime, extremist groups, illegal emigration, unauthorized sales of weapons, and illicit trafficking of drugs is another major contribution to the problem. Still another fact that constitutes a real threat is that civilians currently possess a large number of weapons acquired during past regional conflicts or purchased illegally. This obstructs the guarantee of personal security and the enhancement of peace in potential areas of crisis. The threat connected with the purchase and use of weapons of mass destruction also exists. What also requires attention is the collaboration between terrorist organizations and organized crime, which lately has become more prevalent. Illegal trafficking of weapons and drugs, along with other illegal activity, is the key source from which regional terrorism is gaining its strength, including its financial strength. An important peculiarity here is that lawful non-governmental organizations are used to shelter criminal activities or sponsor terrorist structures. The ongoing regional crises, the emerging demographic changes, and the economic and social difficulties together create problems related to refugees and migration, which terrorist organizations use toward their sordid motives. Separatist forces craftily employ radical Islamic conceptions, which often serve as a base for their terrorist strategies. All of the above demonstrates that certain parts of the region are bases for international terrorism, suitable for attacks as well as logistical assistance for and preparation of terrorist acts in other regions of the planet.

The mechanisms for and means of increasing the effectiveness of anti-terrorist war are, primarily, dependent upon the complexity and peculiarities of the phenomenon as well as upon the necessity to pursue an uncompromising, consistent, and long-term policy. The global nature of the threat requires global response to be grounded on multilateral mechanisms of international cooperation (military, financial, diplomatic, legislative, etc.).

It is obvious that the active participation of the Black Sea regional states in the global anti-terrorist coalition—a coalition which is itself a precedent in international relations—is becoming increasingly significant. To effectively struggle against terrorist threats, it is necessary to make proper amendments in national legislation that will allow adequate response to the threats. It may also be applicable to extend the legislative and treaty base of regional collaboration on anti-terrorist war, organized crime, and illicit trafficking of people,
commodities, weapons and drugs. A number of signed bilateral and multilateral agreements lie perfectly within such a base already. With the aim of providing a collective front and improving interaction, it is necessary for all states to sign and ratify the conventions and agreements within the United Nations framework relating to the struggle against terrorism. Combining their experiences, the states of the region are capable of fostering a comprehensive anti-terrorist international convention.

Increasing the effectiveness of efforts to suppress the financing of terrorist structures is becoming particularly important. Notwithstanding the successful actions to identify and freeze funds going toward Al-Qaeda banking accounts, the terrorist network has continuing economic assets. One should also consider that criminal and terrorist organizations have changed their tactics, now using front persons and companies, sham charity organizations, couriers, and others to acquire finances. With resources devoted to uncovering the sources of terrorist financing, it is exceptionally difficult to allocate additional resources to improving financial intelligence and implementing necessary changes in the banking sector.

Also gaining importance is improved border, customs and visa control, which will suppress terrorists’ entry into the region and hamper the illicit trafficking of people, goods, weapons and drugs. Collective actions aimed at improving border protection could ensure a degree of success in the struggle against terrorism. In connection with this, there are favorable prospects for the improvement of regional cooperation in the Black Sea area, as well as cooperation with countries of other regions, especially within the framework of international organizations such as the European Union.

It is necessary to mention that recent years have seen encouraging results within the context of regional cooperation. What allows us to hope that these great beginnings will continue in the future are initiatives like the Pact on Stability for Southeast Europe and the Organization for Economic Cooperation in the Black Sea, confidence- and security-enhancing measures in the naval field, the task force for operations in the Black Sea (BLACKSEAFOR), and others. Today’s environment is forcing to the forefront the necessity of creating effective mechanisms to apply toward such initiatives, especially in the field of struggling against organized crime. It is necessary to promote the collaboration of training specialists so that they will be capable of more effectively coping with the terrorism problem and exchanging their experiences. It also is important that the states of the region work out-as soon as possible-a collective approach, for neutralizing the threats toward regional stability. It is necessary to decisively suppress any attempts to connect terrorism with the “protection” of minority rights and to prevent a confrontation between the civilizations (Christianity vs. Islam). Instead, we must foster a constructive dialogue between the many different cultures and religions existing in the region.

Another hard-to-exaggerate task is strengthening institutions such as law protecting organizations, law enforcement agencies, and special services, and enhancing the interaction between them. Interaction should include the development of a database containing information on the activities, methods and interrelations or terrorist and separatist organization, as well as their financial resources. The database also should identify people involved in money laundering and the illicit trafficking of people, weapons and drugs. A demonstrative example in this regard is the activity of the Regional Center for Combating Transborder Crime, established within the confines of the Initiative for Cooperation in Southeast Europe.

International cooperation organizations include as their integral part measures that guarantee the safety of air, sea, surface and railway transport, and that safeguard internal territorial waters from terrorist acts and suspicious activity. Taking into consideration the nature of terrorist threats, the meaningfulness of intelligence-with its key preventive role-has increased rather considerably. Coming to the forefront is the necessity to seek, accumulate, store, analyze, and use intelligence information relating to the intentions and activities of terrorist organizations in different parts of the planet. This is why it is necessary to reinforce the coordination and collaboration between the special services of all states concerned.

The armed forces play a particular role in countering terrorism. Mainly they task forces that can contribute to preventing terrorist actions or neutralizing terrorist structures, with the objective of safeguarding vital communication systems and infrastructures. They operate independently from or in conjunction with the Interior Offices’ forces, or within the framework of multinational forces. The BLACKSEAFOR task force may be used for just such a purpose under certain circumstances.

In an international context, there exist challenges in the definition and
understanding of terrorism and the strategy that should be employed to counter it. It is obvious that the future will give birth to different views on both the nature and definition of terrorism, which will have a negative effect on globally coordinated efforts. This difficulty will be further complicated by the necessity to elaborate a single judicial policy with regard to terrorist actions by unifying the laws in different countries. (Presently, such unification is being conducted within national legislation frameworks.) It also is necessary to exert additional measures to safeguard transcontinental projects, including the TRASECA project that connects Europe, the Caucasus and Asia, as well as safeguard communications and the transfer of energy carriers. Combating terrorism claims a significant place within the context of regional aspirations to integrate into European and Euro-Atlantic structures.

Now I would like to give you a brief report on the relevant contributions of Bulgaria, a member of the global anti-terrorist coalition. Bulgaria signified its complete readiness to act in compliance with actions of the European Union and to act de facto as a NATO member. As a result, the United States and other NATO member states were granted access to Bulgaria’s air space, which was necessary given the objectives of the anti-terrorist war. There is an agreement signed with the United States granting US aircraft the right to use air space over the Bulgarian territory, and granting US forces the right to pass freely and safely through and be temporarily deployed in the territory of Bulgaria in connection with Operation "Invincible Freedom." Bulgaria granted the US access to its air base in order to successfully accomplish the tasks of the anti-terrorist coalition. In addition, our state signed the October 4, 2001 Resolution of the NATO Council the September 21, 2001 Plan for Action of the European Union, and the OSCE Plan for Combating Terrorism. The government took steps toward complying with Security Council Resolution No. 1373 and submitted to the UN the appropriate report on time. Also, the Law on Measures Suppressing the Financing of Terrorism was passed and the International Convention on Suppressing the Financing of Terrorism was ratified. Besides, the additional measures were undertaken with the intent to reinforce the border, customs and weapons and commodities control, as well as to struggle against the illicit trafficking of drugs and minimize the money laundering employed to finance terrorist organizations. The operational exchange of intelligence is underway to prevent any use of the Bulgarian financial system by terrorist organizations. The Bulgarian contingent contributes to the international forces dedicated to keeping security in Afghanistan.

The military doctrine of Bulgaria and the tasks of the armed forces have experienced familiar transformations given the necessity to counteract terrorist threats. Given Bulgaria’s aspirations to join NATO and the European Union, the various aspects of the anti-terrorist war are now included in our nation’s plans and programs.

