Dear Readers,

It is a pleasure to present you with the 2013 Harvard Black Sea Security Journal. Each year, the tide in the Black Sea Region brings something new and leaves many things as they were. The year 2013 will be remembered as the last year the Black Sea Region maintained the frozen conflict status quo (Kogan).

The Russian Federation has illegally annexed Crimea and invaded Ukraine. As many watch the dramatic changes with surprise and disbelief, attempting to make some legal sense of the crisis (Pointkovska), others are focusing on how to invest into the illegally annexed Crimea and the contested Russian Black Sea Fleet. (Delanoe)

The Russian Federation prepared the crisis in Ukraine for many years. In fact, “the most aggressive humanitarian policy aimed at the Russification of Ukrainian history was, and is, held by Russia” (Perepelytsia). At long last, Russia’s soft power aggression exposed Moscow’s geopolitical strategy for the Black Sea Region. Now, more than ever, “the European Union needs to find a modus vivendi between the promotion of its norms and values and thinking and acting geostrategically (Triantaphyllou).

As the EU continues to work toward more solidarity among its member states, Russian-driven federalization and decentralization of Ukraine runs the risk of spreading throughout the region, and beyond. “Western support to initiate negotiations towards Ukraine’s Federalization may encourage Russia. Russia will next push for a parallel process in Transdniestria, Moldova” (Socor, Shelest).

One can only hope that the frozen conflicts will be resolved and not expand. The role of Turkey may very well turn out to be a decisive one. Considering the Exclusive Economic Zones of Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Yayci) however, one is reminded of the economic damage caused to Ukraine and private enterprise by the unrecognized annexation of Crimea as well as the delicate Cypriote peace.

US interests remain strong in the Black Sea region and many of those who are interested in democracy and freedom continue to turn to it for development assistance and hope (Konoplyov, Dunoe). As always, energy remains a tool of coercive diplomacy. Romania’s untapped potential (Dudau) and Azerbaijan’s vast resources will remain major instruments of prosperity, peace and war. The “4.5 format” for protecting resources could lead to a bit more peace in the energy sector (Aslanbayli). Straddled between Azerbaijan and Turkey, Armenia continues its struggle for peace and effective co-operation with both the Russian Federation, CSTO and NATO partners (Yesayan).

NATO’s American Missile defense system in Europe and relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan (Intel, Kotanjan, Aslanbayli) are certainly going to be high on the priority list of many nations; particularly with the war and terrorist conflicts taking place in Ukraine and Syria. Should theoreticians and policy makers focus on justice and peace-making when considering the nature of strategic, operational and tactical doctrine (Nalmpantis) the future could be bright. In the meanwhile, The Black Sea region is bound to be in the limelight for quite some time as its geopolitical positioning ebbs and flows between war and peace.
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The Black Sea Security Program had its genesis in 1997 when Harvard Kennedy School reached out to Ukraine as a fledgling democracy. Over the years this program has expanded its reach first to include other former Soviet Black Sea countries and currently to countries in the greater Black Sea region. An overarching goal has been to encourage regional security through cooperation and integration. It is unique in its mission to bring together leading policy makers in the region with senior US officials to gain a deeper understanding of issues affecting the region and to encourage problem solving in areas of common interest. The program typically involves senior military representatives and civilian security specialists from the United States and ten regional countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. Recent efforts to reach out have brought participants from Kazakhstan, Croatia, Slovenia and Serbia to Harvard. The Black Sea Security Program and its predecessor – the Ukrainian National Security Program – have brought together more than 400 regional participants and 200 American participants since 1997.

The program aims to:
- Deepen participants’ understanding of global and regional strategy, defense organization, and military reform and restructuring;
- Identify the very broad common areas of agreement that exist among the Black Sea nations;
and expose their officials and the US participants to the strong common history and shared values of the region;
- Highlight the specific areas of current cooperation on issues of vital interest to these countries and, at the same time, identify those issues which divide them and present challenges to regional cooperation;
- Expose the Black Sea officials to the free flow of ideas inherent in the pluralistic American system and within the US national security community itself by engaging them with officials who represent a wide range of viewpoints.

The 2013 program started in Bucharest, Romania with a seminar "Strategic Goals and Security Policy" on April 4-6. The group moved on to Vienna for a conference "EU and Black Sea Region" on April 7-8, organized by Austrian MoD and International Institute for Peace. The second week was in Boston at Harvard Kennedy School from April 10-15, 2013.

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THE STATEMENTS MADE AND VIEWS EXPRESSED ARE SOLELY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AUTHORS
Continuities and ruptures: tracking the US interests in the Black Sea area in the context of the "Pivot to Asia"

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ABSTRACT

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US has become one of the main actors on the Black Sea stage. Whereas energy has been the key driver of Washington’s involvement in the region from the end of the 1990s, the US agenda has broadened to include security issues and democratization after the 9/11 attacks. Today, in the context of the withdrawal from Afghanistan and the ‘Pivot to Asia’, the US influence in the Black Sea is retrenching. However, despite a seeming waning interest, Washington’s involvement in the region is likely to remain driven by energy security as well as by the deployment of NATO’s ballistic missile defense.

The Black Sea lies at the crossroads of several geographical regions: Transcaucasia, Eastern Europe, the Balkans, Eastern Mediterranean and Asia Minor. As a strategic intersection connecting the Middle East, Eurasia and Europe, the Black Sea appears to be one of the world’s critical crossroads.1 Defining the Black Sea region is not easy. Depending on what countries are taken into consideration, the Black Sea region could be considered as the territory corresponding to the pontus euxinus, or one could also consider the area delimited by the only regional organization which gathers all the neighboring stakeholders, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC).2 However, according to the European Commission, the Black Sea region encompasses ten countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine.3 These definitions nonetheless do not provide an accurate sense of the Black Sea as a region, in the sense that the countries considered do not share ‘self-conscious projects for crafting a sense of belonging to a broad com-
munity based on territorial proximity, common domestic policies, or cooperation in foreign policy. In other words, the geographical proximity of the Black Sea States does not compensate for the weakness of their political and economic interdependence as well as their cultural heterogeneity. Moreover, other foreign or local actors, such as NATO, the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) should be taken into consideration since they exert influence on Black Sea dynamics, thus shaping relations between local stakeholders. As for the US, Washington’s policy regarding the Black Sea area during the 2000s was centered on three pillars: energy, security and democracy. The aim was to turn the Black Sea into a reliable conduit of energy diversification, security and freedom between Europe and the Middle East and Central Asia. Since 2008 and the election of President Obama, the Black Sea seems to have been de prioritized by the US administration which is focused on the withdrawal from Afghanistan and on the ‘pivot to Asia’. However, despite a seeming waning interest, the Black Sea remains involved in the security agenda of the US; the region continues to be the back door to the Caspian Sea and its hydrocarbons resources, it is a hub for the pullout from Afghanistan and an outpost for the post-withdrawal period as well as a centerpiece of the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) architecture. Furthermore, the ongoing Ukrainian crisis has highlighted the central role of the region in Europe’s security context.

**FROM THE CLINTON TO THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION: TOWARD A GROWING INTEREST FOR THE BLACK SEA**

If the access to natural resources seems to have first attracted the US in the Black Sea area during the 1990s, one could also consider more widely the expansion of Washington’s influence in the Black Sea in late 1990s as the next step after Central Europe and the Balkans. The irruption and the extension of US influence to the Black Sea area in the late 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s was sustained by two main dynamics: securing access to the hydrocarbon resources of the Caspian basin and creating a secure corridor allowing the projection of influence and forces toward Central Asia and the Middle East through the Black Sea. Washington’s growing influence had been later sustained by the war on terror triggered after 9/11, NATO expansion and the wave of democratization in the countries of the former Warsaw Pact, with the objective to anchor the Black Sea to the West by turning the Newly Independent States (NIS) into reliable partners.

**New Sources of Energy**

Energy remains one of the main drivers of Washington’s foreign policy as it seeks to ensure availability, accessibility and affordability of the energy resources for its own consumption, but furthermore, for its European partners. As a provider for economic stability, energy security became a high priority for the US and the EU economies during the past decades. Whereas President Clinton’s first term was mainly focused on ensuring stability in Russia; during his second term, the US administration developed an energy policy for the Caucasus and the eastern part of the Caspian basin. The concept of an ‘East-West corridor’ for oil and gas supplies emerged and the opening of this region corresponded in the early 1990s to raising US commercial interests. However, the focus on the hydrocarbon resources of the Caspian and the objective to reshape the regional energy map by bypassing Russia precluded the creation of any comprehensive Black Sea policy. In 1999, the Silk Road Strategy Act was voted by Congress in order to support US involvement, enabling Washington to enhance its foreign economic and military assistance to the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

The first Bush administration started with similar priorities than its predecessor, and in May 2001, then Vice-President Dick Cheney commissioned a policy review that was expected to produce recommendations to enhance the US role in the region. As the main corridor to access and secure the hydrocarbon reserves of the Caspian basin, the Black Sea, and the Caucasus with mainly Georgia and Azerbaijan, became a priority for the US, which sought to diversify energy routes. Furthermore, Caspian resources appeared as strategic as, in the context of a growing energy competition; they would offer gas and oil supplies from non-OPEC, non-Persian Gulf and non-Russian reserves, thus increasing diversification and energy security for the European market. Turkey, as a NATO partner, was also seen as an energy hub and a key player for Washington’s influence in the region. In that regard, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, operational since 2005, may be considered as an achievement of the US for diversification of the supplying energy routes. Moreover, Washington focused its strategy on bypassing Russia to diminish its influence on former Caspian and Black Sea Soviet republics. However, the EU preferred interdependence with Russia,
and this difference undermined to some extent Washington's projects in diversifying pipelines.

Whereas Caspian states attracted first the US interest, shedding a new light on the Black Sea and Caucasus strategic relevance, Bulgaria and Romania didn't attract much attention to Washington's eyes in the 1990s as they were not a part of America's energy vision in the area. However, starting from the beginning of the 2000s, the US displayed a renewed interest for these states as the Black Sea became more and more involved in the global security agenda of Washington.

The War on Terror & the Expansion of the US Security Agenda to the Black Sea

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 overthrown Washington's priorities and interest for the Black Sea, and gave an impetus to the US involvement in the Black Sea, which was seen as a platform for influence and power projection for the War on Terror. The area began to be perceived not only as the backdoor to Central Asia, but also as the backdoor to the 'Wider Middle East' or to the 'Broader Middle East and North Africa' (BMENA). As a nexus to Central Asia and the Middle East, the strategic relevance of the Black Sea was enhanced whereas the Bush Administration deprioritized the Caspian basin. While under Clinton Administration, the US Special Advisor for Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy reported directly to the President; under the first Bush Administration, he reported to the Secretary of State. Moreover, his office was merged with the office of the Special Envoy for Eurasian Security, which meant that there was no more specific focus on this area. Moreover, the American security agenda in the Black Sea was not restricted to the War on Terror, but was soon widened to combating proliferation, organized crime and various illegal trafficking activities that aided and financed international terrorism.

The War on Terror shed a new light on the Black Sea region's role as, on the one hand, a border between the Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia, regions with potential terrorist threat, and the West on the other hand, committed to fight global terrorism. The US soon established a network of military facilities and bases in Central Asia (Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kirghizstan) with the approval of Moscow. More widely, the American security agenda in the Black Sea was not restricted to war on terror, but was soon widened to combating proliferation, organized crime and various illegal trafficking which help and finance international terrorism. These so-called national security threats (NST) undermined stability and integration of Black Sea and Caspian states while creating opportunities for larger conflicts. Washington decided to enhance the capabilities of the Georgian army, and in 2002, the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) was launched and aimed at equipping and training 3 battalions. This program was not only intended to build up Georgian capacities to address potential terrorist issues on its territory, but also to give Tbilisi the ability to contribute to operations in Afghanistan. The buildup of Georgian forces was part of a greater concern for the Bush Administration which sought to secure unlimited air and land access to Georgia and Azerbaijan for projection of US and NATO forces into Afghanistan. Raising security challenges were underscored in 2006 by Matthew Bryza, while he was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs:

"Throughout the Caucasus, we have three sets of strategic interests. These are valid in all three countries. Yes, we have energy interests, and we're not embarrassed to say that energy is a strategic interest. We have pure security interests, or traditional security interests – meaning fighting terrorism, fighting proliferation, avoiding military conflict, and restoring (or preserving, in some cases) the territorial integrity of the states of the region [...] And then we have a third set of interests: in the internal reform of each country – democratic and market economic reform, for all the reasons the [US] president has articulated, based on our belief that stability only comes from legitimacy. And legitimacy requires democracy on the political side and prosperity on the economic side, and you only get both – democracy and prosperity – through serious reform. So all three sets of interests are being pursued by us at any one time."
region15. Kazakhstan was part of Central Command's area of responsibility, whereas European Command (EUCOM) was in charge for operations in Azerbaijan.

NATO Extension to Black Sea States

The NATO Strategic Concept of April 1999 stated that "No European democratic country whose admission would fulfill the objectives of the Treaty will be excluded from consideration", meaning that Black Sea countries are legitimate candidate for membership16. In 2002, during NATO Prague Summit, a NATO-Ukraine action plan was adopted in order to initiate the membership process. During the Istanbul NATO summit in 2004, the Alliance underscored "the importance of the Black Sea region for Euro-Atlantic security", calling for further efforts in order to strengthen "security and stability in the area"17.

The extension of the North Atlantic Alliance to Black Sea countries found its relevance in the context of the War on Terror. The integration of some of the Black Sea states to Euro-Atlantic security structures was supposed to provide stability while enhancing NATO's capacities of intervention. Bulgaria and Romania became credible candidates for joining NATO and allies for anti-terror operations while being part of Donald Rumsfeld's concept of 'New Europe'. Whereas the process which led to Bulgarian and Romanian membership in 2004 was shortened; with regard to Ukraine, Washington lost at the same time a historical opportunity to offer NATO membership to Kiev. As for Georgia, possible NATO membership was raised in September 2006, when an intensified dialogue was launched in reforms required to join the Alliance.18 The scope of cooperation covered by NATO-Georgia relation remains broad: security cooperation, defence and security sector reform, civil emergency planning, science and environment and public information. Tbilisi's involvement in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) allowed Georgian troops to operate in peacekeeping operations in Kosovo (1999-2008), as well as being deployed in Iraq and in Afghanistan (in Helmand Province). With 1,500 military personnel operating in Afghanistan, Georgia is today one of the largest non-NATO contributors per capita to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).19 However, during the NATO Bucharest Summit of April 2008, both Kiev and Tbilisi were not granted the Membership Action Plan (MAP – a tailor made support programme for countries wishing to join the Alliance). While Tbilisi appeared deeply disappointed by the outcomes of this summit, Kiev was less concerned since there was no massive public support in Ukraine for joining NATO. The perspective of Georgian and Ukrainian memberships raised a set of issues regarding the readiness of the Alliance to accept new members and to deal with frozen conflicts, potential conflicts (Crimea) or declared conflicts (South-Ossetia, Abkhazia), on the territory of new members, as well as challenging Russia in what Moscow considers as its 'sphere of influence'.

Democratization & the Colour Revolutions

Democratization as a driver of US involvement in the Black Sea appeared before 9/11. The promotion of initiatives related to the democratic development of the NIS was split between the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the State Department20. However, in 1996-1997, then Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott delivered a series of speeches in which he outlined strengthening political and economic reforms as one of the US priorities in the NIS. This objective displayed Washington's strong belief that the US will benefit from promoting peace and democracy in the NIS. Sustaining civil society institutions and promoting democracy through funding and technical assistance in Black Sea states was furthermore seen as a way to consolidate volatile and weak states and to prevent potential wars between them.21 The terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the rise of international terrorism further enhanced the need to strengthen weak states and fortify central authority in Black Sea states to deter them from becoming safe havens by terrorist groups. Democratic transformation became the backbone of US foreign policy, and the Rose Revolution in Georgia (2003) as well as the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (2004) were seen as results of Washington's investment in democracy support. In the meantime, the aim was also to prevent the re-emergence of Moscow as the main regional hegemon that would be able to undermine US interests and influence, especially regarding energy security.22 Moreover, the color revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine were seen as iconic and as a strong path toward further integration with European and Euro-Atlantic structures.

While building up its security partnership with Tbilisi as seen previously, Washington saw naval diplomacy as a driver to display its political support to the new leader in Kiev, and Sea Breeze exercise appeared as a way to show this commitment. However, in March 2006, Viktor Yanukovich won the election at the Ukrainian parliament. Following his election, pro-Russian parties in
Ukraine contributed to the cancellation of Sea Breeze 2006 and Tigh Knot exercises both previously scheduled to take place in Crimea. This move was followed in September by Viktor Yanukovitch’s decision to postpone NATO membership due to a lack of popular support (60% of the population against NATO accession) and the desire to maintain good relations with Moscow.

**THE FIRST OBAMA TERM: THE BLACK SEA DE-PRIORITIZED**

The year 2008 represents a turning point at many levels in Washington’s involvement in the Black Sea, and more widely, on the relations between the Euro-Atlantic community and the Black Sea stage. The replacement of Donald Rumsfeld by Robert Gates in 2006 as the Secretary of Defense had nevertheless initiated a shift in the US policy toward the Black Sea. However, President Obama’s election confirmed the shift in US foreign policy since the newly elected President decided to put the relations with the Arabs on the top of his policy agenda. President Obama also began his tenure with a security agenda focused on the withdrawal from Iraq and from Afghanistan as well as rebuilding confidence with Moscow.

**Energy: a Persistent Driver**

The Obama administration appointed Richard L. Morningstar as the new Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy in April 2009. While visiting Ankara in July 2009, he strongly advocated for Nabucco gas pipeline and put aside the option that Iran would be part of this project. The drivers of US involvement on the Caspian energy stage remain unchanged: bringing Central Asian hydrocarbon resources to international market, enhancing European energy security by increasing energy supplies, while developing the economy of supplying countries of the Caspian and transit countries of the Caucasus. Richard Morningstar underscored the role of Turkey both as a transit country and as a leader in the region. Turkey’s role as an energy hub was set to increase thanks to Nabucco, however, with a planned capacity of 30 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas per year, the question was raised on how to fill the pipeline with enough gas. Azerbaijan, with its tremendous Shah Deniz gas field, was seen as the main supplier; yet, Turkmenistan and even Iraq were also seen as potential and relevant gas providers. In 2010, there was a shift within the US rhetoric toward energy issues; Washington stopped supporting exclusively Nabucco, and started promoting the Southern Corridor. As stated by Richard Morningstar in October 2010, the US has “a balanced policy on energy, more balanced than previously” and “support the Southern Corridor in general, rather than a sole pipeline”. The commercial viability of Nabucco was questioned. Although Nabucco appeared as much desirable strategic and political project, the US administration started to support any projects part of the Southern Corridor, no matter how smaller they are, which would be able to supply gas to European countries that need it, and which could be enlarged when greater volumes of gas are produced.

**The Failure of the ‘Colour Revolutions’**

The eastern shore of the Black Sea has been experiencing a rise in authoritarian practices since the end of the 2000s. If Ukraine and Georgia were promising candidates to democratic breakthroughs, there has been a deep disillusion since the end of the past decade regarding domestic developments. Democratic transition in both countries could be considered as frozen if not regressing, although a distinction must be made between the Georgian context and the Ukrainian one. Whereas he was elected president in 2005 as the leader of the Orange Revolution, Viktor Yushchenko had not been able to sustainably implement democratic changes in Ukraine. After he lost the legislative elections of 2006, his main opponent and past challenger for the presidential election, Viktor Yanukovitch, became Prime Minister. However, the turning point remains his election as President of Ukraine in 2010. As a first step, Viktor Yanukovitch decided to improve relations with Moscow, which implied a deal on the issue of the Russian Black Sea fleet stationed in Ukraine. On 21 April 2010, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovitch signed the Kharkov Agreement. According to the text, the lease for the Russian Black Sea Fleet was extended from 2017 to 2042, with an option for another five years. In return, Ukraine was to benefit from discounts on gas imports worth up to $40 billion under current contracts that expire in 2019. Kiev carried on its relations with NATO during the second half of the 2000s, especially in the naval realm. In 2007, the first Ukrainian ship, the corvette URS Ternopil, was deployed in support of Operation Active Endeavour, a deployment that has since been renewed annually. Kiev granted the Alliance a land transit right for the supply of ISAF in 2009; however,
in February 2010, President Viktor Yanukovitch clearly stated that he intended to continue cooperation with NATO, while taking the issue of NATO membership off the agenda.\textsuperscript{30} The same month, President Obama called President Yanukovitch and outlined the main drivers of US policy toward Ukraine as ‘expanding democracy and prosperity, protecting security and territorial integrity, strengthening the rule of law, promoting nonproliferation, and supporting reform in Ukraine’s economic and energy sectors’.\textsuperscript{31} Kiev’s intention to improve ties with Moscow received the support of Washington as stated by then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton when she visited Kiev in July 2010.\textsuperscript{32} Yet, Washington has also expressed concerns about political developments: in October 2011, former Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko ‘was convicted of abuse of power arising out of her role in signing a natural gas supply agreement with Russia and sentenced to seven years in prison’.\textsuperscript{33} Timoshenko’s custody was interpreted as an attempt to eliminate a potential challenger a few months before the parliamentary elections of October 2012 that were considered by both Washington and Brussels as not meeting democratic standards. The State Department considered these elections as a ‘step backward’ and as a negative signal coming from Ukrainian political stage. By the end of President Obama’s first term, the ‘passion’, which existed during most of the 2000s in the US-Ukrainian relations, was downgraded.\textsuperscript{34}

In Georgia, Mikhail Saakashvili was reelected President in January 2008 through elections which, while being considered by the OSCE as meeting democratic standards, were nevertheless characterized by irregularities.\textsuperscript{35} Yet, Georgia’s step back from democratic progress recorded in the mid 2000s started in 2007. Opposition parties called for further systemic reforms, and growing tensions with the government led to demonstrations in Tbilisi in November 2007. Washington expressed deep concern in the Georgian government’s use of excessive force to break up the protests.\textsuperscript{36} In May 2010, a constitutional commission amended the constitution and as a result, those of the president was slightly reduced while the powers of the prime minister were increased.\textsuperscript{37} Although Tbilisi was not granted MAP during the 2008 Bucharest NATO summit, Georgia and NATO have increased their ties during President Obama’s first term. In August 2010, bilateral relations were enhanced through the development of an effective military cooperation with the creation of a military committee, and in October, a NATO Liaison Office was inaugurated in Tbilisi. The NATO-Georgia Commission meeting held in Brussels in May 2012 underscored the Alliance’s commitment to strengthen support for civil service reform and democratization efforts.\textsuperscript{38} Washington and Tbilisi signed a Charter on Strategic Partnership on January 2009 which aims at strengthening the US support for sovereignty and independence, and underscore perspectives for Georgia’s NATO membership.\textsuperscript{39} In October 2013, Giorgi Margvelashvili became the country’s new President, and in late November, Irakli Garibashvili was appointed Prime Minister. Although the NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated in October 2013 that Georgia would not accede to the Alliance in 2014, both sides continued to pursue their bilateral cooperation after the elections.\textsuperscript{40} In February 2014, NATO’s Military Committee conducted its first ever visit to Georgia and acknowledged progress made by Tbilisi in defence reforms.\textsuperscript{41} According to Irakli Garibashvili, Georgia hopes to be granted MAP during the next NATO summit in September 2014.\textsuperscript{42} While this perspective remains very unlikely, Tbilisi is at least expected to contribute to the NATO Response Force in 2015.

