

## **DR, MG HAYK KOTANJIAN: Strategic Concept for the Development of Collective Security of The CSTO**

*The report is presented to the International Conference on "CSTO and the South Caucasus: Peace and Regional Security Perspectives" of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, Ministry of Defense, RA - the CSTO Secretariat – the CSTO Institute on May 19-20, 2011 in Yerevan by Major General Hayk Kotanjian, Member of the CSTO Academic-Expert Council, Doctor of Political Sciences, Fellow Member of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences. Heads of leading strategic studies centers of the CSTO member states, top strategic analysis specialists from the international expert community, political and military leaders, diplomats, as well as military attachés from the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair states participated in the Forum.*

The Treaty on Collective Security of May 15, 1992 was signed during a dynamic period of dramatic change and transformation of the security architecture in the Eurasian area.<sup>1</sup> It was a time for reconsidering the traditional paradigm of "East-West" Cold War confrontation, pursuing new premises and opportunities for the expected cooperation concept for the newly-created independent states within the former Soviet space. The process was evolving into a still uncrystallized and rather vague view of the contemporary model of "global and indivisible security." Simultaneously, in conditions of the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the transformation of the bipolar world, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance was also compelled to forge and refine a new identity of values and security architecture.<sup>2</sup>

In the context of these systemic catastrophic challenges and facing a high level of uncertainty in the evolving transitional political processes, as well as considering their turbulence and possible reversibility, the Treaty on Collective Security sought to guarantee a smooth deviation of the Post-Warsaw area form of positional security architecture defined by bipolar confrontation. At the same time, it was required to safeguard against new regional-scale symmetric threats already perceptible in the significant part of the zone of responsibility of the former Warsaw Pact with regard to its demise.

Today, it is safe to state that the Treaty on Collective Security has not only achieved an impressive level of overall success in meeting these challenges but has also accumulated the strategic potential necessary for further self-development in compliance with the dynamics of changes in the internal and external security environments. However, it should be noted that the Treaty on Collective Security is a classical defense pact signed by a specific group of states striving to combine efforts for the purpose of a collective protection against the traditional symmetric threat of armed attack. Separate rudiments of inertial bloc thinking typical of the Cold War period underlay the logic of this document. The distinctive features of the post-Perestroika era did not offer a chance to consider the rich variety of strategic interests of the new independent states when forming the doctrinal basis – the Collective Security Concept of 1995 – to consolidate the new security area. Under these conditions, the pursuit of guarantees to deter global and local military catastrophes overshadowed the necessity to consider in a more systemic way within the Collective Security Concept the full range of security factors, including civilization, political, economical, social, defense, information, and cultural factors, etc. These objective obstacles, to a certain extent, limited the vision of distant horizons of development, as well as long-term perspectives of building the future CSTO.<sup>3</sup>

In 2002, ten years after the signing of the Treaty, during the establishment of the CST Organization through transforming the pact on collective self-defense into an international regional organization,<sup>4</sup> the key goal was still to collectively assure military security. Since 2005-2006, there has emerged the tendency to transform the CSTO into a multifunctional organization aimed at ensuring collective security through cooperation in various fields, besides the military one, as well as at countering the combined symmetric and asymmetric threats,<sup>5</sup> the modern tool for which becomes the Collective Rapid Reaction Force established in 2009.<sup>6</sup>

Recently, it has become more apparent that for a shift to a comprehensive security model encompassing all of the essential spheres of the vital activity of the member states and conforming to the most up-to-date world standards, it is necessary to reassess and conceptually review the approaches to the progressive evolution of the given system. The Council on Collective Security and the CSTO Secretariat have become more focused on the strategic perspectives of updating the Organization. At present, the cornerstone of the goal has become strategic pragmatism, the initial guideline for which may also become a systemically updated vision of the CSTO security architecture expedient for all the participants of

modernization which should exclude the inertia of bloc thinking, as well as palliative-kind decisions on integrating the Organization in the global security system.

