**EXPERT OPINION**

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The Black Sea Security Program had its genesis in 1997 when Harvard Kennedy School reached out to Ukraine as a fledgling democracy. Over the years this program has expanded its reach first to include other former Soviet Black Sea countries and currently to countries in the greater Black Sea region. An overarching goal has been to encourage regional security through cooperation and integration. It is unique in its mission to bring together leading policy makers in the region with senior US officials to gain a deeper understanding of issues affecting the region and to encourage problem solving in areas of common interest. The program typically involves senior military representatives and civilian security specialists from the United States and ten regional countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. Recent efforts to reach out have brought participants from Kazakhstan, Croatia, Slovenia and Serbia to Harvard. The Black Sea Security Program and its predecessor – the Ukrainian National Security Program – have brought together more than 400 regional participants and 200 American participants since 1997.

The program aims to:
- Deepen participants’ understanding of global and regional strategy, defense organization, and military reform and restructuring;
- Identify the very broad common areas of agreement that exist among the Black Sea nations and expose their officials and the US participants to the strong common history and shared values of the region;
Highlight the specific areas of current cooperation on issues of vital interest to these countries and, at the same time, identify those issues which divide them and present challenges to regional cooperation;

Expose the Black Sea officials to the free flow of ideas inherent in the pluralistic American system and within the US national security community itself by engaging them with officials who represent a wide range of viewpoints.

The 2010 program took place from April 12-23, 2010. Slovenia hosted the initial gathering and was sponsored by the Ministry of Defense. Regional participants came together in Ljubljana to better understand Balkan issues in a regional context. The group moved on to Paris for a second program sponsored by the EU Institute for Strategic Studies. This was another example of building bridges to other organizations with common interests. The participants spent the majority of the time gaining a better understanding of the EU and its role in European governance and security. With great misfortune, the Iceland volcano prohibited the regional participants from departing Paris. After many valiant efforts, the 14 regional participants in Paris were unable to make it to Harvard. The decision was made to continue the program with the US delegation. Representatives from 7 of the regional countries who were not part of the Paris delegation were able to make it to Harvard.

Prior Workshops took place in Yalta, Ukraine (2002); Baku, Azerbaijan (2003); Batumi, Georgia (2004), Chisinau, Moldova (2005), Bucharest, Romania, (2006), Kiev, Ukraine (2007), Yerevan, Armenia (2008) and Moscow, Russia (2009). In addition to program alumni, the workshops host European representatives from NATO, the EU, and various international organizations. The Workshops have been an ideal venue for bringing alumni together with European representatives from both government and non-government organizations.

The next Regional Workshop will take place in Istanbul, Turkey in 2011.

The Black Sea Security Program Regional Workshops

Regional Workshops were added to the program concept in 2002 to 1) strengthen and expand the regional network encouraged by the annual Black Sea Security Program; 2) provide a forum for regional experts to discuss critical security issues pertaining to the region; 3) involve US general officers and policy makers in Black Sea regional dialogue; and 4) recruit key individuals for future iterations of the program. The most recent Harvard Black Sea Security Program Regional Workshop took place in Sofia, Bulgaria. It was organized by the Atlantic Club of Bulgaria in cooperation with Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Bulgaria, and the NATO Information Center in Sofia. It was co-sponsored by The Black Sea Trust, a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Over 70 participants from 14 countries took part in the workshop entitled “The Black Sea: Risks of Confrontation, Prospects for Cooperation”.

Prior Workshops took place in Yalta, Ukraine (2002); Baku, Azerbaijan (2003); Batumi, Georgia (2004), Chisinau, Moldova (2005), Bucharest, Romania, (2006), Kiev, Ukraine (2007), Yerevan, Armenia (2008) and Moscow, Russia (2009). In addition to program alumni, the workshops host European representatives from NATO, the EU, and various international organizations. The Workshops have been an ideal venue for bringing alumni together with European representatives from both government and non-government organizations.

The next Regional Workshop will take place in Istanbul, Turkey in 2011.

The Black Sea Security Program is funded by a generous grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York.

The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors.
Ladies and Gentlemen,

Allow me first of all to express my satisfaction with the fact that for the first time Bulgaria hosts this expert international forum, which is held every year in a country from the Black Sea Region, upon the initiative of the Harvard University. On this occasion, my congratulations go to the co-organizers from the Atlantic Club for their efforts to ensure that this year the forum will take place here, in Sofia.

This event, a milieu where experts, politicians and military officials from the Black Sea countries and the USA exchange opinions and ideas, is a sign of our efforts aimed at the development of dialogue and cooperation in the interest of promoting security and stability in the Black Sea Region. Our efforts reflect our vision that our common future depends on how successful we are now in building trust, cooperation and solidarity in the region where we all live together.

Opening this workshop is both a pleasure and a challenge to me, as it will provide the participants with the opportunity to seek and find new and more effective common solutions and approaches adequate to the parameters of the present-day strategic environment. Let me emphasize that this already nine-year-old tradition of exchanging opinions and building relationships demonstrates, on the one hand, our resolve to add new and constructive dimensions to the cooperation in the Region. On the other hand, nevertheless, this forum will also remind us that we all still have a lot of work to carry out, in order to turn this region into an area of stability and prosperity.

In this regard, being a governmental representative of a NATO and EU Member State, that is located both in South-Eastern Europe and in the Black Sea Region, I would point out that we see these two regions as interconnected. And that is not only because instability in any one of them will have a negative impact on the other, but most of all because we first and foremost should be seeking new avenues for further developing constructive relations among us.

This means that the positive example provided by the regional cooperation and progress towards Euro-Atlantic integration and/or European integration in South-Eastern Europe may be followed with regard to the Black Sea Region as well. At the informal ministerial of the defense ministers of the EU held in Ghent I shared my opinion that for the Permanent Structured Cooperation is very important to use and to develop the existing regional forms of cooperation. I underlined the fact that we have successful SEDM process and try to do our best to reinvigorate it now. We should try to use the assets already existing like SEEBRIG, the Headquarter of which is currently in Istanbul. We have suggested hosting a permanent Headquarter of SEEBRIG in Bulgaria since 2013. This gives me grounds to assert that it is time to transfer the constructive know-how gained so far in building security and developing cooperation in South-Eastern Europe to the Black Sea Region as well. Furthermore, in the future, stability in the Black Sea Region will be of greater and greater importance, in light of the fact that new horizons are
emerging for cooperation between EU and NATO, on the one hand, and the Caucasian and Central Asian countries, on the other.

In the meantime, we must not forget that we have yet a lot of efforts to pay with regard to South-Eastern Europe, because peace and stability here still cannot be taken for granted. Not to a lesser extent, the same goes for the Black Sea area, where the Black Sea has become an arena for the combined action both of traditional and of new asymmetric risks and threats.

All this is relevant today, when both for NATO and the EU, and for Bulgaria, the year 2010 is a year of strategic rethink. Nowadays is the time when the innovations in the field of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defense Policy are starting to take effect, in accordance with the Lisbon Treaty. Meanwhile, the new NATO Strategic Concept is soon to be adopted – in November in Lisbon. This Concept will define NATO’s identity and responsibilities for the coming period of at least 10 years. This is of exceptional importance for the Black Sea countries, in view of the fact that in the foreseeable future the region will play an increasingly significant role on NATO’s and EU’s agenda. In this context, Bulgaria is soon to have a new National Security Strategy discussed by many institutions. It will enable us to adequately respond to new challenges, as well as to work for the achievement of the goals that the EU and NATO have with regard to regional security.

Ladies and Gentlemen,
Let me wish you successful and fruitful discussions.
Slovenia and Euro-Atlantic integration – lessons learned

Euro-Atlantic cooperation in the security area: regional perspective for the South East Europe. Balancing political and practical interests in regional security cooperation

Mitja MOCNIK
Minister Plenipotentiary, MFA of the Republic of Slovenia
Ljubljana, 13-14 April 2010

I. THE RECENT STATE OF PLAY

Security issues are detrimental to the stability of institutions in the SEE. They impact the business climate, domestic and foreign investments, economic growth, and, they violate human rights. Trans-border crime in the SEE is partially based on spontaneous voucher–based privatization, tenders/sales and on management-employee buy-out processes. Some of the social, political and legal controls which collapsed with the break up of former regimes still represent one of the most serious obstacles to development.

Today, countries in the SEE aspire to contribute to the European Security Architecture with variable levels of resources and capacities to respond. Improving legal frameworks and restructuring the state institutions are main challenges and in many cases, national developments were only viable thanks to the direct support, guidance and finance provided by bodies such as the UN, EU, WB, OSCE as well as from single donors like USA and others. Although needed and gratefully received, this aid hasn't been offered entirely out of philanthropy because security issues pose a wider threat than just to the countries of the region. Addressing them before their impact widens, makes good commercial and security sense for donors. Are we today competent to answer these questions?

1. Are security problems in the region changing in scale, scope, or quantity and how can we measure them?

2. What political and economic impact does security problems have in the region and what are key indicators in gaining influence in politics and economics?

3. To what extent does the phenomenon involve criminals corrupting politicians or officials exploiting their power to take control of criminal activity?

4. Are the states in the SEE improving the quality of JHA systems?

5. Does Euro-Atlantic cooperation (EU/NATO) curb security threats or does the elimi-
nation of internal borders help organized crime to thrive?

6. Are there any untapped opportunities for Euro-Atlantic cooperation in the SEE?

7. Were threats were suppressed, and, what was necessary to accomplish that?

International cooperation is a huge challenge, reflected by the way that so many national groupings have sought to build their own cooperation frameworks. Whether this is the result of strong local motivation or because of disappointment with existing practice, is not known. However, a common view on how to streamline many different efforts is definitely lacking. There is a gap in the European security model, which does not go beyond the European Security Strategy and being converted into regional, national and local security plans. The “security map” that would reveal to all in Europe to have information in terms of the origin, transit and targeting of trans-border crime groups is missing.5 “Eurocentric” approach can not solve all problems in the EU.

Over the past 19 years, the SEE was the host to an enormous growth of opportunities for different types of security threats. Some governments in the region have struggled to impose the rule of law needed to compete effectively against illegal immigration, trafficking in human beings, drugs, and proliferation of small arms, smuggling of highly taxable goods and financial and computer crimes. The activity against illegal immigration in SEE has been in response to events in other parts of Europe. Radical groups and other forms of extremism have been fermenting within SEE boundaries. This has motivated countries to reassess priorities in international cooperation. After changes in the political structures in the late eighties and nineties the development in SEE shows significant progress, but there are still unsolved problems in some regions that might have an effect on the future security situation in the EU.6

Security cooperation cannot be separated from the political and economic environment in which it exists. The countries of the SEE have always had a distinct personality and been blighted by history. However, out of the instability that followed the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the former federal Yugoslavia, the region has emerged with a stronger regional identity in terms of trade and economics and security challenges. The international debate has refocused away from purely defence and military security towards a complete concept involving development of law enforcement networks. Countries in the SEE share experience of transition, and to some extent are still finding their feet as single players in the security area, with similar challenges. They share developments and cooperation with neighbours due to similar background, even if they find themselves in disagreement in certain areas.

One of the main threats for future cooperation in the SEE is changing political and security situation in the region or in some countries. This can change their political will. The biggest challenges in this respect are some donors. Lack of awareness and possible change in their priorities due to the changing security situation in other regions, limited resources within the assistance funds and insufficient efforts, could affect the achievement of the strategic goals and objectives. Most governments in the region are, together with international support, making progress towards adopting legislative reforms and national security plans. The real challenge lies in implementation. The problem of synergy is a reflection of the whole picture. There is a role for an international forum for all interested parties, but that does not mean a huge number of unproductive committee meetings on almost every subject in the region.

II. REGIONAL COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF SECURITY AND JHA

1. Justice and Home Affairs (regional dimension)

The RCC7 members from SEE, despite progress, face major challenges in the area of rule of law, which is fundamental for the functioning of market economies. Structures of countries emerging from post-conflict situations are vulnerable to organised crime and corruption. Addressing these negative phenomena is a crucial part of the criteria for accession to the EU and is a high priority in the pre-accession process. A strong regional dimension in combating organised crime exists. The SEE countries cooperate in tackling these challenges, also in the fight against corruption, they exchange experiences, information and best practices. The need for regional cooperation is most evident in criminal issues, and in the area of private and civil law, such as labour and family law, inheritance and property rights and mutual recognition of civil court decisions.
1.1. Existing regional activities

A range of regional activities have developed in the past years, with varying success and impact. Donors have launched a number of projects to strengthen the regional dimension of the rule of law. These include the Prosecutors’ Network in South-eastern Europe (PROSECO), creating linkages among the prosecutorial services of the countries, the International Law Enforcement Co-ordination Units (IIECs), and strengthening national platforms for international police cooperation.

The South East-European Cooperation Initiative (SECI) Center SECI/Southeast European Law Enforcement Centre (SELEC) (operational police and customs cooperation), the Police Cooperation Convention for SEE (PCC – addressing the security of borders) and the Southeast Europe Police Chiefs Association (SEPCA – creating a framework for strategic cooperation at the highest levels of the police) are particularly important. Operational activities of SECI/SELEC are independent and supported through the Southeast European Prosecutors’ Advisory Group (SEEPAG) facilitating the prosecutorial part of the cooperation and giving advice. The Regional Anti-Corruption Initiative (RAI) focused on promotion of anti-corruption and good governance, sharing best practices and promoting relevant international instruments. The Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative (MARRI), aims at strengthening cooperation and information exchange of the members. Overall, law enforcement cooperation is advanced, while prosecutors’ and judges’ cooperation is less so. In the areas of the fight against corruption as well as migration there are only limited results. The core regional priority in the field of JHA is to fight organised crime, focusing particularly on economic and financial crime, smuggling of drugs and trafficking in human beings. Ongoing activities such as SECI/SELEC, PCC and SEPCA have a key role in tackling this priority.

In the area of the fight against corruption the regional priority is in sharing of good practices but the activities of the RAI need to be better targeted. As regards migration, MARRI should build its capacity to assess circumstances in the region. Protection of fundamental rights as well as cooperation in private and civil law matters are among the least developed areas of regional cooperation in the SEE.

The RCC is planning to contribute to the achievement of the above goals in close cooperation with active European and international institutions (EC, UN Office on Drugs and Crime – UNODC, Council of Europe, International Criminal Police Organization – INTERPOL, European Police Office- EUROPOL etc), to ensure the inclusiveness of the process, taking into account the different status of its member states vis-à-vis the EU.

The RCC is also coordinating the drafting and adoption of a Regional Strategy and Action Plan on Justice and Home Affairs 2011-2014 with an analysis of overlaps of projects and with a suggestion to rationalise and streamline them. Another project is to strengthen judicial and prosecutorial cooperation in criminal matters. (To merge PROSECO network with SEEPAG). The RCC will support the RAI in focusing its activities on sharing good practices from the operational perspective as well as to initiate regional cooperation in private and civil law matters.

2. Security Cooperation (regional dimension)

Overall security and political stability have improved in SEE in the past decade. Six countries are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and five participate in the Partnership for Peace ( PfP) programme. Three RCC members from the SEE are members of the EU playing a role through its security structures and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) activities. RCC plans to build up administrative capacity in order to deal with multilateral cooperation and to continue Security Sector Reform, defence conversion and disaster risk reduction, to meet the criteria, where applicable, for European and Euro-Atlantic integration.

In the area of disaster risk reduction, the SEE is vulnerable to natural and in some cases, man-made disasters with cross-border impact. Cooperation in this field should be strengthened in order to prevent disasters or deal with effects. The capabilities of RCC members from SEE vary with regard to their capacity in terms of preparedness and prevention. The cooperation in reducing the risk and effects of natural disasters is a part of the European integration process.

2.2. Existing regional activities

There are two initiatives operating currently within the RCC framework: the Centre for Security Cooperation-RACVIAC, a regionally-owned organisation aiming at fostering dialogue and cooperation on security issues, and the South Eastern and
Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC). The latter is a UNDP-RCC project, aiming at reducing the risk from Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). The South East European Defence Ministerial (SEDM) is bringing together the defence ministers of the region, the United States backed initiative of the Adriatic Charter aiming at speeding up the Euro-Atlantic integration of the countries of SEE, and the Southeast Europe Clearinghouse – SEEC, aiming at coordinating assistance to NATO candidates and PIP aspiring countries.

The Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Initiative for South Eastern Europe (DPPI SEE), set up under the former Stability Pact for SEE and operating under the RCC umbrella, brings together donor countries, national and international organisations, aiming at fostering regional cooperation and coordination. The DPPI SEE is in the process of being transformed into a legal entity. Croatia already participates in the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and the Civil Protection Financial Instrument (The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has also applied to do so). Activities under the EU Preention, Preparedness and Response to Disasters-South programme covering the Euro-Mediterranean area are open to the EU candidate and potential candidate countries. The EU-funded regional Disaster Risk Reduction Initiative is currently implemented by the UNDP and World Meteorological Organisation (WMO). The WB and the UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) are active in the civil protection and disaster risk reduction.

For the next three years the RCC is planning to enhance regional dialogue and cooperation mechanisms on security issues, including the development of common strategies, planning and coordination processes and develop a regional approach to disaster risk reduction, through the participation in the EC Disaster Risk Reduction and Civil Protection programmes, developing networks to fight forest fires (SEEuropean Fire-fighting Regional Centers Network – SEEFREC) and reducing fiscal liability to natural disasters. To this end, the EC will begin implementing a programme on Civil Protection Cooperation with candidate countries and potential candidates, to extend the benefits of participation in the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. The RCC will contribute to enhance regional cooperation in dealing with hazardous materials through cooperation with other competent international institutions (EC, NATO, UNISDR, WB etc).

The RCC would like to facilitate the establishment of regional mechanisms, notably the SEE Defence Policy Directors Forum, the Forum of SEE National Authorities on Information Security, the SEE Defence Intelligence Forum and the SEE Counter-Intelligence Chiefs Forum. The RCC is planning to establish regional structures, including the SEEFREC, in cooperation with international partners and will also assist the WB in the implementation of its project to develop the ability of the governments of the region to reduce fiscal liability for natural disasters, through the establishment of a SE and Central European Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (SECE-CRIF).

### III. THE CONSENSUS LEAD POLICIES - BENEFITS AND WEAKNESSES OF SUCH DECISION MAKING PROCESSES AND IMPACT ON REGIONAL OWNERSHIP

Today a number of international, governmental and non-governmental organizations deal with security and trans-border organized crime in the SEE. Projects are mostly oriented in establishment of training centres, programs for employees, on promotion of good practice, on adoption and implementation the legislative and institutional framework. Most of them are functioning on the principle of consensus. International organisations are subject to decisions taken by their membership under whatever voting arrangements exist. Where unanimous decisions or consensus are required, the strategic direction of an organisation can radically alter. Linked to this is the question of funding. Where funding depends on just one or two donors, changes in priorities or disillusionment with organisational performance can result in unwelcome financial pressures. This means that, any international organisation that is not aligned to a fixed political grouping, must always seek out new sources of funding. The long term commitments/projects need to be carefully assessed against the risk of loss of revenue. Benefits must not be allowed to be warped in favour of a donor at the expense of other less affluent members, but there are financial considerations and members should equally not be allowed to receive a benefit if they themselves do not provide their fair share of resources. Where countries have lack of budget
resources as in the main they are in SEE, an international organization must appeal to other sources of funding to supplement membership fees. This inevitably compromises independence.

The main benefits of the consensus lead policies are: interagency cooperation and a common agreement on strategic issues which is of crucial importance for regional organisations dealing with exchange of information, projects, action plans, strategy and budget. Without consensus it is impossible to build trust and confidence among members. Political support is important, but is not always implemented or exercised in practice.

Weaknesses of the consensus lead policies are also visible. Lack of legal basis and poor information development and analysis. Some projects are not productive, because of the weak absorption capacity of such organisations that are suffering from the lack of financial resources, equipment, and people. Reliance on external donations and funding is not acceptable for the long term planning and financial management. Consensus rather than majority voting can also lead to difficulties in getting agreements on priorities. Countries have different national considerations which do not always coincide. It is necessary to find the best possible agreement (as opposed to the lowest commonly acceptable solution). This is important because of the need to reach agreement on new services demanded by the national authorities.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS WITH THE REFERENCE TO THE SEECP (SOUTH EAST EUROPEAN COOPERATION PROCESS) AND RCC (REGIONAL COOPERATION COUNCIL)

The SEE is covered with regional initiatives, and it seems that the RCC approach overlaps with other forms of regional cooperation. The RCC is almost three years old and the widespread agreement is that it had reduced performance with no clear ownership. The main problem of the RCC is that the states of the region did not want a serious regional political structure and that the major international donors do not want some other body to coordinate their aid or strategies for them. International actors often appeared to be marginally aware of other projects. The exchange of information rarely extended to the level of coordination and the SEE countries seem not to have yet taken the lead in actively coordinating international assistance, because it is difficult to identify all gaps and overlaps within the security and JHA area.

The problem of synergy of initiatives is a reflection of the whole picture. It is obvious, of course, that there is a role for an international forum for all interested parties, but that does not mean also a huge number of unproductive committee meetings on almost every subject in the region. Some of the most useful organizations and initiatives existed before RCC adopted them, and will continue with their work, but they do not all need central coordination. The RCC should retain strategic ambitions in a limited number of domains such as Security and JHA. The extension of the model of EU to SEE looks problematic, since the EU, WB, the OECD and others will not hand over their powers and resources or merge them with the RCC, even for a few key policy sectors. Without real powers and resources there can be little expectation of strategic action. The SEE needs authorized RCC which would represent the development and activities to the EU and other international players. This would help the EU to deploy all its possible powers and resources into the region.

Independence is essential for any international organization to have credibility. Membership should be regionally oriented, promoting donor co-ordination and focusing on sequence technical assistance with fixed time frames. Where donors are involved they shouldn’t be looking for an early exit, but must be prepared for a sustained period of cooperation, especially when the main activity of an organization relies on different projects. Regional multi-agency cooperation was mentioned by several EU Presidencies as an important part of the SAP. The EU staffing in the region needs serious reinforcement. Today, we have strong EU embassies in the region alongside the number of tiny EU delegations, all busy duplicating each other’s political and security reporting.

The “status quo” approach in security area in the SEE is not acceptable as well as “Eurocentric” way of thinking. We need political commitment at the ministerial level and practical commitment at the implementation level as well as to identify the threats that could be faced at the regional level. Based on this, analysis, information sharing, operational planning and coordination are essential together with the recognition, understanding and involvement of SEE governments. Enhanced coordination with major players in the SEE
would avoid duplications with many of above mentioned activities.

What is primarily needed, is a realistic vision for the future, derived from the concrete needs of the region identified by the SEECP and with clear roadmaps how the RCC intends to use the available resources in an effective and target-oriented way to achieve the objectives. The added value of the RCC should be concrete operational relations with the SEECP and other key interlocutors like the EC thus ensuring effective inclusiveness in regional cooperation of all parts of the region. RCC’s contribution to the removal of existing various bilateral conflicts can be achieved through implementation of concrete projects for future accession negotiations and not through political pressure.

An outstanding question is how to streamline the vast amount (50) of regional initiatives, with a general demand for even more structures. The priorities must be indicated as the most or less urgent. Many of them have no clear roadmap. The link between regional cooperation and the EU integration process must be further elaborated in relevant areas, pointed out in details in cooperation with the EC. The viable and cost-effective solution, endorsed by practice, is a flexible organization that pools regional information sharing and operational coordination through unitary cooperation policy and procedures. Membership of such an organization gives to the member countries a sense of ownership and responsibility for the regional cooperation process and through coordination among multiple law enforcement actors. The SEECP needs concrete input from the RCC for further political decisions and an effective monitoring of ongoing regional cooperation is essential, not only where the RCC wants to be concretely involved.