Rebuilding Relations with Russia: from August 2008 to the Reset

Rebuilding confidence and constructive relations with Russia became one of the priorities of the Obama administration through the ‘Reset’ although it was not a top-level objective of US foreign policy. Meanwhile, the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict remains a milestone since it has recast the security paradigm in the area, and confirmed the inefficiency of regional structures to prevent, diffuse and settle the conflict. As Oksana Antonenko has written, ‘the war and its aftermath have clearly demonstrated that no regional security in the Black Sea is possible against Russia or even without Russia’.\textsuperscript{43} Moreover, it indicated that Moscow will not hesitate to use military forces when it comes to its interests and that the conventional use of force remains a policy option in the area.\textsuperscript{44} Engaging Russia became a two level objective for the new administration. First, at the regional level, Washington aimed at reducing tensions and instability. Improved ties with Russia in the Black Sea would improve, at the sub regional level, the security of energy infrastructures in Caucasus, especially those crossing Georgia.\textsuperscript{45} At a global level, the US needed better ties with Moscow to benefit from its support on key international issues such as Iran’s nuclear program and arms control. Washington called for a ‘Re-
set’ in bilateral relations with Moscow, and prospects for improved US-Russia came at a time when the perspective for further NATO enlargement was put on the back burner, at least for the foreseeable future.\(^4\) During President Obama’s first term, the US did not seek to challenge openly Moscow in what Russia considers as its ‘sphere of privileged interest’, namely Ukraine and Georgia. Yet, Washington’s security agenda in the Black Sea area remained shaped by drivers which have conflicted with, even challenged, Moscow’s interests: the Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) shield, and ongoing measure to diversify Europe’s energy supply routes.

According to agreements signed in 2006 with Sofia and Bucharest, Washington has been granted the use of military facilities in both countries. In Bulgaria, the US plans to accommodate up to 2,500 soldiers deployed within four assets: the Novo Selo polygon, a storage unit at Aitos, Bezmër air base, which is the core facility, and Graf Ignatievo air base. In Romania, the US has been granted the use of Mihăileanu air base, near Constanța, as well as free access to Babadag polygon. Washington has used Mihăileanu air base as a hub for the carriage of troops and military hardware from and to Iraq and Afghanistan. However, another asset, Deveselu air base is planned to receive part of US ABM defense shield\(^5\). In Romania, Washington intends to deploy up to 1,700 troops, and the cost of the deployment of 24 interceptor missiles was estimated at $400 million with an additional $20 million each year for maintenance. Moreover, the US Navy plans to deploy Aegis destroyers, carrying SM-3 interceptor missiles, not only in the Mediterranean, but in the Black Sea, as a part of the European ABM defense architecture\(^6\). The establishment of US and NATO assets in Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey is set to increase naval, air and infantry activities in the Black Sea area, potentially threatening the military balance. The enhancement of Washington’s military capacities in the Black Sea area has been one of the key issues of US-Russia relations during President Obama’s first term, especially regarding the ABM shield.

If US-Russia relations have improved globally since 2008 in contrast to the years of the Bush administrations, the ‘Reset’ did not provide the expected results. Bilateral relations between the two sides remain tense despite progress on key global issues such as Afghanistan. Unlike the Bush administration, the Obama administration focused on a shift toward the Caspian basin energy issues while strengthening its position on the western shore of the Black Sea. One of the top priority issues of US foreign policy, the withdrawal from Afghanistan, has shaped Washington’s stance on the Black Sea stage, as well as the commitment to protect European allies from a potential ballistic missile threat.

On the eastern shore of the Pontus Euxinus, Washington’s pressure has on the contrary decreased since the US tried not to challenge Moscow’s influence since the August 2008 conflict.

**THE SECOND OBAMA TERM: AMERICA’S RETRENCHMENT ON THE BLACK SEA STAGE**

Washington’s foreign policy appears today as less driven by the promotion of democracy than it used to be during the past decade, a shift that has affected its involvement in the Black Sea. The ‘pivot to Asia’ illustrates the prioritization of the US interests eastward, toward hot topical issues such as Iran or East Asia. Furthermore, the ‘Pivot to Asia’ takes place in a difficult economic context tied to the global economic crisis. Washington had to make a choice and to prioritize its foreign policy issues. As a consequence, energy and security issues have arisen as the two main priorities of Washington’s involvement on the Black Sea stage. While energy remains an area of direct investment, by ‘leading from behind’, the US has used NATO and the EU as channels of influence with mitigated outcomes.

**The Political Dimension of Energy Competition**

Maintaining diverse and secure supplies to European allies remains an extremely important priority. Although the shale gas revolution has turned the US into a gas exporter, it should not impact on Washington’s involvement in the Black Sea and the Caspian where American interests are more geopolitical. The presence of NATO allies, the partnership with Turkey and the need to support energy security for the EU should keep the US involved in the area.

The stability of the transit route through the Caucasus remains a concern for the US, especially with regard to the protracted conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh. Washington approaches its settlement through the Minsk Group and bilateral ties with both Armenia and Azerbaijan. This conflict is nevertheless not considered through a Black Sea prism since the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), as the only broad regional organization, is not robust enough and not an appropriate forum to host peace talks. In June
2013, the Azeri Minister of Foreign Affairs Elmar Mammadov visited Washington and met with Secretary of State John Kerry. During their meeting, they raised a set of common issues such as the key role of Azerbaijan in the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), the Southern Corridor, as well as the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh frozen conflict. Indeed, pipelines connecting the Caspian Sea to Europe have to snake around Armenia because of this protracted conflict.

The second Obama administration has kept on supporting the Southern Corridor as this project contributes to the diversification European gas supplies, diminishes European dependency upon Russia and furthermore isolates Iran. In their respective quest to diversify energy supplies, some European countries have nevertheless started to support new routes for Russian gas, as Germany did with Nord Stream gas pipeline for instance. South Stream is another Russian led project which is supported by European countries as Hungary, Italy (ENI), France (EDF) and Germany (BASF). Both projects bypass Baltic States, Poland as well as Ukraine and challenge other projects, however, while not supporting them, Washington hasn’t try to block their respective developments. As the Nabucco project had appeared to be less and less commercially viable during the last years of the first Obama administration, a variant arose: the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) will bring Azeri gas to Turkey via Georgia. Scheduled to begin in 2018, the TANAP will cost $10 billion, will be 2000 kilometers long and will have a capacity of 16 bcm per year, 6 of which will stay in Turkey as the 10 remaining will be exported to Europe through Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). Being operated by the Turkish BOTAS and the Azeri SOCAR, TANAP’s capacity is about half of the capacity of Nabucco, although its maximum capacity is expected to be 31 bcm. The operators of the Shah Deniz field, namely BP, Total, Statoil and SOCAR, have chosen TAP instead of Nabucco-West because it is shorter and more commercially viable. TAP will be connected to the TANAP in Turkey, and run through Greece and Albania before crossing the Adriatic Sea and reaching Italy, Statoil, AXPO and EON will operate the project which is supposed to cost $10 billion and is scheduled to start working in 2018.

The US has furthermore supported the development of domestic gas production, which would ease Black Sea state’s dependence on Russian supplies. In late 2013, Ukraine held talks on a production-sharing agreement (PSA) with an ExxonMobil-led consortium to exploit the Skifska gas field off the western coast of the Black Sea. However, in late January 2014, Kiev postponed the agreement for a later date. In the meantime, Kiev and Baku were prospecting possibilities to create an LNG supply route via Georgia. This ambitious and costly project would require building an LNG plant in the Georgian port of Batumi in order to liquify the gas, and another one in Ukraine’s port of Yuzhny to gasify it. The US also backed the development of Ukrainian shale gas fields since the country is believed to have Europe’s third-largest reserves with recoverable reserves assessed by the US Energy Information Administration at 1.18 trillion cubic meters. In January 2013, Kiev signed with Royal Dutch Shell a PSA on the Yuzivska field located in the east, while in November 2013 it signed a deal with Chevron on the Oleska field in western Ukraine. However, these are long term projects that could later open the path for further energy cooperation between the Black Sea area and the Baltic, through the old “Varyags to the Greeks” trade route.

"Leading from Behind": NATO and the EU as US Channels of Influence

The US has retrenched behind NATO in Romania, where the Ballistic Defense Missile (BMD) is being built, and to a lesser extent, in Georgia. In Ukraine, where US involvement relies mainly on geopolitical drivers, the EU appears as the main channel of American involvement, resulting however, in little constructive outcomes. Washington has allowed the EU take the lead in Ukraine, and decided to support whatever policy Brussels would undertake. Indeed, NATO enlargement to Ukraine seems frozen for the foreseeable future, since this perspective did not benefit from much support within the Alliance itself, and in Ukraine proper. President Yanukovitch rejected MAP in 2010, and has sought to improve ties with Russia since then. During the last years of the 2000s, Moscow had regularly stated that Ukraine’s membership to NATO is seen as a direct threat and that it would be compelled to react; a ‘red line’ which NATO member states were not ready to cross, and which prevented the Alliance from adopting a comprehensive and robust stance regarding Ukraine’s membership. While cooperating with Kiev on nuclear non-proliferation and energy issues, the first Obama administration voiced serious concerns about democratic developments, especially regarding the October 2012 parliamentary elections. With the prospects for NATO integration fading, Kiev’s best chance to get...
closer to the Euro-Atlantic community was some sort of enhanced integration with the EU. However, even this prospect has turned out to be compromised following Kiev's decision to suspend talks with Brussels on a Ukraine-EU agreement in November 2013 and the ensuing political crisis in the country. Beyond decisive economic and internal politic factors, President Yanukovich's decision is also explained by the lack of support from the US, which had previously fueled the initial reluctance of some of the EU members to support a rapprochement with Kiev. Ukraine's decision highlights the lack of a strategic vision by the EU with regard to its neighborhood, and the Union's attractiveness should not be taken for granted anymore. Kiev's decision follows Armenia's choice for the Russian led Customs union in September 2013, and further illustrates the failure, if not the collapse, of the Eastern partnership (EaP) in the Black Sea area. Conflicting and overlapping EU policies (EaP, Black Sea Synergy) as well as a tendency to isolate Russia explain Brussels' inability to deal with the Black Sea region.

On the other hand, both Georgia and Moldova, initiated an Association Agreement with the EU during the November 2013 Vilnius Summit. In Georgia, Bidzina Ivanishvili's tenure (October 2012-November 2013) as Prime minister, raised concerns in the US after the Ivanishvili government had begun arresting officials who had served in the previous Saakashvili government.59 In November 2013, new elections brought to power Giorgi Margvelashvili as President, and then, Irakli Garibashvili as Prime Minister. Mikhail Saakashvili's withdrawal from the Georgian political landscape could open the path to normalized relations with Moscow. The new Georgian government should also seek to establish relations with Abkhazia and South-Ossetia, an endeavor already backed by the US as stated in December 2013 by Victoria Nuland, the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs.60 Constrained by the 2014 pullout from Afghanistan, the US seems to have engaged Moscow in the eastern shore's security system, thus not challenging Russia's interests in the Caucasus, in order to maintain stability in the Southern Gas Corridor.

On the other hand, the BMD appears to be the most difficult issue in US-Russia relations. Romania plays a key role in the NATO missile defense architecture as it hosts elements of the second phase of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). Interceptor missiles are scheduled to be deployed on the Deveselu airbase in southern Romania by 2015 while work to overhaul the base has been underway since October 2013.61 However, following the November 2013 agreement on Iran's nuclear program, relations between Washington and Teheran might improve in the midterm. This could potentially question the raison d'etre of the BMD which is aimed at preventing any potential missile attacks, mainly from Iran, against Europe. In the context of the development of the BMD, Turkey plays also a key role: Ankara accepted in September 2011 to host on its soil a AN/TPY-2 radar, as a part of the European BMD.62 Romania also contributes to the US withdrawal from Afghanistan as a transit hub for American troops. In October 2013, Washington and Bucharest signed a bilateral agreement that would allow the US to switch its flight operations from Kyrgyzstan's Manas air base to Romania. Washington has been allowed to use the Mihail Kogalniceanu air base as well as the nearby port of Constanta in order to withdraw its 52,000 troops from Afghanistan.63 The subsequent increase in NATO naval activity around Constanta has made Ankara's involvement essential for the US, since Turkey has shown in the past reluctance to any unilateral increase of US naval activity in the Black Sea. The revitalization of the US-Turkish partnership has been more broadly a part of the Obama's administration effort to build a new approach to relationships with countries in the Middle East.64 Washington sees Ankara as a key partner to deal with Middle Eastern issues as well as with the EU, as a key economic actor and an energy hub, and as a NATO member state.65 Moreover, there are ongoing outstanding tensions between Turkey and its neighborhood, in particular with Greece, Cyprus and Armenia while the country has borders with sensitive actors such as Syria, Iraq and Iran. NATO appears as the key American driver on the western shore of the Black Sea. The Alliance has furthermore already planned to hold its next exercise, Trident Juncture, in Southern Europe in 2015. This exercise should be six to seven time bigger than Steadfast Jazz which was held in early November 2013 in Poland and in the Baltic States, with the involvement of 6,000 NATO personnel as well as military from Ukraine, Sweden and Finland. Yet, the US only sent 300 personnel. Trident Juncture's aim is to preserve Afghanistan-era cooperation between member states through the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI).66

The Ukrainian Crisis and its Impact on US involvement in the Black Sea Region.

The Ukrainian crisis and Russia's annexation of Crimea have recast the strategic context of the Black Sea region.
Washington is likely to refocus its security involvement in the region both bilaterally and through NATO, mainly on the Northwestern shore of the Black Sea.

While US-Russian relations are severed for the foreseeable future, Washington has adopted a legal response to the situation in Eastern Europe. The "Russian Aggression Prevention Act" was adopted by the Congress on May 1, 2014 with the aim to prevent "further Russian aggression toward Ukraine and other sovereign States in Europe and Eurasia". Beyond this serial of legal measures, the US have outlined the "European Reassurance Initiative" in an effort to support NATO allies and European partners in Central and Eastern Europe. Through this initiative, the US military footprint is set to increase in the Black Sea area as Washington aims at increasing interoperability as well as the number of air, land and sea exercises with its NATO allies in the region in order to build up their respective combat readiness. The capacity of Central and Eastern European NATO members as well as those of Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia should be further enhanced through an increased military and technical cooperation with the United States. In order to support the "European Reassurance Initiative", Washington has planned to spend $1 billion included in the Department of Defense’s FY 2015 Overseas Contingency Operations. The US is noticeably pursuing the implementation of the BMD as well as the deployment of Black Sea Rotational Forces (BSRF) on Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base in Romania. This BSRF includes 250 Marines and sailors tasked with maintaining positive relations with partner nations, enhancing regional stability, and increasing interoperability while providing the capability for rapid crisis response in the Black Sea, Balkan, and Caucasus regions. This enhanced US military presence, which had been ongoing before the outbreak of the crisis, partly brings an answer to Romanian calls for a greater security involvement of Washington in the region. Moreover, the US Navy has increased its activity in the Black Sea since the beginning of the crisis, and has conducted exercises with the Romanian and the Bulgaria naval forces.

On the other hand, other allies, such as Bulgaria, have called for more NATO troops in the Black Sea area. NATO will also be part of the US response to security challenges posed by the Ukrainian crisis which has nevertheless raised a set of both internal and external issues for the Alliance. First, the Ukrainian crisis has shed the light on the unsufficient defense spending of its member states. In June 2014, US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel urged NATO allies to bolster their military spending which have dropped during the past years to far less than the minimum 2% of GDP required by the Alliance. Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania have announced plans to boost their respective military budget, however, Eastern Europe and Black Sea NATO allies are likely to remain security consumers more than security providers for the Alliance. NATO’s military footprint is nevertheless set to increase as the new air and sea deployments should take place: AWACS are scheduled to be dispatched in Romania to enhance NATO's situational awareness of activities in the region as well as to reassure NATO allies. On the other hand, the naval presence of the Alliance in Black Sea waters has been almost ongoing since the beginning of the crisis with the noticeable contribution of US and French vessels. However, the Ukrainian crisis has also questioned the ability of NATO to address ambiguous warfare. The Alliance does not have a comprehensive strategy to address cyber-attacks, and in the case of an asymmetric attack conducted against a member state, it would be very difficult to invoke the article 5 which triggers a collective response.

CONCLUSION

Following the US withdrawal from Iraq and the forthcoming pullout from Afghanistan, the 'Pivot to Asia' is likely to impact Washington's involvement in the Black Sea area. Washington needs to maintain constructive relations with Moscow to deal with major international security issues such as arms control, Afghanistan, Iran or stability in the Middle East. In that regard, the US does not have any interest in challenging Russia in its so-called sphere of 'privileged interests'. If supporting democratization in the region is not the priority it used to be during most of the 2000s, Washington still maintains a presence through NATO and energy security remains a key driver of its involvement in the area despite the ongoing shale gas revolution. Nevertheless, regional hegemons, namely Russia and Turkey, have gained more influence and leverage in the Black Sea stage. Russia has already seized this opportunity, as Armenia's choice for the Russian led Custom Union and recent developments in Ukraine have demonstrated. Turkey has claimed its sovereignty on Eastern Mediterranean offshore gas reserves, reviving tensions with Cyprus. On the other hand, the EU has not been able to fill the strategic vacuum left by the waning American...
influence in the region as shown again by its inability to deal with the Ukrainian crisis.

Yet, one of Washington’s best asset in the area remains Turkey. Ankara continues to be a major energy hub for Europe’s energy security, and as a NATO member state, it is furthermore involved in the BMD. In addition, Turkey remains a key stakeholder in the Cypriot and Nagorno-Karabakh protracted conflicts. Solving the Cypriot frozen conflict and reconciling Israel and Turkey would unlock energy issues in the Levant, and enhance Ankara’s role as an East-West energy corridor. Moreover, it could give a new impetus to the negotiations over the resolution of other Black Sea protracted conflicts, like the Nagorno-Karabakh one. As for energy security, the exploitation Ukrainian and Romanian shale gas reserves with the assistance of major European and American energy companies are likely to enhance Europe’s energy independence in the long term. In Ukraine, the US should closely work with the EU and Russia to settle the crisis and maintain Ukraine’s mainland territorial integrity.

Today, in the context of the ‘pivot to Asia’, Washington’s diplomacy in the Black Sea is reactive rather than proactive. The US retrenchment from the Black Sea stage should be acknowledged by the EU as an opportunity to take the lead and engage other stakeholders like Russia and Turkey, to solve security issues, and transcend the traditional competitive stance and ‘zero sum game’ that still characterize the region today. Brussels should overhaul its the Eastern Partnership which has failed as demonstrated by both the Armenian and Ukrainian episodes. The EU should endorse its strategic role in the Black Sea before its soft power and attractiveness have definitely faded. ■

NOTES

2. Eleven countries established BSEC in Istanbul in June 1992. Today, it numbers twelve member states, including Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine.
4. Charles King, "Is the Black Sea a Region?" in Oleksan-
11. Ibid., p. 219.
12. This program cost $64 million and ended in 2004. See Stéphane Delory, "Stabilisation et destabilisation en mer Noire. L’influence des facteurs militaires", in Baptiste Chatré, Stéphane Delory (dir), Conflicts and sécurité dans l’espace de la mer Noire: l’Union européenne, les riverains et les autres, op. cit., pp. 304-305.
15. Ibid.
16. The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, NATO meeting in Washington DC, April 1999.
24. Recoverable reserves of the Shah Deniz gas field for the first stage of development are put at 22.1 trillion cubic feet.
30. In 2007, while he was Prime Minister, Viktor Yanukovitch already stated that the Ukraine was not yet ready to consider possible NATO membership. See NATO website: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-841CFFBE-119EBDB6D9/natolive/topics_37750.htm? [accessed on August 23, 2014].
32. See Hillary Clinton’s speech at Kyiv Polytechnic Institute: http://m.state.gov/md143941.htm [accessed on August 23, 2014].
35. Among the irregularities, the OSCE noticed the use of state resources for campaign purposes, the lack of balance in media coverage and troubles in vote counting. See Georgia, Parliamentary Elections, 21 May 2008, OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission: Final Report, OSCE, 9 September 2008, Vienna.
38. Ibid., p. 11.
39. Ibid., p. 16.