To sum up, I would like to make some observations. Even though terrorist activity is gradually being constricted, combating it should remain issue number one on the world agenda. The operation in Afghanistan proved to break the ice in the anti-terrorist war. To successfully counteract terrorism, it is necessary for the international community to unite its efforts in political, diplomatic, economic and military dimensions, so as to isolate those states, which are sponsoring terrorism. Also, it is necessary to employ all mechanisms prescribed by law with the intent to uncover and punish executors of terrorist acts and suppress the financing of terrorist organizations. Of a particular importance in this context is compliance with United Nations Resolution No. 1373, as well as with appropriate conventions and resolutions of other international organizations.

Developing the region economically and accelerating democratization and internal stability should minimize terrorist threats. Promoting amicable, neighborly relations with and cooperation between the states of the region is a necessary prerequisite for creating a collective anti-terrorist and anti-extremist front. It is important for the Black Sea states to be sustained from beyond, as the appropriate aid is necessary to increase the effectiveness of anti-terrorist actions in separate states and throughout the region. Intelligence, whose primary task is to identify terrorists and undertake preventative measures against them, should remain the major influence in the quality of the anti-terrorist war.

The anti-terrorist war is going to be waged in conjunction with the effort to combat organized crime. Aspiring to establish a better world order and equilibrium between safeguarded freedom and security should remain a driving force, which in turn will promote a collective force of states-including the Black Sea states-with a joint campaign to combat international terrorism.
Since 1990, Romania has followed consequently a very important goal: the European and Euro-Atlantic Integration. This paper is intended to help the readers learn about the level reached by the Romanian Armed Forces in meeting the NATO integration criteria, about the security and stability vocation of Romania deeply correlated with the international and regional efforts to create a new security and cooperation architecture after September 11th, 2001.

FOREWORD

Since 1990, Romania has set one very important goal: European and Euro-Atlantic Integration. This paper is intended to help readers learn about the level reached by the Romanian Armed Forces in meeting the NATO integration criteria, and how the security and stability vocation of Romania correlated with the international and regional efforts to create a new security and cooperation architecture after September 11th, 2001.

Among the NATO candidates, Romania continues to register the largest percentage (80%) of support by both the population and the armed forces for the pro-NATO option. The explanation of the firm national adhesion to this political and military goal is crystal clear: every Romanian believes that Romania belongs to NATO, alongside all the countries to which her past and present are connected and on which Romania’s future mostly depends on the Alliance. The unity and the security of the European continent are based on a system of values in which Romanians find themselves.

By summing up the measures for the reorganization and modernization of the Romanian Armed Forces, the participation in Peace Support Operations (POS) and in numerous humanitarian actions and in the Partnership for Peace...
(PfP) as well as the nation’s efforts to ensure the necessary conditions to fulfill such engagements, it is obvious that there is continuity in this process based on consensus and a well-defined and applied concept. The preparation process of the civilian society and the armed forces in favor of NATO integration is a Romanian construction, based on national solidarity, knowledge, and awareness.

The integration approach in the last two years has been much more coherent, more consequent and more efficient at all levels. It has transformed Romania into a powerful and unitary candidate for the NATO Summit in Prague in November 2002, a candidate that has already met the essential Euro-Atlantic standards and behaves as a real member of the Alliance.

I. THE ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES CLOSE TO NATO

The Romanian Armed Forces have already reached an operational and modernization stage in line with the requirements and objectives of the 3rd Membership Action Plan (MAP) cycle. The ample process of developing modern, supple, and flexible armed forces with a good operational readiness that is interoperable with NATO, ready to act in any mission, including peace keeping ones, has reached an advanced stage. It allows the Alliance to realize that Romania’s integration will strengthen the organization and its area of stability and security will be expanded substantially towards Southeastern Europe, an area confronted with new risks and security threats, with many tensions, challenges, vulnerabilities and unpredictable evolutions for regional and European stability.

To reach the NATO standards and to accelerate the reform process of the Armed Forces, the Ministry of National Defense (MoND) has decided to focus its efforts on the following prioritized areas: career management, professional reconversion, the planning integrated system, the Air Space Operational Center, the robust budgeting system, the Romanian Armed Forces Communication System (STAR), PfP participation, English language training, NCOs training, force restructuring and operationalization, forces designated for NATO/PfP missions and exercises, a new acquisition and coherent procurement strategy.

Nevertheless, armed forces restructuring and modernization is a need of the Romanian MoND and isn’t entirely motivated by NATO integration. The full reform process, Objective Force 2007, will balance the military requirements and commitments with financial realities so more of the available resources can be redirected from personnel and other overhead costs to training and modernization. It will create a supple, flexible and modular force, more compact, and more able to maintain credible sustainability in the theatre of operations. The new force will ensure the national defense and will properly contribute to the collective defense, crises-response operations and to regional and European security.

Between 1990 and 2002 Romania adopted the main laws and norms to ensure the optimum functioning of the armed force under the new conditions of the rule of law, market economy, democracy, civilian control, and defense reforms. These laws guaranteed the security of Romania and the accomplishment of the armed forces missions, enabled the implementation of the new organizational structure, integrated planning, requisitions, siege and emergency status, and external missions funding.

A new conceptual and doctrinal system was created, referring to the organization, development, training and use of armed forces to protect the national interests. An increased crisis management capability was developed, together with the ability to prevent and deter the threats against the national security. The peace-to-war transit system was improved and the military cooperation with NATO members and partners was amplified.

Positively, the most important costs are the procurement costs. Procurement will reach its peak between 2004 and 2007 when major programs will be finalized to modernize the combat technique and equipment specific to the combat environment of the new century. The Romanian Armed Forces will provide a digital command system at the level of NATO standards and will continue to develop the STAR system and the C4I. The program foresees modern air control operational systems, early warning systems, force protection and friend-or-foe systems for the main combat technique, improved armament precision, and performing ammunition.

II. MILITARY REFORM

Military reform is well underway, following the 3rd cycle of the MAP. The military has been downsized over 60% since 1989 and the defense budget has increased at a level of 2.38% of GDP. Respecting previous commitments, while better correlating objectives with resources, will continue to be at the core of Romanian preparation for NATO membership. The implementation of the 3rd cycle of the National Annual Plan and the fulfillment of the objectives assumed within the 4th cycle of
the MAP continues to be the backbone of Romania’s endeavors towards reaching interoperability in the broadest sense of the word.

During the 3rd MAP cycle, Romania has continued to drive forward the reform and restructuring of its Armed Forces with the utmost vigor, concurrently with the increasing of their interoperability level and the effective participation alongside NATO forces in peace support operations, or in the international campaign against terrorism. The MAP formula will continue to be the key instrument during the next cycle and will remain a fundamental planning tool in Romania’s reform and restructuring process. The 3rd MAP cycle has been particularly important through a qualitative approach focused on capabilities. A holistic review of the armed forces was launched, taking into account the new strategic environment and the fight against terrorism, to build a flexible structure that meets national defense and NATO requirements using smaller, better-trained, better-equipped and more mobile forces. This review is almost complete and envisages a gradual decrease in the force size by 2007 to 75,000 uniformed military and 15,000 civilians.

The most significant achievements of the 3rd MAP cycle include the following:

- Disestablishing more than 100 structures, restructuring another 300 and making 2 brigades operational (to be continued during the 4th MAP cycle), the Main Operational Air Center, one air base, one ship squadron;
- Increasing the interoperability level of the forces earmarked for NATO;
- Increasing participation with more than 100% in KFOR and SFOR, and participation in ISAF and Enduring Freedom Operation with more than 450 troops;
- Improving the officers/NCO’s ratio from 1/1.14 to 1/1.23 by further reducing the number of senior officers and training more NCOs;
- Implementing a NATO style planning, programming, budgeting and evaluating system;
- Improving the air space management by continuing the implementation of the Air Surveillance Operational Center;
- Acquiring modern NATO compatible communication radios for units earmarked for NATO-led PIP operations and continuing the implementation of the STAR system.