SOURCES

1) South East Europe
2) Media reports throughout the region tell of powerful firms and individuals buying off politicians and bureaucrats to shape the policy, and legal environments in their own interests.
4) Justice and Home Affairs

5) Europol has created an Organised Crime Threat Assessment. Its insight into this region in its own backyard is limited. The assessment is more political document than practical one. For example, every year more than 200,000 illegal migrants are detected in the SEE and more than 60 tons of drugs are seized in the region. Very little of this contraband was destined for SEE. The EU has created an EU Threat Assessment, but its insight into this region in its own backyard is limited.
3) Outstanding jurisdictional and sovereignty issues in Transdniestria and Kosovo will need to be resolved in order to establish effective law enforcement and security coverage.
7) Regional Cooperation Council.
8) The SEE countries are exposed financially to the high risk of natural disasters.
9) Kosovo for example presents a significant geographical gap in terms of a regional approach to combat organised crime. There are no projects in this field and it seems that the fight against trans-border organised crime is not on the top of the priority list in Kosoro.
11) The Special Coordinator of the SP SEE was the EU nominee; but he is answerable to everybody.
11) The RCC would have the important role of ensuring the coherence of EU policies vis-à-vis the accession candidates with a task how the whole region should best integrate in the medium to long-term, the only strategic option really available.
12) Threats are not just coming to the Europe from the outside, they are interlinked. Trans-border crime is very well placed also in so called "old democracies".
13) The Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) Regional Centre for Combating Trans-border Crime (The SECI Centre) is such a framework. The Centre began as one component of the SECI Initiative, the seat of which is in Vienna and is a part of other regional projects linked to Infrastructure, Energy, Environment and Private Sector. It is today an independent international organization, but with a regional perspective and participation. The SECI Centre became operational in 2001 and is an excellent example of how to challenge and address the evolution of organized crime in its trans-border dimension through the cooperation of 13 member countries and 30 observers. The SECI Centre is now transforming into the Southeast European Law Enforcement Centre (SELEC).
**INTRODUCTION**

The present paper does not deal with the policy recommendations such as what should Turkey do or do not in order to arrest the process of NATO's transformation in unwanted way but rather highlights varied agendas where Turkey's and NATO's interests diverge. These divergences highlight the changing place and role of Turkey in NATO. There is a small chance that divergent issues or agendas will be bridged over because both sides' perceptions are far and wide. It can be assumed that during the last several years Turkish domestic agenda in the form of Ergenekon and Sledgehammer Affairs and its fallout drove leaders of Turkey to focus on internal developments. Both affairs pose a problem for the military in Turkey and for leadership of the NATO member states. The uncertainty pertaining to the affairs, its less than transparent procedure and unknown outcome pose more questions than answers. As a result, reaction of leadership in Brussels remains reserved and mooted, to say the least. Whether such reaction is justified or not is a different matter and is beyond the scope of this paper. It can be further said that present frictions between Turkey and the Alliance are likely to continue and are likely to have an adverse effect on relations between the two. As a result, Turkey needs to reassess its place and role within the expanded Alliance. The author also touches upon scenarios or options for Turkey in the expanded Alliance.

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**DIVERGENT ISSUES OR AGENDAS:**

1. The issue of NATO's enlargement

Even though Ankara acquiesced to NATO's enlargement, Turkey's perception of this process has undergone some fluctuation. On the one hand, enlargement has strengthened Turkey's front state identity, as opposed to the flank state identity it maintained during the Cold War era. On the other hand, the marginal utility Turkey formerly extracted from its NATO membership has begun to decline (author's italics) with the addition of new members. For example, since Bulgaria and Romania joined NATO in 2004, Turkey is no longer the only ally representing NATO in the Black Sea region. There is an unspoken view in Turkey that Turkey as the only Middle Eastern member of the alliance feels that it is no longer an important asset and in addition its importance eroded for the alliance since the alliance expansion during the last sixteen years. In addition, interests of Turkey in the alliance have been marginalised in favour of new members. Furthermore, the value of Turkey as NATO's ally in the region has strongly diminished. In part, because Turkey reassessed its relations with Russia in the Black Sea region in favour of the latter. And in part, because Turkey wishes to be perceived as a state in peace with every other state in the region. Or to paraphrase the motto of Turkey's foreign policy clearly articulated by Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Turkey wishes to maintain 'zero problems with neighbours'. Rapprochement in Turkish-Russian relations proved to be not exactly compatible with the state
of Turkish-American relations. Tabib Huseynov, head of the International Crisis Group (ICG) in Baku, said that ‘Russia is interested to squeeze out European and American influence’.[5] In a manner of speaking, Russia is interested to pull Turkey away from the Alliance and that Turkey play the regional game according to the tune of Moscow. The Russian officials would, however, disagree with the author’s point of view about this and would claim that Russia and Turkey are partners and guarantors of peace in the Caucasus.[6]

2. Turkey-Russia and the issue of NATO

Turkey does not want to see Turkish-Russian co-operation sabotaged by growing tensions between Russia and the West. Reflecting such concerns, Turkey recently resisted American intention to ‘NATO-ize’ the Black Sea region by extending Operation Active Endeavour from the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. Turkey’s opposition to the NATO-ization of the Black Sea mainly emanates from fears that this might lead to the militarisation of the area. Turkey does not want to find itself in the middle of any quarrel between the US-NATO and Russia that might stem from NATO’s military exercises in the sea. Another point that appears (author’s italics) to unite Turkey and Russia is their opposition to the construction of US military bases in Bulgaria and Romania.[8] In a possible scenario of the collapse of Turkey’s accession process Turkey might turn away from its Western allies and institutions such as NATO, where it had been an invaluable ally. Turkey’s growing ties with Russia and attitude during 2008 summer’s Georgia crisis seems to underscore at least the possibility of such a shift.[9] Although Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkey’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, would deny such scenario, the enhancement of economic relations between Turkey and Russia and a personal chemistry between Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Prime Minister of Turkey, and Vladimir Putin, Prime Minister of Russia, suggests that rapprochement between Turkey and Russia is a real thing and not a pipe dream. In case that Russia manages to pull Turkey away from NATO, both Turkey and NATO will suffer the consequences. Whether this point is taken seriously by the leadership in Ankara and Brussels is not known to the author. The author is not alarmist but rather highlights notion that is currently taking place.

3. Intra-alliance quarrels

As long as many European NATO allies continue to have a different view regarding the present and future outlook of NATO and their view diverge from that of the United States Turkey’s position in and perception of the alliance continues to be marginal. Turkey is currently caught between its pro-European position, namely use more often soft power and less flex your hard power, and Turkey’s long strategic co-operation with the United States Turkey’s position in and perception of the West. Reflecting such concerns, Turkey recently resisted American intention to ‘NATO-ize’ the Black Sea region by extending Operation Active Endeavour from the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. Another point that appears (author’s italics) to unite Turkey and Russia is their opposition to the construction of US military bases in Bulgaria and Romania.[8] In a possible scenario of the collapse of Turkey’s accession process Turkey might turn away from its Western allies and institutions such as NATO, where it had been an invaluable ally. Turkey’s growing ties with Russia and attitude during 2008 summer’s Georgia crisis seems to underscore at least the possibility of such a shift.[9] Although Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkey’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, would deny such scenario, the enhancement of economic relations between Turkey and Russia and a personal chemistry between Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Prime Minister of Turkey, and Vladimir Putin, Prime Minister of Russia, suggests that rapprochement between Turkey and Russia is a real thing and not a pipe dream. In case that Russia manages to pull Turkey away from NATO, both Turkey and NATO will suffer the consequences. Whether this point is taken seriously by the leadership in Ankara and Brussels is not known to the author. The author is not alarmist but rather highlights notion that is currently taking place.

BIOGRAPHY

Eugene Kogan

Dr Eugene Kogan holds a BA and MA in History from Tel Aviv University. In 1990 he received his PhD in History from Warwick University in the United Kingdom. His thesis examined the evacuation of Soviet military industries from the war zone in 1941-42.

Dr Kogan is a noted expert in the field of defence technologies. He has held a series of research fellowships at some of Europe’s most renowned research institutes, including Deutsches Institut fuer Auswartige Politik, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, the Swedish Defence Research Agency, the Swedish National Defence College, and the Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences. In addition to all of this he has also conducted research at Harvard University. Recently he was attached as Guest Researcher to the Center for Asia Studies at Stockholm University and to the Department of International Relations at Middle East Technical University.

Dr Kogan is a prolific writer and has presented an extensive series of papers on the following topics:

• Conversion and related problems in the Soviet/Russian military industrial complex;
• Russian arms exports;
• The privatisation process in Russian industry, including within the military-industrial complex;
• Defence industrial policy in Central and Eastern Europe;
• Arms export policy;
• Israeli defence industrial policy and arms export strategy;
• Space technology;
• Turkis-Russian relations;
• Chinese aviation and space industry.

Dr Kogan currently resides in Vienna and attached as a Guest Researcher to the International Institute for Liberal Policy.

HARVARD BLACK SEA SECURITY PROGRAM-2010
EXPERT OPINION

ics).12 Turkish position has irked its allies in NATO and the contribute forces to such operations.11 Turkey remains
However, as a NATO member Turkey would require to area military operations that Turkey may not like.

participation in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) they are not combat troops (author’s italics).12 Turkish position has irked its allies in NATO and the US in particular. We can foresee that position of Turkey is not going to be changed in the coming years.

Since the end of the Cold War, the transformation of NATO has been matched by the emergence of a European security and defence structure that has sought to provide a strong security dimension to the EU and complement NATO in confronting new threats. Turkey's role in this redesigned Euro-Atlantic security environment has ranged from vague to problematic just as the country’s EU membership application has faced a variety of obstacles. Consequently, Turkey has felt increasingly frustrated and unappreciated to the point of rejecting the current framework of EU-NATO co-operation and coordination defined by the 2002 'Berlin Plus' agreement.

objections and withdrawal from the structure increases insecurity for Turkey and threatens strategic and operational breakdown between NATO and the EU.13

According to Stephen Flanagan et al., Turkey’s possible position as a NATO member state excluded from the EU could pose real problems for the future of EU-NATO co-operation, which the United States is intent on enhancing. NATO has recently experienced a glimpse of just how obstructionist Turkey can be, as Ankara has attempted to leverage its position within NATO to pressure Brussels into action on the accession front. The Turkish government refused to approve NATO activation orders for both Kosovo and Afghanistan operations that involved cooperation with the EU. It is now clear that Turkey will not hesitate to impede NATO unity when it believes its interests are at stake.14

4. NATO transformation and Turkey's bargaining (in) capability

The critical question posed by Tank Oğuzlu whether Turkey is capable of using the NATO transformation process to its benefit. Turkey's limits are clear. Turkey is a mid-seized country which has long acted on the peripheries of the alliance.15 Although Oğuzlu cites four particular developments in recent years that have strengthened Turkey's bargaining capability within NATO, the present author does not share his optimistic point of view. On the contrary, there is a certain degree of overestimation of Turkey's bargaining capability that exists between Turkish elites, whether we refer to politicians, diplomats and/or military. There is a sense that Turkey has become more important to alliance and, as a result, can attempt to leverage its position within NATO. In addition, there is a notion that suggests that Turkey's commitment to NATO should not be taken for granted. Rather, it needs to be earned. This particular notion is discussed in note 15. It appears that Turkey and NATO needs to address the issue who is important for whom and how different perceptions regarding importance can be bridged over. Otherwise, the inflated sense of self-importance would continue to drive wedge between Turkey and the Alliance.

To support the author's claim that Turkey is unable to project its own strength and thus influence internal NATO's developments remember recent France's reintegration into NATO military command and the appointment of a new NATO Secretary-General. Although Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan played a hard ball in the April 2009 decision against the nomination of a new Secretary-General of NATO Anders Fogh Rasmussen it
did not help to assuage the grievances of Turkey, but only irritated EU NATO leaders' and contributed to the already strained relations between the EU NATO member states and Turkey. It can be said that Turkey feels slightly alienated from NATO and has not yet found its new place within the expanded Alliance.

According to Armağan Kuloğlu, what really matters is Turkey’s ability to identify what it wants or does not want. The key to using this ability lies in the mutual agreement of all the authorities positioned at the decision-making level. Should this be achieved, Turkey would gain the opportunity to better express itself within the body of NATO, the opportunity to negotiate more effectively with other Alliance countries, and the opportunity to present the issues it desires to the NATO platform. The provocative question that rises what if this ability is not achieved. What then? It appears that for the time being Turkey does not articulate its ideas clearly as a member of the Alliance. Turkey’s clumsy behaviour regarding selection of a new Secretary-General of NATO and inability to push forcefully against reintegration of France into NATO military command highlights Turkey’s marginality and lack of strategic thinking regarding NATO’s important issues. The Turkish officials would, however, disagree with the author’s point of view about this point.

Kuloğlu further suggests that Turkey must show interest and co-operate with the Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as the West. Turkey must consider establishing relations with the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO). Turkey should further its interests and security in all these new fields, without excluding NATO or severing relations with the West. Finally, Turkey sees NATO as the main military and political structure of transatlantic relations. Since there is no well established substitute for this organisation, Turkey still (author’s italics) attaches importance to the NATO alliance. However, the threat assessment of NATO and the world have changed since Turkey joined the alliance and organisation began to act in line with US interests after the Cold War era. Therefore, Turkey does not need the alliance as much as it did before, and its attachment to NATO no longer calls for excessive dependency and allegiance. Balanced policies regarding its relations with NATO will better serve Turkey’s interests (author’s italics). That is the crux of the matter, namely rebalancing Turkish-NATO relations without posing impediment to these relations. The question that remains unanswered is whether such a rebalancing act can be accomplished and what are going to be costs and benefits for Turkey and NATO.

To conclude, Turkey continues to search for its place and role in changing NATO. Kuloğlu’s suggestions to show interest and co-operate with adjacent to Turkey areas and to establish relations with SCO without excluding NATO remains a hard task to accomplish. In each and every scenario Turkey needs to take into consideration interests of Russia. And the latter tenaciously pursue its task to pull Ankara away from NATO Headquarters in Brussels. In order to foresee what kind of options Turkey is likely to pursue with regard to NATO, the author present below several scenarios retained to further development between the two.

THE FIRST SCENARIO: TRUST BUT VERIFY

Armağan Kuloğlu’s report can be summarised as follows: ‘It would be wiser for Turkey to stay in NATO without trusting it too much (author’s italics), to conduct policy in line with its own national interests, to perceive NATO as a stable and common platform for various issues, and to exercise her veto right regarding issues that are incompatible with its national interests, or else find other ways to benefit in such cases’. Kuloğlu has not spelled out the meaning of find other ways to benefit and, as a result, there is no sense to speculate what exactly he had in mind. There is no doubt that staying in the Alliance and exercising her veto right give Turkey an instrument to influence NATO’s internal decisions. At the same time divergent interests spelled out in this paper highlight an acrimonious atmosphere in relations between Turkey and NATO. Whether this atmosphere can be changed for better remains to be seen. In a very interesting article penned by David Schenker, director of the Programme in Arab Politics at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, he wrote that it is a time that NATO starts thinking about a worst case scenario in Turkey. For even if the increasingly Islamist state remains a NATO partner, at best, it seems Turkey will be an unreliable partner (author’s italics). Thus, in this scenario Turkey will undermine efforts of NATO to function as multinational organisation by influencing NATO from within and by remaining an unreliable partner. Schenker’s assessment might be not exactly correct and/or perhaps even slightly farfetched. Perhaps instead of unreliable partner, we may use term unenthusiastic partner and/or less supportive partner. Whether Turkey is unreliable and/or unenthusiastic partner both criteria pose certain degree of danger and bear unwelcomed consequences for Turkey and NATO. They also draw further wedge between the two. It can be said that under the circumstances it would be an illusion to view NATO as one of the benchmarks of Turkey’s relations with the West. If once it was the case it is no longer today.
**THE SECOND SCENARIO:**
**ON THE WAY OUT OF NATO**

Without being alarmist and forecasting rather negative scenario of development we need to remember that despite Turkey being a member of NATO since 1952 things have changed and neither Turkey nor NATO is the same as before. Turkish sense of alienation from the Alliance has not been filled up with a new and satisfying feeling of belonging. Turkish feeling that Turkey does not need the alliance as much as it did before expressed so clearly by Armağan Kuloğlu is driving further wedge between Turkey and NATO. Rapprochement with Russia that is perceived differently by many of NATO member states underscore the notion that perhaps one day in the not so distant future scenario **"on the way out of NATO"** may prove to be the formula for Turkey. Whether on the way out of NATO is a recipe for disaster or a recipe for success is a different matter, which is beyond the scope of this paper.

**THE THIRD SCENARIO:**
**GOOD BYE NATO**

Undoubtedly, this scenario appears to be very unrealistic at the moment. In order to materialise this scenario the current AKP government need to be re-elected by the majority of Turks. Such a re-election will empower AKP to conceive a fairly detailed plan of how and when Turkey would leave NATO. It needs to be remembered that the third scenario is not the foregone conclusion. We also do not know to what degree the pacified military will oppose the AKP plan to leave the Alliance. There are too many unknown variables at the moment. It is, however, important to raise such a far-fetched possibility. This scenario may seem to be provocative to Turks, however, it is worthy to present such scenario today and think about the consequences now and not five years later. Perhaps in five years time Turkey would be on the brink of leaving NATO.

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**ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**

- **AKP** – Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi/Justice and Development Party
- **DGAP** – Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik/German Council on Foreign Relations
- **EU** – European Union
- **GDP** – gross domestic product
- **ICG** – International Crisis Group
- **ISAF** – International Security Assistance Force
- **HQ** – headquarters
- **NATO** – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
- **SCO** – Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
- **UK** – United Kingdom

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**NOTES**


3. The author assessment is supported by Armağan Kuloğlu: the arrival of new members, raising the total number of NATO’s members to 26, has radically reduced Turkey’s portion of the pie. “60 years of alliance: NATO and Turkey” in Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies (ORSAM), Report no. 2 (April 2009) online: http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/enUploads/Article/Files/2009612_nato983e.pdf, p. 11.

4. There is more of an effort on the part of the secretary general to visit the newer members more often than once year (Petros Vamvakas, "NATO and Turkey in Afghanistan and Central Asia: Possibilities and blind spots" in Turkish Studies, vol. 10, no. 1 (March 2009); p. 66) and not Turkey. Whether this is perceived by Turkey as a snub is not known, but it certainly deeply frustrates Turks. Hereafter cited as Petros Vamvakas, "NATO and Turkey".

5. Brian Whitmore, “Moscow visit by Turkish Prime Minister underscores new strategic alliance” in Eurasia Insight (12 January 2010) online: http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/pp011210...

Hereafter cited as Brian Whitmore, "Moscow visit". For an opposite point of view, namely that Russia is not interested "to snub EU and the US", see E. Kirsanov, "K voprosu rossisko-turetskogo strategicheskogo partnerstva” ("About the question of Russian-Turkish..."
This particular point that Turkey will not play the regional game according to the tune of Moscow but rather in tandem with Moscow was clearly elaborated by Vadim Dubnov. Dubnov wrote that sharing influence in the Caucasus as a couple (Russia and Turkey), becoming the main players in those locations, and then selling this influence as a couple to all prospective buyers, who would form a long line. “The Turkish safe bet” in Gazeta online: http://www.gazeta.ru, 18 January 2010.

6. In support of the author’s assertion, see Tarık Oğuzlu, “Turkey and the transformation”; p. 8. See also Armağan Kaloğlu, “60 years”; pp. 9-10.


10. In support of the author’s assertion, see Tarık Oğuzlu, “Turkey and the transformation”; p. 5.

11. A similar idea was expressed by Tarık Oğuzlu. Oğuzlu wrote that Turkey fears the possibility of being abandoned by the alliance less than the possibility of being entrapped in unwanted contingencies ("Turkey and the transformation"; p. 11) of alliance in the countries located in the vicinity of Turkey. As a result, it can be said that tensions between Turkey and the Alliance will continue to exist and further hamper Turkish-NATO relations.

12. In support of the author’s assertion, see following. On 1 November 2009 parallel to the resumption of its ISAF command in Kabul, Turkey increased the number of Turkish non-combat troops there by nearly a thousand, bringing its total contribution to 1750. US Ambassador James Jeffrey and National Security Advisor James Jones made it clear after President Barack Obama’s speech that the administration would welcome additional soldiers, preferably with “fewer caveats” relating to their mission. However, Turkish civilian and military leaders have consistently opposed the idea of Turkish troops assuming a direct combat role. This was reaffirmed by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan immediately before his departure to Washington (author’s italics). Bulent Aririza, “President Obama meets with Prime Minister Erdoğan” (7 December 2009) online: http://www.csis.org/publication/president-obama-meets-prime-minister-erdogan. See also Vladimir Socor, “Lessons learned” and I. Sristunova, “Ob otmosheniyakh Turskii i SSHA” (“About Turkish-American relations”) online: http://www.iimes.ru/rus/frame_stat.html – online on 20 December 2009. See also Petros Vamvakas, “NATO and Turkey”; p. 67 and note 34 on pp. 73-74.

13. Petros Vamvakas, “NATO and Turkey”; p. 58. The inability to fully benefit from and appreciate Turkey’s strategic dimension within the alliance is echoed even within the policy planning area of NATO. Turkey is perceived as a ‘problem’ for the alliance within the framework of the NATO-EU relationship. Ibid; p. 66. Unfortunately, Turkey’s vague role in the redesigned Euro-Atlantic security environment has not been addressed in a recent NATO document beyond generalities such as: full complementarity is only possible if non-EU NATO members and non-NATO EU members are accorded the same degree of transparency and involvement when joint activities are conducted. NATO 2020: Assured security; Dynamic engagement. Analysis and recommendations of the group of experts on a new strategic concept for NATO. NATO, (17 May 2010); p. 24.
14. “Turkey’s evolving”; p. 29. For Turkey veto in the involvement of Greek Cyprus in a multinational task force in South Kosovo, see Petros Vamvakas, ”NATO and Turkey”; note 29 on p. 73. For Turkey blockage of NATO to provide security to the EU police training forces, see Ibid, note 30 on p. 73. For the EU’s six-year dispute with Turkey and the status of Cyprus and Turkey’s refusal to let the alliance formally cooperate or share documents with the EU, see Jane’s Defence Weekly, 21 April 2010; p. 15. A notion that Turkey will foot the policy line of the US, Europe and NATO without objection is not correct. Nikiolas Gvosdev, a Russian expert and professor of national security studies at the US Naval War College reinforced the author’s point of view. Gvosdev said that “Where this is problematic for the West is that the assumption that people bad for many years – that Turkey was automatically going to follow the policy line that the US, Europe, and NATO wanted – is not the case anymore. Brian Whitmore, “Moscow visit”. For further information as to whether Turkey might turn away from its Western allies and institutions such as NATO towards Russia, see note 10.

15. Tarık Oğuzlu, “Turkey and the transformation”; p. 10. For the details related to the intra-alliance dissent and how it affects Turkey, see Ibid; pp. 6-7.

16. For details related to four particular developments, see Ibid; pp. 10-12.


18. Ibid; pp. 14-15. The same notion was reinforced by Kuloğlu in “60 years of alliance”; p. 15.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. For a complete article, see “A NATO without Turkey?” in Wall Street Journal, 5 November 2009.

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Turkey’s external security and defense policy, shaped in line with international law and principles in the United Charter, has been based on the principle of lasting peace and stability both in its own region and the rest of the world. Pursuing this policy to establish a zone of peace in its neighborhood, Turkey has always been a pioneer for regional cooperation in the field of security.

When regional security is considered, the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean are gaining greater significance as geopolitical aspects are becoming increasingly relevant in the international arena.

Where the Black Sea is concerned, the first issue that should be underlined is the increasing maritime traffic in parallel with the growing seaborne trade and oil transportation. The amount of the Black-Sea-basin-originated oil transportation through the Turkish straits has reached approximately one hundred forty million tons in a year. In other words, three million barrels of oil by twenty-thirty tankers are being transported to the global markets on a daily basis. Currently, on any given day, around 150 ships transit through the east–west axis in the Black Sea, another 150 ships pass through Turkish strait¹.

About twenty percent of the ships transiting through Turkish Straits carry about 145 million tones of crude oil and petroleum products annually. For example, about 51,000 ships from more than 100 nations passed through Turkish straits last year. These ships transported over 3.5% of global oil productions and over 7% of the oil was transported through the Black Sea and Turkish straits.

Despite this intensive maritime traffic, there were no incidents of terrorism, illegal arms, piracy or human trafficking in 2009 and 2010, according to the statistics shared among the Black Sea littoral states within the framework of Black Sea Coast and Border Guards Cooperation Forum (BSCF) published by the Black Sea Border Coordination and Information Center (BSBCIC). This is very much in line with the conclusion that there are no threats, but risks in the Black Sea maritime domain as agreed by all littoral states. However, these risks have the potential to transform themselves into threats if not controlled and deterred.

As a littoral state possessing Turkish straits and the longest coastline in the Black Sea, Turkey’s approach to Black Sea maritime security is based on a two-pillar approach:

First: Full cooperation and coordination among all Black Sea Littoral States.

Second: Since maritime security is indivisible, keeping the maritime security of the region complementary to the Euro-Atlantic security system.

¹ Last year fifty five thousand merchant ships belonging to one hundred two states have navigated through Turkish straits either to or from the Black Sea. They carried almost half a billion tons of goods, quarter of which was petroleum products.
In light of these principles Turkey has pioneered a series of initiatives in the last decade to increase maritime security in the Black Sea Area.

Turkey;
- led the BLACKSEAFOR initiative in 2001;
- participated in confidence and security building measures in the naval field in 2002;
- launched Operation Black Sea Harmony in 2004, and;
- initiated the Black Sea Coast and Border Guards Cooperation Forum in 2006.

Each of these initiatives has provided a remarkable contribution to the preservation of a stable environment in the region.

Among these, BLACKSEAFOR, is tasked for search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, mine counter measures, environmental protection, goodwill visits, and other tasks including peace support operations agreed by all parties. It is the only naval organization which as a confidence and security building measure is the most eminent example of regional cooperation in the Black Sea maritime domain.
At the operational level, BLACKSEAFOR has already achieved the interoperability of different units belonging to different security systems. This is a unique success further encouraging the idea to consider BLACKSEAFOR as a regional security tool with larger mission and roles.