50. South Stream has a capacity of 63 bcm per year.


56. The ''Varyags to the Greeks'' route was a trade route that connected the Baltic region to the Byzantine Empire through the Kievan Rus’ lands and the Black Sea between the early 9th century and the 11th century.


The Black Sea region in search of a narrative

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The Black Sea region continues to be a grey zone of instability. It is in constant flux and home to competitive political, ideological and geographic narratives. It finds itself in regular redefinition as to what it is and whether it is actually a region, a bridge, a buffer zone, a pivot, a transit zone, or a corridor, inter alia. There is also debate as to which countries actually comprise it. Also, the Black Sea Region is home to competing notions of the concept of neighborhood in particular between the European Union (EU) and the Russian Federation. Finally, the Black Sea Region has undergone and is experiencing various forms of institutional regionalism since the end of the Cold War; the most notable example being the Organization for Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). The assessment is that the regionalism experiment has not really worked over the last two decades or could be interpreted as "regionalism light".

The tell tale signs regarding the future of the region do not necessarily augur well. The reasons for the pessimism are many. They take into account the evolution of the region since the early 1990s and project themselves in the future.

Firstly, none of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries "have pursued a determined long-term perspective or aim" regarding where they want to go or belong to as countries and societies. Unlike the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs) that were committed to westernization and Euro Atlantic integration, the countries of the Eastern neighborhood of the European Union, facing an assertive Russia and unable to rid themselves fully of their Soviet legacies, have pursued a balancing act between Russia and the West. In other words, this balancing act has not necessarily led them closer to the West.

Take Ukraine, for example, which keeps vacillating between the 'no pole' or multi vector policy of President Yanukovich or the "Strategic Asset" argument propounded by the supposedly pro western opposition. Neither implies a deep rooted commitment to the West and its values, norms, ideas and identity. The recent saga regarding the signing of an Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU in the run up to the Eastern Partnership of November 2013 and the political stalemate in Ukraine since is a case in point. Ukraine's 'pendular' foreign policy suggests the need that the perspectives between its elite and its citizens differ when it comes to the role and contribution of the EU to the promotion of democracy and the role of Russia which seeks to maintain control over assets.

Georgia, the other western champion of the region, is also uncertain as to both its Western prospects and its commitments. In an assessment of Mikhail Saakashvili's legacy, who served as the country's president for ten years, The Economist reaches a mitigated conclusion. Saakashvili led Georgia "through a mental revolution, modernizing it, shaking off its Soviet legacy and putting it back on the map. He also fought and lost a war with Russia, cracked
down on the opposition, dominated the media, interfered with justice and monopolised power.7 His attempt to modernize society from above without engaging society by all available means leaves much to be desired.7

This implies two things. The first is what Tedo Japaridze refers to as the "role of geography" or what Lilia Shevtsova refers to as remaining "hostage to geography" thereby leaving the in between countries with no choice but to play off Russia and the West.8

The second is the importance of the attractiveness of the West and its values (the normative dimension). Is the European Union committed? Does it have a strategy towards the East and its eastern neighbors? I have long suggested that the EU lacks a strategy – a strategic vision even though it possesses more instruments, initiatives, and policies than ever before. An alphabet soup of these includes, inter alia, the Eastern Partnership ( EaP); the EU Strategy for the Danube Region; the Black Sea Synergy Environmental Partnership; the Association Agreements; the Integrated Maritime Policy; the Communication on "The EU and its neighbouring regions: A renewed approach to transport cooperation"; the TRACECA and INOGATE programs; the Energy Charter Treaty; the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs); the European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument ( ENPI); the Cross Border Cooperation ( CBC) initiative under the ENPI; the Conference of the Regional and Local Authorities for the Eastern Partnership ( CORLEAP); the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum ( CSF); the Eastern Partnership and Cooperation Programme ( EaPIC); the EURONEST Parliamentary Assembly; the renewed ENP; the more-for-more approach; the European Endowment for Democracy; and the European Neighbourhood Instrument ( ENI). The establishment of the European External Action Service ( EEA S) in an attempt to make the Common Foreign and Security Policy ( CFSP) more efficient, the role of the EU Special Representatives ( EUSR s) and the various Common Security and Defence Policy ( CSDP) missions in the region with the aim to strengthen the EU’s external ability to act through the development of civilian and military capabilities in Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management also attest to the EU’s involvement in the region.

Yet the overall strategic blueprint is lacking. Amanda Paul is to the point when she writes that "[w]hile Russia sees its Western neighbourhood strategically, the EU has suffered from a lack of strategic vision, rather viewing it as a technical process."9 Other analysts suggest that most EU pro democracy programs have failed to meet their ambitions while facing completion from pro-Russian illiberal groups supported by Moscow.10 M.R. Freire and Licina Simao suggest that on the EU’s end there is a mismatch between "discourse and action and the meaning of these conflicting practices to the attainment of the stated goals of regional stabilization and deepening political and economic integration with EU structures."11 While the European Neighbourhood Instrument has more money budgeted for democracy promotion for the Eastern Neighborhood countries, the effectiveness of EU instru-

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**BIOGRAPHY**

**Dr. Dimitrios Triantaphyllou** is, since September 2010, the Director of the Center for International and European Studies at Kadir Has University in Istanbul where he also teaches international relations. He holds a BA in Political Science and History from the University of California, Berkeley and an MA and Ph.D. in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. He was previously Director General of the International Centre for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS) and Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of the Aegean, Rhodos (2006-2010). He was also Special Advisor at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic (2004-2006); Senior Research Fellow at the Hellenic Observatory of the European Institute at the LSE (2003-2004); Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Security Studies of the European Union, Paris (2001-2003); Research Fellow at the Institute for Security Studies of the Western European Union, Paris (1999-2001); Deputy Director of the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Athens (1996-99) and Foreign Policy Advisor to a member of the European Parliament (1995). He has written and edited a number of books and articles pertaining to European security, developments in the Black Sea and South-Eastern Europe and Greek Foreign Policy. He is also Associate Editor of the Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, a member of the Greek-Turkish Forum, a member of the Governing Board of the European Studies Institute (ESI) at MGIMO University, Moscow and co-convener of the Commission on the Black Sea.
ments in place is unclear. In other words, the policies and instruments in place do not necessarily translate into coherent and cohesive policies.

The aforementioned touches upon the limits of the democratization process and the level of commitment by the EU and the United States towards the region. One can also add to the equation the underperformance of both the CFSP and the CSDP which contribute to the feeling that the Union is not pulling its weight strategically. The reasons are many. The intrusion of national prerogatives into EU foreign policy making by member states in light of the absence of Germany to act strategically in terms of the Union’s Ostpolitik is part of the problem. The absence of Germany is detrimental to a cohesive policy. The ongoing financial and monetary crisis has made the union more inward looking to the detriment of strategic thinking. Finally, the current age of populism given its emergence within the EU limits the detriment of strategic thinking.

The United States’ role and vision in and toward the region is also crucial as it views the region as a transit corridor. In line with the New Silk Road concept introduced by Hillary Clinton in 2011 when she was the Secretary of State, there is a school of thought contending that the Black Sea Region is rather part of a wider ‘East-West Black Sea/Caspian Sea Corridor’ where the emphasis is on transportation, trade, and energy linking both the union more inward looking to the detriment of strategic thinking. Finally, the current age of populism given its emergence within the EU limits the prerogatives into EU foreign policy making by member states other than the European Union. In both the CFSP and the CSDP which contribute to the feeling that the Union is not pulling its weight strategically. The reasons are many. The intrusion of national prerogatives into EU foreign policy making by member states in light of the absence of Germany to act strategically in terms of the Union’s Ostpolitik is part of the problem. The absence of Germany is detrimental to a cohesive policy. The ongoing financial and monetary crisis has made the union more inward looking to the detriment of strategic thinking. Finally, the current age of populism given its emergence within the EU limits the detriment of strategic thinking.

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Another key concern is the growing twin exceptionalisms of Russia and Turkey, the region’s key stakeholders other than the European Union. In both the Russian and Turkish cases, the issue is not so much the pivot of these countries to the East but rather the stress on a different set of value systems.

Vladimir Putin’s speech at the 2013 Valdai Conference is indicative of the Russian approach. Speaking on 19 September, Putin suggested that “We are not the West” and “We know better ourselves”. The stress on Russian identity and values and the invocation of morality, and spiritually (including homophobic pronouncements) reflects a Russian pivoting inwards.16 Dmitri Trenin captures today’s Russia well when he suggests that it is “a country in search of a nation”.17 The strong arm tactics used on neighbors either by forcing them to join the Eurasian Union (see Armenia) or the trade wars or threats thereof with Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Lithuania coupled with the possible loss of Ukraine exacerbate the divide with the West. Another concern for Moscow is that Germany cannot be considered a given anymore as its evolving foreign policy approach stresses an element of ‘inclusivity’ which Russia dislikes. This suggests a policy which includes dialogue with civil society, individuals, and pro democracy movements on top of the official contacts with the Kremlin. It clashes with the policy of exclusivity that Moscow favors. As Judy Dempsey suggests the partnership for modernization that is at the crux of EU–Russia relations today should not just focus on technological change but should also be about societal change.18

In Turkey’s case, the ruling AKP seems to be pivoting towards creating its own normative space; its own 21st century version of the ‘caliphate light’ where Islam combined with economic diplomacy shapes its ties with other Muslim countries as it tries to place itself and its model of governance as the champion of modern Islamic values and modernity. As a consequence it further loosens its bonds from the West to which it is anchored at least since 1947 (since the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan) and institutionally since joining the Atlantic Alliance in 1952. Cengiz Candar, A seasoned Turkish journalist, suggests that “Turkey is behaving like a non-aligned country of the 1970s. Its foreign policy and concepts of security and defense resemble more that of a non-aligned nation instead of a NATO country. Can Turkey be a NATO member with a non-aligned foreign policy?19

The growing apart with the European Union also needs to be factored in as it reveals a fundamental lack of commitment towards integration. This is reflected in Turkish public opinion polls where support for EU membership has dropped to 44% from a high of 75% some years ago to a growing divide in convergence criteria in particular the ‘democracy standard’ which is all the more wanting. It seems nowadays that the integration process is measured in terms of visa liberalization for the growing Turkish middle class that wants to spend its money in EU countries; yet there seems to be no systematic campaign in place to educate the public on accepting convergence criteria. The theme of difference from Europe and European is becoming all the more relevant and prevalent in academic, social, and public discourse. Though the convergence between Turkey and the European Union is undeniable, there seems to be a lack of understanding
that belonging to the Union is more than simply the application of the four freedoms and that the lifting of the impediment of visa restrictions is simply not enough to transform and socialize Turkish society toward adopting EU norms and values. The 2013 European Commission Progress Report on Turkey is clear in this regard. While it welcomes the announcement of the Democratization Package of 30 September, it decries the crushing of the Gezi Park protests of June 2014 which reflect "the emergence of vibrant, active citizenry."21

This is all coming to a head as both Turkey and Russia converge in their interests in particular in the Black sea region by refusing the accept the role of the European Union as a equal regional stakeholder while preferring the status quo and the limited definition of the region based on the 6 littoral states.22 The parallelism between their leaders also gives pause for concern.

THE WAY FORWARD

1. The first question that needs to be asked and answered is "Where's the beef?". It is especially relevant for the post Vilnius EaP Summit whose mitigated results need to be strengthened with policies, objectives, and vision by the European Union if it wants to ensure for itself and for the countries of the region the role of a stabilizer. In other words, the ‘either or’ pendular policy fluctuations of the Eastern partners, especially the ones that have signed Association Agreements with the EU.23 The case for a clear headed EU strategy is obvious as the calls to focus beyond Vilnius are growing. The EU has many options at hand including the prospects of putting visa liberalization on the fast track; providing unilateral DCFTA trade concessions; focusing on ‘bottom up’ approaches which reach out directly to the civil societies of the EaP countries; the creation of an EU investment fund for EaP countries, among others.24

2. Linked to the above is a determined focus on democracy. The emergence of a democratic alternative in both Russia and Azerbaijan suggests the beginning of an incipient civil society. The strong showing by Alexei Navalny in the Moscow mayoral elections in September 2013 suggests that he has emerged as a credible alternative to President Putin.25 Similarly in the October 2013 presidential elections in Azerbaijan, the emergence of a new political process was in evidence with the regime being "confronted with a serious opposition" for the first time.26 In Turkey's case as well, the centrality of the Gezi Park protests in the European Commission's 2013 Progress Report suggests that more needs to be done on the promotion of democracy.

3. The need for a more pro-active Germany in neighborhood issues is vital both a generator of a new Ostpolitik for the EU and one which focuses on the direct dialogue with the civil societies of the partner countries and Russia.

4. The European Union also needs to find a modus vivendi between the promotion of its norms and values and thinking and acting geostrategically. Whether this can be achieved as Youngs and Pishchikova suggest through a "value-based geostrategy"27 or through the selective usage of the normative approach with the EaP countries that profess closer ties to the Union and turning a blind eye to protect its interests such as in the case of its energy deal with Azerbaijan is a subject for further discussion. Nevertheless, the current approach is not dynamic enough and needs to be reconsidered.

5. In parallel, the EU needs to strengthen the efficacy of its CFSP and CSDP as these serve the role of ensuring "stability, security, and prosperity" in the European Continent irrespective of the process of integration. The need of a "culture shift" in thinking in order to fortify its foreign policy. As Jan Tchau suggests, "[t]he bottom line is that Europe's desired end state – freedom, peace, prosperity – is more important than the process by which it gets there."28 Its apparent weakness in these areas is reflected as a general weakness in its ability to deliver on the Eastern Partnership.

6. Finally, with the passage of time and the mounting dilemmas regarding the efficacy of its neighborhood policy, the European Union needs to review its European Security Strategy which dates back to December 2003. The ensuing ten years have witnessed fundamental strategic changes in Europe and elsewhere yet deep divisions between key EU member states over defense and other priorities have made a strategic review a difficult endeavor. Whether the review leads to the drafting of a new security strategy or a wider inter-governmental strategic debate is not important as long as there is movement on this front.29
**SUMMING UP**

The multiple identities of the Black Sea Region and its stakeholders have been compounding its stability and development as the region’s strategic environment is being constantly remodeled and challenged as the strategic debates keep changing reflecting the fortunes and priorities of the key stakeholders. The tugs of war between Russia and the European Union and to a lesser extent between the EU and Turkey are at the core of the challenge of transforming the Black Sea Region from being a "grey zone of instability" to one of peace, freedom, security, and prosperity. The drama surrounding the EaP Vilnius Summit of November 2013 for the heart and soul of the countries that are contested by both the Russian Federation and the European Union can only suggest that a smarter, coherent, and consistent approach is necessary in order to avoid defining the countries of region as the 'in betweens'. The stakes are high for all concerned especially the Union which needs to add a political and strategic element to ensure that its impact is long lasting and truly transformative as the civil societies of its neighbors would wish it to be. The Black Sea Region may be down but should rational thinking and action prevail, it could rebound. Its search for a common narrative continues.

**ENDNOTES**

13. See, for example, Jan Techau, "Will EU Foreign Policy Save the Integration process?", *Strategic Europe*, Carnegie, Europe, 26 July 2013, http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=52500.
15. For a clear indication of the Asian pivot, see for example, David E. Sanger, *Confront and Conceal: Obama's Secret Wars and Surprising Use of Ameri-
can Power (New York, Crown Publishers: 2012). In this assessment of the first three and a half years of the first Obama administration, it is telling that most of the book deals primarily with the challenges of Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iran, China, and North Korea.


27. Youngs and P Pishchikova, Smart Geostrategy for the Eastern Partnership.

28. Techau, "Will EU Foreign Policy Save the Integration process?"

29. See, for example, Daniel Keohane, "Does the EU Need a New Foreign Policy Strategy?" ISN, 21 October 2013, http://isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=171319
Russian factor as a problem for the formation of national identity in Ukraine

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This paper examines the influence of Russian factor in the formation of national memory and national identity in Ukraine. The author reveals the characteristics and mechanisms of this effect across such categories as national identity, national memory, historical memory, regional identity. The article provides the author's assessment of an attempt to implement the project of Little Russia identity in modern Ukraine as well as the analysis of its likely consequences.

Ukraine, without its own state for centuries, had always been under the external influence of its more powerful neighbors – Poland, Austria-Hungary, Russia. These effects were powerful enough to define and construct internal processes in Ukraine as well as the direction of its historical development. The main effect of this spear was designed to enslave the Ukrainian people, and to prevent its conversion into a self-sufficient nation. The nation is the main subject of the nation-building process as well as the social basis of a nation state.

Lack of nation generates statelessness that is filled by a power of another foreign country. National memory is one of the main components of the formation and existence of a nation. It is no coincidence that each state, which Ukraine used to be part of, tried to eradicate from Ukrainians their national memory, and to fill their national awareness with external myths, symbols and meanings and to impose external version of their history inscribed in foreign historical context.

The most aggressive ‘humanitarian’ policy, aimed at russification of the Ukrainian history, was and is held by Russia. Due to this infusion of strange public awareness within Ukraine's population, Russia has become a main criterion of self-identification of Ukraine, as a state and a nation that lives within its territory. Thus, the Ukrainian-Russian relations go far beyond bilateral relations, and so they are critical not only for Ukraine's foreign policy, but also for the future of the country.

The Russian impact on Ukraine can not be included in the format of foreign policy because it is total and systematic. On the other hand, the trends specific for domestic policy and social develop-
Development in Ukraine to some extent reflect Russia in Ukraine and renew Russian genetic heritage. Russia serves both an internal and external factor of shaping and implementing Ukraine's foreign policy.

Such discourse leads to considering the claimed subject in three major aspects: ideological (conceptual), domestic and international.

A conceptual approach indicates the place, which is cast to Russia in the formation of the Ukrainian state as a subject of foreign policy, and the role Russia plays in determining Ukraine's global position as well as international processes. In this coordinate system of Ukraine's self-identification, there are several versions in regard to Russia, all of which in this or that scale are present in Ukraine and are taken up by various segments of the Ukrainian political elite.

Ukraine plays the same role in Russian national memory and Russian political outlook as, i.e. an identifier of Russia as a state and Russians as a nation. Extremely important for Russians are just such slogans as ‘Kiev is the mother of Russian cities’, ‘Little Russia’, etc.

Obviously, the Russian factor as a focused Russian Federations' geopolitics, performs two functions: on the one hand, it aims to construct a national memory of Russians based on the meaning of ‘great Russian people’, giving it an universal messianic nature of ‘Great Russia’ the world power, and, on the other hand, it serves to destruct and decomposition Ukraine's national awareness and to ‘cleanse’ Ukraine's national memory as a particularized, different from Russian nation and community.

Analyzing this process is impossible without appealing to such categories as ‘national identity’, ‘national identity’, ‘regional identity’, ‘national memory’, ‘historical memory.’ The use of this terminology makes it possible to highlight those essential facets that show why the most important spear of Russian influence is aimed at destroying or kind of ‘reconstructing’ Ukraine's national memory under the Russian great-power project.

These categories have been sufficiently processed in the works of both foreign and domestic scientists M. Ferro, E. Smith, M.Hona, V. Polianskyi, A.Andreeva, A.Tregub, VTroyan, LFedyk. In particular, LFedyk in his publication ‘National memory as a means of constructing national identity: the case of Galicia within the interwar period’ examines the impact of national memory in the formation of national awareness; it reveals factors that determine characteristics of this process using an example of Galicia within the interwar period [1, p. 232-236]. According to this definition, ‘national memory is a set of representations of a national community about its past that is recorded in the form of knowledge, cultural stereotypes, symbols, myths’ [1, p.233]. Under ‘national awareness’, LFedyk means a set of ideas about the role and place of a nation in social and ethnic relations, relations with other communities [1, p.233]. The mechanism of interrelation of these social phenomena lies in its specific functional filling. National identity is a very complex set of feelings, ideas, traditions, attitudes and values enabling to understand the axiological aspects of a nation's life, its difference from other communities in a social and international environment, the national memory indicates a link between generations, a sense of common roots, belonging to a nation, its traditions, responsibility for common destiny. National memory is awareness of himself/herself in the nation.

Both national memory and national identity have certain markers, which allow a person to feel he/she belongs to a nation as a social community, and to realize how his/her community differs from others. National identity is such a universally recognized marker. According to V. Troyan’s definition, ‘national identity is a self-recognition of an individual in a national dimension, his/her belonging to a nation and its system of values, and his/her acceptance of a certain historical experience’ [2, p.143].

Thus, national identity is an important functional component of both national memory and national awareness. No wonder that the main criteria of national identity are: common origin, common historical territory, religion, history, customs and traditions, language [2, p.144].