The 4th MAP cycle will continue to devote the most important resources in priority areas of the longer term objectives of the previous cycles and focus on ensuring that the armed forces are fully able and ready to assume the responsibilities and to accomplish the tasks associated with Alliance membership. Thus, the 4th MAP cycle will concentrate on continuing the implementation of some objectives in key areas such as: force restructuring and operationalization, increasing the interoperability with NATO, human resources management, air space management and air defense, participation in NATO-led PIP operations and multinational formations. The 4th MAP will assume new objectives in areas that address especially the development of some new capabilities in line with the new security requirements following the September 11th events, such as: host nation support, personnel training, fighting against terrorism and capabilities to counter terrorism, NBC defense capabilities, logistics and force sustainability in the theatre.

The main objective of the restructuring and modernization process is to build a small, flexible, mobile, professional, and modernly equipped army able to be a warrant of the national sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and the constitutional democracy. To achieve this objective and to have force structure interoperable and compatible with NATO, the following main goals are to be accomplished:

- Increase professional level and downsize forces;
- Increase the crisis management capacity;
- Achieve interoperability with NATO defense system and member armed forces in order to participate in Article V operations;
- Simplify the command and control procedures;
- Improve force structure transition from peacetime to wartime;
- Restructure and modernize Military Education and Training System;
- Provide and manage the resources efficiently;
- Elaborate the Doctrine and Concept System (structure, endowment, training development, peace, crisis operations and war time).

With the exception of the units designated for PIP operations, Romania has already offered forces in order to act under Article V provisions. They will act on the same bases as the PSO/regional structures, will be ready within 30 days from notification, and will be those presented below.

**Force Category, 2002 year**

**Land Forces:** 1 Infantry Battalion, 1 Parachute Company, 1 Mountain Company (SAR)

**Air Forces:** 6 MIG-21 LANCER

**Naval Forces:** 1 Frigate, 1 EOD/SEAL Team, 3 Artillery Carrier River Ships
Force Category, 2003 year

Land Forces: 1 Mechanized Brigade, 1 Mountain Company, 1 Parachute Company
Air Forces: 8 MIG-21 LANCER, 4 IAR 330 SOCAT
Naval Forces: 1 Frigate, 1 EOD/SEAL Team, 3 Artillery Carrier River Ships

Force Category, 2004 year

Land Forces: 1 Mechanized Brigade, 2 Mountain Company, 2 Parachute Company
Air Forces: 8 MIG-21 LANCER, 4 IAR 330 SOCAT
Naval Forces: 1 Frigate, 1 EOD/SEAL Team, 3 Artillery Carrier River Ships

To support the achievement of the objectives assumed or to be assumed in the future, a defense budget profile reflecting 2.38% of GDP was established for 2002 and it will stay at this level during the period 2003-2008. This is possible as the economy recovered in 2000 and the GDP grew by 1.8%. In 2001, this trend continued and Romania proved to be the fastest growing economy in Central and Eastern Europe, with a GDP growth of 5.3%. GDP growth is expected to be between 4.0-4.5% in 2002, which is a realistic target considering the 4.4% growth for the first half of the year.

Private sector contribution to the GDP was 67%. Foreign trade represents the engine of the economy, the growth rates of imports and exports being higher than those of the GDP and industry output. For the first time in the last decade in 2002 monthly average exports exceeded 1 billion dollars, with figures for July on top of 1.5 billion.

In the last period progress has been achieved in the disinflation process. The annual inflation rate figured out at 30.3% in 2001, against 40.7% in the previous year. The target for 2002 is 22%. The government aims to bring the inflation rate to 9% by 2004. The economic performances recorded in the last period and the future orientations established by the Government’s Program, with regard to the economic and social development and the fostering of a stable and attractive business environment, have resulted, among others, into two upgradings of the “country rating”.

III. THE FUTURE OF ROMANIAN PARTICIPATION IN PFP PROGRAMS

The Romanian MoND acts with the same conviction to maintain the combat readiness of the operational units designated for national defense. as it does to keep the operational level of some of the territorial units. The interoperability and the operational capability of the units nominated for NATO-led PIP operations increased, intensifying their training and improving their endowment. The PIP cooperation and the Romanian formations participation in humanitarian or PK missions under the aegis of the UN or the OSCE have always been opportunities to have the units checked against acting in such missions alongside allied and partner countries.

The very large number of NATO/PfP actions and exercises to be accomplished are: staff officers training according to NATO procedures; military and civilian personnel training for the structures of NATO/PfP exercises; tactical and operational management of the NATO/PfP staff activity; practical cooperation with the international, governmental and non-governmental organizations; command and control elements and the specific rules of engagement; NATO doctrine and the equipment and systems used in PSOs.

Appreciated as “good” by NATO evaluators, the stage of the Romanian Armed Forces restructur-
ing process brings the confirmation that the PfP Program represents a unique opportunity for NATO members and partner states, to get the candidate armed force closer to the Alliance’s armed forces. The PfP program stimulated the complex reform process in which both the Romanian Armed Forces and NATO integration partners have been engaged and has proved that the Euro-Atlantic initiative was beneficial in re-configuring the military institutions and constituted a catalyst for better co-operation among the new Central and East-European democracies.

Romania will keep on participating in PfP exercises and activities in order to accomplish the Partnership Goals and will continue to be an important provider of security and stability in Southeastern Europe. This is the reason for the increase in participation of NATO-led PSOs and the intensification of the training programs in accordance with NATO standards. One of the main objectives is the participation in the Multinational Peace Force in Eastern Europe, Joint Romanian-Hungarian Battalion, SHIR-BRIG and BLACKSEAFOR, and other regional arrangements.

The goals of the Romanian Armed Forces participation in PfP continue to be: carrying out the English training and assimilation of NATO’s operational vocabulary; continuity of the representation in the planning activities of the exercises’ construction body; assimilating NATO’s operational planning procedures; improving the operational and technical interoperability level with NATO; accomplishing thePGs that are complementary to NATO/PfP activities and exercises; participating in multinational exercises in order to prepare the joint forces for crises management; using the air space in the limits of European Community and managing the air space during crisis situation.

IV. ROMANIA’S ROLE IN THE REGIONAL AND CONTINENTAL SECURITY ALONGSIDE NATO AND PFP COUNTRIES

A comparative analysis describes the fact that, at present, the southern line of the Euro-Atlantic Space is much more important than the others. Here, the terrorism has its most extensive organizational and operational activity. In this area the biggest dangers and strains of today’s world are individualized. There are various conflict hotbeds in close proximity: those of Middle East, Asia, and Africa. Even if it seems to be very strong, the southern dimension still has many vulnerabilities. Five years ago at the Sintra Summit in Portugal, the NATO officials talked for the first time about the fact that the most fragile area of the Alliance is on its southern flank.

If the northern flank of the Euro-Atlantic Area is completed and strengthened after Poland admission and by Baltic nations’ close relationship with NATO, the southern line still maintains obvious discontinuities and gaps, being open to multiple threats from the Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea. This is the reason why the land link between Hungary and Turkey has to be taken seriously. Hence, NATO control over the western seashore and the maritime space of the Black Sea would prove to be vital to Southeastern European security, and for a quick and comfortable access to Middle East, Caucasus, and Asian spaces. The control of the energetic resources of the Caucasian and the Caspian Sea could be obviously facilitated through the extension of the NATO responsibility over the Black Sea.

One of the difficulties of the Euro-Atlantic Area is its detachment from the European nucleus, which is geographically situated to the right of Romania’s terrain, an area from where all the limits of the continent and the big strategic European corridors could be equally controlled. The filling of this gap would increase NATO strength, flexibility and mobility, would define the Euro-Atlantic Area in a decisive way and consolidate its centralized survey of the continental air space, communication, and strategic maneuver space. It could allow the projection of the Alliance’s interests beyond its perimeter and will enhance the Alliance’s status of global power factor.