Since its inception, it surely has ensured that Black Sea littorals are now more interoperable and prone to adopt the philosophy of “working together”. Meanwhile, the year 2011 constitutes an important milestone in the BLACKSEAFOR history. It marks the tenth year of its establishment. In this context, the celebration activities of the tenth anniversary were held on 08 April, 2011 in Istanbul. These activities were an opportunity to renew the commitment of the littorals to regional cooperation.

Another Turkish Navy-pioneered initiative in the Black Sea is the Operation Black Sea Harmony (OBSH), which is a typical maritime security operation composed of maritime interdiction operations and maritime situational awareness pillars.

The mission of Operation Black Sea Harmony is to achieve and maintain maritime situational awareness (MSA) in the designated patrol areas, enabling prompt identification of – and reaction to – suspect vessels, and conducting active presence operations along vital sea lines of communications.

This operation is open to all Black Sea Countries. Up to now, the Russian, Ukrainian and Romanian Navies have taken part in this initiative, giving it a multinational character. In April 2011, the process for the participation of the Bulgarian Navy commenced. These interests are clear testaments to the strong belief in the merit of this operation.

Additionally, search and in-port visits were conducted by Turkish Coast Guard in Cooperation with other state agencies. Post action reports have been sent to relevant NATO authorities.

Since initial activation of the operation, effective cooperation has been established between OBSH and Operation Active Endeavour. Annual coordination meetings started in 2005 between HQ MC Naples and Turkish Navy HQ.

Turkey also led a co-operation and coordination forum between the Border and Coast Guard of Black Sea Littoral States in 2006. Its aim was promoting the stability, safety and the security in the Black Sea area.
and improvement of co-operation and coordination of maritime law enforcement activities.

Another important region to be dealt with is in the south of Turkey. There, The Bay of ISKENDERUN is an important energy hub. The Bay, the terminal area of BAKU-TBILISI-CEYHAN and KIRKUK-YUMURTALIK pipelines, presents itself as a special location. When full capacity is reached and the SAMSUN-CEYHAN by-pass pipeline project is realized, the annual overall capacity will increase by up to 190 million tons.

In 2008 the Turkish Navy launched Operation Mediterranean Shield. This was done within the legal framework of UN Security Council’s relevant resolutions to contribute to global energy security through securing vital Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs) for oil shipping from the CEYHAN terminal.

Frigates, fast patrol boats, corvettes, patrol boats, Maritime Patrol Aircrafts (MPAs), naval helicopters and coastal surveillance radar stations equipped with Automatic Identification System (AIS) participate in the operation.

According to statistics from the past 5 years, Operation Mediterranean Shield units have detected approximately 41,000 ships and identified almost all of them. During same period, more than 1,500 ships were hailed. Maritime traffic information obtained through this operation has been shared with relevant NATO headquarters and other regional and national initiatives.

Mediterranean Shield and NATO’s Active Endeavour, to which the Turkish Navy has provided continuous support since its commencement in 2001, are complementary maritime security operations. They provide enhanced maritimesituational awareness in the Eastern Mediterranean with mutual coordination and cooperation.

Deployment statistics articulate how robust presence of Operation Mediterranean Shield units contributed to operational efficiency of Operation Active Endeavour by enabling them to focus on other areas as required. All Turkish units under national tasking provide associated support to Operation Active Endeavour during their transits in terms of information exchange.

In order to achieve and maintain an effective maritime situational awareness, an integrated network of naval coastal surveillance radar stations and Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) of other governmental agencies has been activated around Turkish coasts. And, maritime situational awareness over the Black Sea and Mediterranean has been dramatically improved.

Turkish White Picture (Recognized maritime picture containing unclassified data) and Recognized Maritime Picture (RMP) are shared with NATO via MSSIS (The Maritime Safety & Security Information System, freely-shared, unclassified, near real-time data collection and distribution network) and MCCIS (Maritime Command and Control Information System, near real-time C2 system focused on strategic and operational use) systems respectively. Additionally, Turkish naval HQ operation center continuously monitors NATO Operation Active Endeavour.

Turkey has also been supporting a Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Center (V-RMTC). This, from its very beginning, has been located in Italy. Additionally, the
Information which was gathered from the interrogations and focused operations on the new tactics and techniques of the pirates, as well as their camps in Northern Somalia was transmitted to coalition countries.

The IRTC counter piracy information guide was prepared for the use of successor CTF-151 commanders, Shared Awareness and Deconflictions (SHADE) document was issued for the use of contact group countries. All the basic orders not suitable for a coalition operation were updated, the CENTRIX web site was reorganized to allow all units to reach the necessary orders, directives and documents.

So far, Turkish Navy ships:
- prevented many pirate attacks, and;
- neutralized hundreds of pirates and numerous skiffs and rescued many hijacked people.

The last maritime initiative consists of the activities carried out by the Turkish Maritime Task Group. It was recently established to demonstrate the Turkish Navy’s commitment to maritime peace and stability through enhancing friendship, cooperation and interoperability with allies and friendly nations.

The main aims of this initiative are:
- to support ongoing UN and NATO operations in order to contribute global security and stability;
- to demonstrate Turkish Navy’s commitment to the stability and security of the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) in order to ensure safe passage for all vessel;
In conclusion, maritime security and energy security in the Euro-Atlantic sphere is directly linked to the security and stability in the maritime domain. Turkey has become a prominent security provider in the surrounding seas; contributing to regional as well as global peace and stability.

The most economic and applicable method of providing maritime security is the strengthening of regional cooperation. The global partnership of regionally provided maritime securities is a very important instrument for making the world seas evermore secure and safe for everybody; deterring those conducting illegal activities at sea.

The Turkish Navy will remain committed and it will continue to exert influence in, and around, her surrounding seas. It will thereby continue contributing to global efforts for a safe and secure maritime environment through regional initiatives.

- to sustain the Turkish Navy’s capacity to operate with friendly and Allied Countries’ Navies and multinational forces, and;
- to enhance cooperation and interoperability with friendly countries and to conduct import and sea trainings with their navies.

In 2010, the Task Group operated in the Mediterranean and conducted training and exercises with other navies, provided support to Operation Active Endeavour via surge operations, and contributed to the overall MSA efforts during the activation period.

The Turkish Maritime Task Group, comprised of 3 Frigates and 1 Oiler, is to contribute to counter piracy operations in Gulf of Aden and Somalia basin during its activation in 2011.
Bulgaria's foreign policy and cooperation initiatives in the Black Sea region

Milen Lyutskanov
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Events of the recent years have shown how important the Black Sea region is for our common stability and security, from energy supplies to democratic values, from frozen conflicts to environmental challenges. Current global and regional trends only reinforce the argument for focusing on this region and stepping up EU's "political investment" in it.

Starting from that premise, one of the main priorities of our foreign policy is to strengthen the role of Bulgaria as a leading regional actor in enhancing security and stability in the Black Sea Region.

The threats to security and stability in the 21st century are global in character and, therefore, a global and comprehensive approach is needed to adequately address them. Along the same lines, the issues related to stability and cooperation in the Black Sea region should be considered within the larger Euro-Atlantic context. And any national initiative aimed at strengthening the stability in the region should not lead to its isolation or capsulation.

The Black Sea region has a particular importance in terms of geopolitics, economy, infrastructure, communications and energy supply. Transport, energy security, including the main transport and energy corridors and environmental protection are amongst the main areas of cooperation identified in the Black Sea region. Bulgaria supports the following principles for intensified cooperation among the Black Sea states – inclusive approach in terms of participation of all littoral states; pragmatism and interaction between different regional initiatives; co-financing of important regional projects by regional partners, international financial institutions, state and private funds; coordination and cooperation between the EU, NATO and other international and regional organisations, including NGOs; making connections between the Black Sea Region and neighbouring regions such as the Danube Basin, the Caspian Basin, Central Asia and the Middle East.

The European Union enlargement with Bulgaria and Romania brought a stronger Black Sea dimension to the Union's policy. The EU realized the challenges, the opportunities and the
long term tasks for the common internal market, the renewed Lisbon Strategy and the energy security. Bulgaria appreciates the continuous efforts towards generating a political approach of the Union regarding the Black Sea region, notably through the Black Sea Synergy.

In 2009, the Eastern Partnership was launched as an ambitious approach of the EU towards its Eastern neighbourhood, an area which we deem crucial for the EU and which is of high priority to our country. The Member States have agreed on the principles of complementarity and delineation between the Eastern Partnership and the Black Sea Synergy. Bulgaria was among the first countries to raise concerns over the possible overlap between the Eastern Partnership and the Black Sea Synergy, emphasising the need to put these principles into practice. A project-based approach seems the best for bringing clear results of EU’s policies, including for the benefit of both the EU and our Eastern neighbours.

We have to find the most appropriate structures to fit in the ideas proposed under the different labels. While the Black Sea Synergy can be an appropriate vehicle for practical regional cooperation, the Eastern Partnership could contribute towards reaching the standards in the partner countries. To make the Black Sea Synergy work, the EU needs to pursue the complete setting up of the three Sector Partnerships, in the fields of Environment, Transport and Energy Partnership. We support, therefore, the Commission endeavours in opening the ground and ensuring the institutional and financial conditions necessary for the emergence of feasible projects within the framework of these Partnerships.

Based on its recent integration experience, Bulgaria also stands ready to contribute to the larger goals of the Eastern Partnership. We are prepared to support the Eastern Partnership’s countries in their efforts to follow the path of European integration on a bilateral basis as well as within the framework of the Eastern Partnership.

Due to the fast technological development of both natural gas and petrol transfer and storage means and facilities, the Black Sea could be considered as part of the littoral States’ territories. The Black Sea has huge potential for transferring natural gas from the Caspian region. Accordingly, Bulgaria is actively working for the realization of the Nabucco project which the EU sees as a priority. The Agreement on Nabucco and the positive attitude shown by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the European Investment Bank gave a solid boost to this project. Bulgaria considers Nabucco as one of the main elements of the so called “Southern corridor”.

The Black Sea is one of the important world corridors for energy supply. The European perspectives of the energy cooperation in the Black Sea depend also on the EU-Russia relationship in the energy domain. Excellent opportunities do exist for a strategic cooperation in Central Asia between the EU, Russia, the United States and the countries producing natural gas in that region. Such cooperation would reflect the new realities in both the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea regions and would lay the basis for the creation of the necessary geopolitical balances.

Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, being the NATO member states in the Black Sea region, bear special responsibility and have an active role in elaborating the Alliance’s, and, in the near future – the EU strategy for the Black Sea region, security issues included. In this sense we believe that the good level of cooperation and interaction on a regional basis should be complemented by a more active involvement of NATO and the EU in the security issues in the Black Sea area.

The perspectives for construction of co-owned critical energy infrastructure in the Black Sea region raise the question of its proper protection. We consider the dialogue among the littoral States and with other countries, instrumental to explore possible ways of assistance provided by NATO. In the near future, the contemporary technologies will convert the Black Sea region into an area of possibly the highest concentration of critical energy transit infrastructure.
I would like to note the fact that in 2006 Bulgaria and Romania signed agreements with the United States envisaging joint use of military facilities on the territory of the two countries. This step is as a new positive factor in the security environment in the Black Sea region in general.

In 2007 the United States announced a Black Sea Strategy defining their principles for constructive cooperation in the region and reiterating their firm support for the existing multilateral forms of cooperation in the Black Sea region.

An important fact to mention is that the Black Sea, an area of 432,000 square kilometres, does not have the so called “open sea” and its territory is practically parcelled among the six Black Sea littoral States. Currently, there is no existing comprehensive and agreed concept on strengthening of the maritime security in the Black Sea region. An improved coordination in this key sector would contribute to the long lasting stability in the region as well as to the long term European energy policy perspectives and energy security.

Speaking about the most significant and efficient international, regional and national security mechanisms, organizations and initiatives in the Black Sea region we could specify:

- The South-East European Cooperation Process;
- The Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) in the part of applying the so called “soft security measures”;
- The CSBM in the naval field in the Black Sea;
- The BLACKSEAFOR.

The Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation is the only full-fledged and the most inclusive regional organization in the wider Black Sea area, having workable structure and institutions. It is an economic organization, having nevertheless indirect contribution for political rapprochement. It contributes to maintaining of good-neighbourly relations and building of mutual trust in a region, which is a zone of several protracted conflicts. Bulgarian participation in BSEC is part of its regional policy in the wider Black Sea region and it is directed towards enhancement of stability and peace in the region – a precondition for economic growth, competitiveness and prosperity.

As BSEC Chairman from November 2009 to May 2010 Bulgaria focused on energy, tourism, science and technology, transport and “soft security measures” in sectoral cooperation. The trilateral Bulgaria – Romania – Greece coordination meetings at ministerial level should become regular. Being EU and NATO Member-States and part of the wider Black Sea region, the three countries should work to put its major problems in the focus of the attention of the two organisations. Currently the BSEC-EU interaction is directed towards a pragmatic, project-oriented cooperation for resolving the most outstanding issues in the economic development of the region and this will inevitably foster dialogue and better mutual understanding.

Bulgaria considers the BLACKSEAFOR one of the important mechanisms of international cooperation in the security domain in the Black Sea area. We support a step-by-step development of the initiative’s potential based on the existing Agreement.

A national contribution to the security and stability in the Black Sea region is the International Black Sea Border Control Coordination and Information Centre based in the town of Bourgas which plays an important role in the information exchange among the Coast Guards and the Border Police services of the countries in the region.

In December 2008 Bulgaria proposed a Concept called “Synergy of Partners Efforts” based on already signed or ratified documents and thus avoid new structures or duplication of already existing initiatives. The aim of the Concept is to optimize the Black Sea littoral States’ efforts to further strengthen maritime security in the region.

Bulgaria strongly believes in the potential and the political will of the countries situated along the coasts of the Black Sea to seek and agree on common approaches and ways to guarantee and strengthen peace, security and stability in the Black Sea region on an equitable and mutually beneficial basis, respecting the legitimate interests of each littoral state.
The new National Security Strategy and the Defense Policy of Bulgaria

Stefan Yanev
Brigadier General Director, Defense Policy Directorate, Ministry of Defense, Republic of Bulgaria

It is both privilege and honor to address the 9th Black Sea Security Program Regional Workshop, which has thus far progressively worked to promote regional security through dialogue, cooperation and integration. Bringing together decision makers from the wider Black Sea region and US representatives encourages deeper understanding and problem solving attitudes in areas of common interest. One such interest is in finding together the best strategy to make the Black Sea a zone of stability and prosperity.

Examining the regional context, we cannot but come to the conclusion that the Black Sea region, being part of an ever globalizing world, grows in importance. And it will continue to attract more attention from outside, given its key geostrategic location and especially its potential to bridge Europe and Asia. This is why we need to go beyond the plain goal of managing the current risks, threats and challenges in the region. Without a shred of doubt, this is a crucial and indispensable duty to fulfill, but our vision should be broader in scope and oriented to the future, not the past. What we also have to do nowadays, is to look for new avenues to expand our cooperation. This means to try more and more to find what we can do together, in order to reap maximum benefits from our mutual efforts. To achieve this, primarily we need to have that vision deep-rooted in our own countries' security strategies. Accordingly, the new Bulgarian Security Strategy, being the basis for the defense policy, is oriented in this direction.

Our new Security Strategy, which is at its final stage of elaboration, will come to replace the current National Security Concept of 1998, which has already successfully achieved its principal purpose – Bulgaria’s NATO and EU memberships. Being part of the European and the Euro-Atlantic community, Bulgaria needs a new strategy at the basis of its policy, regarding the strategic environment of the second decade of the 21st century. This strategy aims at making our country a stronger and more valuable NATO ally and an EU member state, actively participating in the building of the Union's Common Security and Defense Policy. The Concept of 1998 was the expression of a strategy aimed at rejoining the European family of free democratic nations. The new one will envisage the way to reap
the benefits of membership to the fullest extent and, at the same time, to best contribute to the allied efforts of bringing peace and stability to the world, including the Black sea region.

The elaboration of our new Security Strategy goes hand in hand with the process of strategic rethink at both NATO and EU levels. It takes into account the work done to date by the group of experts on the new NATO Strategic Concept, as well as the Lisbon Treaty, which lays the foundations for building a genuine *Europe de la Défense*. Last but not least, it takes into account the security strategies of our key NATO allies, including the new US Security Strategy and that of EU member states.

In this sense Bulgaria, as a member state, contributes to the NATO and EU strategic rethink while, at the same time, we bring our own strategic conceptual basis in line with the new realities. We manage to do both simultaneously as we are already conceptually in tune with the requirements of the NATO and EU strategic rethink. Moreover, our defense policy is the expression of a new realistic judgment of the security environment. It is already based on the new NATO Strategic Concept which is soon to come, the Lisbon Treaty philosophy and our new National Security Strategy. That is why this time we do not have to catch a moving train, but are already in there, together with our allies. Therefore, the National Security Strategy will serve us in the context of the new NATO Strategic Concept and the EU Lisbon Treaty.

The National Security Strategy, based on the European and Euroatlantic values shared by our society, will be a product of the efforts of all the relevant state institutions, the civil society and the academic community. The broad public debate means that it will also be a Strategy of national consensus, reflecting the needs of today and looking into the future. This is even more necessary today, given that this document will be the foundation for the formulation and conduct of the national security policy, including the defense policy. Thus, the National Security Strategy will be of a functional rather than declarative character. It will prescribe actions and give directions on what to do in terms of security, including defense.

The new National Security Strategy serves as the foundation for the new National Defense Strategy, which is almost finalized. In this connection, I should mention that as part of the strategic rethink, as far as defense is concerned, we are undergoing a thorough defense capabilities review. The Force Structure Review, which we successfully conducted and the results of which are reflected in the second Bulgarian White Paper on Defense and the Armed Forces, will define the armed forces we need today and tomorrow. Our defense will be fit to meet the national security interests, the requirements of our membership in NATO and our participation in the EU Common Security and Defense Policy.

The new National Security Strategy, in its capacity of a functional document, will serve as the foundation of our security and defense policy in

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**BIOGRAPHY**

**Stefan Yanev**

Brigadier General Stefan Yanev began his career in 1983 as Commander of Artillery Platoon. After his graduation from the Bulgarian Military Academy "Rakovski" in Sofia in 1993 he was a Division Commander and later on in 1996 he was appointed as an expert in the International Cooperation Directorate in the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Bulgaria. In 1998 Brigadier General Yanev served as an Analysis Officer in the Programming and Planning Department of the PfP-Coordination Group in Mons, Belgium. From 2000 to 2003 he was Senior Assistant Head of the Strategic Department in the Defense Planning in the General Staff, State expert in the PfP-Department in the Euro Atlantic Integration Directorate and Head of Defense Policy and Analysis Department in the Defense Policy Directorate. In 2005 he graduated the Defense College of the National Defense University in Washington, USA, and was appointed in the position Head of the Transformation Department in the Centre of Excellence Defense against Terrorism in Ankara, Turkey. In 2007 he was Director of the Defense Policy Directorate in the Ministry of Defense and since 2008 he was appointed in his current position as Director of the Security and Defense Policy Directorate. Currently BG Yanev is Defense Attache of Bulgaria to the United States.
the years to come. At the same time, the security environment progressions are so dynamic and requiring constant swift adaptation, that it is also accurate to say that the contemporary security and defense policy of Bulgaria, on its part, also serves as a starting point for filling the new Strategy with content. In this respect, we are already implementing a defense policy which is realistic and future-oriented, the ultimate expression of which will be the National Security Strategy. Thus we do not have to wait for the formal adoption of the new document to start putting into practice the tenets of our new policy. More precisely, we are already doing what the present requires from us and the new document will only confirm and strengthen our resolve to have an adequate defense policy for today and tomorrow, rather than one oriented to the past, one that we’ve already gotten rid of.

The essence of our defense policy as a NATO and EU country is that we must be ready, together with our allies and partners, to face any security challenge whenever and wherever it might appear. The ideal approach to security is prevention. That is why our Armed Forces participate in NATO and EU-led missions and operations, far beyond our national territory. For if we do not act collectively, adequately and promptly, given the parameters of the present-day strategic environment, new kinds of unconventional and asymmetric risks and threats will certainly one day knock at our own doors. This is the essence of the philosophy of our strategic rethink, in general, and of our National Security Strategy, in particular. This is why we should have not only the right vision, but also the suited instrument to serve for the implementation of our strategy – the Armed Forces.

Having raised this matter, let me say a few words on the results of the Force Structure Review, which serves to have the Bulgarian Armed Forces ready to fulfill their missions to the greatest extent. The Force Structure Review has as a product the White Paper, which presents to the public, as well as to our allies and partners, the Armed Forces that we need and that we are decided to build-up.

In order to fulfill its duty to ensure that the Bulgarian society has the most adequate to the present day instrument for its security and defense, the Force Structure Review has made a comprehensive assessment of any possible security challenges and the plausible scenarios for the strategic environment. Against this background, we have assessed and identified the defense capabilities that are required for guaranteeing our security and for promoting our national interest, as formulated in the new National Security Strategy. The Review gives us the answer to what defense we need and most importantly – what Armed Forces we can afford, taking into account the resources available now and in the foreseeable future.

In brief, the answer to this question can be summarized in the following lines: build-up and further development of a single set of Armed Forces. They should be interoperable with the NATO and EU member states’ Armed Forces and ready to execute all the tasks assigned to them. The single set of Forces will have a single system for command and control in peace time and in a period of crisis. Their organization, armament and equipment should match the tasks assigned to them and the national level of ambition. Last but not least, they should be adequately provided with necessary and realistically affordable financial resources.

By the end of the year we will have a new Plan for the Development of the Armed Forces, based on the achievements of the Force Structure Review and summarized in the White Paper. At the start of next year we will adopt a long-term investment plan, going up to the year 2020, the implementation of which will start in 2013. Additionally, as of 2011 we plan to have a Law on the Reserve of the Armed Forces, which will regulate the entity according to the best examples of other NATO and EU countries. In 2011 we plan to have also laws on the Military Police and the Military Intelligence.

This Force Structure Review has initiated comprehensive reforms, which are aimed at replacing quantity with quality. The Armed Forces will be fewer in numbers but better trained, equipped and motivated, which will make them more usable for expeditionary operations and ready to take more demanding tasks together with the Armed Forces of our NATO allies and the other EU member states. This reform goes far beyond reducing the number of personnel. It will change the way our defense system operates. Hence, we can speak about a genuine transformation of our defense.
The reform efforts could also be considered as the epitome of our resolve to build a national defense system that is run according to the best NATO defense management practice. Efficiency, effectiveness and accountability are amongst the basic principles we hold.

Having said all this, there comes to my mind a question that probably some of you, given your own experience, would ask. Is this Force Structure Review the final one, which will resolve all our pending issues concerning defense? By the way, the same could be asked about our National Security Strategy. The answer is both “yes” and “no”. The answer is positive, if we speak of the job which ought to have been done several years ago and which was postponed until now. In this sense, this Review lays solid foundations for the development of our defense as an integral part of the NATO collective defense mechanism and the developing Common Security and Defense Policy of the EU. On the other hand, the reply to this question will be negative given the constantly evolving risks and threats and the need of constant adaptation to the less predictable but ever changing security environment. That is why we stand ready to periodically reassess the adequate defense capabilities to develop, while taking into account our NATO and EU commitments and the parameters of the strategic environment.

Finally, the Force Structure Review process is conducted with the special methodological support of experts from the Center for Civil-Military Relations, Monterey, USA, to whom I would like to thank once again for the dedication and resolve with which they carry out their tasks.

Now, let me mention a few figures from our plans on the development of the Armed Forces. Given our NATO and EU membership and the sound assessment of the security environment, we assess that a massive territorial aggression on our country is extremely unlikely in the foreseeable future. We therefore estimate that a balance between tasks and missions of the Armed Forces on the one hand, and available resources on the other, can be achieved with a total Armed Forces personnel of up to 26,000 troops. In order to attain the national level of ambition, the Land Forces should have two mechanized brigades, 4,200 troops each, as well as Special Forces and combat and logistic support elements. The Navy will decommission its only submarine as well as some out of date vessels. The Air Force will focus on a more compact ground-based air defense and will decommission some decades-old ground-based air defense missile systems. We are working to set up conditions for the gradual replacement, starting from 2014-2015, of the MIG-29 jets with multi-role fighters, interoperable with the other NATO countries’ aircraft.

Our intention is, by mid-2011, to reduce and restructure the administration of the Ministry of Defense and the operational level commands, followed by the tactical level transformation in the second half of the year. The main restructuring activity should be completed by the end of 2012. With the intention of the Ministry of Defense achieving the abovementioned plans in time, we need the right allocation of resources in the three main cost items – personnel, maintenance & supply and defense investment – in the proportion of 60%-25%-15%. Given that ambition, the national Parliament will have to approve at least 1.5% of the GDP for defense.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The new National Security Strategy will define the parameters of our new National Defense Strategy and will guide the Bulgarian defense policy in the long term. The Force Structure Review serves the aforementioned strategic documents by ensuring that we have the best defense as means, at the disposal of our foreign and security policy, as part of NATO and the EU. Our Armed Forces will still be a key element in the wide range of tools we have at our disposal to promote peace, stability and regional cooperation both in South East Europe and the Black Sea.