Meanwhile, it is obvious that becoming engaged in more constructive cooperation with the United Nations (UN), European security structures, CIS, SCO, EurAsEC, as well as building its own peacekeeping forces and Collective Rapid Reaction Force, the CSTO has already crossed the threshold to emerge as a key actor within the global security system.<sup>7</sup> It is, in fact, becoming effectively involved in the construction of this new security architecture. The evidence for this include the evolving cooperation of the Organization with the UN and the documents accepted by the Heads of States at the Council on Collective Security in December 2010, which predetermined the core guidelines for fostering the collective security system. By the decision "On Measures of Elaborating Strategic and Conceptual Documents to Improve and Advance the CSTO Collective Security System," a specific task on elaborating appropriate documents has been put forward, namely the Collective Security Strategy, a new Concept for Developing the Collective Security System, as well as a Strategic and Operation Planning System.<sup>8</sup>

Under the impact of present-day realities, one of the key problems for updating our security Organization is the necessity to address the perception of the contemporary practice of ensuring collective security and of adopting a more flexible interpretation of the consensus principle. The principle of decision-making (except for procedural ones) based on consensus<sup>9</sup> – uncontested common consent - functioning within the CSTO, as well as in most other international organizations, refers to the fundamentals of politics and law that rely on the principles of sovereignty and equality of member states of a given organization. A guarantee of equal engagement in making crucial decisions, with a view to meeting their own security interests, is indispensable for states founding a collective security organization. Sovereign states, entering into a collective security system and voluntarily waiving a definitive part of their sovereign rights, expect to compensate for that sacrifice by ensuring their security on a higher level - due to the synergistic jointness of efforts of all the member states of the organization. At the same time, we should not exclude the possibility of the emergence of such situations when the minority's opinion, not coinciding with the position of the majority of the members, may conflict with the vital or strategic interests not only of the majority, but also of the organization as a whole. We recognize such examples both from the experience of NATO and our Organization. Within NATO, which holds a solid record of experience of building and sustaining activity of a collective security system, taking into account the lessons learned, it is envisaged that such decision-making mechanisms may be developed and introduced which would ensure the expression of the "coalition will" on the part of member states under international law and in accordance with the mission, goals and tasks of the Alliance. It should also be mentioned that such elements of decision-making in this reduced format have been reviewed to a certain extent in the context of coalition cooperation practices among NATO nations.

In the case of the CSTO, we may state that the decision-making process in a "truncated format" is an efficient tool to overcome stalemates in such situations when the minority is unwilling to participate in certain coalition activities, however, it does not oppose their implementation. An additional universal initial resource to develop and implement the principle of "coalition will" may become one of the backbone principles in the CSTO - the principle of regional establishment of the collective security system. This principle, in further conformity with the consensus principle, allows the streamlining the decision-making process with respect to separate regions of collective security.

It is of great importance to precisely define the role, place and purpose of the military component in the collective security system. In spite of the transformation affected by changes in security environment parameters, and sometimes also due to the partial replacement of other constituents, the military component retains its significance, and in cases where the political factor prevails, it remains a system-forming one. Thus, while settling the issue of updating the mission, goals and tasks of our Organization, it is necessary to determine modernization parameters of the security system's military component on an extremely reasonable ground. Simultaneously, a potential resource base should be provided for its guaranteed build-up to the required level when the balance of challenges and threats changes drastically. It is of no less importance to conduct a sound strategic assessment and to build and bolster the military security architecture for each region of collective security in the context of the general collective security architecture of the CSTO system.

Thus, to assure a shift to a more effective multi-faceted system of CSTO collective security it is urgent to develop and accept such a new strategic concept which would take into account the dominant idea that multi-functional security is indivisible and its provision through international cooperation has no alternative. The given approach, as we recognize, is aimed at searching for reciprocal decisions for all CSTO member states, as well as for other partners from the community of global security entities.