Researchers point out two main types of national identities: Western and Eastern. The first one is mainly civil-national, i.e. it is also characterized as an identity of equal citizens of their state. These are historic territory, political and legal community, political and legal equality of members, common civic culture and ideology [3, p. 390]. The Eastern type of national identity is equated with ethnic identity.
National identity, national memory and national identity in its everyday, public, political and theoretical dimensions can be regarded as the spiritual basis of a nation.

It becomes clear why external influences of aspirants to the territory under the name of ‘Ukraine’ with its natural and demographic resources have been primarily aimed to destroy or prevent the formation of spiritual basis of the Ukrainian community. L.Fedyk gives illustrative examples of how it was done in Galicia, Poland, where the then Polish government tried to form the ethnically homogeneous Polish nation as well as attempted to substitute the names of ‘Galicia’, ‘Ukrainian’ to ‘Little Poland’, ‘Rusyn’. The purpose of that was to negate Ukrainian national past and national identity. This became especially evident during the population counts of 1921 and 1931: Ukrainian nationality was forcefully replaced by ‘Rusyn’ [Ruthenian]; in the section ‘language’, that was used to identify the nationality, an artificial distinction was made for ‘Ukrainian’ and ‘Russian’ languages. This was contributed by the activities of the Old Ruthenians who showed their loyalty to the Polish state and protested against the change of ‘Rus’, ‘Ruthenian’ for ‘Ukraine’, ‘Ukrainian’, and emphasized their national individuality [4, p. 484], hereby giving the grounds for denying the Ukrainian identity as well as assaulting it [1, p.232].

However, Poland tried to just copy the vast experience of Russian Empire and Soviet authorities in using such technologies with regard to Ukrainians, who are experiencing their renaissance. The latter is reflected in the humanitarian component of the Russian foreign policy. Russian historians and Russian president are deeply convinced that there are no Ukrainians as a nation and there is no Ukraine as a state exist. M. Smolin in his preamble to the book by Sergey Shchegolev ‘The History of Ukrainian separatism’ notes that ‘Ukrainian separatists often refer to several ancient chronicles where the word ‘Ukraine’ was mentioned in relation to different parts of the modern Ukraine’s territory. These chronicles interpret ‘Ukraine’ as ‘okraina’ (frontier, margin) and ‘Ukrainians’, therefore, as provincial, peripheral people. In the Russian chronicles, the word ‘Ukraine’ is found in Ryazan, Pskov, Novgorod and other neighborhoods but the word ‘Ukrainians’ is not found in those places [6, p.10-11].

So it becomes clear why they tend to call Ukrainians the ‘Southern Rus’ people. In the same context, the Russian academic and political discourse often use scholastic methods of manipulating such concepts as ‘historical memory’ and ‘regional identity’. The scholastic way of such manipulations lies in the fact of substituting ‘national memory’ by ‘historical memory’, and ‘national identity’ by ‘regional identity’.

The reason for that is that both national and historical memories are associated with the past. However, while ‘national memory’ stores the experience of past generations, nations, their traditions, symbols and values, ‘historical memory’ assesses events from a certain point of view. The latter allows to manipulate history by interpreting it from somebody’s advantageous positions. Today, this technique is widely used in the Russian information policy, which manifests itself in an attempt to impose Soviet-Russian historical discourse on Ukraine’s history. No wonder that the Russian Foreign Ministry strongly suggests to harmonize Ukrainian educational books with Russian ones. According to V. V. Vyatrovych, the authors of ‘common educational books’ concept are well aware that by means of this one can influence not only the vision of the past in a neighboring state, but also can form the national identity of its citizens [5].

Regional identity is a way of self-identification according to the territory. It is just one of the criteria for identification. For this reason, regional identity does not have a coherent set of criteria that the national identity has. So we can not speak of a community that lives in a particular area as of a nation, and even more so as of a state. The most that such a regional community can claim for is a territorial autonomy. Namely this feature attracts Russian ideologists in their effort to prove the groundlessness of Ukrainian rights to their own nation and statehood, limiting these rights to a Russian province. According to them: ‘a multi-million southern Russian population as a result of the ‘Ukrainian’ project in a radical variant had fallen into a deep ‘swamp’ of self-satisfied provincialism. This ‘swamp’ emits smelly Russophobic miasma, while offering the best way to impose its will on Southern Russian mass of people’ [6, p.15-16].

However, such radical and aggressive denial of the Ukrainians’ right to statehood is caused pri-
marily by the vulnerability of a myth about Russian state as of ‘Great Russia’. Not coincidentally, A. Dugin says that ‘the existence of present borders of Ukraine and the current status of ‘sovereign state’ is equal to inflicting a terrible strike against Russia’s geopolitical security, which is equivalent to invading its territory’ [12, p.379]. V. Putin explains to his foreign counterparts that Ukraine is a failed state. Ukraine is presented as a problem for Russian identity, nation and the Russian Federation as a state. Therefore, it becomes a part of the Russian domestic discourse.

The end of the post-Soviet period poses to Russian leadership a fundamental problem of finding a new model of Russian state and its place and role in global process and new system of international relations. Peripheral place of the existing Russian state (the Russian Federation) in the world order mismatch with expectations of Russian society, Russian elite and President V. Putin himself.

So major foreign policy interests and V.Putin’s efforts will be concentrated at restoring Russia’s status quo as one of the global centers of influence that would define or at least be involved in managing global processes and developments.

The trend of developing international relations towards multipolarity creates very favorable conditions for expanding Russian geopolitical space as well as for regaining full control over the countries that previously belonged to Russian Empire or Soviet Union. Achieving this goal requires to address two strategic objectives: 1) to disconnect the emerging Eastern European countries from the European integration projects and to neutralize Western influence on them and 2) to reintegrate this space, which was lost owing to the collapse of the USSR, into Russia by creating reintegration projects subordinated to Russian interests exclusively.

Quite favorable international geopolitical situation contributes to the implementation of these objectives. The effect of ‘resetting’ relations with the U.S. has been very positive for Russia. As a result of ‘reset’, Washington refused to expand NATO eastward by integrating ex-Soviet countries; the post-Soviet space was informally recognized as Russian sphere of influence; Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia were excluded from the U.S.’s scope of strategic interests. However, despite favorable external factors, Kremlin’s trying to find a form of the Russian state which would allow to absorb this space and to turn it into a part of Great Russia.

For V.Putin it is obvious that without absorbing this space, Russia would be unable to achieve its critical geopolitical weight in order to influence global processes. On the other hand, a new form of the state should meet internal Russian needs of historical development, i.e. to consolidate Russian society around the government and to mobilize it for realization of this grand geopolitical project. At that, the reintegration of the post-Soviet space should not lead to disintegration of the nucleus called the Russian Federation.

Consequently, this problem requires appropriate conceptual grounding, which could serve as a certain unifying ideology for the post-Soviet space countries, and also give a clear picture of implementation plan of the ‘Great Russia’ geopolitical space. The first version of this concept was the doctrine of the ‘Russian world’, which had been actively implemented by Russia in the post-Soviet space over the past five years. At its core was an attempt to blend Russian idea of Russian civilization. This symbiosis would facilitate finding and determining the common markers of identification, belonging to Russian state and to Russian people – especially of population living in the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and Kazakhstan.

Despite some success in implementing the ‘Russian world’ doctrine in Ukraine and Belarus, its conceptual and political weaknesses became apparent. The ‘Russian world’ doctrine’s markers of common Russian identity include: Orthodoxy, Russian language, Russian cultural environment (cultural identity), common historical memory and shared views on social development. The idea of autocracy, that is perceived both by Russian society and Russian government, is not perceived in Ukraine and Belarus.
So V.Putin faced a problem of homogenization of the society at macro level under the ‘Great Russian state’ concept as well as at the level of recovery of the Russian society as a nation. What is worsening the problem is that we face the growth of Russian national awareness as a dominant ethnic group, and the growing share of non-Russian ethnic groups and non-Orthodox confessions in Russian society that leads to erosion and leveling of Russian identity.

The existing model of Russian Federation no longer meets neither current realities, no Russian geopolitical ambitions. Trying to go back to the model of Russian empire runs against big challenges as a model that existed in the 17-19 centuries; it looks anachronical in the 21 century, and it does not meet current international trends and internal Russian processes associated with growing national awareness.

Trying to solve this contradiction, V. Putin in his programmatic article ‘Russia and national issue’ raises a key point: ‘The self-determination of Russian people is a poly-ethnic civilization, which is hold together by Russian cultural core’ [8]. In this thesis V. Putin departs from the concept of ‘nation’ and substitutes it by ‘Russian nation’ devoid of moral connotation. So he distances himself from the association with European nations trying to justify the otherness of ‘national issue’ in the Russian context; he sees a perspective that contrasts with European national projects. According to V. Putin, ‘the crisis of nation-state’ model stands behind the failure of the multicultural project, historically constructed based solely on ethnic identity’. Moreover, he is deeply convinced that ‘the attempts to promote the idea of building Russian national mono-ethnic state contradicts the entire thousand-year-old history, it is the shortest path to annihilation of Russian people and Russian statehood’ [8] .

The Russian statehood, according to V.Putin, is not equivalent to Russian national state. A constituent element of the Russian statehood turns to be not the Russian nation, as an ethnus, but the Russian people which include not only ethnic Russians but also Ukrainians and Belarusians as well as the russified national minorities within the Russian Federation. So the legitimization of political community based on nation is not suitable for Russia; Putin offers another civilizational scale. Russian nation is not a nation but a civilizational community. This community differs from other civilizations by unique cultural code.

In fact, culture is one of the main criterions of defining civilizations. Although, in this case, this ‘common cultural code’ is confined exclusively to Russian cultural tradition. The core that holds the fabric of this unique civilization is Russian people and Russian culture’ [8]. ‘Such civilizational identity, – V.Putin continues, – is based on preserving Russian cultural dominant, which is carried not only by ethnic Russians, but by all holders of such identity, regardless of nationality’ [8].

Ukrainians might also belong to this civilization community in case they consider themselves Russians. To be considered a Russian means, according to Putin, to be involved in Russian culture, history and identity. To be called Russian, it is enough ‘to consider yourself as such regardless of ethnicity.’ ‘The Russian people is a state-founding one due to the fact of Russia’s existence. A great Russian mission is to unite and bind the civilization... by means of language, culture, global sensitivity... into such type of state-civilization where there are no ‘natsmen’ [disdainful term for national minority people – interpreter], and the ‘friend or foe’ principle... is defined by common culture and shared values’ [8] – he said.

Further on, V. Putin states that namely Russian, but not Ukrainian or any other statehood, has to be inherent to this civilizational community. V. Putin believes that all problems of the Russian society are directly related to ’wrecking of the USSR’, which had brought ‘degradation of state, social and economic institutions... of the post-Soviet space’ [8]. This is logically followed by the conclusion: to do away with these problems, it is necessary to revive Russia as a ‘historic state’ on the territory of the entire post-Soviet space.

Implementation of the ‘Russian world’ doctrine aims to de-legitimize Ukrainian nation, to finish with the Ukrainian statehood, and to remelt Ukrainians into Russians and replace the Ukrainian state by Russian one. ‘Great Russia’, as Russian ideologists believe, could be able to counter the globalization processes and to successfully promote Russian national interests globally [9]. V. Putin concludes
Should this Russian civilizational project with regard to Ukraine be implemented, Ukraine would be alienated from modern European civilization built upon democratic values, Ukraine would lose its European identity, and Ukraine would lose its Ukrainian statehood and democratic order.

An important basis for materializing this project is presence in Ukraine of two clearly marked national identities: Western Ukrainian (national-patriotic) and Eastern Ukrainian (Little Russian) that exist within a rather weak and vague all-national Ukrainian identity.

This situation enabled Russia and Yanukovich’s regime (which mostly came from Eastern Ukraine) to start reformatting Ukraine into a Little Russian project, i.e. in ‘second Russia’. According to V. Troyan and other scientists, Eastern European identity is characterized by:

- Creolistic culture (Russian language, inclusion into Russian information and mass-cultural space);
- Comprador capital in the economics (oligarchic clans tied to Russia);
- Interiorization of former communist regime (sovietization of awareness);
- Domination of the following historical and modern myths: Rus is a cradle of three peoples; reunification of Ukraine with Russia is an act of historical justice; Donetsk basin is developed most successfully and feeds all others in Ukraine (the so called ‘Donetsk miracle’);
- Right-radical nationalism underlies Western Ukrainian identity (yet Soviet times’ myth about Bandera follows);
- Russia’s fundamental geopolitical interest in Ukraine is this: should Ukraine become a part of Russian imperial project, Russia turns into a post which protects it from civilizational influences as well as gets a springboard for geopolitical offence on Europe. Inclusion of Ukraine into Russian state-civilization would give Russia much better chances to integrate all post-Soviet space.

Russia’s fundamental humanitarian interest in Ukraine is the homogenization of Ukrainian socio-cultural space based on Soviet-Russian identity.

In all, Russian foreign policy mission is to impose Russian identity upon Ukrainian population, to include Russian into civilizational space, and to object the existence of Ukrainian national identity typical to Ukrainian society. Russia, Ukraine and Belarus are regarded as a single civilizational space. So the civilizational war in Ukraine turns into a war of national identities, and Russia’s foreign policy as to Ukraine bears an openly anti-Ukrainian nature.

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Ukrainian quotas on TV channels, favoritization of the Moscow-backed part of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, changing of history, depriving Stepan Bandera of the ‘Hero of Ukraine’ title etc.

Anyway, whatever efforts are taken, the project of changing Ukraine's identity is destined to failure as it is based on anti-Ukrainian, anti-national sentiment. Built under such project, Ukraine would be nonviable as a sovereign state and would get back to the status of Russian autonomy.

CONCLUSIONS

The attitude to Ukraine, as an independent state, has to start with formulating common Ukrainian identity. A leading role here belongs to revival of national memory. Identity is an important element of the spiritual basis of a state, through which it is perceived both by society and international community. Without memory, both collective and individual, it is impossible to complete the formation of national identity [2, p.149].

Since the time Ukraine became independent, it is being dominated by two alternative projects of state-building. Initially, the project called ‘Ukraine’ dominated. But the main shortcoming of that period was that the state-building process was not supported by building the nation. As M. Ryabchuk points out, ‘the incomplete nation-building processes on the overwhelming territory of Ukraine has at least two negative consequences. On the one hand, it nourishes Russian imperial myths and revanchist aspirations, it evokes their impression of Ukraine’s amorphousness and its, so to say, spinelessness and susceptibility vis-à-vis any imperial manipulations, including direct expansion. On the other hand, the mentioned incompleteness evokes the inferiority complex within Ukrainians themselves as well as forms their feeling of stay inside ‘a surrounded fortress’ [13, p.136-137].

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New "Frozen Conflict"?

Vladimir NAZHARCHUK
Harvard Black Sea Security Fellow, 2014

The unchallenged invasion and hostile takeover of Crimea by Russian Federation in spring of 2014 was another step in Vladimir Putin’s expansionist vision. One must now acknowledge that from a Russian/Putin Inner Circle point of view to recover economically, maintain prospects for growth based on commodity leverage, and ward off perceived threats to their fragile stability they must continue expanding into countries that can be considered "Frozen Conflict".

This paper will focus on how Putin and Russia will continue to target "Frozen Conflict" geography created during the Soviet machinations of USSR domination and the sudden, unstructured demise of same, to advance his empire building. A "Frozen Conflict" geography is defined as a situation in which active armed conflict has been brought to an end, but no peace treaty or other political framework resolves the conflict to the satisfaction of the combatants. The term has been commonly used for post-Soviet conflicts, but the term has often been applied to other perennial territorial disputes.

Using the above definition Putin appears to have exhausted his direct action "Frozen Conflict" rationale, supported by his "protect Russians" mantra with his incursions into Georgia and Ukraine. The only other country with a dominant Russian/Slavic population is Moldova and the majority is in the province of Transnistria. But we can surmise by his rhetoric that he feels Russia must continue to with his expansion plans to protect economic growth and secure their borders. So now the debate and anticipatory analysis is where and how he intends to manufacture "Frozen Conflicts" in other post-Soviet republics to continue his empire building using the "civil war proxy" strategy. How far will he go in Ukraine? What are his next targets and why? What makes the countries so susceptible?

The term "Frozen Conflict" is usually associated with such terms as "self-proclaimed", "uncontrolled", and "unrecognized". Recently, some experts have started to use the terms "secessionist conflicts", "dormant conflicts" and "protracted conflicts". No matter what we may call them, they not only affect regional stability but also pose a serious threat to international security and may even lead to global confrontation between the external players.

Svante Cornell from John Hopkins University argues that Putin uses "Frozen Conflict" engagements as a new form of irregular instruments of statecraft. "When Putin came to power in 2005 Russian military and security officers appeared, as if by magic, in key positions in the breakaway self-declared "republics." This showed how little Moscow trusted its own proxies, and it also gave the lie to Moscow's claim to be a peace-broker in these conflicts. The same script was acted out in Ukraine, with one major difference: There
was no violent ethnic conflict to begin with. Tensions between the country's east and west were there, to be sure, but there was nothing that would have devolved into large-scale violence.

Putin had to create the separatist movement in Ukraine practically out of thin air and the Ukrainian people gave him "just cause". Citing illegal revolt against democratically elected President and inciting nationalist fervor at home with a rallying cry of "Protect Russian people everywhere" he deployed military and security officers of the newly minted "Donetsk People's Republic". The Georgian and Ukraine incursions were easy to market internally and fit nicely into the definition of "Frozen Conflict".

The list of "Frozen" candidates is lengthy. And to anticipate his next moves there is plenty of material to draw from based on direct and indirect moves he has made across the former USSR. He moved aggressively and militarily in Abkhazia, North Ossetia, Crimea, and now Eastern Ukraine. Indirectly he used economic leverage in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan to form the Customs Union and in Tajikistan he has used economic subsidies to leverage a continued military presence. So who on the list is next?

We put the balance of the Central Asian States (CAS) and Azerbaijan in the indirect "Frozen Conflict" category. Russia must tread gently with the Muslim dominated countries. Currently they are relatively stable given the strength of their authoritarian regimes, appetite for economic incentives, limited Russian citizenry, and importance to Russia's large trading partner, regional competitor, China. China will tolerate little interference in their areas of operation.

Much of the Russian citizenry that was relocated to the CAS in the Stalin era has re-migrated to home of origin. So with little or no "Russian" citizenry to show his "friend of the Muslim" face as adopted from Primakov. He uses his Chechnya model with Kadyrov as an example of what a good partner he can be. But there are over eight million Muslim CAS migrant workers in Moscow and St. Petersburg who, as the economic conditions worsen and nationalism rises, are a potential source for terrorist recruitment.

So now we look South and West for his next direct action "Frozen Conflict" candidates. Where will he go after Ukraine?

- Nagorno-Karabakh in Armenia
- Transdnistria in Moldova
- Abkhazia
- South Ossetia in Georgia
- The Baltics
- Moldova
- Serbia

How far would Putin push to secure his new vision for an Eurasian Trading regime? How far can he push NATO and other interested Sovereign regimes including China before they react? It appears he can push EU/US/NATO further as sanction activity to date hasn't discouraged activity in Ukraine. And his recent warning not to push back on him to hard, accompanied by his reminder that Russia is a nuclear power, implies he means to do business in "Frozen Conflict" environments for a time to come.

In determining where he will go next we must ask ourselves several questions? Where does he perceive his greatest threats and opportunities? Beyond Ukraine and the Baltics he will be hard pressed to push his "Russian" citizen protection mantra as he did in Ukraine and Georgia. In the Baltics the citizens have spoken loudly for NATO membership unlike Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, so what would he do to justify movement there?

If it is a security threat he perceives from NATO countries along with a disruption in energy trading partners than the Baltics and Romania would be hostile takeout targets possibly defended by NATO. Hungary, though in NATO, may be easier to influence with the new regime trending to authoritarian rule. But Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Slovakia would be heavily defended by NATO.

With Russia's commodity economy energy competition from the CAS, Caspian and Middle East threaten to lure away his European dominance. In this case he must look to increase influence in additional parts of the Black Sea region including Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova so he has an easier time pushing through his South Stream Project for which Ukraine is essential and Moldova easy prey. These countries have no obligation from NATO or other regional entities that they can demand assistance from and in each there is a "Frozen Conflict" province.

So what are the issues we face in predicting Putin's next steps in what we could describe as "Frozen Conflict" nations and in generating potential neutralizing strategies to prevent Russian hostility? Well we do not yet know Putin's boundaries. We do not know his limitations. At what point will US/EU
sanctions work against him with his own citizenry? Where might he gain unexpected support from beyond China? Iran? Latin America? Could he deflect EU/US/NATO attention by stirring additional conflict in the Middle East? Where will he meet the least resistance? We know his psychographics which should caution anyone against trying to bluff him out of an action. We know he needs growth markets for his economy. We know he is concerned about extremist terrorism migrating through the CAS, Caspian, and Caucasus regions.

For purposes of this paper we are going to select Putin’s need to secure his Black Sea presence to move through his South Stream project and do what he can to interdict competitor initiatives. Historically, the wider Black Sea Region has always been a battle field for the external players and border countries. One only has to review the outcomes of the Crimea War and World Wars I & II to see understand the impact the region has had and continues to have on shaping global influence.

Today the situation is no different as multi-nationals seek to exploit the Energy resources and geographic positioning in the region. And Putin views this region, as Russia has done so throughout history; as his rightful domain and all external players as invaders. At the end of the day Russia, The United States, NATO, EU, China, Iran and many others have interest in securing Black Sea region leverage. And each try to find solutions to ‘frozen Conflicts’ using different formats there they can exercise their clout and influence.