That is why the countries from the wider Black Sea area should look further ahead to new areas, ways and forms of regional cooperation in the name of our common future – unquestionably the future of each of us respectively. We should consider the Armed Forces as an exceptionally trust- and cooperation-building instrument available to us. And, finally, I think that the valuable experience gained up till now in South Eastern Europe could prove to be just as useful and applicable in the Black Sea region.
Good afternoon to everybody! My name is Stefan Ralchev and I am a Research Associate at the Institute for Regional and International Studies, IRIS, in Sofia, a think tank. Thanks to our hosts for organising this important event and for turning the attention again on the Black Sea area. I will briefly try to present to you the role of non-governmental organisations, or more generally – civil society – in upholding security and democracy in our region. I will focus above all on the security aspects in the Black Sea region and the contribution of civic organisations in addressing them; I will not be able to talk much about the Commission on the Black Sea, as I personally have not participated in its work. My colleague at the Institute for Regional and International Studies, Dr. Ognyan Minchev, has participated in the Commission’s sessions and has contributed with advice and expertise for its latest report, “A 2020 Vision for the Black Sea Region,” issued in May of this year. And I am sure Mr. Sergei Konoplyov here, who is also a member of the Commission, is the best source on the achievements and aims of its work. I will also like to apologise for having to leave early, right after the presentation, but I will be happy to answer any questions you might have over the email; I have left my address with Mr. Sotirov.

Going back to security and civil society engagement in the Black Sea, the non-governmental sector in the region has been involved in almost the entire spectrum of security issues, from peace-building to environmental security. Even in military security, which is traditionally the realm exclusively of the state, given the weakness of the institutions in post-Soviet countries – NGOs have played an important role as mediators and facilitators. In the beginning of the 1990s, NGOs in Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine and Moldova played a serious part in expanding NATO’s cooperation and membership programme in the region. The Atlantic Club of Bulgaria, our hosts, is an example of such an organisation. Think tanks participated actively in the preparation of the national security strategies of the Black Sea countries. The Institute I represent, IRIS, published a book in 2002 called Bulgaria for NATO 2002 and dealing with advocacy instruments for Bulgarian NATO membership. Also, civil society organisations in the region contributed to reforming the military establishment by promoting an innovative approach, providing expertise, influencing public opinion on the advantages of Euro-Atlantic inclusion – campaigning for Partnership for Peace participation and subsequently for full-scale NATO membership. Regrettfully, those campaigns are turning out to be not very successful so far in Georgia and Ukraine for reasons beyond the control of local NGOs. All in all, the concept of a national security based on democratic values in the Black Sea countries was first endorsed and promoted by the civil society, and state institutions attuned and embraced it only after that.

NGOS AND INTER-COMMUNITY CONFLICTS IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE

In Bulgaria, NGOs like IRIS, the Centre for Liberal Strategies and the Atlantic Club were able to gain significant know-how in participating in crisis mediation in the former Yugoslavia. An entire think tank network was created in Skopje in 1999 devoted to security and policy issues in the region – the South-East Europe Policy Institute Network (SEEPIN). This valuable experience in mediation and in analysing concrete processes was successfully transferred to the post-Soviet space in the early 2000s, and common projects were launched with civil society organisations from Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, etc. For example, IRIS takes part in a Black Sea NGO network on conflict management, coordinated by the Georgia-based South Caucasus Institute for Regional Security (SCIRS). NGOs in Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine and Moldova have been particularly active in the elaboration of policy platforms for negotiations between conflicting communities. Georgian NGOs have been especially active, until 2008, in mediating between Georgian and South Ossetian and Abkhazian leaders, experts and media. Similar forums were organised by civil society organisations along the Armenia-Turkey line (for example, by the Yerevan-based Analytical Centre on Globalisation and Regional Cooperation) and the Armenia-Azerbaijan line. NGOs from Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine played an important role in supporting the international diplomatic efforts at forums and meetings on the solution of the Transnistria conflict. In Crimea, given the weakness of official institutions and the tension between Russians and Tatars, Ukrainian NGOs created very effective structures for mediation and relieving of tension. Generally, international NGO networks have had significant contribution for conflict mediation, in the Black Sea region and Europe-wide. Examples of such networks are the Black Sea NGO Network (BSNN) and the Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly (HCA), whose committees in the South Caucasus countries and Turkey have been very active, creating common domains of shared understanding.

**NGOS AND ENVIRONMENTAL AND MARITIME SECURITY**

Environment protection is a key security issue for the Black Sea region, given the sea’s unfavourable climate conditions and the high quantities of oil being shipped from Novorosisk to the Bosporous, the planned oil pipeline construction and the pollution from the large river basins of the Danube and the Dnieper. There are several networks in the Black Sea region of NGOs and municipal authorities devoted to environmental protection and related issues. Some examples are the Black Sea Centre for Environmental Information and Education (BSCEIE) and the BSEA Network, as well as specific environmental activities under the already mentioned Black Sea NGO Network. A very good instance for a successful NGO cooperation which has grown into an inter-institutional cooperation among governments is the common action among Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in monitoring of the Kura-Araks river basin spreading across all three countries’ territories. NGOs have also actively participated with their advice in the elaboration of maritime strategies in the Black Sea – problems of search and rescue operations, safety networks for commercial and naval shipping.

**NGOS AND THE FIGHT WITH ORGANISED CRIME AND CORRUPTION**

Organised crime, corruption, trafficking in human beings and drugs pose a serious security threat to the Black Sea region, as it is situated on the crossroads between Asia and Europe and between the Mediterranean and the North of Europe. There are NGO networks in the region dealing with comparative policy research, policy strategic planning in the spheres of fighting corruption, strengthening institutions, strengthening state capacities in confronting organised crime, poverty reduction, etc. NGOs cannot boast huge success in this respect, given the powerful criminal networks and the relative weakness of the institutions in the region, yet the NGO’s work makes a difference. I can give an example with a current project of our Institute, called the Black Sea Young Reformers Fellowship (BSYRF). The project coordinates regional elites devoted to institutional transformation and the fight against organised crime and corruption. It creates a forum for young and prospective leaders from all Black Sea countries – politicians, civil servants and civil society activists – to exchange ideas and subsequently channel them to the European Union institutions. We had a conference in Varna in April where key problems in security and institutional development in the Black Sea countries were analysed, and at a conference in Berlin in November the participants will be able to present them to important representatives of the EU and the member states. Thus on the one hand the EU people will be able to share their advice and experience in institutional development and fighting corruption with the regional elites, and on the other hand the Black Sea people will be able to influence future EU policies towards the region.

**NGOS AND DEMOCRATISATION**

It is inevitable that we mention democratisation, as this is one of the most important activities of Black Sea civil society organisations, and more democracy means more security, at least in our part of the world. NGOs from all Black Sea countries have been particularly active in supporting the democratisation movements in the post-Soviet societies after the Rose and Orange revolutions. They underpinned the formation of major international networks for democracy support and promotion such as the Commonwealth of Democratic Choice (CDC) and the Black Sea Forum.
The Black Sea Fleet of Russia and the Naval Forces of Ukraine: reasons, state, tendencies

In the article there is an analysis of quality and quantity changes in the combat structures of the Black Sea Fleet of Russian Federation and the Naval Forces of Ukraine from the Soviet Union fall till nowadays. The author disperses the myths about the reasons, which have brought to the existing state of both navies, evaluates the objective circumstances, which have made influence on the development of both navies for two latter decades, and makes unprejudiced prognoses of the navies’ development in the nearest future.

Is it the truth, that the reiterated reduction of the combat potential of the Russian Black Sea Fleet is the aftermath of the division the fleet between Ukraine and Russia? Who is responsible for the unenviable situation the navies of both countries are in at the beginning of the second decade of the XXI century?

Is there a real way out from the existing situation? The answers to these questions require a contextual and historical analysis of the events surrounding the fleet for the past 30-35 years.

In this article we consciously limit ourselves to current state examination, the reasons which have caused it and the prospects of ships’ alignments of both navies (escaping the coastal forces, aviation and etc. analysis) as the main means of the navy to fulfill its designated tasks.

FROM THE VERY BEGINNING

To answer the raised questions it is necessary to go back to the moment of the Soviet Union breakdown. Conditionally, it would be right to consider December 25, 1991, as the “the point of reading”. It was the day M. Gorbachov made a speech on TV with the declaration that he stepped down from his powers as President of the USSR.

However, to understand in a full volume the tendencies which dominated the fleet at the moment of the USSR breakdown, it is necessary to come back to the mid-eighties – the epoch of the “Gorshkov’s – fleet” flourishing (such is the name,
The Center for assistance to the geopolitical problems and Euro-Atlantic cooperation of the Black Sea region studies is a Ukrainian non-governmental public policy think tank. The main aim of Nomos is the assistance to the geopolitical problems in the Black Sea region, analysis, recommendations and prognoses preparation in the sphere of home and foreign policy of Ukraine and international relations as a whole, information spreading about the european and euroatlantic integration processes.

The Nomos Center works on:
- independent strategic analysis and events evaluation, which concern all the main aspects of the national and international security;
- information on european and euroatlantic integration problems;
- promotion for GOs and NGOs, international institutions, political parties on organization and conduct international, educational and other programs;
- drawing up recommendations to remove existing and potential threats to national interests and priorities of Ukraine;
- international economic and political development experience summing, new approaches to innovative development in Ukraine, scientific public attraction to conduct researches on actual problems of geopolitics, chosen technologies, and actual articles publication in native and foreign sources;
- taking part in sociological researches and public opinion-polls;
- taking part in the projects on civil control of the security sector of state.

Nomos Center publishes all-Ukrainian journal The Black Sea Security in which informational and analytical articles, dedicated to various aspects of regional and international security have been published. With the main of them you may acquaint on site http://nomos.com.ua/

and missile ships, 66 antishipping ones, 38 mine sweepers, 19 landing ships, and also 78 combat boats.

On its strength the Black Sea Fleet outnumbered the Turkish Naval Forces in 1.5 times, on combat capacities in 2.5 times.

But, by the end of December 1991, the USSR Black Sea Fleet had only 28 submarines, 3 antisubmarine cruisers, 6 missile cruisers and large antisubmarine ships and escort ships (2nd rank), 40 small antisubmarine and escort ships, 30 small missile ships and boats, 70 mine sweepers, 50 landing ships and boats [4]. The total: 246 units.

The tendency had designated, especially on submarine forces. But “the flee forces were yet ready to fulfill its peculiar tasks in its operational zone”.

The next “registration point” is the workshop of experts from the Russian Federation and Ukraine on the division of the Black Sea Fleet, November 1996. By this date the pennant list of the Black Sea Fleet of the former USSR had become “the initial” for the subsequent division of combat ships and vessels between Russia and Ukraine. By that moment in the Black Sea Fleet there were 4 submarines, 6 cruisers and large antisubmarine ships (1st rank), 10 artillery and missile antisubmarine ships (2nd rank), 15 small antisubmarine ships, 16 small missile ships and boats, 18 minesweepers/mine hunters, 22 landing ships and also 12 artillery boats.

The total – 103 units [5]. During five years the fleet had lost 58% of its combat component, the personnel were reduced more than three times! And all this had happened without the notorious “division of the fleet”.

What had happened with the Black Sea Fleet in the period from 1992 till 1996? Wars, tsunamis, epidemics? Of course not. There were just the same processes in the Black Sea Fleet as in the USSR Navy, as a whole, but that time it was proudly called “The Russian Federation Navy”. Remember, just this period was “remade on needles” the pride of the Soviet Navy – heavy aircraft carrying cruisers Project 1143 (Girfalcon class CVGM).

CVGM Kiev of the Northern Fleet was deleted from the pennant list of the fleet on July 30, 1993. Then, at the beginning of 1994 she was sold to the Chinese.

CVGM Minsk (The Pacific Ocean Fleet) was deleted to the reserve and then sold to the Chinese. CVGM Baku, known today as the Admiral Gorshkov had been under repair from February 3, 1992. The repair was not completed and from January 2004 she had been modernized for Indian Navy. The only “Soviet aircraft carrier”
which did not share her predecessors fate, was deleted October 21, 1989. It was the CVGM Tbilisi currently named Admiral Kuznetsov.

It is interesting, that by the moment of the Soviet Union breakdown, CVGM Tbilisi – not fully completed – was on the Black Sea. According to the decision of the Soviet Navy command, on December 1, 1991 she was urgently and secretly withdrawn from Sevastopol and underwent the transfer to the Northern Fleet. On the contrary, the fate of the Black Sea helicopter cruisers turned out in another way – antisubmarine cruisers Project 1123 (Kondor class) Moskva and Leningrad. The latter was deleted in June 24, 1991, and in December 5, 1992 she was stroked off the fleet pennant list. Moskva did not live longer than her “sister-ship”. In April 27, 1994 she was deleted and in November 7, 1996 she was sent for the scrap metal.

No less tragic changes had happened that time with “the missile and nuclear shield of the country”. In 1992, the portion of ballistic missiles on submarines in the structure of nuclear weapons carriers of the strategic forces of Russia constituted 44.7% – 58 SSBN Project 667 of all modifications and “The Typhoons” Project 941. They carried 2792 nuclear warheads (37.1% from the total Russian quantity). By the middle of 1998, the number of warheads reduced to 1854, the number of strategic missile submarines to 26 units, and their portion in the carriers structure – approximately to 30% [6].

A heavy situation had happened that time with the fleet infrastructure, as well. Many of the most important and powerful services of the Navy were destroyed. The latter circumstances stipulated the main problem of the Russian Navy in the 90’s – a chronic absence of forces and means for the ships and vessels repairs. As a result, between August 3, 1992 and November 4, 1996 263 ships and other units were deleted and cut from the Black Sea Fleet[7].

The first reason of all these manifestations had become the Russian economic chaos at the beginning and the middle of the 90’s and full absence of real attention of the government of the country to the Navy problems. Officially, it was called “the period of reduction and forces optimization” [8].

The Black Sea Fleet was the only Soviet fleet using the Soviet Union Navy flag. And, this fleet was interesting to the Russian leaders only as the element of political haggling with Ukraine, the goal of which was Sevastopol.

“SOVIET HERITAGE” DIVISION

We won’t stop on all the events of Russo-Ukrainian talks that are connected with the division of the Black Sea Fleet. The questions have been elucidated in detail and it is not a goal of our analysis. We will stop on the fact, that on May 28, 1997 the process of “the former USSR Black Sea Fleet fate definition” was formally completed. The Chairman of the RF Government, V. Chernomyrdin, and the Prime Minister of Ukraine, P. Lazarenko, signed the documents of agreements between governments on the Black Sea Fleet and the Agreement on the parameters of the fleet division.

According to the agreements reached at the time of negotiations, formally the division of the fleet had been done in the proportion 50:50. In fact, Russia received a half of the ships plus about 24% in order of offsetting on clearing off the debts of Ukraine to Russia on state credits. Thus, the factual ratio of the Black Sea Fleet ships division between Russia and Ukraine was 74:26. At the same time, in the Russian Federation’s Black Sea Fleet there were 388 combat ships and boats, auxiliaries and other vessels, and only 137 units were allotted to transfer to Ukraine [10].

After the division, the combat core of the Black Sea Fleet consisted of 3 submarines, 6 cruisers and large antisubmarine ships (1st rank), 7 missile and artillery and antisubmarine ships (2nd rank), 11 small antisubmarine ships, 9 small missile ships and boats and 8 artillery boats [11]. The total – 76 units or 31% from the combat component of 1991. Thus, after the Black Sea Fleet division the combat ships correlation between the Black Sea Fleet and Turkish Naval had changed in favor of Turkey. Contrary to the generally accepted opinion it had happened not only owing to the transfer of the part of the Black Sea Fleet ships under the jurisdiction of Ukraine, but because of the unconsidered reduction of ships and personnel of the fleet in 1991-1996 and quality and quantity growth of the concerning the young Ukrainian Navy, it received after the division of the USSR Black Sea Fleet – one submarine (B-435), three frigates (Krivak class FFM Bezzavetny, Bezukorizneny, Razitelny), six landing ships Olshansky, Azarov, SDK-137 and three hovercraft (air-cushion ships) Project 1232.2), four small antisubmarine ships (MPK-52, MPK-43, MPK-93, MPK-116, five minesweepers (MSOM Zenitchik, Pazvedchik, BT-26, BT-79, RT-214), 7 missile and 4 artillery boats. The total – 30 ships and boats [12].
It is necessary to mention, that the Naval Forces of Ukraine, which had begun their formation in 1992, received several ships, which were built on Ukrainian shipyards: frigate Hetman Sagaidachny Project 1135P, command and control ship Slavutich (AGFM Bambuk class), corvette Lusk Grisha class, air-cushion landing ship Donetsk Zubr type. Also, in January 1996, maritime border guards of the State border service transferred to the Naval Forces of Ukraine PC Project 1124P Dnepr and Izmail, which were commissioned as corvettes Vinnitsa and Chernigiv.

Thus, in 1997 the Naval Forces of Ukraine had one submarine, 4 frigates, 7 corvettes, 5 minesweepers, 6 landing ships and boats, 7 missile and 4 artillery boats. The total – 34 units of the main classes.

The manner in which the military and political leadership of both countries could keep and increase the Soviet heritage is examined below.

INDEPENDENT STATES’ NAVIES

The Russian Federation Black Sea Fleet. Nowadays, this fleet consists of two submarines, one missile cruiser, two large antisubmarine ships, three escort ships, seven small antisubmarine ships, 10 minesweepers, nine missile ships and boats, seven large landing ships and one hundred and a half of auxiliaries. This is a little bit more than 50% from that part of the USSR Black Sea Fleet, which belongs to the Russian Black Sea Fleet after the division (for more accurate estimation it is necessary to take into consideration that the part of small...
ships and boats was transferred to the Caspian flotilla then but some auxiliaries were transferred to other fleets. This means the real number of those ships which were left-approximately 2/3 (two thirds) from the number of ships in 1998-99. 

From the beginning of 2000, under the conditions of permanent deficit of financing Russian Navy Command headed for technical readiness maintenance of the existing ships. It turned out well to put missile cruiser Moskva (former Slava, Atlant class) into commission. It was upgraded the advanced in years DDGM Smetlivy, the former large antisubmarine ship, Project 61M. After the long-term repairs, not less advanced in years the large antisubmarine ship Kerch (Kara class CGHM) was re-commissioned, it was taken out from the temporary inactivity the large landing ship Novocherkassk (ex-BDK-46, LSTM Ropucha class). The main losses are – the ships of ocean-class missile cruiser Admiral Golovko, the large antisubmarine ship Azov, FFMs Krasny Kavkaz, Skory, Sderjany, submarine B-9. Such ships as the CGHM Ochakov, which is always in permanent repairs and modernization. The the only submarines in the Russian Navy B-380 Project 641B are ready to be scrapped at any time. Besides, during the previous ten years some small missile ships and boats, small antisubmarine ships and minesweepers have been scrapped.

However, the main problem, which appears under such an approach, is the ships aging. If in 2000 the terms of exploitation of the great majority of the ships were 20-25 years, today they are 30-35 years, and some of the ships – 40-45 (!) years. The Navy urgently needs renovation of the combat component and the leaders of the state understand it, at least, in their words [13].

What is the matter? The Russian officials like to refer to that fact that the renovation of the Black Sea Fleet has been blocking by Kiev. Really, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine occupied (and occupies) the position, according to which the renovation of the ships component of the Black Sea Fleet, which is stationed in Sevastopol, should be conducted in concordance with the Ukrainian side and by the principle “type on type, class on class”, arguing it by the provisions of the Agreement on the status and conditions of the Russian Black Sea Fleet stationing on the territory of Ukraine. And it irritates the Russian leaders.

Diagram 1
Quantity changes of the combat component of the USSR and the Russian Black Sea Fleet

For comparison in the right upper corner there is a diagram “Ships component of the Russian Navy changes dynamics” according to V. Zaborsky
In fact, the requests of Kiev are not so cruel. First of all, the Black Sea Fleet has the Novorossiysk naval base on which “the wishes” of Ukraine are not disseminated. Secondly, there is always a possibility to come to an agreement. For instance, in 2002, the missile ship (air-cushion) Samum was re-based from the Baltic to the Black Sea and formed a part of the 41-st brigade of missile boats, located in Sevastopol. Samum — is a missile ship (PGGJM Dergach class). Re-basing the ship to Sevastopol was submitted with the Ukrainian side on the level of the Sub-commission on the issues of the Russian Black Sea Fleet functioning and its stationing on the territory of Ukraine of the mixed Russo-Ukrainian commission. But there are some nuances: The Ukrainian side permitted the re-basing of the ship, and Russians from their side “agreed to discuss” the question of transferring to Ukraine one of the “disputable objects” — the Sevastopol-based sailors’ club. As a result, the ship arrived to Sevastopol, but the Sailors’ club remains under the authority of Russia.

Another example — the reinforcement of the Black Sea Fleet aviation with the Su-24 Fencer bombers. In 2000 in the 43rd separate maritime attack air squadron (Gvardeiskoe, the Crimea) there were the out of date ground attack aircraft — Su-17M3 Fitter and then they were substituted for Su-24M. Within Russian military data the question of aircraft substitution had been resolving for two and a half years. And, directly 22 new Su-24M were waiting for flight from Anapa to the Crimea for almost half a year.

The Black Sea Fleet Staff representatives in their declarations for mass-media repeatedly accused official Kiev in this question solving delay (the Ukrainian side insisted on the necessity of initial inspection of the aircraft on their possibility to carry nuclear weapon and the appropriate equipment dismantling). The final agreement on the re-basing the aircraft was attained on New Year’s eve in telephone talks between Leonid Kuchma and Vladimir Putin [15]. Together with the front bombers Su-24M (Fencer-D), the reconnaissance aircraft Su-24MR (Fencer-E) was received by the squadron. The argumentation of Russians was interesting. In 2000 they asserted that Su-24 and Su-24MR were “the aircraft of the same type”. Some years later the Russian airmen refused to admit the Ukrainian verification commission to these aircraft, explaining their actions, that “Su-24MR is entirely another type of aircraft”. The use of such logic impedes trust in the partner in such a situation.

We make bold to declare that “laying obstacles from Ukrainian side” it is not the only and not the principal reason of the new ships absence in the Black Sea Fleet (except the above-mentioned missile ship air-cushion Samum, the fleet has received in 2000-2010 only maritime minesweepers Valentyn Pikul Natya class, which were built for Indian Navy — in 2002 VADM Zahar’in Project 02668 (the modernized Natja) — in 2008, which had been built for ten and fourteen years (!) correspondingly and also the amphibious landing boat Serna class (DKA-144 Project 11770 in 2008). The principal reason for the absence of new ships in the Black Sea Fleet is not found in the Ukraine-Russian relations. Their character is particularly Russian, which is typical for all the Russian fleets. The most detailed analysis of them, has made a wellknown Russian naval expert, in the past the Head of Section of the Operational Department of the Russian Navy Main Staff, Captain Vladimir Vasilievich Zaborsky. On his opinion, one of the most important Russian Navy problems is the Navy, during all the period of “reforming”, practically has not been built, because of the proper financing lack in the frameworks of state order. Another important reason — common degradation, military — industrial complex possibilities decrease and the break-down of some its branches [16].

The facts speak for themselves. From 2000 till 2010 the combat component of the Russian Navy was reinforced with one nuclear (SSN K-335 Gepard Project 97 – 2001) and one diesel-electric submarines (SSK B-585 Sankt-Peterburg Project 677 – 2010), the large antisubmarine ship (DDGHM Admiral Chabanenko Udaloy class – 2000), missile and artillery 2nd rank ships (FFHM Jaroslav Mudry Jastreb class – 2009) and (FFGM Tatarstan Gepard class – 2003), two escort ships of near maritime zone – FFGHM Project 20380 Steregushchyi – 2007 and Soobrazitelny – launched in 2010), small-size gunnery ship (Bujan class corvette Astrakhan – 2006), two minesweepers (mentioned above maritime minesweeper Valentine Pikul Project 266ME – 2002 and VADM Zahar’in Project 02668 – 2008), three missile boats – FSGM Tarantul III class (R-2(870), R-5(992) – 2000, R-29(992) – 2003). All these ships for ten years for four fleets plus flotilla! And that time the Russian defense industrial complex diligently strengthened the fraternal Navies of PRC and India — for the last decade they have received two times more ships and submarines than the native Navy.
What are the prospects of the Russian Navy as a whole and the Black Sea Fleet in particular? What are these on the ways of native shipyards and could it reinforce the fleets in the nearest decade? Without touching the subject of purchasing the French landing ship-dock “Mistral” class, building SSBNs and SSN/SSGN (they will not serve in the Black Sea) we will stop on more realistic projects.