The economical, political, and strategic importance of the Black Sea is exceptional due to its link to the Mediterranean Sea. The integration of another two riverside nations into NATO consolidates the Alliance’s role of creating a sense of unity, development, and stability within the vast geographic area which links Europe and Asia. The significant span to the Mediterranean Sea, Middle East, and Asia establishes an enduring ground for the cooperation of the sub regional group of states that integrates riverside and non riverside nations as a bridge towards the future Europe. The possibility to build new bases for a quick deployment of forces within one of the most unstable areas of the world is another strategic advantage that the Alliance could have by its presence from the Danube Delta to the Bosporus and further.

The security arch that would be closed by integrating Romania could be consolidated by the treaties agreed on by the neighboring nations. In a judicial and political way, these treaties remove past animosities and consolidate the relationship between Romania and the surrounding states.
This is a strong asset for Romania concerning the collaboration, cooperation and partnership, and proves Romania’s willingness to undertake the common strategic security interest and to join the common values of a new Europe.

Romanian integration into NATO will change the political situations, economical fluxes, and force ratio in the region. Due to a Romania that is democratic, and integrated in the Euro-Atlantic structures, the Black Sea becomes a more stable area among regions affected by major conflicts, risks and threats.

Following the terrorist attacks against the United States, Romania has clearly understood that it must act along with the international community in combating terrorism, thus further confirming its dedication to Euro-Atlantic values. Consequently, Romania has acted firmly and in full awareness of its responsibilities. Both the Romanian Government and Parliament clearly defined their stance and decided on the concrete contributions Romania could pledge as a Strategic Partner of the United States and as a de facto NATO ally. The Supreme Council of National Defense adopted the Resolution on Romania’s participation alongside NATO members in the international coalition against terrorism, whereby Romania would provide the Alliance, upon request, all facilities related to its air, ground, or maritime space to support possible counter-terrorism operations.

Romania participates in the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) with a military police platoon (25 military), 1xC-130 Hercules transport aircraft and 3 liaison officers. The Romanian contribution totals 48 personnel. All Romanian military participating in ISAF were deployed to Afghanistan by February 3rd, 2002. Romania joined Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan with one Infantry Battalion (405 military personnel) and agreed that an additional NBC company (70 military personnel) can be deployed upon request.

On a regional level, Romania proposed ways to enlarge the scope of the Bucharest-based SECI Regional Center for Combating Trans-border Crime in acting against organized terrorism. The Bucharest SECI Center has produced real success stories within the Southeastern Europe regional cooperation and it is now also extending its cross-region links endorsed by the Defense Ministers of the SEDM states.

V. ROMANIA’S PROSPECTIVE FOR THE PRAGUE SUMMIT

The enlargement of NATO and the strengthening of its southern flank in an area still insecure would certify NATO’s mobility, flexibility, and availability in crisis situations. At the same time, the transgression of the interest from the Mediterranean Sea towards the Black Sea will have as a consequence, not only the enlargement of the security area, but also an effective strengthening of NATO’s role in the area.

The transgression of the interest from the Mediterranean Sea towards the Black Sea will have as a consequence not only the enlargement of the security area but also an effective strengthening of NATO’s role in the area.

The cornerstone for receiving Romania into the NATO structure still depends on the Alliance’s strategic goal in this part of the world; to increase the security and stability in Balkans, to build a potential pattern for stability and collaboration in Western Balkans, to find optimum solution for critical and various challenges of this new century, and to build a reliable bridge for a new relationship with the Russian Federation.

The admittance of Romania and its southern neighboor into NATO structure, by the linkage between Southeastern part of the Alliance and its Central European part, changes the situation of the Black Sea Basin.
and links it to the Mediterranean Basin, accomplishing a security belt around the conflict areas in the Balkans. Based on that, the Black Sea will become more important, being the main route for trade between East and West, particularly from the energy resources-point of view. As a result, the integrated security area would grow and the Black Sea would not be an isolated sea anymore, becoming a prolongement of the Mediterranean area towards the Caspian area and the energy resources in the Caucasus and Middle East.

Ready to assume accession responsibility, Romania has already proved her ability to act as a "de facto" ally. Her infrastructure and facilities put at the Alliance's disposal are valuable: harbors, airfields, railway networks, terminals, depots, and medical logistics and communications facilities. Romania has already placed four airports under NATO disposal for air cargo transport operations, three airports to support air operations, and two naval ports endowed in efficient logistics for harbor and naval services to support military operations. As for the rest of the facilities, a lot of work is being done to have them modernized. Benefiting from these facilities, NATO can successfully meet the new threats against the regional and global security and stability.

The present realities point out the fact that irrespective of the option for extension, a geostrategical point of view is needed:

- Building up the northern flank by including the Baltic states, thereby achieving the connection to Finland and its superimposition with the alignment of the EU extension;
- Securing the flank of Poland and Hungary and the terrestrial continuity of the Alliance by integrating Slovakia;
- Connecting Turkey and Greece to the NATO central area by including Romania and Bulgaria. This will enhance the centralized monitoring of the continental air space in view of the ballistic approach to Europe, the control over the Black Sea space for fighting organized crime and illegal migration, and the balance of power in the Caucasian-Caspian area and in the Middle East.

In this way, we can presume that in the next 10 to 15 years, the Alliance could have its eastern limit along the Baltic-Black Sea axis and the southern one along the Caspian, Turkey, and the Mediterranean, ensuring optimum conditions for defense planning and for coping with asymmetric threats.

According to the evaluation of NATO's political and military authorities, as well as of the majority member countries’ leaders, Romania is currently considered a real security provider at both the regional and continental level. Through the way in which she has participated in crisis management, particularly in the Balkans, the way in which she assumed OSCE leadership in 2001, her involvement in the fight against terrorism and organized crime, and the building up of good neighborly relationships, Romania has proven that it is a mature and responsible country when dealing with both domestic and international issues and that it is more than able to contribute to the enhancement of peace and stability in Southeastern Europe and beyond.

As a country that has never generated conflicts and tensions and has proven to be a security-generating factor in the region, and through her armed forces, Romania is a peace and stability guarantor. The excellent bi-lateral relations maintained with the Central and Eastern European states strengthen her unique position as a candidate with a decisive contribution to the consolidation of the southern dimension of the Alliance. As the range of security risks and threats against the Alliance and Europe expands to the south, Romania’s presence among NATO members and armed forces is necessary and credible. Romania has the ability to build both a "security" bridge between the Central and Southeastern allied states and to support the safe power corridor towards the Caucasus and to keep being a stability factor in the Balkans. With the armed forces in a full modernization process, Romania can demonstrate, at any time, that she has the capacity to contribute to the collective defense and alliance’s missions, and is able to assume the full range of membership responsibilities.

Romania looks forward to the Prague Summit because she wishes to contribute further with other NATO and PfP members, to consolidate the peace and cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic space, including through fighting terrorism. Romania expects that the summit will confirm a new enlargement, from the Baltic to the Black Sea, which represents a unanimously accepted goal of the political forces and the public opinion. As it is known, the National Security Strategy, adopted in 2001 by Romania’s Parliament has confirmed the essential goal of NATO and EU integration. For Romania, it does not represent a conjecture related option but one in favour of common values, for modernization and against marginalization.
The Pridnestrovie conflict
and measures opposing to between-national threats

Ion Koropchan, Chief, General Staff National Army of Moldova, Lieutenant General

I would like to welcome all the participants of this symposium and forward my sincere thanks and gratitude to the organizers for the opportunity to take part in this forum, which positively promotes a constructive dialogue among the Black Sea states, and for their valuable contribution toward developing interaction and mutual understanding in the fields relating to enhancing stability and security in this region’s states.