Putin’s "Frozen Conflict" targets for Black Sea dominance are the remaining members of GUAM – Organization for Democracy and Economic Development: Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. De facto each of these countries has state attributes – population, territory, laws, governmental structures, elections, state insignia and, in some cases, their own currency.

But like the East in Ukraine there is a "Frozen Conflict" province for Putin to use as justification for invasion: Transnistria in Moldova, break-away Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan which will also act to cement Russia’s relationship with Christian Orthodox Armenia. Until recently the only GUAM country without a conflict was Ukraine.

Below is the short overview of remaining GUAM countries with "Frozen Conflict":

**TRANSDNISTRIA**

The tiny breakaway republic of 4,163 square kilometres consists of a narrow strip of land located east of the Dnieper River (hence the name), plus the city of Bender and its surrounding localities located on the western side. The country borders Ukraine to its east. In total, Transnistria comprises more than 500,000 people, with Russian and Ukrainian Slavs making up 59 per cent of the population and Moldovan Romanians 32 per cent. The capital, Tiraspol, a city of 203,000, is almost three-quarters Russian and Ukrainian. Moldova itself has a checkered history. It is a largely Romanian-speaking entity, historically known as Bessarabia, which was part of Romania after the First World War until occupied by the Soviets in 1940 and reconstituted as the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (Moldavian SSR).

However, when Moscow created the Moldavian SSR, it added the mainly Russian-speaking Dniester region, formerly an autonomous part of Ukraine, to Romanian Bessarabia – sowing the seeds of future ethnic trouble. In the late 1980s, as the Soviet Union was collapsing, it was clear that Moldova had an identity problem and that the inhabitants, coming from an array of ethnic backgrounds, were a long way from being a cohesive and friendly family.

The mainly Russian and Ukrainian population in the Dniester region grew alarmed over growing Moldovan nationalism and even the potential reunification of Moldova with Romania. A 1989 law which made Moldovan an official language added to the tension. The law made it compulsory for everyone who worked in a position where they had to communicate with customers to speak both languages; Russian and Ukrainian speakers saw this as discriminatory.

With aid and equipment from the 14th Army, which still retains a 1,200-strong Russian military contingent in Transnistria, the region held off the Moldovans. A
cease-fire led to the creation of a three-party Joint Control Commission, comprised of Russia, Moldova, and Transnistria, which supervises a demilitarized security zone on both sides of the Dniester River. It has been a "frozen conflict" ever since. In September 2006, Transnistria’s citizenry voted overwhelmingly to confirm their independence and the country has created its own constitution, flag, national anthem, and coat of arms, as well as a military, police, postal system, and currency. But Transnistria remains a de facto state, unrecognized by sovereign members of the international community – including Russia itself.

Transnistria is plagued by corruption, organized crime and smuggling. It has been accused of conducting illegal arms sales and of money laundering. However, it remains an electoral democracy. The current president, Yevgeny Shevchuk, an ethnic Ukrainian, won the December 2011 election by beating the incumbent, Igor Smirnov, and the Kremlin-backed speaker of the parliament, Anatoliy Kaminski.

Moldova is also home to 160,000 Gagauz, a Turkic-Christian people. In 1994 the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia, in Moldova’s south, was established for them. If Moldova decided to unite with Romania, Gagauzia would have the right of self-determination. Moldova and Transnistria have engaged in talks including a meeting between Moldovan Prime Minister Iurie Leanca and Shevchuk. Moldova announced that its parliament would consider removing travel restrictions on Transnistrians with Russian or Ukrainian passports.

Moldova has also signed a free trade pact and political association treaty with the European Union which offered the impoverished country’s 3.5 million citizens visa-free travel entry within the 28-nation bloc. Russia has already shown its dissatisfaction by banning the import of Moldovan wine, Moldova’s major export. It has delivered thinly veiled threats that Russia might stop supplying Moldova with natural gas. Moreover Russia might use Transnistria to invade Ukraine from the south to provide help to pro-Russian fighters in Eastern Ukraine.

NAGORNO-KARABAKH

Since the fall of the iron curtain, the status of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) has been the main source of conflict between the Armenian, Azerbaijani governments and the leadership of the self-proclaimed NKR. A large ethnic Armenian population lives in Nagorno-Karabakh and it resents the extent of Azerbaijani influence in the area. The collapse of the Soviet Union triggered a resurgence of ethnic sentiment. It was met by military suppression. In 1991, heavy fighting broke out between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces. The fighting enabled the Karabakh-Armenian forces to establish control over Nagorno-Karabakh and seven surrounding districts, which they claim as a security zone. The region of Nagorno-Karabakh has since seen the buildup of a state like entity. It contains elements that insist on full independence from Azerbaijan. Since 1992, peace negotiations have been brokered by the OSCE’s ‘Minsk Group’, co-chaired by Russia, France and the US. Despite regular meetings, the sides have yet to reach a peaceful consensus on the future status of the republic.

The regular meetings between Presidents Aliyev and Sargsyan – including a recent one in Sochi – did not bring any results. Many experts think Baku is considering different options: one of them is to move from a strategic relationship with Turkey to Russia. One positive result of the Russo-Georgian war is that the leadership of Azerbaijan decided to “cool down” its militaristic rhetoric toward Armenia. By witnessing the defeat of Georgia, Baku no longer appears so certain that it should bring back disputed territories with military force. In previous years, the Azeri leaders permitted themselves public announcements of such a stance. In 2006, President Aliyev said, “Our policies must be aggressive. We must be ready for war” (AFP, October 2, 2006); and in 2007: “We are ready for a military operation at any moment” (Kavkazskiy Uzel, 2 July, 2007). However, experts agree that Baku does not have any chances for a blitzkrieg and would lose in a long war. Some Azerbaijani strategists offer another concept the so called “limited revenge”. The opening of the border with Turkey would allow Armenia to increase its cooperation with Iran and become an important energy corridor for Iranian energy. Russia
would gain from that because of the presence of Russian energy companies in the Armenian market.

Russia's annexation of Crimea, however, has contributed to the new tensions between two countries. In August 2014 this resulted in 20 causalities from both sides. Armenia, which depends on Russia for economic and military support, has welcomed the takeover of Crimea and some Armenians have suggested it could be a model for Nagorno-Karabakh. This has rattled Azerbaijan, which (like Ukraine) has aligned itself with the West. Energy-producing Azerbaijan, host to oil majors including BP, Chevron and ExxonMobil, frequently threatens to take Nagorno-Karabakh back by force and is spending heavily on its armed forces. Armenia, an ex-Soviet republic like Azerbaijan, has warned it will intervene if Nagorno-Karabakh is overrun. The Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan again made statements that it would use the military force to get the enclave back. Abkhazia formally declared independence in 1999, resulting in an international economic embargo that is still in force. It has left Abkhazia's economy highly dependent on Russia, which maintains a border crossing and railway line to Sukhumi. Moscow infuriated Georgia by making it easy for people in Abkhazia to gain Russian citizenship, and most now hold Russian passports. For nearly 15 years, UN peacekeepers – mainly composed of Russians – patrolled a buffer zone on the border between the two sides.

However, in August 2008, during the war between Russia and Georgia over South Ossetia, Russian army troops moved through Abkhazia and pushed into Georgia proper, effectively using the region to open another front with Georgia. Meanwhile, Abkhaz forces drove Georgian troops out of the only area of Abkhazia still under Georgian control – the Kodori gorge.

After the 2008 conflict, Moscow declared that it would formally recognize the independence of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russia's allies Nicaragua and Venezuela followed suit, as did a number of small Pacific island states. After the Russian annexation of Crimea, Abkhazia is considering what would be the better option – to take the example of Crimea or to continue to remain a self-proclaimed republic.

South Ossetia has been a long a source of tension in the region and was the focus of a full-blown war between Russia and Georgia in 2008.
In the aftermath, it declared independence from Georgia and was recognized by Russia, although only a few other countries followed suit. South Ossetia is inhabited mostly by Ossetians who speak a language remotely related to Persian. Georgians account for less than one-third of the population. Insisting that North Ossetia is, in fact, the only Ossetia, Tbilisi prefers to call South Ossetia by the historic Georgian name of Samachablo or, more recently, Tskhinvali Region. By tradition, the Ossetians have had good relations with Russians and were regarded as loyal citizens, first of the Russian empire and later of the Soviet Union. They sided with the Kremlin when Bolshevik forces occupied Georgia in the early 1920s, and, as part of the carve-up which followed, the South Ossetian Autonomous Region was created in Georgia and North Ossetia was formed in Russia. In the twilight of the Soviet Union, as Georgian nationalist Zviad Gamsakhurdia came to prominence in Tbilisi, separatist sentiment burgeoned in South Ossetia.

After several outbreaks of violence between Georgians and Ossetians, the region declared its intention to secede from Georgia in 1990 and, the following year, declared de facto independence. The collapse of the USSR and Georgian independence in 1991 only strengthened South Ossetia's determination to break with Tbilisi. Sporadic violence involving Georgian irregular forces and Ossetian fighters continued until the summer of 1992 when an agreement on the deployment of Georgian, Ossetian and Russian peacekeepers was reached. Political stalemate followed. Separatist voices became less strident during President Shevardnadze's rule in Georgia, but the issues returned to the foreground when Mikhail Saakashvili replaced him as president. Making clear his intention to bring the breakaway regions to heel, Mr Saakashvili offered South Ossetia dialogue and autonomy within the Georgian state. But his offer fell far short of separatist demands, and in 2006 South Ossetians overwhelmingly voted to restate their demand for independence in a referendum that Georgia did not recognize. Tensions came to head in early August 2008, when, after nearly a week of clashes between Georgian troops...
and separatist forces, Georgia launched a concerted air and ground assault attack on South Ossetia, briefly gaining control of Tskhinvali. Declaring its citizens to be under attack, as most South Ossetians have Russian passports, Moscow sent in troops and launched air attacks on the Georgian forces. Within days Russian forces had swept the Georgians out of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and then proceeded to occupy parts of Georgia, causing panic in Tbilisi. In April 2009, Russia bolstered its position in South Ossetia by signing a five-year agreement to take formal control of its frontiers with Georgia proper, as well as those of Abkhazia.

Recent events in Ukraine seem to support the view that Moscow is prepared to punish Georgia for moving closer to Europe, by finally annexing Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In the recent parliamentary elections in South Ossetia in June 2014, the party United Ossetia enjoyed a landslide victory. United Ossetia advocates South Ossetia joining North Ossetia and creating a united Ossetian region inside the Russian Federation. The leader of the party, Anatoly Bibilov, stated that this is an age-old dream of the Ossetian people. But the proposal significantly differs from the program of the former president of South Ossetia, Eduard Kokoity, who headed the republic during the five-day Russian-Georgian war. Kokoity advocated retaining South Ossetia’s independence and made additional territorial claims against Georgia – including the mountainous gorge of Truso and Kazbegsky district.

Ten years ago Western experts warned about the imminent danger of leaving the solution of “frozen Conflict” in Russian hands. At the 2004 NATO Summit Vladimir Socor stated that in his view, Moscow’s policy paradigm with respect to these conflicts can be defined as controlled instability. It foments, then manages the conflicts; casts Russia in the dual role of party to and arbiter of the conflicts; frustrates their resolution (unless it be on terms ensuring Russia’s dominance over the whole of the affected country); perpetuates a Russian military presence; capitalizes on the geopolitical and socioeconomic consequences of mass ethnic cleansing (of Azeris from Karabakh and of Georgians from Abkhazia); fosters state weakness and chaotic conditions in the target countries; distracts these from the agenda of systemic reforms; and discourages Western interest in developing organic ties with Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The overarching goal of Russian policy has evolved from the simple one of thwarting these countries’ independence in the early and mid-1990s, to the more ambitious present goal of thwarting their integration into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. This indicates essential continuity in the conflict-management policy of three successive Russian regimes from 1990 to the present.

At the socio-political level, the strategy paradigm of controlled instability has its counterpart, the export of the Russian model of governance to breakaway enclaves. These have become miniature reproductions of the Russian phenomenon whereby authoritarian leaderships, security services, shadow business and organized crime, all intertwined, control policy and politics, the administration and the economy. While Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan have evolved degrees of political and institutional pluralism and the offshoots of civil society, and continue moving in that direction, the Russian-controlled breakaway satellites are highly authoritarian and militarized, and their populations confined to a Moscow-centred informational environment.

Despite the fact that the US and NATO are very cautious about potential military support to Ukraine one should remember the Balkan war where the Alliance had to intervene after long period of hesitation and countless victims. Hopefully 2014 NATO Summit in Wales could work out a realistic solution how to stop Russia’s stealth invasion of Ukraine. If not, President Putin will continue his pursuit of complete dominance of the Black Sea region by intensifying his “Frozen Conflict” strategy in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and perhaps even beyond.

ENDNOTES

Russia's plans for Crimea: the economic development

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PART ONE:

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: FIRST STEPS, FIRST CHALLENGES

Russia's annexation of Crimea on March 18, 2014 has raised issues related to the economic impact of such a move for Moscow. The takeover of the peninsula as well as Moscow's involvement in the Ukrainian crisis have sparked economic sanctions from the Euro-Atlantic community. On the diplomatic stage, Western countries have sought to isolate Moscow and boosted their efforts to ease Kiev's economic rapprochement with the EU. Beyond the political and diplomatic cost of the annexation for Moscow, the question is to what extent could Crimea be a burden for Russia's economy? This first article tackles this issue by examining Russian plans to develop the peninsula. A second article will deal with plans to beef up Russia's Black Sea Fleet and military assets in Crimea.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF CRIMEA: HOW TO ATTRACT INVESTMENTS?

Although the figures have fluctuated during the past months, it is now possible to draw a picture of Russia's plans with regard to Crimea's development. Plans to develop the economy of the peninsula involve mainly Russian government as well as private investors. The challenge nevertheless will be tough to meet: Crimea has benefited from very few money flows since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia was prevented from investing in the peninsula, and Kiev was reluctant to spend money for the Republic of Crimea, one of the most Russophile and Russian-speaking parts of then newly independent Ukraine.

Soon after the annexation, President Putin created the Ministry for the Development of Crimea and appointed Oleg Saveliev as the head of this new ministry. Concrete plans to develop the peninsula still remain vague, although some measures have already been outlined in a strategic document called 'concept of development of Crimea until 2020', released in early May. Moscow's idea is twofold: attract investments, and develop and refresh Crimean infrastructures (ports, railways, airports, power plants and distribution network). By 2020, Moscow intends to spend up to 825 billion rubles (US $24,2 billion) to develop Crimea, including 695 billion rubles (US $20,4 billion) pumped directly from the Federal budget[1].

Tourism remains the most relevant way to attract money and to develop Crimea. Since the imperial era, the peninsula has been one of the favorite spots for the Russian elite, and during the Soviet period, Crimean resorts were very popular among middle and upper class Soviet citizens. Last June 17, Aeroflot's low-cost subsidiary Dobrolyot launched two more regular flights from
Russia to Simferopol, bringing daily services to the peninsula to 10 flights. With economy class seats available at 7 000 rubles (US $204) only if reserved about a month in advance, Dobrolyot’s objectives are to bring 200 000 passengers to Crimea in 2014. The combined total number of passengers flying from Russia to Crimea would be 650 000 to 700 000 for 2014, three times more than in 2013[2]. Due to the increase in the number of daily flights between Russia and Simferopol, Russia-Crimea airline traffic jumped to 60 flights per day in June 2014. Growing air traffic between Russian airports and Crimea will be further eased since the International Civil Aviation Office designated Russia as the main provider for air navigation services over the peninsula[3].

The Kremlin outlined an original way to attract tourists and develop Crimea’s economy. In an attempt to promote tourism and development, the Russian authorities have planned to invest US $1.5 billion to create a special gambling zone in the peninsula. Russia has tried to implement the American practice in opening gambling resorts in remote and isolated zones like in Las Vegas. Since July 2009, four Russian gambling zones (Krasnodar Territory, Kaliningrad Territory, Primorsky Territory and Altai Territory) have been established, and Crimea could become the fifth territory to open. However, Oleg Saveliev stated in May 2014 that the project to open a new gambling area in Crimea would be postponed to 2015 since Russian authorities had not been able to outline a comprehensive development plan[4]. Yet, in June, the Duma enacted a law supporting the opening of the Crimean gambling zone[5]. The first Crimean casino is slated to open in 2016, most probably somewhere in the southern part of the peninsula, and the launch of the gambling zone is likely to create around 10 000 jobs in Crimea[6].

Russian authorities have considered another possibility to ease money flows into Crimea: in March 2014, Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev recommended granting peninsula the status of special economic zone to boost investments. According to a bill introduced before the Duma in late April 2014, anyone who invests a minimum of 150 million rubles in Crimea in three consecutive years will be exonerated of all taxes, excluding income taxes (10% average). Moreover, the rate for the income taxes for the residents of the peninsula has been set to 0%[7]. The Kremlin hopes to attract Russian offshore capital back to Crimea, including those which have flown to Cyprus and those which could be subject to Western economic sanctions[8].

Yet, the development of Crimea requires proper and attractive infrastructures to support and to boost economic expansion of the peninsula. This point remains the main challenge for the Kremlin and Russia’s economy.

THE URGENT NEED TO DEVELOP TRANSPORT AND ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURES

The question of the Crimean transport and energy infrastructures has quickly raised after March 18. Although airlines and ferries can connect the peninsula to Russia, there is nevertheless the need for direct communications between Crimea and mainland Russia. Since Crimea largely relies today on the Ukrainian side for its energy supplies, Moscow has also started to draw a plan for energy supplies.

Crimean railways urgently need to be refreshed and expanded. According to the Russian Minister for Economic Development, Alexei Ulyukayev, Russia may have to invest up to 100 billion rubles (US $3 billion) to develop transport infrastructures in Crimea[9]. However, the bill is likely to be much higher than this rough estimate. Indeed, only the cost of the construction of the bridge across the Kerch Strait has been assessed at 283 billion rubles to 349 billion ruble (US $8.2 to $10.1 billion), 70% of which will

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PhD Dissertation: ‘The Russian Black Sea Fleet from Catherine the Great to Vladimir Putin: a Tool at the Service of Russian Ambitions in the Mediterranean (1783-2012)’.

This blog tackles issues driving security and geopolitics of the wider Black Sea region.
be paid by the Federal budget, and mostly pumped from the National Wealth Fund. The 4.5 kilometers automobile and rail bridge across the Kerch Strait should be built by 2018, and Russian authorities plan that its construction will take no longer than 3.5 years. Moscow has sought foreign investors to support the project, and so far China International Fund and China Railway Construction Corporation have already displayed a strong interest in the Kerch Bridge and are ready to partly fund the project, as are South Korean companies[10]. Russia has also drawn plans to beef up Crimea’s railways network, mainly the Kerch-Feodosia-Dzhankoi line (207 kilometers), and to build a new line connecting Simferopol to Feodosia (nearly 120 kilometers)[11]. Once the Kerch Strait Bridge is built, the heart of Crimea will be directly connected to Russia’s Kuban, putting Simferopol, and Sevastopol (the Sevastopol-Simferopol line already exists), from a few hours from Novorossiysk.

The other issue is energy supplies to Crimea. Currently, the peninsula produces 10% to 30% of its needs, while the rest of the electricity, around 1,400 megawatts, comes from Ukraine. To deal with Crimean energy supplies, Russia plans to build two new power plants. The first one would be built directly on the peninsula and would deliver 500 to 600 megawatts, whereas the second plant would be located near Novorossiysk and would have a capacity of 600 megawatts. It has been reported that the latter plant would cost between 20 and 30 billion rubles (US $580 to $870 million), and 2 to 2.5 years would be required for its construction[12]. All these plans require large public investments and will undoubtedly weigh on the Russian Federal budget as well as on Russia’s economic growth.

**WHAT WILL BE THE IMPACT ON RUSSIA’S ECONOMY?**

Beyond economic sanctions adopted by most of the Euro-Atlantic community against Russia due to the Ukrainian crisis, the integration of the peninsula and Sevastopol to the Russian Federation is likely to have a substantial cost for Russia’s economy in the short and middle term.

Most of the Russian growth forecasts predicted in early 2014 had to be reassessed in light of the integration of Crimea to the Russian Federation, and the subsequent sanctions. The IMF has already cut down its 2014 growth forecast for Russia from 2.0% to 1.3% and the 2015 rate, originally set at 2.5%, has been reassessed at 2.3% in late spring 2014[13]. However, the World Bank has forecast an even worse situation for Russia’s economy, and has outlined two scenarios. Whereas the World Bank predicted 2.2% growth in 2014 and 2.5% in 2015, it has dramatically cut its forecasts to 1.1% (positive scenario) or -1.8% (negative scenario) for 2014, and 2.1% or 1.3% for 2015[14]. Even the Russian Ministry of Finance has outlined lower forecasts than initially expected: Moscow expects 1.1% growth in 2014 (initially 2.5%) and 2.6% in 2015 (instead of 2.8%).

In May, Alexei Uluykaev stated that the Russian government planned to cancel two major projects in order to save money and redirect funds to higher priority issues, including the development of Crimea. The project to build a 3 kilometers bridge across the Lena River in Yakutsk (estimated at US $1 billion) planned for 2020 has been cancelled as well as the project to expand the port of Taman in the Black Sea. It has been reportedly estimated that due to the cancellation of these two major projects, the Russian government would be able to redirect 112 billion rubles (US $3.2 billion) for Crimea’s development[15].

Interestingly enough, despite the tremendous cost for Russia’s economy of the seizure of Crimea, the Kremlin’s policy still enjoys fair support from the population. According to a survey carried out by the Russian institute Levada in June 2014, the number of people supporting the integration of Crimea and Sevastopol into the Russian Federation has increased from 28% in March to more than 40% in June[16].