Of the surface combat ships there are two perspective elaborations, which personify the new appearance of the Russian Navy. We speak about the escort ships Projects 22350 and 20380. The first ship is the newest and the most expected ship, but the information about it is extremely discrepant.

According to the Russian political and military leadership declarations the Navy needs 20-30 ships of such a class. Frigates Project 22350 must reinforce all four fleets of Russia and become the basic surface ships of ocean zone of Russian Navy in 21st century.

However, only two ships were laid down on “Severnaya verf” the only frigates supplier of such a type. They are Admiral Gorshkov and Admiral Kasatonov (2009). The commission of the Admiral was planned for 2009, then for 2011... The escort ship of another project – 20380 Steregushchiy is allotted now to the Baltic Fleet, and according to the comments, it has presented itself not in a bad light. Nowadays, it is developed a production chain of such a type of ships – on the ways there are Soobrazitely (laied down in 2003, she was planned to be commissioned in 2010, but it will take place very likely at the beginning of 2011 – the mooring trials were stopped in August of the current year), in 2006 three more hulls were laid down Bojky, Soversheniy, Stojky with the terms of commission 2012-2015. We have no exact data about the fate of the third ship Jastreb class (Project 11540) Tuman laid down in 1993. The ship in the degree of readiness 30-50% is moored to the birth of Yantar plant in Kaliningrad. The works on it were stopped in 1996. Occasionally, there was information in mass-media about giving the ship a new name “300 let Rossiskomu flotu” (300 years of the Russian Navy) and that this ship must be completed for export by project 11541. Most probably, it would be completed for the Russian Navy, but when it would be – is not clear.

The fate of frigate Novik Project 12441 (laid down in 1997 and it was planned to have a series of 14 ships with the terms of commission in 2002-2004) is turning out much worse. The works on the project were stopped in 2005, the process of building was also stopped. There is information about the plans of its further completion as training ship and giving it a new name Borodino.

We will not stop on the prospects of escort ships building Tatarstan class and small gunnery ships Astrakhan class – there are the specific project ships and they are intended especially for Caspian flotilla.

Of the large landing ships, which have been building, there is only Ivan Gren Project 11771 (was laid down in 2004, and was planned to be commissioned in 2012 which is hardly probable) is on the ways of Yantar plant there is only the bow section of the ship. It has been building some small landing ships types 21280 and 11770. There is no exact information about the new MCM ships building for Russian Navy. The data about the laying down in 2002 and 2004 of two base minesweepers type 12700 on Sredne-Nevsky shipbuilding plant has not received official confirmation yet.

Submarines. There are two diesel-electric submarine Lada class (Project 677) Kronstadt (laid down in 2005, is planned to be commissioned in 2013) and Sevastopol (laid down in 2006 and is planned to be commissioned in 2015) which are in the process of building, and the leading submarine of this type – Sankt-Peterburg the fourth year is in the experimental exploitation, which has exposed a lot of problems and not do the full amount of work by the constructors.

So, let us spread it on four fleets. You see, that the picture is not very optimistic. We have only to join the Moscow Defence Brief journal editor in chief Mikhail Barabanov’s estimation that “the nearest 10-15 years Russia will have no serious perspectives in renewing the surface fleet. Though, lately they have laid down some ships of new types, but the real volume of financing makes able this programs to be of long duration. The total of ships, which were planned to be built according to the State program of armament even if it would be successfully and fully realized, will not allow to reckon on equivalent substitution of the ships’ component which has been deleted and new types of ships homogeneous task forces formation. Most probably, some separate fleets will be reinforced with some separate ships [17].

Thus, the victorious declaration of the RF Ministry of Defense representatives that by 2020 the Russian Black Sea Fleet will be reinforced by 15 new frigates Project 22350 and diesel submarines Project 667 “in correlation 60:30” [18] is probably more their desire than reality. According to the realistic prognoses, under the favorable concurrence of circumstances the Black
Sea Fleet may be reinforced for the mentioned period only by three-four ships (frigate-corvette classes) and one-two new submarines, and it will not guarantee the full value substitution of the existing core of the fleet, which is unrestrainedly growing old.

**THE NAVAL FORCES OF THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE**

As it was mentioned above, after the division of the USSR Black Sea Fleet, the Naval Forces of Ukraine have 137 combat ships, boats and auxiliaries. In 1997 the Naval Forces of Ukraine had submarine Zaporizya, four frigates – Hetman Sagaidachny, Sevastopol, Dnipropetrovsk, Mikolaiv, seven corvettes (Lutsk, Vinnitsa, Chernigiv, Khmelnytsky, Uzgorod, Sumi, Kherson), two missile corvettes – Pridniprova and Kremenchuk, two large (Konstantin Olshansky and Rivne) and middle (Kirovograd) amphibious landing ships, 5 missile, 4 artillery and 3 landing boats.

It is necessary to mention, that the majority of the ships and boats of the former USSR Black Sea Fleet, which had become “the lion’s share” of the Naval Forces of Ukraine, was not in a good technical condition. It was stipulated, first of all, that according to the provisions of their transfer to Ukraine, signed in 1994, “the ships and coastal infrastructure objects transfer is carried out on their tactical state on the day of transferring”. In consequence of some objective and subjective reasons this “factual state” was highly deplorable. Just that very circumstance was used by many officials to crib on it all misfortunes and problems of the Ukrainian Navy. The veritable reasons were not only in it, but the young state of Ukraine. Leadership, having inherited an enormous by European measures army, had taken up to it, to put it mildly, consumers’ position.

The scanty financing has stipulated the main problem of the Naval Forces of Ukraine – the chronical absence of forces and means to conduct ships and vessels repairs. In particular, mid-life ship’s repairs must have been conducted every 7-8 years – in this case the term of ship’s exploitation is 25-30 years, under the absence of mid-life repairs the term of exploitation is reducing to 10-15 years. But many ships, received by Kiev in the process of division the fleet were in need of not only the mid-life, but a complete overhaul. Half measures in this issue – money at random! For example – the fate of frigates Sevastopol, Mikolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk, which under the favorable circumstances were capable to make up the principal strike force of the Naval Forces. Mikolaiv (former escort ship Bezukorizenny), after the dock repairs, completed in 1998, the price of which was about 345.000 hrivna, was sold on scrap metal. Just the same fate has overtaken Dnipropetrovsk (former Bezzavetnyi) – in December 2003 the ship was transferred to the category “technical equipment” and sent to the enterprise Ukzaliznytsya for realization and Sevastopol (former Razitelny) was deleted in November 30, 2004 by Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine instruction and in 2005 she was sold to Turkey to be used as a shooting-mark for training gunnerys.

It is necessary to tender admiral Michailo Yezhel, Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces of Ukraine in 1996-2003 his due, when he under the conditions of practical absence of budget financing tried to restore the ships’ component, at least for the patronage assistance of the regions of Ukraine. And sometimes it turned out well. One of the examples – the patronage assistance from Zaporizya region and Ukraliznytsya in repairs the only submarine in the Ukrainian Navy Zaporizya (former B-435). At the same time, the manner in which the state and the Leadership of the National defense department have been in charge over the ships and vessels of the Naval Forces of Ukraine, sometimes arose surprise. The tanker Makiivka (former Boris Chilikin) was sent to foreign company for 2.754 mln. hrn which is on experts estimation on 18 mln. hrn less, than real market value. Almost 7 mln. hrn below market value, only for 2.7 mln. hrn was sent to foreigners tanker Kurch (former APT Sventa). [19]

For the past seven years the number of the Ukrainian Navy ships and vessels has reduced almost two times. In 2005 the sensational property of massmedia had become the report of the Deputy Commander of the Naval Forces of Ukraine (logistic services) Technical state of ships and vessels in the Naval Forces of Ukraine on 05.05.2005. According to the document in 2005 there were 28 warships, boats and auxiliaries, including frigate Hetman Sagaidachny, submarine Zaporizya, six corvettes (FFLM Grisha class and FSGM Tarantul II class), three amphibious landing ships Konstantin Olshansky, Kirovograd and Donetsk), four minesweepers, two missile boats Matka class Priluki and Kahovka), three artillery, two landing boats and one anti-diversion boat. From this number of ships and vessels 27 units were, badly in need of immediate repairs or were under repairs. According to the Naval Forces of Ukraine Command it was necessary for repairs not less than 9 mln. hrn [20].
But the Navy has not received money in the necessary volume, they continued to cut it. Under the plausible excuse of the forces optimization and expenditures reduce (a familiar song, isn't it?). In December 2005 by the Decree of the President of Ukraine №1862-25р / 2005 The State Program of the Armed Forces of Ukraine 2006-2011 was activated. By the Program “24 ships and boats, the further maintenance of which was not expedient and to put into commission 12 new ships and boats and modernize five ones”. Even that time the experts of Nomos warned about the unreality of declared plans on renewing the ships’ component of the Ukrainian Navy [21]. And to our regret, we were right. Nowadays there is one frigate – flagship “Hetman Sagaidachny in the Naval Forces of Ukraine. There are four corvettes – Lutsk, Ternopil, Vinnitsa and Khmelnitsky. From four missile corvettes and boats there are only three in formation – Pridniprova, Priluki and Kahovka; Kremenchuk is waiting for complete overhaul, and is deactivated now. From landing ships only Olshansky and Kirovograd have left. MCM ships there are five (MSO Chernigiv and Cherkasy, MHSC Melitopol; MHC Genichesk and MHSC Mariupol are deactivated). Gunner boats – Skadovsk Grif type and two “small children” AK-01 and AK-02, anti-diversion boat Gola pristan. Submarine forces – the ‘legendary’ submarine Zaporizya is like a trunk without a handle, it is heavy to carry it and grudge to throw it out. Special and auxiliary ships, vessels and maintenance boats there are 55 units and only 39 from them are capable to fulfill their tasks and all of them are in need of repairs. All of them!

The current state of the Naval Forces of Ukraine – is not the fault of Ukrainian seamen, but it is their misfortune. Speaking about the complicated situation with the Ukrainian Navy, the author does not accuse in it the Naval Forces of Ukraine Command, commanders of the task groups and commanding officers of the ships and does not advice to do it somebody. It is, first of all, makes no honor for such kind of ‘experts”; as a rule, they have little knowledge of the Navy at the best, and in the worst they are the dense dilettantes in naval questions. Secondly, it is the outrage for the Navy officers of all the ranks and service positions, nobody of them may be envied – all of them are the hostages of circumstances turned out and misfortunes of our time. On the contrary, it is necessary to thank the Naval Forces of Ukraine Command and all the personnel of the Ukrainian Navy for they have been keeping the Naval Forces of Ukraine as an Armed Forces of Ukraine branch in such quantity and state, which is ready to defend our country from the sea directions.

What is waiting for the Naval Forces of Ukraine in the nearest future? According to many expert opinions, the Naval Forces of Ukraine may be reinforced with two small antisubmarine ships (hydrofoil) – corvettes Lviv and Lugansk Project 11451 (shipyard numbers 503 and 504).

These both ships are in various stages of readiness on the ways of Feodosia shipbuilding company Morye (the terms of passing the corvette Lviv to the Naval Forces of Ukraine have been repeated by postponed on 2003, 2005 and another years). Despite the fact, that the financing the works on the ship was factually stopped, the hope that these plans would be realized gave the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine instruction from July 9, 2009, according to which it was charged to the Fund of State Property of Ukraine and the Ministry of Industrial Policy to control further use of these ships as objects of incomplete production. Another perspective ship for the Naval Forces of Ukraine – is a AGF/AR PM-16 Project 2020 which has been completing on Nikolayev shipyard named after 61 communards. The hull of the vessel has been laid down, but according to the experts’ opinion, the completing and transfer the vessel to the Naval Forces of Ukraine are hardly probable, because of budget financing suspension.

However, it all these units will be commissioned in the nearest future, such reinforcement is not enough to form the Naval Forces of Ukraine appearance on perspective of ten and more years. The majority of independent military experts and state officials from
“Oboronka” (“defense industry”) are convinced that the basis for the Naval Forces of Ukraine in future would become the new ships of “corvette” class. They are most admissible on criterion “value-efficiency” to fulfill the tasks of the Ukrainian Navy and Ukrainian ship-building industry has all necessary possibilities to create and build these ships.

For the years passed, our project and constructor organization have worked out many types of contemporary corvettes. They are – Pahar-S, which was worked out by the Central Constructor Bureau Shuna (Kiev), and Mirage, Mistral-1500T, Haydük-21 of the Nikolayev government experimental and designed center of ship-building. The latter, because of stealth-technologies use, has become a prototype of Ukrainian corvette.

The Ukrainian corvette program has become realized with the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine instruction publication from September 9, 2005 №32p “About the ship corvette class building”. The draft designing, tactical and technical target plan had been changed for many times. As the result, the proud of our constructors has become the fact, that they were in success to accommodate on the ship with the dimensions and displacement of Large corvette the armament of frigate – in 2007 the work out of a draft project of the ship type 58250 has been completed.

The ship’s main tactical and technical characteristics are:

- displacement – 2500 t
- range – 4000 nm
- endurance – 30 days

It is supposed, that the ship would be supplied with new weaponry, navigation and fire control systems Ukrainian and foreign production. Among the countries – weaponry suppliers – Russia, France, Germany, Denmark. In particular, it has been planned, that the weaponry complete set would consist of ASuS missile complex Exocet MM-40, SAM SAAM-FR, torpedo tubes and torpedoes, produced by Eurotorp concern.

In 2009 it was completed the technical projecting of the ship and they have conducted tender on building up of 10 corvettes, it was planned the first ship to be commissioned at the end of 2012, the first series of four ships by the end of 2018, and by 2026 – all the batch. As a result of a closed competition to select the executor of the state defense order and the winner of it was recognized holding company The Black Sea shipbuilding plant (Nikolayev). Besides it, to realize the project was enlisted SE NPK of gasturbobuilding

“Zarya mashproekt”, CE Kharkov CB of machine building named after Morozov.

JSC Zavod “Fiolet”, Zavod “Ekvator”. According to the calculations, the first ship building up will be near 250 mln. euro, the serial ship – just about 200 mln. euro. On experts’ estimations, the correlation between the value of Ukrainian production and import equipment will be 60:40.

According to the opinion of an experienced ship-builder the Director General of the ship-building plant Liman (Nikolayev) Sergey Michailovich Isakov, the Ukraine corvette program is the most realistic among all the shipbuilding programs which were adopted in Ukraine some time.

And everything seems all right. But, in March 2010 Sergey Isakov let know before hand, that nowadays under the conditions of crisis, the realization of the Ukrainian corvette project was an adventure.

“Is our state ready to invest today such huge money into corvettes’ building? – He is asking. – From my point of view, the moment for realization the project, to put it mildly, was chosen unfortunately. There is a heavy economic crisis in the country and all over the world, the free money resources are absent, the problems with the social program realization are on the threshold. And under such conditions the ships building is practically condemned to failure…” [22].

The expert from Nikolayev was absolutely right. In March, the Black Sea shipbuilding plant had begun the works to build up the first Ukrainian corvette. The enterprise received 1 mln. hry as advance. On this sum it was made marking-out, cutting and painting the metal for the first section of the ship. And, on it, the works were completed. It is necessary to mention, that only for this year for plan realization of corvettes program the ship-builders were in need of 150 mln. euro, but in budget for 2010 it was allotted only 35.8 mln. hry, which would be only enough to settle accounts for the works, which were made before it. It seems, the serious financing of Ukrainian corvette is not envisaged and in 2011.

To the Ukrainian authorities, to all appearances, the Naval Forces of Ukraine and all the Armed Forces problems, and Ukrainian ship-building are absolutely uninteresting. Corvettes program stoppage – is a blow not only at the Armed Forces of the country and at native ship-building. Maybe, we really do not need to have troubles with new contemporary ships building-up? In such a case, the Naval Forces of Ukraine perspectives a very vague.
INSTEAD OF CONCLUSION

Leaning upon the analysis carried out, we may come to the inauspicious conclusion that the existing state of the Black Sea Fleet of Russia and the Naval Forces of Ukraine may be characterized as depressible. This, first of all, concerns the ships component. The difference in situation on the fleets is defined not only by the reasons but the scales of problems.

Using medical terminology, we may say that the patients have the same disease. And although it is taking various degrees of heaviness, the ways of treatment are the same. The state must use more than words when turning its face to its army and navy. Moreover, the Naval Forces of Ukraine formation should gain one of the first places in the number of military priorities – the increasing power of the fleets of our Black Sea neighbors (and not only of them), their capacities for actions against the shore, need the availability of adequate instruments, which is capable to withstand the threats and challenges from the sea.

THE SOURCES OF INFORMATION


4. Ibid

5. Приложение 4 к Соглашению между Украиной и Российской Федерацией о параметрах раздела Черноморского флота.


7. Протокол рабочей встречи экспертов Украины и Российской Федерации по вопросам раздела Черноморского флота от 4.11.1996.


11. Приложение 4 к Соглашению между Украиной и Российской Федерацией о параметрах раздела Черноморского флота.

12. Ibid


23. Ibid.
International economy of the Black Sea port sector: rivalry between Russia and Ukraine

INTRODUCTION

Today, global seaborne trade totals nearly 8 billion tons, and sea transportation accounts for more than 90% of goods traded between countries. Shipping is the lifeblood of the global economy. Without it, export countries would falter and importers would face desperate shortages, much of the world would starve, societies would remain divided, and globalization would slow drastically. Within the international economy, the shipping industry affects a large number of upstream and downstream industries. It is also a crucial link between the world economy and the national and local ones.

The Black Sea region accounts for only 2.5% of seaborne trade, but this is an important area of development, due to its geographical size and resource base. Ukraine and Russia are two major powers in the Black Sea port sector. The ports of Russia and Ukraine together, account for almost ¾ of the total cargo handling in the region. Another interesting point is that the amounts of cargo handled by the two countries are roughly equal. Russia used to be the leader up to the year 2006. In 2007 Ukraine became the champion for the first time in recent years, to retain the position in 2008. But in 2009 Russia came back to the top and still holds this place. Examining the power balance between the two countries in detail, one can clearly see that their patterns make a sharp contrast, although the total amounts are very close. On the Ukrainian side there are several middle-sized ports (Odessa, Mariupol, Illichivsk, Mykolaiv, Izmail etc), whereas on the Russian side cargo handling is highly concentrated in one port, i.e. Novorosiysk.
It must be pointed out, that Russia’s Black Sea port sector is in a sense “inflated” owing to a huge amount of oil transportation. The position of Ukraine's port sector is superior to that of Southern Russia, if only dry cargo is counted. Ukrainian ports also depend on the transit operation of oil. The operation structures of both Russian and Ukrainian Black Sea ports are characterized by a high proportion of export cargo and transit cargo, while that of import cargo is relatively low. That is mainly because we are exporters of natural resources and primitive commodities with low added-value, which are bulky and heavy. This also results in the underdeveloped level of containerization of Black Sea transportation compared to other regions of the world. In fact, container transactions at Ukrainian and Russian ports are more often import than export ones.

As a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, new-born Russia became dependent on foreign sea ports. In the early post-Soviet era, more than half of Russia’s foreign trade cargo was handled at ports of Ukraine, the Baltic States and Finland. Russia's policy-makers regarded this dependence not only as contrary to its own economic interests but also as threatening national security. This dependence is getting less year by year, but even today around 20% of Russia's foreign trade cargo is still handled at Ukraine's and the Baltic States' ports. Southern Russia does not have special terminals to export coal and fertilizer along the Black Sea coast, thus passing these items to Ukrainian ports. Russian authorities pay much attention to the developing port sector of Southern Russia. They adopted the “Federal special program concerning the development of transportation systems in Russia for 2010-2015” in May 2008.² There are four port development projects in the Black Sea region listed on the agenda (Sochi Port – to reconstruct and newly build port facilities; Kavkaz Port – to build new port facilities; Novorosiysk Port – to expand port facilities, especially container terminals, terminals for petroleum products, fertilizers, alumina and so on; Taman’ Port – to build a new port on the Taman’ Peninsula, with coal and container terminals. Expected total investments – more than 240 billion roubles). The mission of Taman’ Port is to regain Russian cargo from Odesa, Illichivsk and Mykolaiv, especially containers and coal, because the capacity of the Novorosiysk Port to handle dry cargo is not large enough. Russia's grain export is recently shifting from Ukrainian to Russian ports, allegedly thanks to a discount railway fare initiated by the government. It is reported that Russia is planning to reduce further Russian cargo transited through Ukrainian ports at least by 40% until 2015.

Ukrainian ports heavily depend on transit operation, with transit cargo making up around 40% of the total. Transit business brings huge hard currency revenue to Ukraine. It is of vital importance for Ukraine to retain and even expand transit operation at its sea ports. One of the priorities for Ukraine now is making effective use of our transit capability. The Association of Ukrainian Ports presented policy proposals to the government, in which it envisaged that Ukraine should exert its geopolitical potential as a transit nation.

Over 90% of transit cargo in Ukrainian ports is from CIS countries, most notably from Russia. Russian exporters are forced to use Ukrainian ports, because the capacities of Russian Black Sea ports are not sufficient. Kazakhstan, Belarus and Moldova are inland countries, and that is why Ukrainian ports are used by them as export outlets. Anyway, cargo transit at Ukrainian sea ports is basically the operation, in which cargoes brought to the ports by land transportation are shipped for export to outside world, mainly to Black Sea and Mediterranean countries. Russia’s strategy to reduce transit through Ukraine is a great threat to Ukraine's port sector. Despite the economic crisis, Russia succeeded in expanding cargo turnover at Black Sea ports in 2009, whereas Ukraine's transaction went down, mainly because of a decline in transit.

As for the so-called “transshipment” of containers, a very prospective transit scheme, Ukraine is still not in a position to provide that kind of service because of a lack of necessary infrastructures and legal conditions. It
is widely known that the importance of container transportation is growing in global maritime business. Black Sea region lags behind other regions of the world in the level of containerization of cargo. There are obvious benefits for a country to have international container hub ports. Hub ports gain money by transshipping containers and the country can shorten the time of transportation, which means a higher competitiveness of the national economy. Third, the country enjoys lower import prices thanks to hosting large container ships directly, evading the additional cost of feeder ship transportation. Thus, it is very natural that both we and Russia have been trying to develop capacities to handle container cargo for the last several years. Ukraine is catching up with Romania remarkably, with Illichivsk and Odesa together handling 1,242,700 TEU vs 1,380,900 TEU of Constanța in 2008.

The world economic crisis, however, revealed that overall container handling capacities of the Black Sea region were rather in excess, than in deficit. Container handling at Black Sea ports was severely hit by the recent economic turmoil. Ukraine suffered most of all. According to one forecast, the negative gap between supply and demand of container handling capacities at Ukrainian ports will widen further because it will take long for demand to recover, while investment projects to build new terminals will not be abandoned so easily. Ukraine therefore has no choice but to develop transit operations of container cargo, including transshipment, so as not to be reduced to a peripheral position in this business. Other Black Sea countries like Russia and Georgia, potential targets of Ukrainian ports’ transshipment, also plan to expand their own container handling capabilities. Russia in particular will try to avoid being subordinate to transshipment by our ports, and this is even one of the factors motivating Russian authorities to expand the Novorosiysk Port and newly built Taman’ Port. Undoubtedly, it will not be easy for Ukrainians to make our ports international container hubs. Ukraine, however, does have prospective container transit projects. The “Viking” and “Zubr” schemas in particular deserve attention. Both of the schemas connect the Black Sea and Baltic Sea regions, so much so that they even remind us of the ancient road “from the Varangians to Greece.” The international transportation route “Viking” was opened in 2003 based on an agreement between the Ukrainian and Lithuanian governments (Belarus also being involved). It connects the Illichivsk/Odesa Ports of Ukraine and the Klaipeda Port of Lithuania by container train and provides clients with quick and reasonable cargo delivery. In September 2009 another international transportation route “Zubr” was agreed upon by the operating companies and railway companies of Ukraine, Belarus, Latvia and Estonia. “Zubr” connects the Illichivsk/Odesa Ports of Ukraine, the Riga Port of Latvia and the Tallinn Port of Estonia. These container transit schemas have the advantage of not infringing on the interests of third-party countries like Russia.

As we have seen, Ukraine and Russia are two big rivals in the Black Sea port sector, with roughly equal total amounts of cargo handled at their ports. Transit operations of Russian cargo at Ukrainian ports are a crucial factor. Both Russia and Ukraine are underdeveloped in terms of container transportation, the most important segment of contemporary maritime business. Ukraine in particular is expanding its container terminal facilities rapidly and even seems to claim a hub position in Black Sea container transportation in the future. But the world economic crisis revealed that Ukraine’s container facilities are rather in excess and the terminals cannot survive without developing transit services. Thus, there is much work to be done with respect to efficiency, developing infrastructure, and extending the capabilities of our ports to survive and win this competition.