Alongside the crucial changes in the geopolitical situation—both in the European continent and on the globe—some new threats have emerged and expanded to turn out quite a grave problem for international security, including the security of the Black Sea states. The end of the Cold War increased the importance of regional security issues, compared to general global problems. As a result, past regional disputes, which are no longer determined by the bi-polar confrontation of Cold War times, have revived to give birth to new questions for the regional security and stability agenda.

Many of the Black Sea states are now going through a maturation process; their political systems are acquiring more democratic principles, and their economies are becoming market-oriented. Although the quality, quantity, and speed of such transformations differ from country to country, all of the countries share the fate of co-existence. Some of the regional states are only emerging and possess infant democracies lacking adequate political and social cohesion; others are concerned with in-house hot spots of potential conflicts, which run the risk of new threats. The intensifying terrorism, extremism and separatism, and the internationalization of organized crime—especially the trafficking of drugs and people—are among the main threats to humanity at present. The exposure to new unconventional risks, such as armed conflicts, illegal migration, refugees and forced emigrants, grave environmental problems (such as the contamination of the Black Sea and the Danube), as well as natural disasters and cataclysms form a conglomeration of vital problems needing solutions to promote favorable bi- and multi-lateral relations within the region and decrease the conflict potential in the Black Sea.
The number-one unresolved problem in our country is the conflict in Pridnestrovie, which proves to be one of the elements of the uncertain and unstable situation in the region. The unsettled status of this conflict has a negative effect not only on security issues in our country, but also on the stability and security of the region as a whole. This ongoing conflict generates controversies in the dimension of regional cooperation; provides conditions for rude and unpunished violations of fundamental human rights and freedoms; hampers the establishment of a single regional customs area to execute effective customs control; prevents a comprehensive and reliable guard over states borders, which results in discredit between states and contributes to smuggling, illegal migration, and trafficking of people and human organs; prevents compliance with the rules and instructions passed at the OSCE summit relating to the withdrawal of Russian armed forces; and enables self-proclaimed governors to maintain illegitimate armed bands, manufacture and sell in an illegal and uncontrolled manner-weapons and armaments to be distributed illegally throughout the region, providing feeding grounds for rampant crime and strengthening existing criminal structures.

I provide the following reference: a list of weapons manufacturing companies located in Pridnestrovie and the models of armaments they produce:

- **Rybnitsy metallurgic plant**: 82-mm mortars, anti-personnel mines;
- **Rybnitsy pump factory**: GP-25 under-barrel grenade launchers;
- **'Electromash' Tiraspol factory**: (122-mm mortars, PM pistol-Makarov’s Pistols);
- **Litmash Tiraspol factory**: (GP-25 under-barrel grenade launchers);
- **'Pripor' Bendery factory**: (SPG-9 stable anti-tank grenade launchers, RPG-7 shoulder anti-tank grenade launchers; parts for GP-25 under-barrel grenade launchers; PSM-(Pistol of Makarov’s System) based pistols; parts for PM pistols - Makarov’s Pistols).

Except for these models of armaments, enterprises of the Pridnestrovie region of the republic of Moldova manufacture ‘Grad-21’ salvo launching reactive systems. And this is by far not the complete list of produced armaments.

In addition these models of armaments, enterprises in the Pridnestrovie region of Moldova manufacture Grad-21 salvo launching reactive systems. And this list certainly is not complete.

Among other threats to regional stability are the trend of increasing corruption and the existing channels and mechanisms of illicit hard-currency money laundering by banking institutions located in uncontrolled areas. I provide the following reference: Last year alone, the three commercial banks of the Pridnestrovie region, with the help of the Petrol Banka, laundered nearly USD 584 million (of which USD 80 million was in cash). Annual budget figures of the self-constituted republic are USD 33m in revenues and USD 37.7m in expenditures, yielding a budget deficit of USD 4.7m.

Also on the list of the threats to regional security are the numerous underground supporters and aides of the Pridnestrovie separatist regime who hail from other countries of the region. Desiring to destabilize the situation in the region with the goal of continued domination, these third parties may at any moment apply methods tested in Pridnestrovie to any other country of the region. Public poverty and nakedness are good enough for such destructive forces. The current social and economic situation enables shadow tycoons to try to dictate and work their wills upon official and legitimate governments, manipulating huge social groups and craftily using people’s discontent.

The ideological component of conflict areas is yet another threat to regional stability. In Pridnestrovie, as in other conflict regions, the new generation is growing up under the pressure of propaganda promoting perverted human values. Young people are brought up prepared to smash down democratic beginnings anywhere and anytime if their leaders should call.
paid to roam from one hot spot to another; they make a living doing it. And there are shadow structures that earn money by offering the appropriate transit services.

The underground tycoons and governors of the illegitimate regimes, who are interested in preserving and expanding the spheres of their influence, are materializing their ambitions, performing actions aimed at aggravating the existing poverty of people, and intimidating whole nations. These illegal tycoons and illegitimate governors are not restricted to merely frightening those who are residing in their controlled territories; the criminals look across the borders at people in adjacent territories. The whole situation definitely takes its toll on the populace and constitutes a real threat to regional stability and security.

As a defense officer, I take close to heart and fully understand the necessity of resolving issues relating to regional security and stability. Despite the fact that we have many common unresolved problems—both internal and external—, we should pool our strengths to resolve them. I assume it is no secret to all of you that the stability and security of the region as a whole are tied to the stability and security of the individual states that constitute the region.

From the first days it took power, the present establishment of the Republic of Moldova singled out the task of settling the Pridnestrovie conflict as a top priority, declaring that the Republic of Moldova would adhere to a policy of peaceful settlement. President Vladimir Voronin identified the conflict as a task of paramount importance for public management agencies, given the principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity. Such a policy and approach stated by the head of our state, did produce certain results early on. In a short period of time, negotiations were revived, and a number of mutually acceptable declarations, agreements, and legislative acts were signed, including those closely relating to security enhancement matters. Among the documents is the record resolution "On the Strengthening of Confidence-Building Measures Between the Defense Ministries of the Republic of Moldova and Pridnestrovie." In the context of these developments, the President of the Republic of Moldova initiated the signing of the agreement "On the Staged Amalgamation of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova and the Armed Structures of the Dniester Region," which was followed by the establishment of a common military commandment. Unfortunately, the period of compliance with the provisions of the signed agreements, as well as the period of negotiations, lasted for just a short time. It was halted once again by the Pridnestrovie party.

If earlier, the problems emerging within the region were largely problems of the region itself, it is now becoming evident that regional problems are developing international implications. The key issue in resolving these problems is implementing various political and economic initiatives that will provide conditions for a favorable security climate in the region. The demonstrative example is the project put forward by the OSCE together with Russia and Ukraine to settle the Pridnestrovie conflict. Reference:

The armed structures of the Pridnestrovie are composed of military commands and units of the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior Affairs, and Ministry of Security. The Ministry of Defence is in charge of:

4 rifle brigades (deployed in the cities of Tiraspol, Ticina, Rybnitsa, and Dubossary), tank battalion (Glinoye village), and anti-tank division (the city of Ticina), artillery and engineer commands (Parkany village), a separate air squadron (the city of Tiraspol), and training centres (Ticina, Kobasna, and Afanasievka).

These military commands and units are armed with: eighteen T-64 tanks, sixty-nine armoured personnel carriers of different kinds, eighteen 122-mm howitzers, twelve 85-mm guns, sixty-nine 120-mm mortars, and otherwise small-calibre weapons and armaments, including fifteen thousand Kalashnikov's automatic rifles. The air forces are composed of six Mi-8T helicopters with rocket launchers equipped, two Mi-2, one An-26 aircraft, and two An-2 and two Yak-18 aircrafts. The peace-time number of the Armed Forces amounts to 4,500 soldiers and officers, while the war-time figure gets increased several times over.

The Ministry of Interior Affairs is in charge of 'Dniest' battalion (500 soldiers and officers) and nine militia departments (nearly 500 militiamen each).