Crimea’s integration to the Russian Federation will require major investments and is likely to hamper Russia’s economy and growth in the short term. After the Sochi Olympic Games, and with the coming 2018 Soccer World Cup, Moscow will have to decide upon strategic priorities with regard to the development of the peninsula. According to various figures, it could be expected that by 2020, Russia will have to disburse nearly 1 trillion rubles for Crimea. The main priorities are the development of the communication network, the construction of the Kerch Bridge and Crimea’s electricity supplies. Because of international sanctions, Western companies are unlikely to participate in supporting the development of the peninsula under Russian auspices, which is not the case of China for the time being. However, in the longer term, a successful economic integration of Crimea to the Russian Federation cannot be dismissed. Although tourism appears to be the main driver for the development of the peninsula, other assets are likely to benefit from Russian investments: agriculture would be one of them, but the shipyard industry and defense-connected activities are more promising drivers for the economic development of Crimea.
PART TWO:
WHAT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE BUILDUP OF THE BLACK SEA FLEET?

Having examined the plans for the economic development of Crimea and the construction of infrastructures in the peninsula in our previous paper, we now raise issues related to the impact of Russia's seizure of Crimea for the modernization of the Black Sea Fleet. The buildup of the Black Sea Fleet '1.0' was initiated years before Russia's takeover of Crimea which has recast Moscow's paradigm in the whole Black Sea region. Due to the full sovereignty gained over the peninsula after March 18, Russia has now a full scope of unimpeded possibilities to beef up its southern fleet. However, not only plans for the modernization of the Black Sea Fleet '2.0' will require redirecting part of investments from mainland Russia to Crimea, but it will also call for further investments in order to develop Crimea's shipyards.

THE MODERNIZATION OF THE BLACK SEA FLEET '1.0'

The Black Sea Fleet remains today mainly a "green water fleet" with limited high seas capabilities. It operates 1 guided missile cruiser, the Moskva (Project 1164), which is also the flagship of the fleet, 1 classic submarine, the B-871 Arosa (Project 877V), 3 frigates (Projects 61M, 1135 and 1135M), 7 amphibious ships (Projects 775 and 1171), and several small units (antisubmarine warfare boats, small missile or artillery boats). Nearly 90% of the tonnage of the fleet is based in Crimea, mainly in Sevastopol (80%), and in Feodosia (9%)[17]. In 2014, the overall average age of the around 40 combat units is 36 years. The Black Sea Fleet is served by 12 000 to 16 000 service men dispatched primarily in Crimea, but in other naval and air assets such as Temryuk (Russia's only naval asset in the Sea of Azov), Utash, Novorossiysk, and Otchamchira and Gudauta in Abkhazia. The fleet nevertheless suffers from a lack of air-defense and therefore relies on land-based air strike capabilities, and therefore relies on land-based anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities in the Black Sea, and contribute to secure Russia's southern flank. They consist in 6 multipurpose frigates from Project 11356M, currently under construction at Yantar Shipyard (Kaliningrad). The lead ship, the Admiral Grigorovich, was floated out in mid-March 2014, and should be inducted in late 2014, early 2015. Derived from the Soviet Krivak type frigates, the new Project 11356M frigates will feature anti-ship (P-800 Onyx missile), anti-surface (cruise missile Klub) and air defense capabilities (Shtil SAM missile system). Six new classic submarines from Kilo class (Project 0636.3), built at the Admiralty shipyard (Saint Petersburg), should also be commissioned. The first unit, the B-261 Novorossiysk, was launched in November 2013 and is expected to be inducted by the end of 2014. As for the amphibious capabilities, in spite of critics from Russian Navy officials, 1 or 2 large landing ships from Ivan Gren class (Project 11711) are slated to be inducted in the Black Sea Fleet. Moreover, the Black Sea Fleet should be strengthened by 1 or 2 high sea multipurpose frigates of Admiral Gorshkov class (Project 22350). The lead ship,
the Admiral Gorshkov, launched in October 2010, is still under completion at the Northern Shipyard (Saint Petersburg). The Black Sea Fleet should finally be reinforced with up to 4 near-shore units like missile corvettes from the Project 21631, and with 1 or 2 frigates from the Project 11540 Yastreth, currently deployed in the Baltic Fleet. Concerning land-based capabilities, Russia plans to dispatch Su-24M and Su-30SM for air strike capacities and Il-38N for patrolling and anti-submarine warfare (ASW).

Until March 18, 2014, the implementation of the modernization of the Black Sea Fleet had been fundamentally constrained by restrictions imposed by the Ukrainian government under the 1997 and 2010 bilateral agreements on the use of military assets leased by Russia in the Crimean peninsula. Last April 2, Vladimir Putin terminated a serial of Russian-Ukrainian treaties on the Russian Black Sea Fleet. The Russian-Ukrainian agreement on parameters of division of the Black Sea Fleet signed on May 28, 1997, the treaty on status and terms of deployment of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine (May 28, 1997), the treaty on mutual settlements related with division and stay of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine (May 28, 1997) and the Kharkov agreement on stay of the Russian Black Sea Fleet on the territory of Ukraine signed on April 21, 2010 have been unilaterally cancelled by the Russian side[20]. As a result, the annexation of Crimea has widened Russia’s possibilities to enhance the Black Sea Fleet and to increase its military and strategic footprint in the region.

**AFTER MARCH 18: THE MODERNIZATION OF THE BLACK SEA FLEET ‘2.0’**

Russia is likely to reconsider plans formerly outlined to beef up its Black Sea Fleet in light of the annexation of the peninsula. While the number of new sea platforms could evolve to protect the Crimean shores, new land-based units and missiles systems should be deployed to protect the south-western regions of the Russian Federation as well as Russian military assets.

From a historical perspective, until 1991, Crimea had served as an outpost for extending Russian and Soviet power projection towards the greater Black Sea and Mediterranean regions. Now that Russian military presence is no longer constrained by legal treaties with Kiev, Moscow can fully use the geostategic potential of the peninsula by dispatching a broad spectrum of mutually reinforcing systems. Crimea furthermore offers Moscow a strong forward defense point, particularly against potential air and sea incursions in its southern flank.

The modernization and the development of Russia’s military assets in the Black Sea has been framed since 2008 by a strategic document named "Creating a system of bases for the Black Sea Fleet on the territory of the Russian Federation by 2020" commissioned by the Kremlin to the Minister of Defense in August 2004[21]. Moscow intends to spend up to 86,7 billion rubles (US $2,5 billion) to expand Black Sea Fleet’s bases and support points (including the Tarsus support point in Syria). Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu stated in May 2014 that 48 military assets had already been built on Russia’s Caucasian shores according to this program before adding that due to the integration of Crimea to the Russian Federation, the funds should be reallocated to Sevastopol[22]. However, the construction of the brand new naval base in Novorossiyk, initially slated to potentially replace Sevastopol, will be completed. Besides, the reparation and the modernization of Crimean military infrastructures (naval bases, coastal artillery, and airfields) has been assessed at no less than 10 billion rubles (US $285 million)[23].

Concerning the number of new sea platforms set to be inducted by 2020 in the Black Sea Fleet, Moscow is likely to stick to its initial plans with regards to the main combat units (5 to 6 frigates from Project 11356M, 6 Kilo type classic submarines). On the other hand, the number of small combat units, including missile corvettes (Project 21631) could be increased in order to cover the Crimean coasts. Russia has already planned to induct a further 6 patrol boats from Project 22160 by 2020, and the overall number of new combat and support units set to be commissioned in the Black Sea Fleet by 2020 could be brought at 30[24]. While the annexation of Crimea has provided Russia with longer shores to protect in the Black Sea, it is unlikely to result in turning the Black Sea Fleet from a "green water navy" into a "blue water navy". It is nevertheless highly probable that the number of second and third rank sea platforms will be increased in the framework of the SAP 2011-2020 or, more probably, commissioned in the SAP 2016-2025.

The annexation of Crimea has on the other hand opened the path for Moscow to deploy a wide scope of land-based systems and units in order to create a strong line of defense ahead of Russia’s mainland. Pending the probable deployment of the S-400 SAM system, new missiles systems have already been dispatched, such as the Bastion-P anti-ship coastal battery and S-300 PMU anti-aircraft missiles, based near Sevastopol since late March 2014[25]. The Iskander surface-to-surface missiles, with a 400-kilometer operational range, could be deployed in response to NATO’s Ballistic Missile Defense program currently under comple-
tion in Romania. It could cover a wide part of southern Ukraine, of Moldova, and a significant part of Romanian coastline, including Constanta. Together with long-range, anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles, it can provide a large spectrum of capability to strike ground targets, interdict maritime traffic and impose a no-fly zone. Having gained access to ex-Ukrainian air bases and military facilities (193 assets, including naval bases, storages, airfields etc.) in Crimea, Russia’s air force now has significantly enhanced its presence covering almost the entire Black Sea coastline, Transnistria and southern Ukraine within its operational range[26]. In that regard, it has been reported that Russia plans to dispatch 20 Su-27 fighters at Belbek airbase near Sevastopol, as well as Tu-22M3 long-range strategic bombers by 2016[27]. These nuclear-capable bombers will be based at Gvardeyskoye airbase along with Tupolev Tu-142, and modernized Iluyshin Il-38N (anti-submarine warfare aircrafts), as well as ship borne Kamov Ka-27 and Ka-29 helicopters, suggesting that Gvardeyskoye could become a major maritime aviation hub in the greater Black Sea and Mediterranean region[28]. Besides, a new cruise-missile brigade is slated to be dispatched in Crimea and Russia plans to increase the number of navy infantry brigades in the peninsula[29]. The costal artillery has already been strengthened with a new regiment featuring 60 artillery units including Msta self-propelled howitzer (152 mm), Khrizantema supersonic anti-tank missiles and Tornado-G multiple rocket launcher systems[30]. Finally, since late June 2014, a new CBRN defense (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) autonomous regiment has been created and dispatched in Crimea. This new unit belongs to the Black Sea Fleet, and operates modernized RKBM-4-01 reconnaissance chemical vehicles, TMS-65 decontamination vehicles and TDA-2K smoke-screen vehicles[31].

However, the reinforcement of the Black Sea Fleet and the induction of new sea platforms will call for the development and the modernization of Crimean shipyards to support Russia’s increasing naval activity in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.

**TOWARD THE REVIVAL OF CRIMEAN SHIPYARDS?**

From a historical perspective, the most important Russian and Soviet Black Sea shipyards were located in Ukraine. While Nikolayev and Kherson laid down among the biggest surface vessels for the Imperial and Soviet navy, Sevmorzavod (Sevastopol) performed the maintenance of more than 80% of the tonnage of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet during the Cold War[32]. Yet, after the collapse of the USSR, most of the units of the Russian Black Sea Fleet were sent to Russia’s Baltic shipyards (Yantar in Kaliningrad; Saint Petersburg) for their maintenance. Russia’s Black Sea Fleet has been critically lacking local maintenance capacities since 1991, and this gap has been one of the issues jeopardizing the development of Moscow’s maritime and naval power in the Black Sea. The annexation of Crimea has therefore paved the way for Moscow to overhaul Crimean civil and military shipbuilding industry.

In order to support the defense industry in the peninsula, 23 Crimean companies will be contracted by Russia’s Ministry of Defense for the implementation of the SAP. Some contracts already inked by the Russian MoD with Russian shipyards should be redirected to Crimea: for instance, the Zelenodolsk shipyard (Zelenodolsk, Tatarstan) is said to be ready to transfer part of its orders to a Crimean plant[33]. The plant has been ordered a batch of 8 missiles corvettes from Project 21631 by the Russian Ministry of Defense. Besides, Russia’s Ministry for Commerce and Industry has outlined a plan to support and modernize 3 major Crimean shipyards: Zaliv (Kerch), More (Feodosia) and Sevmorzavod (Sevastopol)[34]. While Zaliv builds mainly gas tanker ships, More has specialized in building small and medium amphibious vessels. The modernization of Sevmorzavod will be furthermore important since Russia intends to transfer the bulk of modern ships and support vessels from Novorossiysk to Sevastopol. The money has already started to flow into Crimea: the Russian Minister of Defense placed a 5 billion rubles (US $143 million) order at a Crimean shipyard last April[35].

The annexation of Crimea has given a major impetus to Russia’s plans for the development and the modernization of the Black Sea Fleet. It has provided Moscow with a critical geostrategic asset in the greater Black Sea region and it will contribute to enhance Russia’s maritime and naval power not only in the Black Sea, but in the Mediterranean region as well. Moscow is likely to take into consideration the need for new units for its southern fleet in the framework of the 2016-2025 SAP. The development of Crimean shipbuilding capacities remains an urgent need considering the scheduled induction of new sea platforms in the near future. Beyond, the attempt by Moscow to revive Crimean industry appears as another driver to develop Crimea’s economy. However, the challenge will be tough to meet: Crimean shipyards have been economically surviving since 1991 with very few orders. Yet, Russia’s military is likely to remain directly or indirectly once again the first employer of the peninsula.
SOURCES


[23] Ibid.


[29] "Минобороны пересматривает программу базирования Черноморского флота", art. cit.


[32] Igor Delanoë, La flotte de la mer Noire, de Catherine II à Vladimir Poutine: un outil de puissance au service des ambitions méditerranéennes de la Russie (1783-2012), op. cit., p. 532.


[34] "Минпромторг РФ считает перспективным развитие трех верфей Крыма", Flotprom, May 20, 2014.

In this article we set out some of the complex legal issues which have arisen, or may arise in the near future, as a result of current indeterminate political status of Crimea territory. Against the backdrop of a rapidly evolving domestic and international legal landscape in Crimea, this article focuses on the practical steps that businesses operating in Crimea may consider taking in view of the current legal environment.

Over the last few months, events in Ukraine have been changing rapidly. In recent days we have seen the Crimean Parliament (whose authority is no longer recognized by Ukraine) declaring independence of the Crimean Republic. The people of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea voted in a referendum in favor of seceding from Ukraine and becoming a part of the Russian Federation. The referendum and declaration of independence have been categorized as illegal under Ukrainian law, as the Ukrainian Constitution prohibits organization of referendums aiming to modify the territorial configuration of Ukraine.

Following an accession request by the Parliament in Crimea, we have seen the Russian President and the representatives of Crimea signing an agreement on the accession of Crimea to the Russian Federation, which is stated to take immediate effect and has been ratified by the Constitutional Court and the Parliament of the Russian Federation.

In response, we have so far seen the imposition of several rounds of EU and US sanctions against certain Ukrainian and Russian individuals and a very real possibility that additional sanctions will be coming soon, including from Ukraine itself. In addition, there is a possibility that Russia may respond with its own sanctions as well, especially if the EU and the US proceed with imposing further sanctions, as there have been statements from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs about "symmetric" sanctions as a response to EU and US actions.

While the political, diplomatic and security responses to these events will continue to play out, the legal implications need to be considered as well. Today companies operating in Crimea are faced with a very real issue of having to comply with two different legal systems: Ukrainian and Russian.

On 18 March 2014, the Russian Federation entered into the Agreement to incorporate the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol as new subjects into the Russian Federation as of that date. The Agreement was ratified on 21 March 2014 and provides together with other implementing legislation for a transitional period of integration until 1 January 2015 during which Russian law is to apply throughout the region unless stated otherwise.
otherwise in other Russian laws. It also provides that normative legal acts of the Republic of Crimea shall continue to apply throughout the transition period, unless they contradict Russian law, until new legislative acts are passed either by the Russian Federation or the Republic of Crimea.

At the same time, on 27 April 2014, Ukraine approved the Law "On Guaranteeing Citizens' Rights and Freedoms and Legal Regime in the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine", No. 4473-1 dated 15 April 2014 (hereinafter the "Law"). This Law sets out provisions governing the current legal regime in Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (hereinafter together "Crimea"). According to the Law, Crimea remains a part of the Ukrainian territory, which has been temporarily occupied.

The following summarizes the key provisions of the Law which affect business activities in Crimea.

1. Crimea is confirmed to be an integral part of Ukraine and thus the Constitution and other laws of Ukraine apply there.

2. Any body or authority established in Crimea other than in accordance with Ukrainian legislation is deemed illegal and its acts are void and have no legal significance; the same applies to the officials of such bodies and their acts. Ukrainian state authorities may communicate or otherwise interact with such bodies or officers with the sole purpose of furthering the interests of Ukraine, protecting the rights and freedoms of Ukrainian citizens, implementing international agreements ratified by Ukraine or restoring the constitutional order of Ukraine in Crimea.

3. The Law does not restrict business activities in Crimea other than in accordance with Ukrainian legislation is deemed illegal and its acts are void and have no legal significance; the same applies to the officials of such bodies and their acts. Ukrainian state authorities may communicate or otherwise interact with such bodies or officers with the sole purpose of furthering the interests of Ukraine, protecting the rights and freedoms of Ukrainian citizens, implementing international agreements ratified by Ukraine or restoring the constitutional order of Ukraine in Crimea.

4. Ownership rights and other property rights of any legal entity or individual regarding any property located in Crimea, including land parcels and other real estate, are recognized and maintained to the extent that these ownership or other property rights have been or are acquired in accordance with the laws of Ukraine. The State of Ukraine, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (as part of Ukraine), Ukrainian state or municipal authorities, territorial communities and public law entities retain ownership other property rights to any property located in Crimea, including land parcels and other real estate.

5. Ownership rights to real estate located in Crimea are to be acquired or terminated (transferred) in accordance with applicable Ukrainian legislation. Any transactions violating this requirement will be void ab initio. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine is authorized to determine another state registration body for property rights registration and resolving encumbrances over real estate located in Crimea in cases where the existing state registrar cannot perform its regular functions regarding such real estate.

6. The state-owned land, subsoil resources, air, water and other natural resources, including those in the continental shelf and within the exclusive maritime economic zone, property of military units, state bodies, institutions and enterprises may not be transferred into the ownership of any other state, entity or individual other than in accordance with the procedure provided by the laws of Ukraine.

7. Specific rules for production, transfer, distribution, supply, purchase-sale and use of electricity in Crimea is to be regulated by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine separately (no such regulations are yet available).

8. Ukrainian citizens are guaranteed free entry and exit from the territory of Crimea through the established control points upon showing of identification documents. Foreign citizens and persons without citizenship may enter and exit the territory of Crimea through the established control points on the basis of special individual permits in accordance with the regulation to be adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (this regulation has not yet been adopted).

9. The automatic conversion of Ukrainian citizens residing in Crimea to Russian citizenship is not recognized and does not result in termination of Ukrainian citizenship.
10. The law provides for the jurisdiction of relevant courts of the City of Kyiv and Kyiv Region over disputes and cases which would otherwise be heard by competent Ukrainian courts in Crimea.

11. The Law asserts the liability of the Russian Federation for any damage or loss of property and “moral damage” suffered by legal entities or individuals as a result of Crimea occupation by the Russian Federation, and provides that the State of Ukraine will assist in obtaining compensation of such losses and damages from the Russian Federation "by all available means".

12. The Law recommends the National Bank of Ukraine to adopt regulations to ensure the implementation of the Law, this obviously relates to the banking activities and currency regulations. The Law does not provide any guidance as to the regime to be set out in such new regulations of the National Bank of Ukraine.

13. The Law amends the Criminal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code, the Administrative Code, the Administrative Procedure Code, border control and certain other legislation to provide for or increase liability of legal entities and individuals for violations of the provisions and requirements of the Law.

The Law does not provide any tax relief or tax exemptions for activities in Crimea. Therefore, and until further legislative changes, from the standpoint of Ukrainian law the generally applicable requirements of the Ukrainian tax legislation continue to apply to business activities in Crimea.

Although the Law clarifies various key areas of the current legal regime in Crimea, it leaves the specific regulation of business activities in Crimea for a separate law which is yet to be adopted. Also, additional legislation in the tax and currency control areas is likely to be introduced with the objective of protecting the interests of Ukrainian and foreign/international businesses operating in Crimea.

Following the decision by the Crimea Parliament members to seize all Ukrainian state property located in Crimea, the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine has announced that Ukraine will use all available legal means to recover damages caused by this seizure, including seizure of Russian state property located on the territory of Ukraine.

As the referendum in Crimea is categorized illegal under Ukrainian law, Ukraine treats the events in Crimea as an unconstitutional attempt of Crimea territory secession from Ukraine, and adopted a decision to dissolve the Crimean Parliament. Putting aside the legality of the event itself, the practical effect for owners of businesses or assets located in Crimea is that there is a very unusual situation now whereby under Ukrainian law the Crimean territory is Ukraine while under Russian law the territory is Russia. Therefore, which law applies?

Unless a political compromise is reached, no international treaty is likely to be executed between Ukraine and the Russian Federation to settle the legal status of Crimea or to provide for a smooth transitional regime. Companies should also check whether they have any political risk insurance in place that would cover expropriation, for example. In current circumstances, claiming compensation from an insurance company may be the most reliable way of obtaining it.
Ukraine’s fightback

Military manoeuvres took the Kremlin by surprise but the government has a mountain to climb

To those who accept Vladimir Putin’s view of Ukraine as an ‘artificial state’, the routing of pro-Russian insurgents from their stronghold in Slavyansk on July 5 might have come as a shock. It certainly appears to have surprised the Kremlin.

When Ukraine’s interim president, Oleksandr Turchynov, announced the launch of an ‘anti-terrorist operation’ against the insurgents on April 7, there was deep scepticism in Ukraine whether the government would be able to reconstitute any usable force at all.