SOURCES
The purpose here is to consider the energy aspects of the Black Sea Region (BSR). Importantly, we want to visualize the BSR as indivisible from the Caspian Basin. Together, they form a single geo-economic and strategic complex which is directly linked to Europe. Thus the space stretching from Central Asia to Germany, from Turkmenistan to the Baltic Sea is the focal point. In terms of energy supplies, the hub for this space is centered in the BSR, and it is linked to the Caspian Basin. This region is critical to Europe’s energy security in terms of reducing Europe’s energy dependence on supplies from Russia, which Russia tends to use for political purposes. Before focusing on this region itself, the global context in which the energy policy of this region evolved must be considered.

The global context impacts this region in terms of supply and demand for hydrocarbon energy sources. There is an assumption in the energy business that planning of investment in energy development of transportation in the Caspian Basin and Black Sea region depends on dynamics of demand and supply worldwide and in Europe. This assumption which, based on commercial considerations, links energy supplies from the Caspian Basin to demand-supply dynamics in the West, is based on commercial thinking and not strategic considerations. This has led to a great deal of confusion, particularly due to the impossibility of adequately forecasting demands for oil and – especially – gas. Future demands and demand projections regarding gas as well as oil depend on so many constantly shifting, unpredictable factors that it’s impossible to collect all these factors into a coherent whole as a basis for long term investment decisions.

For instance, before the economic crisis hit in 2008, the projections for future oil and gas demands depended on a small set of variables: the extent of industrial relocation for West European countries to countries outside Europe; the success or failure of biofuels and renewables; and, the dynamics of oil prices, which could impact demand either way. By impacting demand of oil they also impact demand of gas. The price of gas by pipelines is pegged to the price of oil; a small number of variables, that were difficult to forecast in the first place. But since 2008 the number of these variables has rapidly increased. First, in 2008 the economic crisis hit. No one could predict when Europe would recover from crisis and how long the recovery would last. Second, in 2008-09 the shale gas revolution in the United States (which resulted in a global energy boom) redirected LNG from Qatar to Europe. Nobody could have predicted that. Third, was the failure of biofuels in the U.S. Fourth, the 2011 nuclear accident in Japan which led to an irrational overreaction in Europe. The reaction was particularly strong in Germany where it bordered hysteria. Its closing nuclear power plants, should come to pass, would massively increase demand for gas. And then the events in Libya, which no one could have predicted, have suddenly jeopardized oil and gas supplies to France, Italy and Spain. This is the wide range of unpredictable variables influencing the price of oil and gas. It is impossible to aggregate all these factors into a single coherent basis for making decisions on developing and transporting oil and gas from the Caspian Basin via the Black Sea Region to Europe.

What conclusions does the EU draw from this? The European Commission, in charge of developing
These factors are rapidly disappearing. The EU is playing a hands-on role with Turkmenistan and actively supporting closer ties with it. The EU wisely also delinks the issue of internal democracy from the issue of energy supply. Previously such a linkage got in the way of developing European access to Turkmen natural gas. Also for the first time, in the fall of last year, the Turkmen president said that the construction of a Trans-Caspian pipeline, from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan linking to Nabucco, does not depend on the delimitation of the Caspian Sea borders between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. Previously, the failure to demarcate that maritime border had been an obstacle to the Trans-Caspian pipeline. Azerbaijan has always said this was not a problem and now Turkmenistan is saying the same. In January of 2011, EC President Manuel Barosso and EU Energy Commissioner Guether Oettinger paid the first ever visit to Baku and then to Ashgabat. During the visits they agreed on a plan for Turkmen gas to cross the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan and then onwards to Europe. They agreed to establish a joint EU-Turkmenistan Committee to look into the commercial and technical issues of this project. Until now, Russia and Iran have jointly used ecological arguments oppose the Trans-Caspian pipeline. Previously silent on the topic, Turkmenistan has supported the ecological aspects of such a pipeline. Then, in February 2011, it organized and held an international conference on the ecology of the Caspian Sea. The conference was a historic first during which it was argued that such a pipeline would not damage the ecology of the sea.

Also, it has launched the construction of the East-West pipeline across Turkmenistan, linking its prolific gas fields in the east of the country with the Caspian coast, at a capacity of 30 Bcm/a. This matches the capacity of Nabucco exactly. Turkmenistan is building this pipeline on its own budget, without resorting to credits. This means that it values this project as a national strategic interest. The pipeline is slated to reach the Caspian coast by 2015. At that point, if everything goes according to plan, 30 Bcm of Turkmen gas will hit the Caspian coast and will be available for westbound transportation by pipeline to Azerbaijan and onward to Nabucco. Turkmenistan used to hold the position of not getting involved in discussions regarding pipelines outside of its own territory. Rather it made its gas supplies available, at the border, to

BIOGRAPHY

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whoever comes up with a pipeline. Now Turkmenistan has modified this position. It says it is in favor of a Trans-Caspian pipeline and would provide the 30 Bcm at the border, but specifically for a Trans-Caspian pipeline. This notwithstanding, Turkmenistan does not get involved in designing or financing a Trans-Caspian pipeline. Yet, it does expect West European customers of Turkmen gas to design and finance the pipeline. This is a great opportunity for Europe and it would be a great shame if by 2015, 30 Bcm of Turkmen gas hit the Caspian coast, available for westward shipment, and the pipeline was not there to transport it to Azerbaijan for Nabucco. Thus, the burden of proof is on the European Union. It has to be said the EC – Barosso and Oettinger personally – is exerting great and unprecedented efforts in that regard.

Further to the west one finds Azerbaijan. For a number of years, it was regarded, and may still be regarded, as the only undoubted source of gas for the Nabucco pipeline. The sources in the Shah Deniz field – phase 2 of development – are due on-stream by 2017. However, this is subject to possible delays for a total production of about 16-20 Bcm/a, of which only 10 Bcm will be available for the Southern Gas Corridor. An unhealthy competition has developed between the three projects of the Southern Corridor: Nabucco, TAP, and ITGI. For this limited, albeit certain, volume of 10 Bcm/a.

This current situation, in which the three projects are competing against each other for priority access to the reserves of the Shah Deniz field in Azerbaijan, is unhealthy and paradoxical. The three projects are parts of the Southern Corridor. But, as long as Turkmen gas is not flooding into it, there is only Azerbaijan left. As a result, these three projects, which ought to have cooperated with each other with synergies, as part of a common project, are actually engaged in a cut-throat commercial competition against each other. This is the result of the long-delayed Western policy regarding Turkmenistan. Both the U.S. and the EU lost many years in terms of developing commercial and political access to Turkmenistan. They are now catching up, but the delay has resulted in this competition over Azerbaijan’s gas.

From Azerbaijan’s perspective, this is a very good situation. Azerbaijan sees three competing projects seeking priority access to its gas. Thus, it can compare the offers and elicit the best possible one. Azerbaijan is not rushing to make a decision. Rather, it weighs the comparative advantages of each. Until about a year ago, Azerbaijan was unreservedly committed to Nabucco, as a strategic project. In the past year or so, it has modified this position. It now says that strategic considerations are not as important as commercial considerations for Azerbaijan’s national interests, rather than European interests. This shift partly reflects Azerbaijan’s political evolution from Europe, the U.S. and Turkey. Those who follow the politics of the South Caucasus know that in the last years, a number of issues, not only energy ones, have diluted Azerbaijan’s strategic partnership with the United States. For the purposes here, it is not necessary to address them. However, one should be aware that in regard to strategic supply considerations, Azerbaijan is currently less receptive to U.S. or European advice than it used to be. Azerbaijan is considering its own national interest now. However, this may not be its final word: if the strategic partnership of Azerbaijan with Washington and Brussels regains strength, Azerbaijan might, again, revert to strategic considerations. Currently, this is not the case.

If developed first, the TAP and ITGI projects could result in killing Nabucco and blocking Europe’s access to Turkmen gas. In my view, both of these are undesirable projects, as long as they compete with Nabucco rather than supplement it; which is something they could do, subject to a greater availability of Central Asian gas volumes. Both ITGI and TAP are headed to a peripheral location: the extreme South East of Italy. That is not the market that requires diversification away from Russia. On the contrary, Italy is highly diversified in terms of gas supplies. It gets most of its supplies from North Africa, from the Middle East by LNG, and in the third place, from Russia. Thus, it is highly diversified. The markets that need to diversify away from overdependence on Russia are the South Eastern and Central European markets. It is precisely for that very reason they are targeted by Nabucco. The landfall point of ITGI and TAP would be in Southern Italy, far away from Europe’s lucrative markets. For those volumes to reach the heart of Europe, they would have to transit the entire length of the Italian Peninsula.

Furthermore, TAP and ITGI are company projects which are only guided by narrow commercial interests. There is no objection to company projects and to narrow company interests – this is the essence of free market. But, we can see the contest between
these two small-scale projects, designed to serve commercial interests, and the strategic Nabucco which is three times larger in terms of capacity and serves the strategic role of reducing dependence on Russian energy and demonopolising the markets of about ten South-Eastern and Central European countries. If either ITGI or TA3G goes first, or if they combine to draw on those 10 Bcm of gas from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz, Nabucco will be left with no gas until Turkmen gas becomes available. Thus, as long as Nabucco would not be on-stream, there would be no outlet for Turkmen gas in Europe. Everything would have to be postponed for five to ten years after the completion of TAP or ITGI. Clearly, for these reasons Nabucco has to go first.

There is another project, which is a distraction – in more than one sense – from the Southern Corridor: AGRI. It is primarily driven by Romania in cooperation with Azerbaijan and Georgia. AGRI involves trading small volumes of Azerbaijani gas (1 to 4, maximum 5 Bcm/a) by transporting them by pipeline to Georgia, building a liquefaction terminal in Georgia, transporting the LNG by a fleet of tankers to Constanta in Romania, reliquefying the LNG in Romania and using most of the gas in Romania, except for one 1 Bcm/a, which would go to Hungary. The EC does not like this project at all. This is insufficiently understood in Romania. The EC has refused to support this project. Barosso and Oettinger declined the invitation to attend the launching ceremony in Baku, last year, and the EU would not finance a feasibility study.

Why? First, because this project would again compete for access to Azerbaijani gas, adding one more competitor against Nabucco beside TAP and ITGI. Another reason is cost effectiveness. For a volume of maximum 5 Bcm, and more likely between one and four Bcm/a, it is clearly not cost effective to build a liquefaction terminal in Georgia, a regasification one in Romania, and pipelines too. Certainly, the main target for this gas would be Romania, a narrow market, plus one Bcm to Hungary. In Hungary itself, the government is interested in that volume more for the sake of closer relationships with Romania. The two governments have close relations, but the national Hungarian oil and gas company, MOL, has declined to be part of this project for the aforementioned reasons and those cited by the EU. Therefore, the Hungarian partner in this project is the national electricity company.

Azerbaijan encourages publicity around the AGRI project. It is interested in having as many commercial claimants as possible which will increase the range of possible competitors and create the impression of competition, as it will heighten the price of its gas. Moreover, from Azerbaijan’s and Turkey’s viewpoints, transporting Azerbaijani gas in whatever form across the Black Sea would mean that Azerbaijan would not need to depend on Turkey for overland pipeline transit over which Turkey has a monopoly. Moreover, in recent years, Turkey has demonstrated that it has taken a page from Gazprom’s textbook in terms of abusing its monopoly of overland transit by setting conditions unacceptable to Azerbaijan. Therefore, Azerbaijan is interested in demonstrating it has alternatives and, does not exclusively depend on Turkey to export gas to Europe, but can bypass it through the Black Sea. This is one political rationale of the AGRI project, but not a commercial or strategic rationale. And finally, an energy market in the Black Sea is unfeasible as such, because it cannot be connected to the global energy markets. LNG makes sense only as part of a global market which allows for total flexibility of transactions and commercial routes, much like the global oil market. However, the Black Sea Region cannot be part of a global energy market because the sea is cut off from the world ocean by the Turkish Straits. Turkey does not allow the passage of LNG tankers through the Black Sea. Turkey sets limits for the passage of oil tankers through the Bosphorus because it is in the heart of Istanbul and poses the risk of environmental accidents. As a result, the Turkish government carefully controls the volume of oil transiting the straits, but does not allow LNG tankers through the Bosphorus. This is why Romania became interested in AGRI in the first place: Originally, it wanted to import LNG from Qatar, to the port of Constanta but when the Turkish policy became obvious, Romania switched to the AGRI option. As such, the Black Sea can, at most, be a local energy market of very limited volume, depending only on Azerbaijan. This means Azerbaijan has a monopoly in terms of energy, contrary to the essence of the global LNG market, which is diversification.

Now, let us consider the Southern Corridor’s and Nabucco’s rival project: South Stream. South Stream has recently undergone a spectacular development, which changes its essence entirely. To give a brief historical background, I choose to express that I
never took South Stream seriously. Since 2009, when Gazprom and the Russian government unveiled the numbers behind South Stream, I have described it, many times, as a political bluff. It is not a project, it is a political bluff. This needs to be explained. In 2007, South Stream was launched in Croatia by the then Russian President Vladimir Putin. Without specifics, it was a grand vision, until Gazprom came up with the numbers in February 2009. Those numbers show this project cannot possibly be serious. Russia promised to deliver 63 Bcm/a through South Stream. This is a staggering amount. Remarkably however, Russia never indicated the source of this volume. The Russian government, the Russian president and Gazprom have had countless discussions with their Western counterparts – governments and companies. During those two years of discussion, Russia has never indicated the source of gas for 63 Bcm/a. Originally, it had been assumed that Gazprom Turkmenistan would be the source. However, in 2009 Russia lost its previous near monopoly on the Turkmen gas. Turkmenistan switched its export policy towards China and Iran. Since 2009, it has continued to reorient its export policies to destinations other than Russia. Thus, Turkmen gas cannot possibly be the South Stream source.

In February 2009, the declared cost of the project was $30 billion. Now it is up to $40 billion. This is out of any possible frame of reference. No one, no combination of countries, governments, or agencies would finance a project of this magnitude. It is totally absurd. What then are the rationales behind this political bluff? There were three rationales, and a fourth one was added in 2011.

The first is to discourage investment in Nabucco by creating the impression among Western investors and the financial community that a Russian project would come and, drawing on Russia’s immense gas resources, would make Nabucco redundant. This rationale is based on historical precedents which worked. For instance, in 2002, the Blue Stream pipeline, which runs underneath the Black Sea from Russia to Turkey, reached the Turkish market ahead of the Turkmen gas, thereby freezing the Trans-Caspian pipeline project. The Russians want to repeat this with Europe. But, the lack of their own gas and the exorbitant costs of the project, they have themselves declared, make the repetition of such a precedent impossible. Thus, the first reason was to create publicity hype and occupy the place, so to speak, at least at the level of discussions, so as to discourage and slow down investments in Nabucco.

The second reason is to force Turkmenistan to, at one point, revise its export policy in Russia’s favor. If Turkmenistan finds for any reason that Nabucco was unable to materialize, then it would have to switch some export volumes back to Russia. If the aforementioned 30 Bcm of Turkmen gas hit the Caspian coast by 2015-16 lacking a Trans-Caspian outlet, Russia would want to absorb that volume. It has already proposed a new pipeline to take those 30 Bcm along the Caspian Sea littoral from Turkmenistan via Kazakhstan to Russia. Thus, the second rational of South Stream is to restore Russian access to Turkmen gas by cutting Turkmenistan off from Nabucco.

The third rationale is to put pressure on Ukraine. Russia is threatening to either entirely bypass Ukraine’s gas transit system or dramatically reduce the flow of gas to Europe via Ukraine by redirecting those volumes through South Stream; on the bottom of Black Sea. Russia embarked on this policy around 2009. The Ukrainian President, Viktor Yanukovich, and his government are unwisely advertising their fears of South Stream. They began doing this during the presidential election campaign of 2010. They argued Ukraine must somehow accommodate Russia in order to avoid the threat of being bypassed. It is amazing that the Ukrainian leadership was so naive as to take South Stream at face value. Or contrarily, that it used the threat of South Stream as an internal political argument to justify the concessions it has made to Russia at the expense of Ukraine’s gas transit system. This question has not yet been resolved in my mind. Yesterday, Prime Minister Putin was in Kiev. They discussed this issue in detail, and I shall look into these discussions. Russia has no resources of gas or funding to bypass Ukraine through a new pipeline. That is crystal clear, and the Ukrainians should understand this better.

In 2011, a fourth reason has emerged for Russia to promote South Stream: to stop the European Commission and the Third Energy Market Legislation Package of the European Union. This Package was released in 2009 and went into legal effect in March 2011. The heart of this legislation package is a monopolization law. It prohibits companies from being gas suppliers and pipeline operators at the same time. Combining the roles of gas supplier and pipeline
operator creates a vertically integrated monopoly. This is Gazprom's business model. Whereas it has this business model in Russia, it is unable to have it in Ukraine, because there the pipeline system is state's property. However, Gazprom has installed this model in several East European countries, including the Baltic States as well as parts of Germany. There, Gazprom is both a pipelines co-owner and monopolist gas supplier. This is also the case in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. It is partly the case with the Yamal pipeline of the Polish territory, and in certain parts of Germany, where Gazprom shares pipelines ownership with Wintershall. The new European legislation wants to break up these vertically integrated monopolies. It would require Gazprom to divest itself of its pipeline ownership on EU territory – including the Baltics and Germany. Gazprom is making great efforts in terms of lobbying to avoid this. South Stream would extend this business model in those European countries that would participate in it. In each one of those states the respective pipeline section would be jointly owned; usually at 50% by Gazprom and 50% by the host country. As a result, Gazprom would extend the business model to break up into European territory. The EU member states Gazprom has enlisted, at least on paper, in South Stream include Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Hungary, Austria, and Slovenia. Gazprom wants to extend the vertically integrated monopoly into those countries. It is a counteroffensive against the EU legislation.

In the last few months, Gazprom and the Russian government have greatly intensified their political lobbying in Western Europe and in Brussels. They have enlisted expensive lobbying firms, and, certain European gas executives have rallied to Gazprom's cause. They are in the EC promoting South Stream as a project which serves the interests of Europe. In theory, this would qualify South Stream EU subvention eligibility. Nobody realistically expects the EU to subsidize South Stream. In closing it is worthwhile to sketch a very cautious forecast. It has to be cautious because of the rapidly changing variables mentioned in the beginning. First, demand for gas in Europe will grow. This is the only certainty. It is impossible to say by how much and how rapidly. Second, demand for Caspian gas in Europe is uneven. Most of it is in Southern Germany and in Central and South Eastern Europe. That is what Nabucco targets. Therefore, Nabucco is the only truly strategic project. Third, outlook on public financing for Nabucco has improved since the letter of intent by three lending institutions (i.e. The European Investment Bank and The International Finance Corporation). They are willing to provide up to EUR 4.5 billion to finance Nabucco. And, fourth, there is unprecedented activity by the EC in terms of commitment to the Southern Corridor in general and Nabucco in particular. Due to the political nature of the EC, it cannot afford to take sides on Nabucco, ITGI and TAP. Et, beyond the public level, the EC clearly favors Nabucco over the two other competitors. And, given the aforementioned developments in Turkmenistan, the outlook for Nabucco is unprecedentedly good.
Cooperation in the Black Sea region to combat illegal immigration

INTRODUCTION

Immigration is often described as one of the drawbacks of globalization. This downside includes images of massive movements of mostly poor people in the direction of rich states. This image is particularly dominant in European democratic countries, especially in the Eastern and Southeastern countries from where many illegal immigrants enter the EU to find better living conditions or protection. The Black Sea Region has itself played a distinctive role regarding the route that immigrants follow to come to Europe. The fact that it is considered “the connecting bridge” between Europe and Central Asia is enough to recognize how important cooperation between the countries in this region is. However, this region confronts many problems such as regional conflicts, state fragility, organized crime and safe and competitive energy transportation. Recently, illegal immigration has appeared as another serious problem that affects every country in the region. How immigration relates to security issues is a multi-sided issue. Generally, people who enter the borders illegally are a noticeable “threat.” Anyone who is unknown to authorities could be a terrorist or a criminal or just carrying a contagious disease.

As far as European immigration policy is concerned, it should be mentioned that the citizens of the European Union can move freely inside the Union, a right which has a positive impact on traveling, but a negative one on migration. Therefore, Europe has built a fortress which could be passed by others under pre-determined modes. Discussions on a common system for dealing with immigration into the European Union have been underway for almost two decades but there has been no concrete policy made as yet. During the last few years, the EU has realized the important role of coordinated policy with countries that are either transit ones or ones of origin for immigrants. Trust is another significant reason for seeking agreements on migration issues. That trust is a matter both of having the confidence that a neighbor country is not letting in people that the EU would not otherwise admit and the trust that the general acceptance of refugees be considered a humanitarian act.

For the above reasons, it is interesting to examine the present picture of illegal immigration in the Black Sea area, the efforts in process to combat this problem in cooperation with the EU as well as the future challenges in the region.
COUNTRIES’ EFFORTS TO COMBAT ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION IN THE BLACK SEA REGION

According to the Black Sea Synergy, the countries included in this region are Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey. It is known that most countries in the “Region” have a Soviet legacy. In the past, total control of the area belonged to Russia and Turkey. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new states, it was obvious that the map of the controlling zones of each country would have to change. However, in the Region, most states are characterized by bad governance, weak state institutions, an ineffective judiciary system, and a low level of economic development which as a result have increasing rates of corruption, organized crime and flourishing illegal immigration. The examination of the problems and the efforts that characterize the most significant countries in the region could shed some light on the dimensions of illegal immigration.

First of all, it should be mentioned that the tensions in Armenia-Azerbaijan, in Georgia, Russia and the self-proclaimed Transnistrian Republic in Moldova are a threat for regional security and cooperation between Black Sea countries. It has been observed that there is increasing illegal immigration by those who live in this region due to these tensions. For example, after the events in 2008 at S. Ossetia, many Georgians went to Greece illegally and asked for asylum.

Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are the route to trans-Eurasian traffic and are either countries of origin, destination or just transit. The unresolved conflicts in these countries and unemployment issues are still serious problems in the area which lead to immigration. In its migration initiatives in 2010, the IOM has proposed a project in the Armenian, Georgian and Turkish borders aimed at on-the-spot research of human movement flows from Armenia to Turkey through Georgia.

As far as Georgia is concerned, in late 2009, the Georgia-EU Visa Facilitation and EU-Georgia Readmission Agreements was a step forward towards cooperation with the EU. It is also important to note that the EU and Georgia signed a Mobility Partnership Declaration that refers to the cooperation between EU member states and Georgia to address the management of migration flows.

Turkey has a unique geographical position that plays an important role in Turkey migration policies. Turkey is both a country of origin and of transit towards Europe. Through Turkey, immigrants desire to go to the European “paradise.” Between 2000 and 2006, almost 500,000 people were apprehended in Turkey. Generally, there are three main groups of immigrants. The first group is from Ukraine and Moldova, which goes to Turkey for work and better living conditions. Secondly, there are those from the Middle East and Asia who want to go to Europe and therefore use Turkey as a transit zone; and, finally, the last group consists of the rejected asylum seekers who do not return to their home country and end up staying in Turkey.

Turkey’s EU membership will force Turkish authorities to transform its migration policies and to align them with the migration-related EU acquis communitaire policies. For this reason, in 2006, the “National Action Plan for the Adoption of the EU Acquis” in the field of Asylum and Migration Issues was implemented. It should be mentioned that due to its geographical location under the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, Turkey gives asylum only to European refugees. The latter is supposed to change by 2012 so that legal arrangements for asylum are in harmony with the EU. In addition, Turkey is also in the process of adopting the EU Schengen Visa System and thus the system is going to be stricter, especially with citizens from Middle Eastern and Asian countries. On the other hand, in 2003, it liberalized access for foreign workers with the Law on Work Permits for Foreigners. But this access is permitted only when there is not a national worker for this position, thus only the low skilled employees enter the economic environment. In general, Turkey is also trying to cooperate with other countries and EU member states by taking part in the Border Police Conference, the EU-driven Illegal Migration and Violation of Borders programmes and the Bern Initiative activities. As far as the Black Sea is concerned, the Centre for Black Sea and Central Asia (KORA) is situated in Ankara, where the Global Migration from the Eastern Mediterranean and Eurasia: Security and Human Rights Challenges to Europe project for fostering international cooperation on global migration, is implemented. Authorities in Turkey should learn to deal with migration flows and find the appropriate procedures to combat it. What it is necessary is the implementation of a new law and new policy for immigration.