In charge of the Ministry of Security is "Delta" battalion (called "the steel fist"), to which, if necessary, additional 2,000-2,500 personnel soldiers and officers can be recruited. Also, in charge of the ministry are 7 battalions of citizens-in-arms the size of nearly 2,000 persons and 7 troops of the Black Sea Cossacks (billeted in Tiraspol, Kamenka, Rybnitsa, Dubossiery, Grigoropol, Ticina, and Slobozeya).

Considering the foregoing, one should reckon with the fact that in the Pridnestrovie they have started up their own manufacturing of weapons and armaments, mentioned above.

Reference:

There are groups of people who are paid to roam from one hot spot to another, making the living out of it. And there are shadow structures that earn money by offering appropriate transit services.
conflict by means of federalizing the state, encompassing military issues as well. This project specifies that the Republic of Moldova has charge over issues of war and peace; the defense and security of the state; and the execution, determination, and guarding of national frontiers and air space. The Pridnestrovie leaders’ views about handling military issues differ from those shared by Kishinev, the OSCE, and the guarantor states, which amount to a full dismissal of the armed forces of both parties. I offer the following reference: The armed structures of the Pridnestrovie are composed of military commands and units of the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior Affairs, and Ministry of Security. The Ministry of Defense is in charge of four rifle brigades (deployed in the cities of Tiraspol, Tighina, Ribnitsa, and Dubossary), a tank battalion (Glinoye village), an anti-tank division (the city of Tighina), artillery and engineer commands (Parkany village), a separate air squadron (the city of Tiraspol), and training centers (Tighina, Kobasna, and Afanasievka). These military commands and units are armed with eighteen T-64 tanks, sixty-nine armored personnel carriers of different kinds, eighteen 122-mm howitzers, twelve 85-mm guns, sixty-nine 120-mm mortars, and other small-caliber weapons and armaments including fifteen thousand Kalashnikov automatic rifles. The air forces are composed of six Mi-8T helicopters with equipped rocket launchers, two Mi-2, one An-26 aircraft, two An-2 and two Yak-18 aircraft. The peace-time number of the Armed Forces amounts to 4,500 soldiers and officers, while the war-time figure is increased several times over. The Ministry of Interior Affairs is in charge of the "Dniestr" battalion (500 soldiers and officers) and nine militia departments (nearly 500 persons each). In charge of the Ministry of Security is the "Delta" battalion (called "the steel fist"), to which, if necessary, an additional 2,000-2,500 personnel soldiers and officers can be added. Also, in charge of the ministry are seven battalions of citizens-in-arms (the size of nearly 2,000 persons) and seven troops of the Black Sea Cossacks (in Tiraspol, Kamenka, Ribnitsa, Dubossary, Grigoriopol, Tighina, and Slobozeya). One should also consider that Pridnestrovie has begun its own manufacturing of the weapons and armaments mentioned above.

At first glance, one may think that the solution to the Pridnestrovie problem lies in dismissing the armed forces of the two parties. However, a more insightful analysis of this proposal leads to the conclusion that such a solution, given present-day circumstances, would be merely another propagandistic trick. In the current situation, the state appears absolutely defenseless in front of the new threats and is unlikely to be capable of promoting any strengthening of regional security. The Republic of Moldova is open to any strengthening of regional security. The Republic of Moldova is open to the mediators’ proposal and agreeable to selecting the route of amalgamation of the armies with a simultaneous reduction of recruited personnel and weapons to reasonable limits necessary for military potential. Such a joint army under a common command should prove the best of any guarantors protecting the state from inside conflicts and outside threats.

The September 11 events are calling us to draw close attention to measures of collective counteraction to the new regional threats, and I suppose that in complying with such counteraction, we should be guided by security-related definitions as well as the declarations made by Black Sea states and governments during an ad hoc summit of the Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (OSCE) dedicated to the tenth anniversary of cooperation and progress.

The following points may serve as the necessary set of measures aimed toward counteracting interregional threats:

- Analysis of the states' contributions to the development and strengthening of amicable neighborly relations, integration within the region and with other regions, collaboration and peace, and stability and security;
- Consideration of new possibilities and ways to make the states' regional security-related activities more effective;
- Assistance to the regional states' promotion of democracies and market-oriented economies, and support of efforts resulting in a favorable positioning of our region in today's world-a position moving toward openness and integration;
- Cultivation of shared values and broadening of international cooperation;
- Transformation of relationships to foster interdependence of the regional states and permanent interaction for the benefit of our region;
- Recognition of the fact that any disputes and conflicts within the region obstruct cooperation, and collective efforts directed at overcoming these obstacles and settling conflicts on the grounds of the rules and regulations of international law;
- Condemnation of terrorism in all of its forms.

To conclude, I would like to note that if the nations of the Black Sea region join forces, they may very well gain a place on the list of economically and politically stable territories having a favorable influence on the security of the continent and the globe.
Ways of attaining stability in the Caspian Sea region

OUTLOOK FROM AZERBAIJAN

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The Azerbaijan Republic believes that the principal imperative of the new millennium should be the creation of a global area of security through the following methods: settling conflicts, strengthening confidence, reducing arms and implementing a global disarmament policy, preventing new emerging threats and risks, assuring ecological equilibrium, extirpating poverty and providing steady development, bringing about free exchanges, and enhancing the pillars of democracy. In reaching the goal of global security, all efforts should be primarily invested in solving problems of developing and newly independent states, especially those situated in painful spots of the planet. The Caspian Sea region is one such spot.

The main challenge to the security and progress of most of the region’s countries is the threat of their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Threats from outside and problems inside, as well as pressure and involvement in the struggle for the spheres of interest do not enable the newly established infant democracies to pursue the chosen course directed at consolidating their sovereignty and improving the welfare of their peoples freely and effectively. Managed armed conflicts are mainly used as a means of undermining the political independence of the region’s newly independent states. Major parts of the present-day conflicts escalate under one of the known scenarios of expansionist policy. The scenario is that an armed separatist group is set up in a particular country by means of unconcealed interference and financing from outside. Following is an armed invasion and occupation of part of the state’s territory. Ethnic purges are executed against non-combatants, and hundreds of
thousands of people are banished from their native localities by force. All of these actions are followed by proposals to resolve the conflict at the round table of negotiations, given the fact that the situation was caused by illicit actions executed by brute military force. It is obvious that similar attempts to realize territorial claims cannot be accepted by the injured party; therefore, any negotiations come to a standstill in the end. Then emerges the situation—which is no less dangerous than at the phase of military action—that the government, striving toward a peaceful settlement of the conflict but incapable of accepting the aggressor’s claims, appears to face a destructive position from the aggressor, being incapable of accepting the aggressor’s claims. The society becomes more anxious with no progress in the negotiations, and some begin to call upon other methods to settle the conflict. Meanwhile, certain negative processes are underway in the occupied area, which is controlled by illegitimate formations. Arms are piled up; organized crime flourishes; terrorist training bases are reinforced; and drug, arms and people trafficking boom.

The suffering country turns to the international community for help in settling the conflict. However, it here encounters the trend of reconciliation with the aggressor’s behaviour, seeking to legitimize its territorial take-overs. Any arbiter normally takes the soft option, demanding that the suffering party make concessions given the accomplished fact. This never eliminates the tension, putting off the would-be settlement of conflict and the restoration of lasting peace, security and stability in the region given standards and principles of international law. Moreover, as we know from modern history, the aggressor appeasement policy has all the potential to make the whole system of international relations temporarily unstable and to fuel expansionist disposition in a global sense.

Azerbaijan, which is a victim of Armenia’s armed annexationist actions, and whose territory is partly occupied by the criminal separatist regime, shall never accept any attempts to legitimize the breach of territorial integrity and considers fatal the policy of maneuvering between the appetites of the aggressor and the principles of international law. We re-express our considerable concern that the four UN Security Council resolutions regarding the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict passed in 1993, which demand an immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of Armenian occupation forces from the territory of Azerbaijan, have not yet been implemented. Striving for implementation, we proceed not only with national interests at heart, but also global security interests and the interests of international law, the universal nature of which someone is trying to discredit.