Ensuring an appropriate level of adequate collective security assumes that there should be relevant answers to the questions concerning the key parameters and conditions of its integration in the global security system. It concerns the compatibility of the CSTO with the community of international security entities in terms of value preferences, vital and strategic principles, missions, goals, interests and priorities of collective security, the place, purpose and role of the political, military and other components, and the structure and functions of the Organization. With regard to this, it becomes significant to optimally determine the contents, proportions and bonds among and between these components in the CSTO collective security architecture being modernized. In the meantime, to further this integration it is necessary to resolve the problem of forging new relations with NATO – a more sophisticated actor having its own well-established key role in the global security system and being based on the Eurasian area common for these two collective security organizations.<sup>10</sup> We should note a number of the CSTO initiatives targeted at cooperation with NATO. However, the North Atlantic Alliance exercises certain vigilance in this matter. So, when tackling priority issues on ensuring security within the CSTO responsibility zone as a part of the common Eurasian security area, it still prefers cooperation in the bilateral format of NATO-partner state by the formula of "28+1." Meanwhile, in the new Strategic Concept of the Alliance, special importance is attached to enhancing cooperation within the framework of the "Russia-NATO" Council. The activation of this Council in terms of the decisions of the Lisbon Summit of the North Atlantic Alliance could serve as an actual starting point to discuss and review cooperation options between the CSTO and NATO. As it is not a secret that the role and potential of Russia for the CSTO are pivotal. And the proficient use of this opportunity may facilitate the generation of productive cooperation on the level of organizations as well. Although we also know that contrary opinions characterized by inertial thinking, conspiracy stereotypes and skepticism have tended to impede the development of mutual confidence, we should notice and foster the improvement in the "Reset" of the dialogue and cooperation in collective and individual formats "Russia-NATO," as well as "US-CSTO" and "NATO-CSTO."

My personal and professional participation in the "Security: US-Russia" Program of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University in 2010 revealed the professional interest of US strategic studies experts in the pursuit of means to enrich the reset in the US-Russian cooperation through the interaction between the US and the CSTO. In this aspect, as a possible starting point, these US analysts were attracted by the Program called "Operation Channel" famous for its successful experience in fighting against narcotics by the CSTO at the Central Asian crossroads of drug trafficking between Afghanistan and Eurasia. In the given context of the Harvard academic dialogue, the pragmatic considerations of scholars sounded innovative which were about the hypothetical possibility of cooperation of the CSTO with the US in the format of "CSTO-US" or "7+1", commensurate with the parallel partnership in the format of "NATO-Russia" or "28+1."<sup>11</sup>

Summarizing last year's Harvard strategic intellectual US-Russia dialogue which represented "Smart Power" of its parties, as the only participant from a third friendly nation, I can verify that in the viewpoint of my colleagues, the global security interests in the present turbulently evolving world in its strategic perspective does not exclude any reset in the relationships between Russia and NATO, the US and the CSTO, as well as NATO and the CSTO for the purpose of cooperation and integration.<sup>12</sup> Such an approach reflects the possibility of deepening cooperation among these global and regional security entities under the impact of the reset strategy of the US-Russian relations, as well as the expansion of the academic pursuit of avenues to mutually influence and enrich the strategic concepts of their modernization. In terms of this premise, the success of developing a new CSTO Collective Security Strategic Concept will considerably be determined by the systemic character of applying security studies advanced effective methodologies reviewed by the intensively modernizing CSTO and NATO, including their members – Russia, US, as well as their allies and partners.

It is important to highlight the fact that the CSTO Council and Secretariat each aim at organizing the process of developing the draft of the new strategic concept of our Organization on the basis of synthesizing the latest theoretical-methodological and academically-applied achievements of modern security studies. From this perspective, it could be helpful to consider the experience of developing the draft National Security Strategy of the Republic of Armenia with the academic coordination by the Armenian Institute for National Strategic Studies of the Ministry of Defense in close cooperation with the leading security studies think tanks of Moscow, Washington and Brussels. Our Institute is ready to make its own contribution to the development of the new Strategic Concept of our Collective Security Treaty Organization.

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<sup>1</sup> **Договор о коллективной безопасности.** Совершено в г. Ташкенте 15 мая 1992 года в одном подлинном экземпляре на русском языке. МОЦИП ОДКБ, Армения: - <http://www.odkb-armenia.am/doc03.php>.

<sup>2</sup> **“Manfred Wörner: NATO Visionary”** by Ryan C. Hendrickson assessing the legacy of Manfred Wörner, NATO's seventh Secretary General, ten years after his death, NATO Review, 2004: - <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2004/issue3/english/history.html>.