Regarding Ukraine, it is crucial to mention that there are many Ukrainians who are victims of human trafficking. Western countries, Turkey and Russia are the top destinations for these victims. Economic reasons also contribute to migration to other countries such as Italy, Russia, Poland and Hungary. The country’s
priority is to finance the migrants to return back and reintegrate them efficiently. Equally troubling is the problem with the Roma peoples and thus Ukraine is trying to provide them with health assistance and improve their socio-economic conditions. Ukraine is also trying to transform the State Border Guard Service and make other border reforms which are necessary for compliance with the EU Schengen regulations.10

Following its EU membership, Bulgaria has been transformed into a destination country from being a country of origin; it has become a European border and a way for immigrants to enter Europe. Most immigrants crossed the border from Turkey but in 2006, there was an increase in Moldovan citizens going to Greece through the Bulgarian – Greek borders. Moreover, the international train Istanbul-Sofia has been used as another way of illegal migration to Europe. It was important that Bulgaria had visa – free agreements which were in force with countries such as Georgia, Russia, Tunisia and Ukraine. This fact made access to Europe easier since immigrants could easily travel to Bulgaria due to the fact that Georgia and Ukraine are transit countries for many immigrants. But since Bulgaria has to comply with the Schengen visa list, this route will stop.11 However, Bulgaria has to confront its own problem first, which includes the outflow of emigrants and the negative demographic consequences for the country. Bulgaria has a National Migration and Integration Strategy and is trying to facilitate sustainable repatriation for nationals and assist immigrants by informing them about their rights and duties in Bulgaria.12

Romania has faced a migration problem ever since the fall of communism since many Romanians preferred other countries such as Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain and Greece. However, after 2000 and the prospects of being EU members have attracted many immigrants, most of which were foreign workers. Romania is to a lesser extent a transit country since it is between West and East Europe, and a link between S. Asia and North and West Europe. Thus, it is estimated that by 2013-2015, approximately 200,000-300,000 foreign workers will go to Romania. The main countries of origin of immigrants are Moldova, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Russia, the Syrian Arab Republic, Hungary, Italy and Germany.13 Unfortunately, Romania offers legal entry on a short stay for some nationals and this makes the route easier. For example, Turkish citizens of Kurdish ethnicity go to Romania legally and then illegally they cross the border and go to Hungary, Austria or Germany. Moldavian nationals go through the Eastern border to Romania legally and then illegally use the following routes Hungary-

Slovakia-the Czech Republic-Germany / Serbia-Bosnia-Croatia-Italy / Hungary-Austria-Germany. African and Asian nationals use legal entry on a short stay visa or just enter illegally through the Eastern or Southern border and then apply for asylum. They prefer to follow the Hungary-Austria-Germany or Serbia-Bosnia-Croatia-Italy route. Generally, it is said that the borders with Hungary and Serbia are the main exit points.14

Romania has made efforts to manipulate the migration flows through the implementation of the National Migration Strategy 2007-2010 and the development and application of national action plans under the EC’s Framework Programme on Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows. One of its priorities is the process of labor migration to and from Romania and the social influences in Romanian society. The establishment of the Emergency Transit Centre in Timisoara under the trilateral agreement signed in 2008 between GoR, UNHCR and IOM to provide shelter to persons who need protection is also extremely significant.15

The Republic of Moldova has had economic problems that forced many Moldovans to look for jobs abroad. In addition, the Moldovan state could not control illegal movements to other countries due to inefficient border controls. The EU has signed a Mobility Partnership with Moldova to assist the reintegration of returning immigrants.16

On the other hand, Russia attracts migrant labor due to its advantage over neighboring states and its economic development. There is the Readmission Agreement between the Russian Federation and the EC (2006) to improve the reception, accommodation and return of third country nationals. In 2010, IOM took the initiative to implement a project for the safe return and reintegration to Chechnya. This is now the most serious issue that Russian authorities should pay attention to in order to establish security in this region.17

GENERAL POLICIES FOR COMBATING ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION IN THE BLACK SEA REGION

Illegal immigration in the Black Sea Region should be considered as an important dimension in EU security. Following expansion in 2007, this is the first time that EU borders have extended to the Black Sea. The EU has shown its interest in the region with the “Black Sea Synergy – A New Regional Cooperation Initiative” (April 2007) and with the “Applying the Global Approach to Migration to
the Eastern and South-eastern Regions Neighboring the European Union” (May 2007).18 It should also be mentioned that three EU policies: The European Neighborhood Policy, The Accession Partnership with Turkey and the Strategic Partnership with Russia, all enhance EU interest in the region. Moreover, the EU is cooperating with Ukraine – the “central European corridor” from Russia to Europe – through the EU-Ukraine Action Plan on Freedom, Security and Justice, the signed Visa Facilitation and Readmission agreement and the EUBAM operation.19 Of course, there are many agreements between the EU and BSR in the energy field, which enhance the EU presence in the region and promote their cooperation. The Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit (May 2009), between the EU and six Eastern EU neighbors and the Caucasian states, will reduce socio-economic imbalances and increase stability.20

Furthermore, the Stockholm Programme, which is an EU programme in the area of Justice, Freedom and Security for the five years between 2010 and 2015 to implement the EU immigration and asylum policy, is also of major importance. There is also the EU Global Approach to Migration for the effective prevention and fight against irregular immigration and the strengthening of the relationship between migration and development.21

Frontex also plans joint operations to implement the EU concept of Integrated Border Management (IBM). Operations also show the picture of migration flows on the EU’s external borders and create analytical products and a network for member states and other stakeholders.22

Frontex searches for systemic solutions to illegal immigration and thus seeks mechanisms that could enhance cooperation of member states. The study for the Mediterranean Sea (the MEDSEA study) led to the creation of the European Patrol Network (EPN). These networks can succeed in border security and help risk analysis. Thus, a similar network in the Black Sea could also lead to better border security in the region. Risk analysis is a significant tool that includes important conclusions about the irregular migration picture. Therefore, Frontex has focused on “focal” points to control illegal immigration. These focal points consist of professional assistance and training at regional hot spots at the external borders.23

It should be mentioned that among states, there are other cooperative programmes for solving these problems. One of them is the Program of Cooperation in the Black Sea region in the area of Migration between Countries of Origin, Transit and Destination (2009-2011).24 The aim of this programme is the elaboration of the issues of illegal immigra-

tion and human trafficking. Sharing information, policy dialogue, monitoring migration flows, the functioning of the Regional Training Center and cooperation between civil society and governments are the means through which the aim of this programme could be achieved.

Naturally, the role of the IOM must also be referred to. IOM contributes to enhancing the knowledge on international and regional legal frameworks related to migration by conducting 6 international migration law courses in 2010 with 400 participants.25 Moreover, it signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) in 2006 whose aim is to assist countries’ cooperation in addressing irregular migration and combating trafficking in persons in the Black Sea Region. The result was the project “Black Sea Consultative Process on Migration Management” with the BSEC’s Working Group on Combating Crime in 2007. This project attempted to strengthen the cooperation of relevant authorities in all twelve member states of the BSEC.

**CONCLUSION**

Generally, the study of the significance of the cooperation for combating illegal immigration in the Black Sea as a region was a neglected phenomenon. For many years, the southern and northern shores of the Black Sea remained separated by the division of Europe.

Fortunately, the EU realized that the problem is in the main countries of origin of illegal immigrants. “The reduction of migratory pressure calls for a coordinated policy which extends far beyond the narrow field of policy on aliens, asylum, immigration and border controls, and also covers international relations and development aid. Here, a model of concentric circles of migration policy could replace that of ‘Fortress Europe’. For obvious reasons, the Schengen States currently lay down highly intensive control measures. Their neighbours should gradually be linked into a similar system which should be brought increasingly in line with the first circle’s standards, particularly with regard to visa, border control and readmission policies. A third circle of States (CIS area, Turkey and North Africa) will then concentrate primarily on transit checks and combatting facilitator networks, and a fourth circle (Middle East, China, black Africa) on eliminating push factors.”26

Cooperation in the Black Sea is not impossible – especially after September 11th. Since then countries have transformed their policies and the fear of “a foreigner” has forced them to cooperate towards a common aim. Of course, stability in the region is a major prerequisite for this cooperation.
To conclude, according to statistics, the number of immigrants who look for shelter in Europe is increasing year after year and thus, it is imperative more studies and research in the region on the flows of immigrants be carried out.27 The organised movements of illegal immigrants are continually trying to find easier ways to cross the borders. Thus, good border control on Greek borders could change their route but they may find another way into Europe through the Romanian or Bulgarian borders. Turkey's EU membership is, of course, a matter of great importance as to what will change when Turkish borders become EU borders. One last thing to keep in mind is the saying “You cannot control what you do not patrol,” and control without cooperation is impossible.

APPENDIX 1. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Acquis – Acquis communautaire  
BSR – the Black Sea Region  
EC – European Commission  
EUBAM – European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine  
EUROPOL – European Police  
ENP – European Neighbourhood Policy  
EU – the European Union  
FRONTEX – the European Police Office  
ICMPD – International Center for Migration and Policy Development  
IOM – International Organization for Migration  
JHA – Justice and Home Affairs  
OC (TOC) – organized crime, transnational organized crime  
UNHCR – the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees  

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OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS FROM EU AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

• Council of the European Union. EU Organized Crime Threat Assessment 2011, April 6, 2011  

BOOKS

**EXPERT OPINION**

**HARVARD BLACK SEA SECURITY PROGRAM**

**2010**

**FLows Of Illegal Immigration**

**Situation at the External Borders (January - Sept 2010)**

**Legend**
- EU/Schengen associated Countries
- Third countries

**Flows of Illegal Migration**

**Central Mediterranean route**
- Italy: Jan-Sept 2010: 2,066
  Jan-Sept 2009: 8,289
  Decrease: -75%
- Malta: Jan-Sept 2010: 72
  Jan-Sept 2009: 8,289
  Decrease: -99%

**Western Mediterranean route**
- Spain (land border): Jan-Sept 2010: 1,069
  Jan-Sept 2009: 1,369
  Decrease: -20%
- Spain (sea border excluding Canary Islands): Jan-Sept 2010: 2,874
  Jan-Sept 2009: 3,540
  Decrease: -23%

**North African route**
- Canary Islands (Spain): Jan-Sept 2010: 14
  Jan-Sept 2009: 2,122
  Decrease: -99%

**Central Eastern European route**
- Western Balkans (KOS, SRB, FYROM): Jan-Sept 2010: 1,760
  Jan-Sept 2009: 2,374
  Decrease: -26%
- Eastern Border (MK, BGR, MD, RUZ): Jan-Sept 2010: 858
  Jan-Sept 2009: 1,019
  Decrease: -16%

**Eastern Mediterranean route**
- Greece (TUR land border): Jan-Sept 2010: 31,186
  Jan-Sept 2009: 6,667
  Increase: +467%
- Greece (sea border): Jan-Sept 2010: 6,209
  Jan-Sept 2009: 23,732
  Decrease: -74%

**Circular route from Albania to Greece**
- Greece (ALL, FYROM land borders): Jan-Sept 2010: 27,020
  Jan-Sept 2009: 51,563
  Decrease: -48%

**Illegal migration within EU/Schengen associated Countries**
- Intra EU/Schengen Associated Countries
- Main routes to EU/Schengen Associated Countries

*Data are provided through the Frontex Risk Analysis Network, except for preliminary data for Greece No. 2010 from Frontex Joint Operation Foundation.*

Note: Figures refer to the percentage change for January to September 2010 compared to the same period of 2009.
**Sources**

1. See Appendix 1
5. IOM, Migration Initiatives Appeal 2010, p.128
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7. IOM, Migration in Turkey: A Country Profile
9. IOM, Migration Initiatives Appeal 2010, p.128
10. Ibid, p.140
11. IOM, Migration in Bulgaria: A Country Profile 2009
12. IOM, Migration Initiatives Appeal 2010, p.143
13. IOM, Migration in Romania: A Country Profile 2009, p.16
14. IOM, Migration in Romania: A Country Profile 2008
15. IOM, Migration Initiatives Appeal 2010, p.148
16. Ibid, p.135
17. Ibid, p.137
21. IOM, Migration Initiatives Appeal 2010, p.151
23. Ibid.
25. IOM, Migration Initiatives Appeal 2010, p.156
Europe in transition

The purpose here is to make some points regarding where Europe is today, where it is going and what needs to be addressed. To really have this discussion on “Europe in transition”, the main questions are: from what and to where? These are the questions one should bear in mind. To do this, it is necessary to consider that past and, for the purposes here wave tops are going to be presented. In the process of hitting wave tops some data will certainly be missed, particularly issues that may probably be important to Romania or to Turkey. Thus the purpose here is to provide a general overview starting with the year 2001.

In early 2001, the Bush Administration came in at the end of the decade. The new decade started with the EU making great strides developing itself as a strong institution. It started a reform process to make itself more efficient, more accountable to the borders, to look at enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe as a real possibility, and to figure out how to develop its own European security and defense identity.

In 1999, NATO invited the first three new members into the alliance: Poland, The Czech Republic and Hungary. At the time it had just waged the air campaign in Kosovo. The NATO summit in Washington laid out the new strategic concept after the Cold War era a key part of which are out of area operations. The Alliance was still very much focused on territorial defense and not quite expeditionary. It still had a lot of Soviet era equipment, a lot of heavy equipment, writ large. And, it had just spent a decade spending a lot of time in the Balkans, trying to ensure peace and stability there. NATO entered the new decade with a new vision about how it was going to renew itself.

In the US policy towards Europe, the Clinton Administration followed by the Bush Administration, had a policy of promoting Europe as free and at peace. That became the driving element of policy: a lot of engagement with Europe, a lot of special envoys in the Balkans, NATO enlargement, on the Caucasus and other issues. The US was very supportive of Turkey’s membership into the EU, and overall the relations are very good. Let us now consider the other situations:

Afghanistan: The Taliban was in control, the U.S. and Europe largely walked away. Al Qaida is there with training camps.

Russia: Putin was the president. He was dealing with Chechnya. There are terrorist issues in the North Caucasus and Russia is still recovering from the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union. At the time it was anti-NATO for a variety of reasons. Nonetheless, it was in dialogue with NATO within the 1997 Russia-NATO Founding Act.

The Black Sea was a mix of different activities. Romania and Bulgaria wanted to become part of the Western institutions. Turkey also wanted to be part of the European Union. Ukraine and Georgia were wrestling with what to do and were sort of holding back at this point. It would only be a few years later that they would take off in terms of the Western-oriented agenda. There are frozen conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transdniestria. Those are big factors holding a lot of things back and focusing a lot of the attention of the Europeans and just preventing a more robust engagement. The regional organization BSEC (the Black Sea Economic Cooperative) was operating with all of the littoral states, working together, its agenda was not robust but it was something as a form. And lastly, recognition of human and weapons trafficking as security threats in the Black Sea was growing. In many ways it was an
area the U.S. and Western Europe had little situation awareness. Thus, it started to grow in importance.

Five years later, at the end of the Rumsfeld term, there were big changes in Europe. The EU had its first wave of expansion whereby 10 countries came in. However, the efforts to bring NATO and the EU to reform were still stalling. Nonetheless a great momentum was created by bringing ten countries in. Europe was now thinking of a common foreign and security policy and the union was feeling much stronger. Yet, the relationships between Europe and the United States were starting to fray. It is worthwhile to consider the data; NATO expanded from 19 to 26 members. Seven new countries came in and every two years NATO held summit. There was a lot of dialogue going on and Kosovo was still underway. What Rumsfeld, and others, were able to do with the New Strategic Concept and the new post-9/11 environment was to go from heavy to more expeditionary, modern equipment. It is equipment that allows the expeditionary operations and forces to move out faster and go where they need.

The U.S. policy toward Europe was very engaged. Rumsfeld visited the region numerous times. His areas of particular focus were the Caucasus, the Balkans, and the CIS. He thought those were strategic areas of importance to the United States. He spent a lot of time going there. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were also engaging the European allies. President Bush added to this the Freedom Agenda, really promoting democracy throughout Europe and the region.

At that point, Afghanistan was full on despite the fact that attention had wavered. Collectively, there were approximately 50,000 troops in Afghanistan at the time. There was much focus on Iraq. In 2003 NATO agreed to take over the ISAF mandate. By the time 2006 came along NATO was in control of the whole region. Funding in Afghanistan was still not at a robust level, and many would say Afghanistan was a distraction for the Iraq war. This point will be considered further below.

The relationship with Russia also changed. In 2002 it went from the NATO-Russia Founding Act to the NATO-Russia Council with even more robust opportunities for Russia to engage with NATO. Terrorism fights in the North Caucasus increased. Yet, President Putin started to become very irritated towards the U.S. He was not particularly happy with a variety of policies the U.S. was pursuing. As a result, the good relations from a decade ago started to fray.

A lot had been going during those five years in the Black Sea. Two ‘color revolutions’, one rose (Georgia) and one orange (Ukraine) were tremendously important for both those countries as well as to the United States. It allowed it the opportunity to reinvest in the region, or rather, to significantly invest in that region for the first time. The NATO-Ukraine Commission was established. The U.S. started to pace negotiations with Romania and Bulgaria in 2005. By 2006, they were largely completed. Pipeline discussions were also going on for gas and oil coming from the Caspian through the Caucasus and into Bulgaria. The U.S. started to pace negotiations with Romania and Bulgaria in 2005. By 2006, they were largely completed. Pipeline discussions were also going on for gas and oil coming from the Caspian through the Caucasus and into the Black Sea to Turkey and to Europe. There was a very active U.S. presence in all these countries. In terms of security cooperation it was helping them to develop their capabilities, to become stronger, and in some cases actual NATO members. Yet, the frozen conflicts continued. There was progress in Georgia, but they were still out there. And lastly to mention, in no small order, the relations between U.S. and Turkey largely deteriorated, particularly over the Iraq war and the lack of U.S. assistance in helping Turkey address the PKK issue. It is clear that very important things were happening in the Black

**BIOGRAPHY**

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Sea region at the time. Also noteworthy is that at this time in 2006, EUCOM, with support from the Pentagon, decided to launch a U.S. policy towards the Black Sea. It was the first time that had even been done.

By the end of 2006, there were 35,000 troops in Afghanistan.

The things started take off. The Secretary of Defense changed and, a whole bunch of things were going on. It is necessary to consider where the transitions were heading. In 2007, the EU had one more round of enlargement during which Romania and Bulgaria became members. The EU set up the rule of law mission EULEX which was its first mission in Kosovo. It was supposed to eventually take over NATO’s mission over in Kosovo.

The Lisbon Treaty was passed in December 2007. It was ratified and went into effect only in December 2009. The Lisbon Treaty, also known as the Reform Treaty, allows the EU to become a more accountable and powerful union with its own High Representative for Foreign and Common Security Policy. It increases the power of the European Parliament, creates the External Action Service, and puts the EU on the map as an even bigger player than it already was. But, all that gets slowed down, albeit not sidetracked, by the global financial crisis. When the global financial crisis hit it affected a lot of Southern Europe, and Europe altogether. Fractures and fissures start to appear, and they are still there today. Greece, Spain and Italy have enormous debts which violate the criteria set out years ago. Whether other European countries will help these states or not has become a big distraction which threatens the European project.

In the meanwhile, after the 2008 NATO summit, the newest members i.e. Albania and Croatia join the alliance. This brought the number of NATO members up to 28. Macedonia was in the document as to be invited, but due to the name issue with Greece, it was held out. Georgia and Ukraine, also didn’t make the break to get a Membership Action Plan. There was enough European resistance to hold Georgia and Ukraine back. However, historic language made it into the communiqué: “Georgia and Ukraine will one day become members of the Alliance.” Also, NATO’s Strategic Concept, was reaffirmed just this past fall: NATO reaffirms its commitment in Afghanistan, agrees to reform itself to be more economically efficient, agrees that Missile Defense is a key priority, and agrees to look at the emerging threats.

In respect to U.S. policy towards Europe, Rumsfeld held off on signing the final Missile Defense Initiative plan. In 2007, Gates signed off a document which stipulated a third site for European Missile Defense would include a radar facility in the Czech Republic and interceptors in Poland, and, moreover, that the U.S. would pay for it. There would be a third part to this system: radar somewhere within a 1,000 km band from Iran. The project was actively pitched, the story is known but what happened by the time the Obama Administration came in is that relations with Russia were really bad. As a result, in September of 2009 the missile defense plans were revised. It doesn’t look exactly the way it did; there are going to be more mobile and sea assets. Then a few months later, Romania stepped up to have some things based there. Initially, the suggestion met the Russian approval, but now Russia has some concerns about it.

The reality of President Obama’s approach to Europe and Eurasia is that they were not a priority for the president. This is not anti-Obama perspective at all, but the reality is, it has not been a priority. In terms of priorities, when Obama came into office it was “domestic, domestic, domestic”. Russia probably cracked the top ten, but only probably because it distracted from the other nine. So there was a reset policy, which is not going to be addressed here. However, it is slightly embittering that from Bush 41 to Clinton to Bush 43 a significant amount of time was spent on creating, developing and cultivating relationships. It is difficult to see this administration engaging at the same level. By the time Libya started, it really showed that the US did not have the type of dialogue it should have had with the Europeans.

In the meanwhile, the mission in Afghanistan has experienced huge growth as well as a number of command changes.

In Munich, 2007, Putin was rather displeased with the United States. It was the first trip to Europe for Secretary Gates and he had been on the job for only 45 days. The United States was referred to as a hyperbolic superpower. Reference was made to a number of policies including the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Kosovo, missile defense. Romanian bases, NATO enlargement and START. It was the root of everyone’s evils in the world. Then attention was turned to the Europeans. It must be recalled here it was February 2007; and everyone in Europe was dissatisfied with Rumsfeld. Iraq was not going well and, suddenly, Putin became displeased about the manner in which the OSCE was treating Russia. This got the attention of the Europeans. Shortly thereafter, Chancellor Merkel expressed concern and invited President Bush to send a delegate to Putin. President Bush sent his Secretary of Defense.
The Russian Federation had been devastated and humiliated by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the loss of the Russian Empire. The goal was to restore Russia’s national pride and make sure its influence was felt in the world. At the time, President Yeltsin had passed away and it became clear that the United States may have underestimated the degree of humiliation experienced by Russia and that it may have approached Russia wrongly. It set the tone for how Gates approached Russia until today. It affected the way in which the United States reached out to Russia in the so-called “2+2” talks, the Reset and everything else.

Building up to 2008 or so, oil prices went on a huge rise, reaching $140 by the time of the Russia-Georgia war of August 2008. This gave Russia much more flexibility to puff its chest out. Medvedev, elected in 2008, said in his Inaugural Address that his vision of Russia was one which, in a generation and a half, will find its place in Europe and by 2030 become both a NATO and EU member. It may have been a missed opportunity. In the Black Sea Region however, the Russia-Georgia war my last big project in the Pentagon. It is certainly something the United States is still living with today. What Russia initially saw as a tactical victory may have well turned out to be a strategic victory. It has certainly left its imprint on the region since.

Turkish Drift: It is partly the EU’s fault, partly the fault of the US and partly Turkey’s own fault. With the EU showing less interest in Turkey becoming a member, the U.S. and its memories of what happened in Iraq, namely, its inability to help with the PKK, and the feeling that Turkey has to look at the Turkey-first interests and address its domestic needs, made Turkey drift away from the Trans-Atlantic Alliance. It appears to be walking its own course. That is not, in itself, bad until one considers the Russia-Georgia war. Turkey used the Montreux Convention to deny the ability of U.S. and allied war ships to enter the Black Sea. It is not certain whether the relations have returned to truly positive ones. Moreover, the Turkey-Armenia Genocide Resolution is a well known, annual thorn in Turkey’s side. The Turkish government wonders why something like that always has to come up and why it cannot be stopped.

Let us now consider Ukraine. From the Orange Revolution until about 2007 things were looking pretty good in Ukraine. As most of you know, Ukraine is divided, one half to the West the other towards Russia. Yushchenko, the president, Tymoshenko, the prime minister, had very many arguments. After 2007 they were really paralyzing the country. Then in February 2010, Yanukovich, from the side wins the election. As a result, Ukraine’s Western course is, if not altered, then certainly slowed. In April 2010, the Kharkiv Agreement is signed with Russia to keep the Russian Black Sea fleet in place. A lot of the pre-2006 momentum has now slowed down for a variety of reasons.

When one considers Europe today it is clear that the financial crisis is still taking its toll. There are stresses between the major powers, and, NATO’s enlargement is on hold. Croatia is the next likely candidate, Iceland is also a likely candidate, but everything here has to do with economics. Yet, it is not clear whether the EU is willing to take on new member states again. One reason of concern is found in the numbers coming from the CSIS. The GDP versus the national debt for some of the countries of Southern Europe is absolutely enormous. Things are going the bad way and the debt is going to continue to rise. That is the cause for caution regarding the acceptance of new members. Maintaining the Euro is of pivotal importance to the EU. These are real numbers, constraining everything the EU will be able to spend and to do. It’s going to require real, hard, painful reform, and it is not clear whether there is sufficient political will to do it.

Europe is aging big time. Western Europe is aging faster than Central and Eastern Europe. Pension benefits and health care are going to continue being an enormous source of dread on these economies. Real political leadership and political will are going to be required to force a change that will fix the welfare of these countries. One bail out now could be ten bail outs later. Europe may be taking a thoughtful approach, but it appears to be a slow one. It is going to require leadership.