The cause of this scepticism was not weak national identity, but profound disorientation following Crimea’s occupation and annexation. That Russia would spy, bribe, intimidate and economically coerce was long taken for granted. But the axiom that ‘Russian will never fight Ukrainian’ was deeply entrenched even among the country’s security professionals.

The interim government sworn into office by Ukraine’s parliament after the swift departure of former president Viktor Yanukovych was not a government of security professionals. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Arseniy Yatseniuk, financial and economic officials emerged with experience and competence. In the defence and security sector, the picture was different. Some new appointees were highly motivated but inexperienced. Others were lacklustre or incompetent.

What they discovered on taking up their posts was a military and security system without a brain or many functioning ligaments. During Yanukovych’s final days, personnel and operational records of the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) were eradicated, codes compromised and communications systems destroyed.

For years, and with Yanukovych’s complicity, military, security and law enforcement bodies had been deeply penetrated, and in the final weeks the SBU leadership took its orders from Moscow. Although the Ministry of Defence and armed forces retained much of their structural cohesion, command echelons had been purged and their assets raided by what had become an openly predatory state. From 2012 onwards, a prominent theme of seminars in Kyiv was the hollowing out of the state. For these reasons, the country was unprepared for war. It faced a well-armed and capably led insurgency, given coherence by Russian advisers, by forces redeployed from Crimea and by Russian special purpose forces. By early April, these forces were fanning out across the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. At the same time, Ukraine had to organize defence in depth against four Russian battle groups deployed on its borders. Yet until early June, the United States and other NATO members declined to supply most of the non-lethal military aid that Ukraine requested.

**RECOVERY**

Against this background, it is not Ukraine’s slowness but its swiftness in seizing the initiative that is remarkable. By the middle of May, the new command authorities had partially replenished the forces with volunteers and completed two limited national call-ups. They had undertaken a substantial redeployment of troops, instituted a new training regime and re-established effective command and control. Forces of dubious reliability – notably the troops of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs – were disbanded and new military formations such as the National Guard established in their place.

On May 9, National Guard and Ministry of Defence units re-established control over the southeastern city of Mariupol, but needed the support of the private security forces of Rinat Akhmetov, one of Ukraine’s richest men, to consolidate it. On May 27, they inflicted a devastating defeat of the insurgents at Donetsk’s Sergei Prokofiev International Airport. By July 1, despite intermittent reverses, the ‘anti-terrorist’ forces had regained control of 23 out of the 36 districts seized by the insurgents.

The ‘anti-terrorist operation’ derives its controversial name from the requirements of Ukrainian legislation. By law, the only other grounds for general mobilization and military operations are a state of emergency or a state of war.

Moreover, Ukraine claims that the pro-Russian insurgents employ terrorist tactics – the siting of heavy artillery in built-up areas and the employment of ‘provocations’ designed to inflict civilian casualties and further vilify Kyiv in the eyes of locals.

Legal niceties also explain why the antiterrorist centre of the SBU, rather than the general staff, coordinates the operations of all armed services. Since his election on May 25, Petro Poroshenko has established the authority over the operation that the interim president lacked. Lieutenant-General Viktor Muzhenko, appointed Chief of the General Staff by Poroshenko on July 3, is emerging as the brains behind the operation as Ukrainian forces close in on the final stronghold of the insurgents, the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk.

The character of the ‘hybrid war’ in the east has caused bewilderment, and it was meant to. For hundreds of years, irregular wars on the fringes of the empire, Tsarist and Soviet, have followed similar principles. The model of warfare is built around informal networks rather than top-down structures; it is untidy and adaptable, covert and vicious, and it is designed to erase the frontier between civil and interstate conflict. Its constituent parts are not only serving officers of Spetsnaz units and the Federal Security Service, but retired servicemen and deserters, the private security forces of oligarchs, Cossacks, Chechen fighters, adventurers and criminals.

Finance comes not only from the coffers of the Russian state, but nominally private banks and businesses, as well as Yanukovych’s pocket oligarchs. For all of these reasons, Kremlin ‘control’ is disputable; its military backing visible but deniable.

Yet the model has its limitations. First, without a strong indigenous component, the explosive will not detonate. Before the conflict reached its peak, opinion polls suggested that 70 per cent of residents in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts (regions) wanted Ukraine to remain a unitary state.

Even if these figures are still valid, 30 per cent is a lot of people, and in war anger is a force multiplier. However, in the remaining three eastern Ukrainian oblasts, not to mention the four oblasts of the Russiaspeaking south, the mixture has failed to detonate despite provocations by Russian proxies in Odessa and elsewhere.

The second limitation is that failure turns networks into cleavages. The authority exercised by Aleksandr Borodai, ‘Prime Minister’ and Igor Girkin, ‘Defence Minister’ of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic, is being tested by militia commanders and by Oleg Tsarev, businessman and politician, to whom Russia has assigned a key role in the political process. Following the Malaysia Airlines tragedy, it will almost certainly be curbed by Lieutenant-General Vladimir Antufeyev, for 20 years head of the KGB in Transnistria, who is as ruthless as Girkin and a dozen times more capable.

UNCERTAINTY

Since the first ‘green men’ appeared in Crimea, discussion in western capitals has focused on Russia’s actions and the West’s response. Yet it is Ukraine, not the West, that has altered the dynamics of the conflict. However well or poorly the Kremlin understands the EU or NATO, it has underestimated the coherence and resilience of Ukraine. Had it been otherwise, had the insurgency rolled through Zaporizhe, Odessa and up to the Moldovan border, we might be discussing the imminence of war rather than the resolution of a crisis. Yet ‘resolution’ remains only a hope. With insurgent forces now fragmented and largely encircled, the end game might be approaching. But that is not to say it will end. By designating General Antufeyev, the master architect of ‘frozen conflicts’, as his de facto plenipotentiary in Donetsk, Putin has provided the clearest indication yet that he has no intention of allowing the region to revert to Kyiv’s control.

This only multiplies fears that Ukraine’s European partners will not allow Russia to be defeated without its consent. More than once, Poroshenko has come under Western pressure to declare a ceasefire that only Ukraine observes. It is too early to say whether the Malaysia Airlines tragedy will diminish this pressure or intensify it.

The final fear is that Ukraine will only be able to prevail militarily by alienating civilians who increasingly damn all sides. Bringing the Donbas back into the fold will be like rebuilding East Germany without West German money. The task of reconciling citizens and government in a torn and traumatised society will be greater still. ■
Moldova: Russia’s next target if the West falters in Ukraine

Viewed from Moldova, the Kremlin’s assault on Ukraine (like the earlier one on Georgia) aims to prevent the country permanently from joining Europe and the West writ large. To defeat those aspirations, Russia acts to destabilize Ukraine’s Western-oriented government and to break up the country’s territory.

The Kremlin is implementing a region-wide strategy, focusing on Ukraine at the present stage. That strategy also targets Moldova, where Russia pursues similar political objectives. It aims to derail Moldova’s association agreement with the European Union, influence the upcoming parliamentary elections, and change the composition of Moldova’s pro-Europe government. If the West and Ukraine together falter in that country, Russia will be able to focus its efforts on Moldova sooner and more effectively.

In Washington with a working visit on May 19-24, Moldovan Liberal-Democrat Party leader Vlad Filat (prime minister, 2009-2013) shared those concerns with senior US government officials and Congressional leaders. Filat is leading Moldova’s largest pro-Western party in the parliamentary election campaign now starting.

Moldova’s governing Pro-Europe Coalition under the current Prime Minister Iurie Leanca also includes two smaller parties: the low-polling Democratic Party, whose leaders’ business interests have all along conflicted with the European agenda; and the firmly Western-oriented Liberal Reformer Party, which seems unlikely to re-enter the parliament unless mentored by fellow-Liberal parties in the EU. Thus, the Liberal-Democrat Party continues to represent the mainstay of pro-Western political forces in Moldova.

Pro-Russia political and “civic” organizations have proliferated in Moldova recently with Russian media support and financing (see EDM, February 5, 19, 20). They have joined the campaign for reorienting Moldova from the EU toward the Russia-led Customs Union and its planned Eurasian Union. The Moldovan Communist Party and Socialist Party have led that campaign. Moscow undoubtedly wants to see a post-election government with the participation of one or both of those parties.

Russia also holds significant economic levers to influence Moldova’s internal political situation in the run-up to elections, and potentially the elections’ outcome. Those levers include:

- Situation of Moldovan guest workers in Russia. Remittances from those workers probably...
exceed $1 billion annually ($987 million above-board through bank transfers in 2012), forming a large chunk of Moldova’s $7.5 billion annual GDP. Last year, Russia introduced significant changes to its labor migration legislation. Chisinau accordingly proposes adjusting the pre-existing bilateral agreements, so as to bring the situation of Moldovan guest workers in Russia into compliance with those changes. However, Moscow is demonstratively ignoring Chisinau’s requests (Unimedia, May 19). This tactic gives Russian authorities a free hand to start sending Moldovan workers back home, timing such a move for maximum political effect in Moldova.

- Access of Moldovan agricultural exports to Russia’s market. Russia re-imposed (yet again) a ban on the import of Moldovan wines in 2013. On-and-off bans, being negotiable, constitute an effective form of political leverage. The Russian government holds in reserve the option of restricting imports of Moldova’s traditional cash crop of apples and other fresh fruit. Russia can announce such a move at harvest time, amid Moldova’s electoral campaign. Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin (Russian co-chair of the Russia-Moldova inter-governmental cooperation commission), has warned that he “will insist on revising economic relations with Moldova,” if the present government signs the Association Agreement with the European Union (Kommersant, May 12).

- Energy dependence on Russia. Moldova is one hundred percent dependent on Russian natural gas supplies, entering Moldova via Ukraine and Transnistria. Prior to the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the EU and Romania decided to finance the construction of an interconnector pipeline from Romania to the Moldovan border, but not further. Any non-Russian gas entering from Romania would still have to be transported through Gazprom-controlled pipelines within Moldova. This situation still allows full scope for Russian political manipulation of gas supplies to Moldova. Moreover, the Russia-Ukraine conflict can jeopardize Russian gas supplies to Ukraine itself and transit via Ukraine. For Moldova, this necessitates an early start to building a continuation pipeline from the Romania-Moldova border to Chisinau. The Moldovan government urgently seeks financing for this project from the US Millennium Challenge Corporation (Unimedia, May 24).

- Vulnerability of Moldovan assets to Russian raiding. It was after Vlad Filat’s departure from the post of prime minister that the government approved two major Russian raiding operations in Moldova’s economy. A Kremlin-connected Siberian company has obtained a long-term exclusive concession to Chisinau Airport (the country’s only international airport). And Russia’s state-owned VneshEkonomBank has acquired a large part of the Moldovan government’s stake in the country’s Banca de Economii (on top of share packages already acquired by obscure individuals from Russia in this and other banks). The Moldovan government needs US and EU assistance for investigating the dubious circumstances of Russian acquisitions of those banking assets. It also needs to freeze the airport deal ahead of the elections; and cancel it afterward, if reelected. The airport’s cession poses a security risk, considering Russia’s use of Crimean civilian airports for blitzkrieg operations, the unresolved Transnistria conflict, and Russia’s Novorossiya project targeting nearby Odessa.

Russia’s annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in March was an overture to the broader “Novorossiya” project, announced by President Vladimir Putin on April 17. This covers eight Ukrainian provinces that Russia aims to carve out of Ukraine, whether
through "federalization" or some form of Russian protectorate. If successful, this project could turn Moldova and Romania de facto into neighbors of Russia, hence frontline states. Romania's president and government have concluded that Russia aims to return to the estuary of the Danube via Ukraine's Odessa region, thus obtaining direct borders with Transnistria, with Moldova's heartland and with Romania. In Bucharest on May 21, US Vice President Joseph Biden told Romania's leaders, "Our countries stand together in supporting Moldova" (Agerpres, May 21).

Concurrently in Washington, Moldovan Liberal-Democrat Party leader Vlad Filat (prime minister, 2009-2013; now leading the main pro-Western party in the parliamentary election campaign) urged senior US government officials to support all countries in the region facing this new threat of Russian aggression. Countries situated beyond the eastern borders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) need a reliable security framework, even if not based on membership in an alliance or organization, Filat argued in Washington. He also underscored the importance of credible Western sanctions to prevent Russia from moving more boldly into Ukraine or Moldova (The Daily Beast, May 23; Unimedia, May 26).

Transnistria provides Russia with a potential lever of pressure on Moldova. The Kremlin's current priorities in Moldova are: 1) to forestall Moldova's pro-Europe coalition, shepherding a left-leaning Russophile alliance to power in the upcoming parliamentary elections (see Part One). Russia holds the Transnistria lever in reserve for now. Moscow is not about to "recognize" Transnistria's secession from Moldova, nor to pursue a Crimea-type annexation of a territorial exclave. Risking additional Western economic sanctions would not be worth it for Russia at this time. Instead, Russia is laying the groundwork for influencing Moldova's debate on EU association and the course of the electoral campaign.

If the elections produce a "multi-vector" government with pro-Russia elements, then Russia will launch another "federalization" attempt, using Transnistria to guarantee Russian influence on the rest of Moldova. If, however, the pro-Europe coalition drives the EU association process irreversibly forward and is re-elected in November, then Moscow would consider ways to retaliate against Chisinau via Transnistria. The Kremlin could abandon even minimal lip service to Moldova's territorial integrity, discontinue the symbolic 5 + 2 negotiations, strengthen Russia's civilian and military presence in this part of Moldova, and hypothetically provoke incidents on either bank of the Nistru River.

Russia proposes "federalization" for Ukraine and Moldova in parallel. The older proposal for Moldova is held in suspension, while that regarding Ukraine is operational since March under the threat of Donbas's secession (see EDM, May 14). "Federalization" aims to empower Russia-oriented authorities in parts of either country, so as to block the policies of Western-oriented central governments in Kyiv or Chisinau. Both incumbent governments, therefore, deem "federalization" unacceptable. Russia seeks Western support to initiate negotiations toward Ukraine's "federalization." If such negotiations start over Ukraine, Russia will next push for a parallel process in Moldova.

Ukraine's Odessa province (contiguous to Moldova/Transnistria and Romania, riparian to the Black Sea and the Danube) forms the strategic focus of Russia's "Novorossiya" project. Russia may well attempt to overcome Transnistria's exclave situation and connect with it directly by land. Much will depend on the political situation in this province and in Kyiv. Former Ukrainian governments had consistently turned down Russia's
requests to deliver military hardware to Transnistria via Ukrainian territory.

On May 22, US General Philip Breedlove, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, told media in Brussels that the chiefs of staff of NATO member countries had just discussed possible scenarios affecting Moldova and Transnistria in light of Russia’s military activities in the region. NATO, Breedlove said, was "concerned by some [unspecified] circumstances in Transnistria resembling earlier developments in some of Ukraine’s regions" (Interfax-Ukraine, May 22).

The Moldova-Ukraine border measures 1,220 kilometers in total; including 450 kilometers controlled de facto by Transnistria on the Moldovan side of the Moldova-Ukraine border. It is vital to Moldova that the Ukrainian government maintain effective control on its side of that border. This would help shield Moldova from Russian paramilitary infiltration by proxy, as occurred in Donbas, in the event that Russia considers such a scenario for Moldova.

Meanwhile, Ukraine is itself at risk of ending up with a Transnistria-type situation in Donbas, if pro-Russian forces connect their scattered positions into a compact territorial base. Moscow may also decide to push its Novorossiya project aggressively on the political-diplomatic level. This would bring a second round of destabilization to the region (after the first one in March) and initiate a "federalization" process in Ukraine. If such circumstances eventuate in Ukraine, the Kremlin may feel emboldened to destabilize Moldova next.

Visiting Moldova on March 29, US Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland declared that US-Moldova relations "have never been stronger" (Moldpres, March 30). Nuland’s visit was the latest in the series of high-profile US-Moldova meetings following Russia’s seizure of Crimea from Ukraine.

US President Barack Obama and Vice President Joseph Biden received Moldovan Prime Minister Iurie Leanca at the White House in Washington on March 3 (see below). The US Special Envoy and Coordinator for International Energy Affairs, Carlos Pascual, conferred with the Moldovan government in Chisinau on March 24. Nuland capped this series of visits on March 29 with an inter-agency delegation, including a Pentagon component, to Chisinau.

Prior to this, John Kerry became the second US Secretary of State to alight in Moldova (December 4, 2013) in 21 years of the country’s independence (James Baker had been the first to visit Moldova in 1992 as Secretary of State).

Concerns that Russia could, after Crimea, move militarily or in some other forms against Moldova, precipitated these serial demonstrations of Washington’s political support. The Moldovan government avidly sought these US gestures. But the United States also needs to dispel the perception of its strategic disengagement, after being caught off guard over Ukraine (as in 2008 over Georgia) and to demonstrate that it can still be counted upon by its partners in this region.

The Moldovan and Ukrainian governments are (to varying degrees) experiencing similar vulnerabilities vis-à-vis Russia. First, their neutrality is wholly defenseless, was declared unilaterally, and is guaranteed by nobody. Second, they lack external protection from Russian moves to derail the signing of the European Union association agreements with Moldova and Ukraine, as well as their ratification. Third, Russia-oriented organizations threaten to subvert and destabilize the ongoing electoral campaigns in Moldova and Ukraine. Fourth, the governments of both countries are exposed to Russia’s combination of economic coercion and economic incentives. And fifth, centrifugal movements are emerging in parts of Moldova’s and Ukraine’s territories, other than the “frozen” conflicts in Transnistria and now Crimea.

On March 23 the Supreme Commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), US General Philip Breedlove, expressed concern that Russian forces massed against Ukraine could promptly advance into Moldova’s Transnistria, if so ordered. A possible Russian thrust via Ukrainian territory toward Moldova was seen as "very worrisome" at NATO (moldova.org, March 23).

Washington shares the Moldovan government’s concerns that Russia could provoke armed clashes in Transnistria or intrude into Moldova’s upcoming parliamentary elections to change the country's European orientation. To defuse such potential threats and avert another international crisis, the United States is moving pro-actively to discourage possible Russian mischief in Moldova. The series of
visits just completed did not produce material deliverables. The political symbolism counts for more at this juncture.

According to the White House’s announcement, President Obama and Vice President Biden jointly "praised the strong and important friendship between our two countries, and underscored the United States’ deep commitment to supporting Moldova's European aspirations. The United States has a profound interest in Moldova's success as a democratic partner" (White House press release, March 3). According to the Moldovan government’s announcement, "My heart is with you, my support is with you and I want to see you succeeding," Obama said, joining Biden at the meeting with Prime Minister Leanca (Moldpres, March 4).

Hyperbole on that unusual scale (far beyond routine endorsements of the territorial integrity) suggests that Washington would take a stand and impose some costs on Russia, should the latter move overtly to destabilize Moldova.

During the same visit, Secretary Kerry and Prime Minister Leanca inaugurated a US-Moldova Strategic Dialogue, to be held periodically (and by request if necessary), as an institutional format of bilateral consultations. They also re-launched the bilateral committee on economic cooperation and investment, after a nine-year hiatus (Unimedia, March 30).

Special Envoy Pascual’s visit to Chisinau (arriving directly from Kyiv) inaugurated a US-Moldova Energy Working Group, similarly designed as an institutionalized format at the inter-governmental level (Moldpres, March 24, 25). This first session focused on European Energy Community-mandated reforms (Russia has compelled Moldova to postpone gas pipeline unbundling by four years) and connecting Moldova with the European Union’s energy market by pipeline through Romania. Both goals are realistically expected to be met by 2020, provided that Moldova’s pro-Europe government continues in power.

Nuland’s visit was another necessary and well-timed flag-showing event. Beyond her assessment of bilateral relations as "stronger-than-ever" (see above), however, Nuland’s concluding press conference statement injected an unexpected note of ambiguity about Moldova’s European orientation: "We see a future for Moldova where it has equally strong relations with Europe, with Ukraine, with Russia, a bridge of trade and education across this space, linking Europe and Russia and Ukraine" (Unimedia, March 30; uni.md/nSut).

This statement went beyond the usual disavowal of "zero-sum games." It alluded to some equidistant positioning for Moldova in the future between Russia and Europe. The Moldovan government, however, is oriented toward the EU unambiguously, in order precisely to avoid being consigned to a grey zone, or some kind of "space."

The Obama administration all along has taken a back seat to that of the European Union in the EU’s eastern neighborhood. Basically, the US would confine its role to supporting the EU’s policies there. Consequently, Washington champions a "European orientation" for these countries. Nuland’s official agenda in Chisinau, however, did not seem to include meetings with the EU’s representatives there. Whether Nuland’s concluding statement was inadvertent or reflects a last-moment decision by the Obama administration (coordinated or not with the EU) to conciliate an aggressive Russia is far from clear, but might emerge with the administration’s further steps. ■
The revitalization of the official negotiations in the "5+2" format over the Transnistrian conflict in 2011 and numerous negotiations rounds in 2013 were perceived by many as a chance for a serious breakthrough in the settlement of this conflict, yet the real situation has not changed dramatically. The management and resolution of the Transnistrian conflict has reached several dilemmas involving both the parties to the conflict and the mediators involved. The resolution of the conflict could be closer should these dilemmas be solved, or will remain unattainable, should they continue.