Андрей Кокошин, **“Реальный суверенитет в современной мирополитической системе”**. Издание 3-е, расширенное и дополненное, М, Издательство «Европа», 2006: - <http://pravo33.wordpress.com/2010/08/17/%D0%B0%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BA%D0%BE%D1%88%D0%B8%D0%BD-%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B0%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D1%8B%D0%B9-%D1%81%D1%83%D0%B2%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B5%D1%82-%D0%B2-%D1%81%D0%BE%D0%B2%D1%80/>.

<sup>3</sup> **Основы военной политики Республики Армения (военно-политический аспект национальной безопасности)**. Ер., 1992. См.: Г. Котанджян, **Этнополитология конфликта. Основы военной политики и национальной безопасности Армении**. Ер., ИНСИ МО РА, 2010, с.с.

<sup>4</sup> **УСТАВ ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ ДОГОВОРА О КОЛЛЕКТИВНОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ**. Совершено в городе Кишиневе "7" октября 2002 года в одном подлинном экземпляре на русском языке. МОЦИП ОДКБ, Армения: - <http://www.odkb-armenia.am/doc01.php>

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<sup>5</sup> **Декларация государств-членов Организации Договора о коллективной безопасности о дальнейшем совершенствовании и повышении эффективности деятельности Организации**. 2006 23 июня (г. Минск, СКБ) год: - <http://www.odkb-armenia.am/doc10.php>

<sup>6</sup> **Процесс создания КСОР ОДКБ осуществляется - Назарбаев**, МОСКВА, 14 июн - РИА Новости : - <http://www.rian.ru/politics/20090614/174328972.html>

<sup>7</sup> **Выступление Генерального секретаря Организации Договора о коллективной безопасности Н.Н.Бордюжи на заседании СБ ООН по тематике взаимодействия ООН и региональных организаций в поддержании международного мира и безопасности (13 января 2010 года, Нью-Йорк)**. ООН, Заявления:- <http://www.un.int/russia/new/MainRootrus/Statements/security%20council/2010/Statement130110ru.htm>

<sup>8</sup> **В Москве проходит встреча глав государств-членов ОДКБ**, МОСКВА. 10 декабря, [www.zakon.kz](http://www.zakon.kz): - <http://www.zakon.kz/192814-v-moskve-prokhorit-vstrecha-glav.html>

<sup>9</sup> **Принятие решений на основе консенсуса в НАТО. основополагающий принцип**. Официальный сайт НАТО: - [http://www.nato.int/cps/ru/SID-38F8456C-10657459/natolive/topics\\_49178.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/ru/SID-38F8456C-10657459/natolive/topics_49178.htm)

<sup>10</sup> **«О ПЕРСПЕКТИВАХ РАЗВИТИЯ ОТНОШЕНИЙ РОССИИ И НАТО»**. Под общей редакцией И.Юргенса и С. Кулика, Коллектив авторов: Е. Бужинский, С. Кулик, А. Никитин, Т. Пархалина, М. Энтин, И. Юргенс, *Институт современного развития*, Октябрь 2010: - [http://www.riocenter.ru/files/MiniBook\\_NATO.pdf](http://www.riocenter.ru/files/MiniBook_NATO.pdf)

<sup>11</sup> Г. Котанджян. **“К вопросу о перспективе диалога НАТО-ОДКБ”**, ПОЛИТИЧЕСКАЯ ЭКСПЕРТНАЯ СЕТЬ “КРЕМЛЬ. ORG”, 27 сентября 2005: - <http://www.kreml.org/opinions/98314439?mode=print>

<sup>12</sup> **U.S. and Russian Military Officers Form Bonds at HKS Executive Education Program**, March 29, 2010, by Doug Gavel: - Harvard Kennedy School of Government: - <http://www.hks.harvard.edu/news-events/news/articles/u.s.-russia-security-program-march-2010>; **Dr. Joseph Nye on Smart Power**, July 3, 2008, Harvard Kennedy School of Government: - <http://www.hks.harvard.edu/news-events/publications/insight/international/joseph-nye>; **What is Hillary Clinton's 'smart power'?** From Times Online, January 13, 2009: - [http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us\\_and\\_americas/article5511343.ece](http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article5511343.ece)

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