As Europe ages, there are less people able and willing to enter the military. That is going to have huge ramifications for national security. Seven percent of Spain’s national forces are non-Spanish nationals. They have to recruit non-Spanish nationals to fill certain jobs in the armed services. Denmark is also wrestling about what to do on this issue. It is very concerned it too will be necessary to use non-Danish citizens. This matter raises the question of allegiance: if the Danish state comes under attack and has to mobilize non-Danish citizens it is uncertain whether they would truly protect the country.

NATO is also worthy of consideration. The global financial crisis has certainly taken its toll on European capabilities. A bad trend had already started in the 1990s. The decade started with territorial defense: non-expedientary capabilities. The transformation is expensive.
Better forces cost more money because they are more expensive to train and equip. Platforms go up in price because they are modernized. As a result countries in Central and Eastern Europe in particular, but also in Western Europe were deciding: “Maybe we don’t need this, and we don’t need that now.” Then in 1999, NATO decided there is no conventional threat to NATO territory. The U.S. was blowing everyone out of the water when it came to any kind of engagement. The NATO members were convinced that “They got our back, we have Article 5.” So they reduced capabilities. Not all members did that, but as the decade continued less and less capability was visible. There were downward trends everywhere. When the global financial crisis hit, some countries, i.e. Poland decide not to spend any money on modernization of equipment for two years (2009, 2010). Most of what the European countries spend is spent on operations only. Poland already had NATO helicopters, ships and air defenses; they decided they are not going to invest in any kind of military modernization. It amounts to two years at two billion dollars a year. Netherlands, Spain, and Italy, each within a 24-month period, decided to cut their military spending by 10 percent. Operations become the only thing they continue to fund. Spain had only one major procurement, namely, an 8x8 wheel vehicle, which is now 12 months delayed and will not come out for, at least, another 18 months. These countries are all going down to nothing in terms equipment modernization. However, the needs are going up. If they decide to do nothing, the ramifications for the Alliance’s capabilities to project any kind of expeditionary and territorial operations will be big.

In the fall of last year NATO agreed on a new Strategic Concept Focused on new emerging threats, due missile defense and the maintenance of Afghanistan. This strategic concept was criticized before the process even started. There was a proposal, still in the Bush Administration, to launch the process. Back then, – late 2007 – early 2008 – there were three reasons for not launching a strategic concept: 1) The US had not proven itself yet in Afghanistan, so therefore the future of expeditionary operations as a part of NATO had not yet been validated. 2) The US did not have a dialogue with Russia; a NATO Strategic Concept is not possible without a dialogue with Russia, and it is known where each side wants to take the relationship. 3) What would French reintegration look like? And how would it affect NATO? (this latter was no longer valid at the time). This last point has since been changed but numbers one and two are still valid. The current number three is the financial crisis. If the allies are going to spend less on capabilities, then what kind of alliance will it be? Would it not be better to just wait for the financial crisis to smooth and then do a strategic concept? The concern is, with everything laid out in the strategic concept, that the resources are not there to match it.

Returning now to the CSIS study, it is worthy to note that the UK, France and Germany combined equal 80% of all research and development on defense in Europe today. If one were to put all 28 NATO allies together, plus Japan and Australia, it equals 70% of all defense spending in the world. Thus, money is still being spent, but the big bulk is being spent on personnel. As a result, the overall number is a bit misleading.

If one considers the category of defense spending per soldier, one finds that in 2007 it was about $73,000. It is now up to $92,000. That is a good figure because there is better protection from better equipped forces. Yet, because it is going to cost more, there are going to be fewer forces. Furthermore, almost no money is being spent on developing new things. For the US defense industry it is good: it is going to buy off the shelf. The French industry will want to make sure it is directing it all to itself. Thus, when considering Europe in transition, it has been a very interesting decade.

It has been commented that the US spends about $250,000 per soldier and that this creates and interoperability gap. This is, unfortunately, something the US is dealing with every day. This gap concerns everything from HF radios, Blue Force trackers, ability to land in any nation of the Alliance and go to work right away. These are absolutely valid points.

It is fair to say that the U.S. has largely disengaged from Europe, particularly when compared to the previous administration. Europe is not a priority. Domestic policies and finances are the priorities. Libya, for instance, is not a shining moment in our relations.

In Afghanistan, the transition has been in process for some time. The US is handing things over to the Afghans. Yet, the exit date keeps fluctuating. When President Obama gave his West Point speech back in December 2009 the talk was about the surge that would get the US through 2011 and possibly to a drawdown of that. Secretary Cohen remains close to VP Biden and Secretary Clinton. The day following the speech, he happened to be breakfasting with Biden at which time he said: “Why did the President say that drawdown would be in 2011?”, to which Biden responded: “Well, the President meant to
say, there will be a drawdown of an additional 30,000, not the drawdown of the base force.” Now the courage coming out of the NATO summit predicts an exit date in 2014, the British say 2015, the Canadians and Dutch are already out in terms of combat power. This exit date will continue to fluctuate. It remains unclear who will remain on the ground as of which date. According to General Corelli, and others who have commented on this, the US Army is planning to be there for the next 10 to 20 years.

Unfortunately, the capacity in Afghanistan is not increasing in any measurable way. It is not that their heart is not in the right place, they have such a distant starting point, and, corruption is a major issue. If there is one thing that the Americans are doing badly in addition to understanding foreign languages, it is understanding foreign cultures. Tens of billions of dollars have been spent on trying to address the corruption issue in Afghanistan. Headway is not being made. The key is to have capacity, it is just not clear how to get to that point.

At this time, ISAF is at a force of 132,000. This is an enormous increase since the situation at the end of December 2006, 90,000 of the aforementioned figure comes from the U.S. but there is still a robust portion coming from Europe. Europe is pulling its weight in Afghanistan. It is a pity that the Canadians and Dutch left their combat roles. However, they are still there in training roles. There are real sacrifices and real money backing it all up. Unfortunately, the pace of the progress being made is not comforting.

It is also necessary to consider Russian military reform. Russian Defense Minister Serdyukov came to Washington last fall to ask Secretary Gates how one pays for and maintains troops of a volunteer army. Serdyukov is very much interested in Russian military reform. A recent Jamestown publication was focused on disagreements between the General Staff College of the Academy and the MoD about what has gone right and gone wrong in the Russian military in the past few years. Also, a report that came out by the General Staff saying that the U.S. missile defense may actually not be a threat to us at all.

Demographic issues are also going to plague Russia. Right now, there are 142 million people in Russia. By 2050 there will be 100 million people there. 70% of the population lives west of the Urals, 70% of the territory is east of the Urals. This are really big issues. At this time, 3 out of 10 conscripts cannot pass the physicals. Thus, the manner in which Russia will protect itself is going to be a real issue for Russia, although for us, there will be some real opportunities.

As we turn to look at the Black Sea region, 2008 was a game changer. Georgia is still essentially divided. Ukraine is no longer focused on the West. Azerbaijan does not know what to do. The Bush Administration always tried to pull Azerbaijan closer. Turkey’s role also continues to be unclear in the region. It is leaning both towards the West and towards the Middle East. Threats continue to exist. There is trafficking, and, for over five years no progress has been made in the frozen conflicts.

WikiLeaks and the damage that it continues to do to US foreign policy must also be considered. For instance, in Romania Basescu was being slammed on a couple of TV channels for what was leaked by WikiLeaks with respect to the Romanian bases and other things. WikiLeaks will continue to play a role and will be used on Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, Saakashvili and Putin. It is all out there and it will continue to be a force affecting policy toward the Black Sea region.

In the future, NATO will do less with less. It does not have the political ambitions and the financial capacity to do much more. That is why the New Strategic Concept is a real concern. Europe will have zero interest in doing more in Afghanistan. It is unlikely to have more longdistance, high-risk expeditionary missions. They cost too much politically and financially. Europe will go through some kind of reset when it is all set and done in Afghanistan.

U.S. policy towards Europe is likely to continue being distanced largely because US priorities are different. As the US reduces force posture in Europe, there is less of connectivity between it and Europe. Currently, the US is there for temporary purposes, rotational purposes – cooperation and training. This is very valuable in itself, but it is no longer based on familiar connections which will make it difficult for the US keep troop levels in Europe (approx. current level 47,000). Moreover, there is a demand for a return to an isolationism in foreign policy particularly in light of the Tea Party movements, domestic concerns and the view that America’s ventures overseas and to Muslim lands have not gone so well. An isolationist policy would be very bad for the US – Europe relationship, yet, the pressure exists. It’ll take a majority to educate a majority in the US Congress or anywhere else that Europe matters to the US.

Currently in Afghanistan, there are big disagreements on reconciliation, on whether the government should go condition-free in talking to the Taliban, or whether conditions should be set on how to engage the Taliban in any kind of peace process. The country con-
continues to lack the financial means to be a viable nation-state. The annual revenues for the Afghan economy are about $600 million. Simply the cost of training and funding the Afghan security force is $10 billion a year. This is a huge, huge gap. The international community is going to have to recognize the need to stay in Afghanistan for decades to come. Yet, the form and in which capacity this will be done remains unclear. As Europe and the US continue to be occupied there, there is room for Russia to expand its influence in the region. With oil prices on the rise and everybody distracted, the potential is there again. There are also opportunities for the West to engage Russia in different formats. However Russia will need to recognize that will be in its interest and that it wants to be a full part of it.

The outlook is bleak, but all it’s not lost. Europe is still the largest trading partner of the US. At the US still has a large military presence. As part of the missile defense, it is going to put more assets in Europe, mostly sea assets. There are more assets, and it still holds the SACEUR job. There are a lot of areas of joint interest, and all of them largely coincide with Russia as well.

Bottom line: people have complained for decades, that US leadership is bad for the world. However, when the US does not lead, bad things tend to happen. There is a view in Europe – though it is not necessarily a complete macro-view – that the US should return to the game in Europe. These concerns are not are also shared by the EUCOM commander.

The Black Sea Region is in the middle of everything going on for Afghanistan. This gives the opportunity to engage the Black Sea in a way that has been long-deserved. The interests there are enduring and include everything from energy routes to the combat of illicit trafficking. It is a fact that the region could go unstable again. This depends on how things break with Russia or on whether a country of the region decides to take things into its own hands. It is also a big piece of EU’s partnership policy agenda, as well as NATO’s Partnership for Peace. Thus, there are interests.

The challenge is the continuing lack of cooperation among the littoral states. Russia and Turkey continue to be skeptical of outsiders, i.e. the US. The Montreux Convention holds the US back from being able to proactively do anything in terms of military exercises and such. In fact, it has walked away from the region in many ways. The US went from a policy of Black Sea engagement to essentially a policy of Black Hole-ism. Only a small military segment is still engaged, but it is not an area of importance. It is not spoken of in Congress any more. There is no simple solution to any of the current situation. It requires attention, engagement, action and trust. Right now, none of this exists in any large and sustained way.

At its 20th anniversary BSEC is trying to figure out how it can have more powers and become more of a player. The US is a BSEC observer and it seems to wants the organization to be able to do more. The US is very engaged bilaterally. It works a lot with the Georgians to train them to do rotations in Afghanistan. It works with the Azerbaijanis for their deployments in Afghanistan. Romania has stepped up to host missile defense assets. However, there is little going on with Ukraine, relatively to where it was. The US also does not have a lot going on with Russia, also relatively to where it was. The same holds true with Turkey. The US does not have a lot of activity going on. What it needs to do is reengage. The EU and the US need to develop a common approach towards this region, focusing not only on how to address the threats that are there, but also on helping advance the region politically as well as resolving the differences of the past and the frozen conflicts. The EU appears to be in a much better position to do that. The Russians would be likely to the US as a disingenuous partner. Perhaps the EU – using its various mechanisms and the Minsk Group – could actually help to broker that. It is necessary to get the attention and become a priority to Europe. If it is not going to be a priority, there will not be any movement.

Russia needs to understand that it can be a constructed player if it should so desire. It is not clear whether Russia accepts that role or if it can even accept it, particularly as oil prices go up. Turkey should certainly play a larger role as well. It all comes down to attention, engagement, action, and trust. There is a lot that can be accomplished, but it is not going to be accomplished in the coming years. Frozen conflicts can be solved, there is no doubt. The annexation in Georgia can be rolled back. Russia can be convinced that having a peaceful, democratic, economically prosperous border with NATO is in its own interest. And, in regard to its southern border, which is in the same basket and transitioning towards Europe, can also be a positive force-multiplier for Russia because that will be a part of the world is will not need to focus on. It is uncertain whether the US will have the political bandwidth to push through another Black Sea strategy, or to put forward any kind of robust effort toward solving these problems. But it appears to be a must. ■
Prospects of military and political situation development in the Black Sea and Caspian regions

The significance of this issue is defined by the increasing importance of the Black Sea and Caspian regions. It is connected to their increasing role in energy provision of Europe. The situation in these regions is determined by a complexity of international relations in this area. On the one hand, they are defined by the historic development of Black Sea and Caspian countries, their different social, economic, political and military potential. On the other hand, these regions are included into the area of interests of the leading world actors. Such multilateral relations are connected to the neighboring areas – Central Asian, Baltic and Mediterranean regions. The countries of these regions are also involved in close cooperation.

Taking the aforementioned into account, the following issues are analyzed in this article:

• The role and importance of the Black Sea and Caspian Regions.
• The general characteristics of military and political development in the Black Sea and Caspian Regions.
• The assessment of the current state and the perspectives for developments in the military and political situation in both regions.
• Suggestions concerning the strengthening of regional stability and the role of military intelligence in this process.

Nowadays the role and importance of the Black Sea and Caspian regions are defined by factors such as:

• The historical perception of the regions as the part of "Greater Middle East", which according to the western classification includes Caucasus, Caspian Sea, Central Asia, Middle East, and;
• The importance of the regions as a link between Europe (the West), Central Asia (concentration of natural resources), Asian-Pacific region and South-East Asia.

The regions contain a considerable part of transit and export capacity for the main existent and perspective oil and gas pipeline projects from Asia to Europe, namely:

Oil pipelines
• Burgas–Alexandroupulos
• Odessa–Brodu–Ploc’k
• Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan, oil pipeline bypassing Sea of Marmora;
• Konstanca–Trieste.

Gas pipelines
• "Nabucco";
• "Southern Stream";
• "White Stream" (from Caspian region to Europe);
• "Blue Stream", "Blue Stream-2".

The project of Azerbaijani gas supply to Bulgaria and Romania (according to memorandum between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Romania signed on April 13, 2010, foresees export
of more than 7 billion cubic meters of Azerbaijani natural gas yearly to Romania at the cost of about 4 billion euro).

The abovementioned circumstances specify the dynamic and contradictory nature of military and political developments in the whole "Greater Middle East", and particularly in the Black Sea and Caspian regions. In recent years, there have been emerging new, and ongoing existing, trends both positive and negative in nature.

Let us consider the main trends.

**NEW POSITIVE TRENDS**

The "Reset" of relations between the US/NATO/EU and Russia, together with renewal of cooperation at all levels. Certain achievements have been obtained in this direction:

- The renewal of strategic negotiations between Russia and the USA (March, 6, 2010, Geneva);
- the signing of new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (on April 8, 2010 in Prague);
- the commencement of consultations on the creation of the global system of Ballistic missile defense (BMD) with Russia's participation
- a renewal of cooperation between Russia and NATO in January 2010 in the military sphere (on May 5, 2010 the program of bilateral cooperation during 2010 was adopted), and;
- a change of Russia's position concerning Iran to strengthen new sanctions.

The establishment of several regional programs, in particular, "The Black Sea Synergy", "Eastern Partnership" and "The Danube strategy of the EU" need mentioning. "The Black Sea Synergy" foresees selection of additional funds for the development of regional economic projects and integration of the Black Sea region countries into the European market.

Besides, due to the active lobbying of the "Eastern Partnership" program by Poland (the program was established during the Prague Summit of the EU members and participants of the program in June, 2009), an intensification of its realization is expected in 2011, when Poland will head the EU.

A strategy to boost the development of the Danube Region was proposed by the European Commission on 8 December, 2010. Member States endorsed the EU Strategy for the Danube Region at the General Affairs Council on 13 April, 2010. The European Council also supported the strategy on 24 June, 2011. This marks the beginning of the implementation phase. The strategy is based on the realization of common projects in the sphere of transport, energy and environmental protection.

The civilized solution of contradictions between Ukraine and Romania concerning delimitation of the Black Sea shelf may be considered a positive precedent to solving similar problems by other countries. According to the decision of the UN International Court (February, 2009) regarding the delimitation of the continental shelf and exclusive economic zones in the Black Sea, Ukraine and Romania received the opportunity to develop economic activity in their respective areas.

Some words on the positive trends:

- **Political** – Regional organizations continue their activity, e.g. the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). The Twenty-Fourth Meeting of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the BSEC Member States was held in Bucharest on 8 June, 2011.
- **Economic** – The energy sectors of Azerbaijani, Turkmen and Kazakh are actively developed and new transport and power routes created. In December 2009, the Trans-Asian gas pipeline "Turkmenistan – China" started its work (it is planned to transport 13 billion cubic meter of gas per annum, and increase up to 40 billion in 2013). Turkmenistan started building a multi-billion-dollar gas pipeline "East-West " in June 2010. The East-West pipe would connect all the major Turkmen gas fields to a single network (it will connect the country's gas entrails with the Caspian region). Azerbaijan is discussing the possibility of increasing the export of energy to Russia and Iran. Kazakhstan conducts the "Trans-Caspian project" to transit Kazakh oil through Azerbaijani territory to the external market (will be implemented in 2012).
- **Military** – The permanent readiness of the international naval group BLACKSEAFOR (comprised of combat ships of Black Sea states). It is ready to act in the case of extraordinary situations in the Black Sea region. Earlier this year, the BLACKSEAFOR Naval Cooperation Task Group marked its 10th anniversary. Every year, BLACKSEAFOR conducts international exercises (last time in August 2011).

Turkey implements the "Black Sea Harmony" initiative aimed at controlling navigation in the Black Sea with the assistance of other regional countries.

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**BIOGRAPHY**

**Lieutenant-General Victor HVOZD**

was born in Ternopil Region in 1959, in 1981 he graduated from the M. Frunze High Combined Arms Commanding College. In 1997 he graduated from the I. Franko State University in Lviv (Faculty of Law) and gained the Master of Law degree from the Kyiv University of Economics and Law in 2005. In 2009, he graduated from the Military Diplomatic Academy (Master of Defence Management). On January 17, 2008 he was appointed Chief of the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine.
In general, these trends create favorable preconditions for the stability in the Black Sea and Caspian Sea regions, settlement of regional contradictions between the leading states of the world, strengthening of confidence and cooperation in different spheres between countries of the Black Sea region, and also creation of favorable conditions to use resource and transport potential of these regions.

At the same time there are several factors that play a deterrent role in the development of the Black Sea and Caspian regions. Let us consider the negative trends of situation development.

NEW NEGATIVE TRENDS

Iran is approaching the creation its own nuclear weapons and missile systems, capable of reaching Black Sea and Caspian region states. In April 2010, despite international pressure, Iran conducted successful testing of third generation centrifuges for Uranium enrichment (are planned to be mounted in the Natanz nuclear center in 2011).

At the same time Iran continues to develop a national missile program. Nowadays, Iranian mobile launchers of medium range ballistic missiles “Shahab-3” (range – up to 1,500 km, may be equipped with nuclear warheads) are fully operational. According to some assessments, Iran will be able to put the new solid propellant ballistic missile with the range of fire to 2,500 km into service in 2015.

The internal instability in several countries of neighboring regions, primarily in Central Asia is intensifying. The security situation in Afghanistan is worsening, especially in Southern and South-Eastern provinces (Gilmen, Uruzgan, Kandaghar, Zabol, Paktika, Paktiya, Khost, Loghur and Nangarhar).

In Kyrgyzstan, public unrest resulted in internal political conflict and change of power. In general, it caused situation aggravation in the region.

All this steps up the threat of spreading radical Islamism from Afghanistan and Pakistan through Central Asia to Caucasus and Crimea.

Let us now consider the other existing negative trends:

Differences continue to exist between the West (US/NATO/EU) and East (Russia) concerning some aspects of situation development in the Black Sea and Caspian regions.

There is a lack of progress in conflict settlement in the post-Soviet area, including the Transdniestrian, Georgian-Abkhazian, Georgian-Ossetian and Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts. During consultations in Astana (Kazakhstan) on 24 May 2010, some indications of negotiations renewal concerning Transdniestrian Moldavian Republic in the “5+2” format were admitted (suspended since 2006). At the same time, tension remains at the border areas between Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia because of continuing armed incidents and provocations from both sides. Also, due to differences between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the settlement process of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict remains blocked.

Increasing military activity in the Black Sea and Caspian regions – expanding deployment of the Armed Forces of leading world countries and their increasing operational and training activity (during 2009-2010 there were series of joint and national regional military exercises held by Iran, Georgia, Russia and other countries); The unresolved issue of the Caspian Sea division complicates the exploration of local natural resources. In particular, it concerns disputes between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan (on the division of some shelf zones);

Problem issues between some Black Sea and Caspian countries on the development of the Black Sea and Caspian shelves and policy of using of Black Sea straits;

Increasing competition between different energy supply routes as a result of changing situation on European energy market;

The consequences of the global financial crisis made negative impact on execution of regional energy projects (and bilateral cooperation between seaside countries).

There are unsolved ecological problems, among which: an overload of Black Sea straits by transport routes; large number of ecologically dangerous factories in littoral states; danger of underwater pipelines usage; underwater military burials (including chemical weapons burials). In this context, the main point of concern is the worsening ecological situation in the delta of Danube and Dnieper (caused by many ecological accidents and uncontrolled pollution of the area).

In general, these circumstances create risks and threats of growing instability in the Black Sea and Caspian regions, an emerging of new regional contradictions and conflicts, as well as spread of terrorism and proliferation of nuclear weapons. They also create obstacles in the use of resources and transportation capabilities of these regions.

Analyses indicates that the abovementioned trends will determine the further development of the military and political situation in the Black Sea and Caspian regions, at least in the mid-term period.

It is possible to admit the following conclusions to the current development of the military and political situation in the Black Sea and Caspian regions:

• the leading world countries and international organizations pay great attention to these regions. Thus they obtain more significant role in the system of interna-
In the security sphere there are a number of necessities:

- a widening of mutual control over activity of Armed Forces of Black Sea countries; an increase of international presence in crisis and conflict zones;
- a resumption of adjusted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and its execution;
- a stirring-up of joint activity to resist the risks and threats to the regional stability;
- mutually beneficial compromise, concerning the issue of deployment of regional ballistic missile defense, involving all interested countries of the region;
- widening of the “BLACK SEA HARMONY” operation on the increasing of navigation control in the Black Sea;
- the continuation of the regional military cooperation in the framework of Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Force – (BLACKSEAFOR);
- the start to Turkey’s initiatives concerning launching regular meetings of ministers of defense of littoral countries such as South Europe Defense Ministerial (SEDM);
- more effective regional cooperation between Black Sea countries in the sense of preparation to react on critical situations (in the framework of joint counterterrorism and peacekeeping exercises), and;
- the organization of information exchange on security issues including data on aerial and offshore situations, activity of criminal and terrorist groups; natural disasters, man-caused catastrophes and other threats to ecological security of the region.

In economic sphere it will be necessary to increase cooperation of Black Sea countries in the frames of joint energy projects, primarily those concerning energy resources transportation. Also required is the civilized settlement of economic disputes with mediation of international organizations and considering interests of all sides.

The practical implementation efforts mentioned require a constantly active regional organization created by Black Sea countries which could, for example, be modeled on the OSCE. In this case, we have to understand that regional disputes between the leading world powers and differing interests of the Black Sea countries will impede the effective and rapid settlement of regional problems, at least in the mid-term term.

Taking the geopolitical position of Ukraine and its non-aligned status into account, Ukraine can emerge as one of the key actors (among the interested sides) providing stability and security in the region. Due to its great territorial, resource, economic, demographic and military potential, Ukraine is a significant element in the regional balance of power between US/NATO/EU and Russia. Under such prevailing circumstances, Ukraine may become a mediator in the settlement of regional problems.

**CONCLUSIONS**

The Black Sea and Caspian regions are becoming very important at the global and regional levels of international relations in the political, economic and security spheres.

Significant problems that create obstacles in the realization of region’s potential remain, namely: "frozen" conflicts, terrorism, energy security threats. They must be resolved by political, diplomatic and economic means involving international judges and avoiding employment of military force.

The settlement of existing regional problems demands a consolidation of efforts of littoral countries and world powers. Ukraine can emerge as one of the key actors (among the interested sides) providing stability and security in the region.
Ljubljana, Slovenia, 13-14 April, 2010

Paris, France, 16 April, 2010

EUISS – Harvard Black Sea Security Program „European foreign policy and the Black Sea region seminar”
Harvard University, April 18-24, 2010

Harvard Black Sea Security Program
J. F. Kennedy School of Government,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, the U.S.A.
Sofia, Bulgaria, September 26-30, 2010

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