The ongoing regional armed conflicts overlap with a great number of other security threats, the most insidious of which is international terrorism. Azerbaijan has proved to be a valuable contributor to the international anti-terrorist coalition from the first day of its emergence. Azerbaijan unambiguously condemns terrorism in all its forms and manners, regardless of its political, economic, religious or other motives. We are resolute in our support for all efforts taken by the international community with regard to the anti-terrorist war and determined in our belief that the approach to such a war should be global, while the object should be all terrorist organizations, regardless of the range of activities. Action should be in compliance with the standards and principles of international law. It should be noted that Azerbaijan has signed eight of the twelve international anti-terrorist conventions. The present situation raises the issue of examining the remaining international conventions, passing a new anti-terrorist bill (the current anti-terrorist law was passed in 1999), and making appropriate amendments to national legislation.

As to the matter of state-run anti-terrorist activities, it is necessary to mention the Decree of the President of the Azerbaijan Republic On Anti-Terrorist Activities, signed on May 11, 2002 and aimed at implementing Resolutions Nos. 1368, 1373 and 1377 of the UN Security Council. At the same time, Azerbaijan is complying with a set of actions in alignment with the UN Resolutions, including those preventing the financing of terrorism, within the framework of Azerbaijan’s cooperation with various countries and international organizations. The legal framework of such activities is based upon several laws of the Azerbaijan Republic, including the Laws “On Accession to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism” (October 4, 2001 and May 17, 2002). Lately, law enforcement and security agencies of our country have detained and extradited over 30 citizens of other nations connected with international terrorism, and convicted several people involved in terrorist organizations, including ‘Hizb-ut-Tahrir’. The national law enforcement agencies exert all necessary preventive and operational measures with the intent to identify international terrorists.

Azerbaijan is determined in the necessity of consolidating international action toward the prevention and elimination of terrorism and herein expresses the hope that elaboration of a universal comprehensive international legal instrument indispensable to attain this objective, will become an important priority. Our country has signified its readiness to play an active role in working out and discussing drafts of the Comprehensive Anti-Terrorism Convention and the International Anti-Nuclear Terrorism Convention. Azerbaijan also endorsed the idea to call a high-level conference on terrorism issues, under the auspices of the United Nations, during which the international community would work out joint, well-coordinated actions against terrorism. In addition, Azerbaijan is enhancing cooperation with the region’s countries within the framework of bilateral agreements and regional international organizations such as the CIS, OSCE, GUUAM, the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICBMA). Thus, the Caspian Sea regional states (with the exception of Turkmenistan, which is not a member of the CICBMA) have reaffirmed their intentions to strengthen bilateral, regional and international cooperation, and to affix these intentions in the Declaration of the CICBMA On Eliminating Terrorism and Promoting Dialogue among Civilisations, signed at the Almaty summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (June 3-5, 2002).

In order to unconditionally condemn all terrorist actions-actions which cannot be justified with any goals-it is first and foremost necessary to recognize the universality principle that is mandatory to the anti-terrorist war and to exclude the use of double standards. Also needed is a set of actions aimed at eliminating the causes of terrorist expansion, which contribute to ongoing conflicts, social and economic degradation, and the continuation of discriminatory relationships.

It should be stated that Azerbaijan itself is a victim of terrorism, which is supported and financed by Armenia. Terrorism in Armenia has grown to be an integral part of the state policy course. In order to unconditionally condemn all terrorist actions-actions which cannot be justified with any goals-it is first and foremost necessary to recognize the universality principle that is mandatory to the anti-terrorist war and to exclude the use of double standards. Also needed is a set of actions aimed at eliminating the causes of terrorist expansion, which contribute to ongoing conflicts, social and economic degradation, and the continuation of discriminatory relationships.

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It should be stated that Azerbaijan itself is a victim of terrorism, which is supported and financed by Armenia. Terrorism in Armenia has grown to be an integral part of the state policy course. In particular, certain Armenian terrorists, convicted in other countries for their wrongdoings, now comprise the political elite of Armenia, where the cult of " terror in the name of the national idea" is endorsed in every way possible in the formal political environment and the policy plans of the parties. Since the late 1980’s, following Armenia’s open infringement on Azerbaijan’s territories and the beginning of armed operations in the Nagorno-Karabakh area of the Azerbaijan Republic, Armenian terrorists have

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illegal trade in arms, illicit traffic in drugs and people, and underground economic activities. In this regard, Azerbaijan insists that more attention should be drawn to the phenomenon of so-called “ethnic terrorism” and to the role of the Diaspora in assisting international terrorism with the goal of undermining states’ territorial integrity. It is necessary to prevent such assistance.

Arms non-proliferation and control together with disarmament issues claim an important place on the agenda of ensuring regional and international security. The fundamental position of the Azerbaijan Republic entails a consistent endorsement of a ban on the manufacture and use of weapons of mass destruction and a complete disposal of such weapons. Azerbaijan continues to uphold the conception of maximum transparency in executing arms control and disarmament. Another bit of evidence in favor of Azerbaijan’s long-term strategy in the nuclear security domain is our initiative at the Tashkent Conference in September 1997 to set up a nuclear-free area in the Southern Caucasus. Establishment of such a nuclear-free area would contribute to the provision of international and regional security, the development and reinforcement of actions of confidence, and increased interaction not only within the Southern Caucasus region but also between the Caspian Sea states.

We attach particular importance to the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty (NWNPT). Having ratified the NWNPT and actively endorsed its unlimited extension in 1995 and the start of negotiations on elaborating the nuclear test comprehensive banning regime, Azerbaijan considers the perpetuity of this treaty as a component of the global security system and the international consensus in the nuclear weapons non-proliferation issue. Notwithstanding the unlimited prolongation of the treaty, Azerbaijan has some serious concerns with regard to the non-observance of the treaty by certain states. The first on the list is Armenia, which has a nuclear power station situated in Metsamor on its territory. Although Armenia is not an eye-catching country on the list of would-be nuclear-weapons states, it should be noted that Armenia has all of the three components that testify to a country’s intention or capacity to possess nuclear weapons. These are the political decision and necessity to work on acquiring nuclear weapons; corresponding nuclear technologies, scientists and engineers; and enriched nuclear raw materials and finances necessary to conduct a nuclear program.

Certainly, one might assume that Armenia would commence a nuclear program in the near future. Despite that, nuclear power plants have always been typical theoretical facilities in which to invent nuclear weapons, whereas these plants provide raw materials for nuclear weapons. Second, there is always a possibility that a military nuclear program may remain concealed, regardless of severe controls and the most effective means of tracing. Third, considering the militarism and revanche rooted in Armenia’s state policy, it appears more than probable that the official Yerevan deems its peaceful nuclear program as a pilot project of future military endeavors. Our aggressive neighbor’s seeming capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons may have the most unfavorable consequences for the security of all the Caspian Sea states. Today the real threat is the likelihood (or fact, according to some information sources) of buried radioactive waste from the Metsamor nuclear power plant in the Armenian-occupied Azerbaijan territories, which are inaccessible to international observers.

Current security challenges consist of specific and interrelated. Thus, terrorist activities are closely tied to drug trafficking, unauthorized turnover of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and SALW provisions to terrorist groups, aggressive separatism, and other forms of extremism. These are the activities that provide financing to terrorism and terrorist training. Therefore, the war against terrorism should entail any measures toward preventing terrorists’ access to arms and ammunition. Azerbaijan is a full supporter of the idea that any illegal manufacturing, trafficking, proliferation, or pilling-up of SALW is a very hazardous threat to peace and stability. The current efforts of international organizations, whose activity Azerbaijan supports, are primarily aimed at elaborating appropriate international instruments to regulate SALW.

Among today’s most disputed issues is the harmonization of national export control systems. There is a set of legislative acts currently valid in Azerbaijan that
regulates the export/import operations of determined commodities. The Law of the Azerbaijan Republic on Exports Control, which is subject to passing now, also should be considered. An integral part of this law is a list of commodities subject to national export control, based on the similar list of the European Union. Regionally, Azerbaijan exerts every effort possible to strengthen cooperation between the regional states and engage in a joint struggle against any unauthorized proliferation of SALW. We are also developing multilateral cooperation in this area with the GUUAM member states.

It should be noted that the OSCE has always been the pace-maker in matters of conventional weapons control. The organization’s unique experience in the given field has all the potential to enable this regional group to reach success in the complex SALW negotiations. Azerbaijan is quite confident that assuring more transparency in SALW sales will greatly contribute to security and stability, including stability in the Caspian Sea region, which is a significant part of the OSCE area. Of paramount importance is the OSCE’s aim to ensure that small arms and light weapons are delivered state-to-state only, and not to any separatist, terrorist, or criminal groups. The system of exchanging information related to SALW supplies (prescribed in the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons), together with appropriate controlling procedures (such as registration, marking and tracing), should definitely improve efforts to prevent unauthorized weapons deliveries. However, here I must mention the limited nature of the mechanisms envisioned to prevent SALW delivery to uncontrolled conflict areas and their adjacent regions.

Referring again to the correlation between various threats, I argue that it is necessary to attach special attention to the relation between terrorism and organized crime. Terrorists participate in organized crime in order to obtain financing, and organized crime indeed is a primary source of funding for terrorist groups. Terrorists become involved in organized crime through the means mentioned above, including the trafficking of drugs, weapons, ammunition and explosives; the transportation of radioactive substances; and various illegal economic activities, including money laundering.

Located at the crossroads between East and West, Azerbaijan seems to be a suitable locale for international criminal elements to execute their illegal transits. By permanently tracing the risks connected with illicit transits, Azerbaijan authorities undertake complex preventive measures. Azerbaijan bases its activity on organized interaction between respective national agencies and international cooperation. Within the format of international regional organizations and bilateral relations among the Caspian Sea states, Azerbaijan has entered into a whole set of appropriate agreements and treaties. Efforts to battle organized crime are more effective with international legislative integration and cooperation, information exchange, and the sharing of experience related to the struggle against crime.

Today the Caspian Sea region is one of the most promising areas in terms of potential for development. The Caspian Sea oil reserves alone amount to 3% of the world total, while gas reserves are 4%. According to Texaco forecasts, by 2010 East Asian countries’ aggregate demand in energy resources will increase sixfold, while West European countries’ will increase tenfold. In light of such forecasts, the assumption that oil will not only flow westward but also eastward gains credence. Russian proposals to construct an oil pipeline to China provide additional evidence that the newly independent states of the former USSR can discover new energy resource markets not just in Europe, but in Asia as well. However, regional armed conflicts-together with separatism, state-supported terrorism and other hazardous challenges-continue to exist and pursue development in the region as a whole. I tend to believe that the Caspian Sea states will find the will and capacity to overcome the threats they now face. They will cast a hopeful look toward the prosperity that can result from refusing to participate in unlawful activity, from avoiding armed fighting for territory, and from establishing international relationships based on confidence, mutual security and cooperation. Turning the Caspian Sea region from an area of contradictions and clashing interests to one of lasting peace and stability is of equal interest to regional and global security.
In the war against terrorism-as in a typical war-there can be no winner. A war against terrorism therefore should not be waged through a single battle, but should be based first and foremost upon a comprehensive approach including:

- Enhancing cooperation between intelligence services of different states, even hostile ones;
- Assuring productive interaction between states’ law enforcement agencies;
- Strengthening diplomatic activities;
- Executing economic pressure.

Any anti-terrorism steps should be taken simultaneously at both the international and national level. Terrorism is a separate form of violence, directed at forcing fear among numerous societal groups-not just its immediate victims.

There may be external and internal sources of terrorism, with the former being unrelated to internal state issues, and the latter being exposed to influence from beyond. For the Black Sea region, terrorism in the United States is an external source. The terrorism in Russia or China, however, is likely to be from an internal source. When terrorism is tied to a matter of religion or to the intentions of certain outside or inside circles concerned with an invented religious alienation or nationalism, the internal terrorism may acquire some features of international terrorism, and may turn into a critical international phenomenon.
Sometimes terrorist activities are unjustly equated with national liberation movements (NLM). To follow this reasoning is as false as to equate a country with a religious group or--what is even more hazardous--hold a nation responsible for September 11.

It is known that terrorism is sometimes considered a form of protest or a means of attaining a particular goal, even if within a national liberation movement. As to religion, it may appear a critical driving force of interethnic discord and conflicts, having the capacity to stir up terrorism and use it as a means of attaining a goal.

An act of terrorism embodies the following:
- An undermining of public confidence in government and society;
- An act forcing society and its leaders to be subject to terrorist pressure;
- A fueling of hatred and conflicts between religious and ethnic groups;
- A provocation of authoritative overreaction, from which terrorists might benefit;
- Instantaneous publicity as a result of the violent act.

Depending on its goals, terrorism can fit into one of these categories:
- Nationalistic
- Religious
- State-supported
- Extremist (right- or left-wing)
- Anarchic

In some cases, unpopular activities--untimely democratization, hasty liberalization of legislation, and Western demands for passage of laws relating to such issues as capital punishment and religious sects--may result in a backlash expressed through acts of terror. Global trends such as demographic distribution, global management, and ecological developments may also lead to a negative behavior, including terrorism. Even when intentions are good, such global trends are not in sync with national and religious traditions, local conditions, or the psyche of a particular people. Moving forward, it can be stated that terrorism is a method an organized group of people adopts to attain stated goals by violent means.

Prior to the collapse of the USSR, the partnership between Europe and the United States was grounded upon the Soviet threat, the US economic stakes in Europe, and the emergence of a new generation of European and American elites. These phenomena have already vanished. In the 20th century, the United States was ready to incur hard-currency military expenses outside the country only in cases where the USSR turned up to threaten establishing its hegemony in the region. The vanishing of the Soviet threat rendered this interest inapplicable. Furthermore, certain joint actions of the United States and its NATO partners--including actions viewed as part of the war against terrorism--may result in different people interpreting certain events differently, or even dissonantly.

The world’s perception of the United States as a grand nation and a powerful state is accompanied by a feeling of hatred and envy toward the rich. These sentiments, combined with extreme notions characteristic of particular countries, are turning into hostility. These extreme notions, especially those born in the East, are what Americans believe constitute the root of all threats to their religious, social and economic interests.

The two ideologies clash in the present fight against terrorism. The US ideology consists of freeing capital and enabling technological progress, functionality, and individualism, with power and wealth as the featured symbols. In Islamic ideology, wealth is not primary and technological progress is not paramount. In the minds of many Muslims, America has become the symbol of universal injustice. In this ideological confrontation, traditions collide with modernization, spiritual wealth clashes with material assets. Nonetheless, up to this day the Islamic factor has been the first criticized in the context of war against international terrorism. This is a mistake, since the Islamic share in the planet’s terrorist organizations is as low as 15%, while the remaining 85% falls to the Judaic, Christian, and other religions. No matter which goals or tasks are pursued and which victims are selected as targets, terrorism is a threat waged by the “whole” human being, inclusive of religion, culture and society, even if it is considered useful for at least a group of human beings.

This report has been aimed at classifying goals, tasks, and types of terrorism, which may be useful in correctly and unambiguously defining terrorism as a crime. Providing all these conceptions and beliefs, the author never claims to relay absolute truth. However, the above commentary may contribute to interpreting this phenomenon correctly and adequately, and what is of most importance--prevent any misuse of a misinterpretation of terrorism, which may be as hazardous and harmful as terrorism itself.