In 2011 the Transnistrian conflict settlement got a second breath, with the conference under the auspices of the OSCE and with support of the German government in Bad Reichenhall, and the consequent revival of the official talks in the "5+2" format through another round of consultations in Moscow. Expectations also ran high at the end of political crisis in both Moldova and Transnistria, when both sides finally had counterparts at the negotiation table. In the beginning of 2013, when Ukraine got the rotating Chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), a unique situation arose when two "voices" became one (its own and the OSCE’s) in the "5+2" format – the official negotiation format for the Transnistrian settlement. This was expected to give a great impetus to the intensification and progress of the talks, if not for the dilemmas appeared through or even created by the negotiation process.

Today, the mediators and parties involved in the Transnistrian conflict can act in two ways: they can be either "builders" or "gardeners". Both create something. However, the "builders" creating a structure or framework of the future peace very often appear blocked within the very framework they have themselves constructed. On the other hand, "gardeners" create the conditions within which the peace can continue "to grow" and develop constantly, as well as generate the proper conditions for its durability. In the Transnistrian conflict today most of the parties involved still act as "builders", creating frameworks and conditions which influence the process, but not allowing for their evolution outside or beyond the framework they themselves created. However new approaches to this conflict management can be stuck with those dilemmas presented in the current conflict resolution process.
**DILEMMA No. 1
CONFLICT RIPENESS**

The first dilemma is connected with the concept of *conflict ripeness*, which is usually described as one of the main conditions for successful conflict resolution. In theory, a conflict can be solved with the intervention of third parties when it reaches a state of ripeness usually connected with inability to continue the confrontation. In the Transnistrian conflict, it is not the parties to the conflict that have reached this phase, but the mediators, who are most eager to find a final solution. The difficulties in solving this conflict stem, primarily, from the fact that the absence of military action and a prolonged status quo of sorts become satisfying enough to both parties at some point, leading to the situation when the bargaining can continue forever. The parties are currently in a comfort zone, where they are not ready for a serious compromise, as the resolution of the conflict is not vital. Unwillingness to move to the political basket of negotiations in 2013 is one of the evidence in support. Both Chisinau and Tiraspol are in positions of maximalist approach, and in result there were more talks about talks than talks about substance. In the Transnistrian conflict settlement most of the conditions put forth by the conflicting parties recently were procedural rather than substantial. However, the agreements reached at the Kyiv round in November 2013 demonstrated the ability to find solutions in a "small-steps" method, when conflicting parties compromised on population mobility and social guarantees issues.

**DILEMMA No. 2
RECOGNITION DILEMMA**

Since 2008 and the recognition of Kosovo, academic and political disputes on the similarities and differences of cases of separatism became endless. The Western countries have pretended for many years that Kosovo is a unique case, without clearly explaining the nature of this uniqueness. As a result, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria, with the support of the Russian Federation, have regularly used the Kosovo precedent as a justification for their actions. Russia, at its turn, brought even more complexity to and confusion around the issue, by recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but adamantly denying recognition to Transnistria. Independent Transnistria will either be eager to join Russian Federation or at least deepen the level of cooperation, yet Moscow is not keen on a second Kaliningrad region, with no common border with the motherland, contrary to the Southern Caucasus regions. This was yet one time confirmed in the text of the OSCE Ministerial Statement, where member-states, including Russia, "reaffirmed their strong determination to achieve a comprehensive, just and viable resolution of the Transnistrian conflict... on the basis of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova..." Also such situation can give additional leverages to Moscow to manipulate the situation on the ground, providing to Tiraspol fewer opportunities for maneuver.

**DILEMMA No. 3
STATUS OF PEACEKEEPERS**

The third dilemma of the current Transnistrian settlement is the status of peacekeepers. The current mandate and composition of the peacekeeping mission are not adequate to the situation on the ground. Military peacekeeping / peacemaking mission was relevant in the mid-1990s when the likelihood of a conflict renewal was high. After a decade free of military action, this mission lost its purpose, and it only helps to maintain an image and psychological feeling of insecurity – if the military are there, then there is something to worry about. Latest incidents on the border with the involvement of the Russian peacekeepers are arguments to this. What is really needed is the transformation of the military mission into a civilian one with peacebuilding or police functions. Militarization of the current peacekeeping mission has not led to confidence-building in the region, but is further ‘proof’ of the hard security challenges and threats. A transformed mission should assist in promotion of the OSCE activities, border control, police functions in the problematic zones, human rights monitoring, confidence building measures, etc. Attempts to change the peacekeeping format have been made since 2006, when Belgium proposed this during its OSCE
Chairmanship. The Belgian proposal placed the reformed peacekeeping operation under the OSCE's aegis, and suggested it included troops from many countries, still allowing Russia alone to provide 30% to 40% of the troops (quoted in an original proposition as: "no single country should provide more than 30% to 40% of the troops").

The proposal was never implemented, due to the reluctance of Russia and Transnistria to change a peacekeeping format.

Some countries, including Romania and the United States, as well as Moldova itself and international organizations, such as Council of Europe have also promoted changing of the current peacekeeping format into a more international one, preferably under the EU mandate or the expansion of the OSCE mandate. The latest statement was done by the US Ambassador to the OSCE at the XX Ministerial Council in Kyiv in December 2013, who insisted on the necessity to change a peacekeeping format from the military to a police one. The Russian Federation blocked all these proposals, insisting the format of the peacekeeping mission can only be changed upon political settlement of the conflict, even if, in fact, at that time one would actually expect any peacekeeping mission to cease its operation.

This "militarization" is also supported by the presence of Russian troops on the territory of Transnistria. Moldova, Romania, the United States and the EU have recently increased their rhetoric by insisting on the withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria as a fulfillment of the OSCE mandate. The latest statement was done by the US Ambassador to the OSCE at the XX Ministerial Council in Kyiv in December 2013, who insisted on the necessity to change a peacekeeping format from the military to a police one. The Russian Federation blocked all these proposals, insisting the format of the peacekeeping mission can only be changed upon political settlement of the conflict, even if, in fact, at that time one would actually expect any peacekeeping mission to cease its operation.

**DILEMMA No. 4  
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS**

The fourth dilemma rests with the effectiveness of international organizations. De facto there are two international bodies involved in the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict: OSCE and the European Union. GUAM and the United Nations have repeatedly tried to have an input yet they were never considered as parties involved. OSCE took responsibility over political settlement from the early 1990s. The EU, invited back in the format in 2005, plays a double role, as a part in the negotiation process, but also managing the border's problem through its European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) to Moldova and Ukraine, with an impact on the confidence-building measures in the region. The European Union was generally more comfortable with a post-conflict rehabilitation and peace building role, and had been wary of becoming directly involved in conflict resolution. Its direct involvement, though, have been seen as added value to others efforts. Also, it worth mentioning that the EU has an indirect effect at the negotiating and resolution process through the process of the European Integration of Moldova. Despite usually stated Tiraspol’s position on greater Eurasian integration, business and population can use the preferences appeared by the closer EU integration of Chisinau. Visa liberalization agreement which will become effective soon, will make Moldovan passports more attractive to the Transnistrians than Russian, but also as less Moldovan citizens will apply for Romanian passports it can lower the fear of the greater Romanization of the country. At the Vilnius summit the government has announced that it would redouble efforts to persuade Transnistria’s political authorities and business circles to take advantage of the DCFTA's benefits. Transnistria's producers and exporters are entitled to be included in the Moldova-EU free-trade area, which Moldova will join in September 2015. Most of the Transnistrian negative statements do not touch Association Agreement but concentrate of the free Trade zone, which is seen by one as a Russian influence opposing greater Moldovan and Ukrainian integration and by others as just inability to adjust Transnistrian economic system to the EU standards.

Even if OSCE is repeatedly under criticism, it is still perceived as the best intermediary in Transnistria. Despite the interruption of the official
talks in the "5+2" format in 2006, it was the OSCE Mission to Moldova that focused its efforts on organization of informal meetings between the parties, aiming to renew the official format, accomplished in 2011. It is also noteworthy that in all conflicts in the post-soviet space the OSCE as a mediator tried to be a link between the conflicting parties, but also between the different mediation and peacekeeping efforts in the region.

As the OSCE mission to Georgia was terminated after the 2008 war, due to the solemn opposition of the Russian federation, so presence of the OSCE mission in Transnistria is seen as a proof that the situation on the ground is not becoming more controversial and tensed.

It has appeared that international organizations, which are usually expected as having the leading role in conflict settlement, as those whose impartiality and legitimate state are difficult to doubt, are too weak and sometimes inactive in Transnistria, concentrating their attention on confidence-building, rather than peace-building. However the willingness of the conflicting parties to continue the talks in the "5+2" format guaranteed by the OSCE is a proof of its viability.

DILEMMA No. 5
MEDIATORS OR COMPETITORS?

The settlement process is now facing serious competition between different mediators. For the last several years more mediators or third parties became ready to get involved in the Transnistrian peace settlement, including Romania, Germany, the US and the EU. This has been welcomed by the parties involved as a demonstration of the importance of the conflict both in itself and for the European security. As years passed, though, positions of different mediators diverged, and at times they place their own interests above those required by a final settlement.

Such a competition on a certain stage was witnessed even among the European Union member-states. One could notice a ‘three-face-situation’, with the EU, Germany and Romania simultaneously pretending to the role of mediators. This further complicates the general peace process, as all three have a different level and quality of relations with the Russian Federation, a key party to the Transnistrian conflict management. Competing propositions allow the parties to the conflict to maneuver between them, choosing the side more suitable at a concrete moment, to shift to another when necessary.

Ukraine and Russia (both official mediators and guarantors of the Transnistrian settlement) at times also appeared as competitors, presenting different peace plans (Kozak plan vs. Yuschenko Plan) or aiming to minimize Ukrainian efforts to raise the dialog to a different stage, as happened with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Mr. Kozhara’s statement on readiness to open a political basket of the negotiations in February 2013. Vladimir Yastrebchak (former de facto Minister of Foreign Affairs of Transnistria) admitted that fragmentation and lack of coordination in the activities of Moscow and Kyiv allowed for a wheelspin of talks, and low level of performance of the undertaken political-diplomatic efforts.

At the end of 2012 many hoped that Ukrainian OSCE chairmanship would have a positive impact on the Transnistrian settlement, as for the first time one country united two votes in the "5+2" format. Ukraine took a quick start in the negotiation process as the OSCE chair in January 2013, conducting first negotiations with the representatives of Moldovan and Transnistrian establishment during the visits of the Chair-in-office Mr. Kozhara and the OSCE Chairperson's Special Representative for conflicts Amb. A. Deshchytsia. This brought some hope, soon broken by the consequent denial by the Transnistrian side of Mr. Kozhara’s statement that Transnistria is ready to move to the political settlement issues and the de-facto failure of the meeting in Lviv in February 2013, boycotted by the Transnistrian leaders. Noteworthy is that the contradiction of the readiness to move to the political basket of the negotiations was stated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia at the same day as official statement of the President of Transnistria, that was perceived by some experts as unwillingness of Russian to have a real competitor for the place of the successful mediator in the region. However, the situation has been improved by 5 rounds of negotiations and several direct meetings of the two sides’ leadership, which were conducted in the framework of the small-steps tactic, which led to the signature of a
numerous agreements of technical character. During the XX OSCE Ministerial Council all participants stated that among successes of the Ukrainian Chairmanship almost only Transnistrian negotiations could be named.

**DILEMMA No. 6**  
**SHOULD ROMANIA BE INVOLVED?**

The Romanian position often sends mixed signals concerning the possibility to be deeper involved in the Transnistrian conflict settlement. On the one hand Bucharest doesn’t want to be involved as an official mediator, still remembering that in the beginning of the 1990s it was not welcomed to intervene, so it would now like others to ‘play these games’. Hence Romania supports the EU as a mediator and pretenses to be a part of the joint European position. On the other hand, Bucharest attempted to be involved directly. Parties in the conflict, including Russia, use this balancing of Romania in their own interests, while minimizing the influence of the other mediators involved.

On February 15, 2005, Romanian President Basescu raised in Moscow the question of Bucharest involvement, underlining that the problem was as important for Romanian security as it is for the Ukraine’s. The Russian leadership has returned to this question in October 2010, when upon the results of the trilateral negotiations between leaders of France, Germany and Russia in Deauville (France), President D. Medvedev stated that success of the Moldovan-Transnistrian conflict settlement depended not only on Russia, Moldova, Transnistria and the European Union, but also on Romania. Active work of the Russian Federation on Romanian involvement can be seen as a desire to minimize the role of other mediators, including Ukraine, which was not even named in Deauville. At the same time, Romania stands upon withdrawal of the Russian troops, seeing them as the threat, and for the closer integration of Moldova with the EU, which is opposing to the Russian ideas of the post-soviet integration, so such contradictions do not make Romania and Russia natural allies in the peace-process. Within the years Romania has been balancing between desire to be an independent mediator and necessity to consider joint position of the EU. Moreover, Romania tries to be a provider of information for Brussels and in this way to enhance its position within the EU.

Ukraine might be tempted to welcome Romania’s ambivalence, as it leaves fewer competitors on the stage, but in fact Ukraine and Romania could ally against the Russian position. Romania and Ukraine have been perceived by some experts and politicians as rivals in the Black Sea area for the role of the regional leaders back to the mid-2000. Transnistrian settlement was perceived as one of the spheres for possible success that could bring such a leadership. Energy, marine, transit democratic developments are still on the agenda of competition, as well as unsolved border’s and minorities’ disputes. However, mutual interest in a quick settlement of the Transnistrian conflict makes these two states natural partners. Some would call a Ukraine-Romania tandem for the successful mediation a dream team, as Ukraine could have more influence on Transnistria, and Romania on Moldova, with which it always had close relations. However this point is exaggerated. Both countries can take responsibility for the security in the region, presenting additional arguments for the Russian military withdrawal, but also use opportunities of the euroregions and European integration for economic, social and environmental integration of Transnistria in the regional affairs.

**DILEMMA No. 7**  
**DO WE NEED A NEW PEACE PLAN?**

One last dilemma is the possibility of a new peace plan. The latest peace plan on the Transnistrian settlement was presented back in 2005 at the Chisinau GUAM Summit. It was accepted by all parties involved but never fully implemented. The only change that it brought was greater involvement of the EU and the US and establishment of the EUBAM mission. However, most of the later peace plan proposals were dealing only with a functional level of cooperation and confidence-building between the parties to the conflict, not trying to break into a new level of negotiations. Transnistrian and Russian sides are eager to concentrate on humanitarian and eco-
economic issues, while Ukraine and Moldova are ready to shift to the political questions, assuming that many economic issues will not be solved without intensification of the political dialogue, especially with the current process of the European integration of Moldova.

Some experts hoped that if Ukraine’s Chairmanship succeeds, it will have the chance to propose a new plan for the coexistence of Moldova and Transnistria. Such a plan can be based on the idea of the self-governed region on the model of Scottish devolution, with all authorities delegated to the local level except for the foreign policy and security issues. Taking into account the concerns of Tiraspol and Moscow some guarantees should be presented, for example, that Moldova will not join another state, will continue being neutral and the guarantee of linguistic and humanitarian rights of the ethnic minorities on the territory of Transnistria. Also, the possibility to have a certain quota for Transnistrian representatives in governmental bodies (e.g. as was presented in the Iraqi Constitution of 2005 for different ethnic-religious groups) should be discussed despite the fear that Russia can use this to manipulate the internal situation in Moldova.

At current, none of the mediators is ready to present a new peace plan for the Transnistrian settlement, while Chisinau and Tiraspol roll away from their short-lived regained readiness for a compromise. Nevertheless the search for new formats of coexistence should be continued. With Moldova and Ukraine moving closer to the European Union, Transnistria should make a choice of its future, now hampered by the fears of possible Romanization. It would be mistaken to say that the keys to the Transnistrian settlement are only in Moscow’s pocket. There are several doors to be opened for the conflict to find a settlement, and different capitals around the region hold the keys.

ENDNOTES

1. OSCE Ministerial Statement on the work of the permanent conference on political issues in the framework of the negotiations process for the Transnistrian settlement in the "5+2" format, 6 December, 2013


To paraphrase the wonderful and humorous fable of Ivan Krylov, The Musicians it can be said that the famous nightingale's reply to the quartet can be substituted by President Vladimir Putin's reply to the political leadership of Georgia. President Putin says clearly and unequivocally: "To be a musician, one must have a better ear and more intelligence than any of you. Place yourselves any way you like. It will make no difference. You will never become musicians" or members of NATO and the European Union (EU). And "I, President Vladimir Putin, will do everything in my power to hinder your efforts in joining both organisations." To sum up, that is how President Putin sees present – as well as future – of Russian-Georgian relations. Namely, Georgia should forfeit its aspirations of joining both organisations and reconcile with Russia under the terms offered by Putin. Still, after the October 2012 parliamentary elections in Georgia, Putin and his administration decided to give a chance to the newly-elected government to start anew.

Although newly-nominated Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili's international priorities are similar to those of President Mikheil Saakashvili and include European integration and NATO membership, he has also pledged to improve relations with Russia. Ivanishvili said that he would try to convince Russia that Georgia's strategic aspirations were not a threat to Russia and that Russia can live with these aspirations. The recent change of political leadership in Georgia in the aftermath of the October 2013 presidential elections, with the new President Giorgi Margvelashvili and new Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili, is not likely to change the state of Russia-Georgian relations. Furthermore, the dual policy of Euro-Atlantic integration and improvement of relations with Russia initiated by former Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili remain on the new leadership agenda.

Russia welcomed the result of the parliamentary elections, saying that the ties which had been suspended in the wake of the 2008 Russian-Georgian war could be renewed. Dmitry Peskov, Putin's spokesman, said that: "We are definitely looking forward to a fresh, new non-hostile, sober leadership in Georgia." Peskov continued that a new leadership would be "very good, very positive for us. If they have more political wisdom under a new leadership, then lots and lots of new roads can be opened for the country." And if not, then perhaps lots of road blocks will be built along the Russian-Georgian highway.

As a first step to improve troubled relations with Moscow, on 1 November 2012 the then Prime Minister Ivanishvili appointed Zurab Abashidze as his Special Representative for relations with Russia. Ivanishvili also stated that: "Our countries are linked by a long history. We lived together for a long time before the Soviet Union, during its existence and after it collapsed. Now, we must first regulate matters and then move to a new kind of relationship."

If Ivanishvili was hoping his initiative would get a warm response from Moscow, he was disappointed.
Alexander Lukashevich, Spokesman for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), gave a very guarded response to Abashidze’s appointment: “I will only say that he is known here for his work as ambassador to our country and for the trips he has made. He is personally well-acquainted with Russia.” While Moscow had taken note of statements coming out of Tbilisi, Lukashevich said that: “We are waiting for concrete, practical steps from the new Georgian government.” As a well-trained diplomat and spokesman of the Russian MoFA, in particular, Lukashevich did not elaborate on the exact nature of concrete, practical steps.

During his first trip abroad since his election victory in October 2012, the then Prime Minister Ivanishvili used a press conference in Brussels with Jose Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, to express his regret at Moscow’s lukewarm reaction. Ivanishvili said that: “Our government is disappointed by these statements. There has not yet been an equivalent response from Moscow. We are waiting and hoping for the Russian authorities to analyse the situation and act accordingly.” Barroso said at the same press conference that “relationships of our partners with such an important neighbour as Russia is” were very important. In other words, “You in Georgia should remain patient and attentive to the wishes of Moscow and not come to complain to us in Brussels. Do not be discouraged by Moscow’s lukewarm reaction, behave nicely and you will be rewarded.” As for Ivanishvili’s disappointment with Moscow, it shows his lack of understanding of Putin’s policy towards Georgia, in particular, and the South Caucasus, in general. Perhaps Ivanishvili is well-acquainted with the behaviour and mentality of Russian business elites; he is, however, less acquainted with the world of Russian politicians.

As for the concrete, practical steps that Moscow is expecting from the new Georgian government, it can be assumed that these steps mean toning down rhetoric related to Georgia’s aspirations to join NATO and the European Union; subsequent forfeiting of these goals and starting to think earnestly about improving relations with Russia as its largest neighbour and market for agricultural products, wine, mineral water and beer. Furthermore, steps undertaken by Tbilisi should not be reciprocated automatically by Moscow. The subtle reciprocity distinction was not stated explicitly by Lukashevich but the hint of it was in the wording. It appears that former Prime Minister Ivanishvili did not get the hint of this subtle distinction, namely “Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s.” Apparently, the newly-elected President of Georgia, Giorgi Margvelashvili, does not understand that Russia is not an equal partner. Otherwise, he would not have said what he said: “We in Georgia will build relations with Russia on an equal and positive footing and in this direction certain steps have been undertaken.”

It appears that after a while, the new Georgian leadership appointed in October 2012, despite its good intention of improving relations with Russia, has hit the Kremlin brick wall. Instead of reciprocity, the Russian leadership decided to accelerate the creeping occupation of the lost Georgian territory of South Ossetia. This issue was exten-
To sweeten the bitter medicine of the creeping occupation President Vladimir Putin made an overture to Georgia in an 11 June 2013 interview with Sophie Shevardnadze, a granddaughter of the former president of Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze. First, Putin acknowledged the existence of two “red lines” that neither side could cross: the Russian recognised “independence” of Abkhazia and South Ossetia versus the territorial integrity of Georgia. He added that he “could not imagine” Russia de-recognising Abkhazia and South Ossetia but also admitted that Georgia “struggles for, as Tbilisi calls it, Georgia’s territorial integrity.” According to Putin, the proper approach “requires careful consideration, a competent solution and the willingness to solve this issue based upon the interests of all those who live in these territories.” Thus, Putin seems to strike a pose of equidistance between its two sets of objectives: those associated with the Western orientation, NATO and the EU, on one hand and improving relations with Russia and re-creating Georgia’s territorial integrity in some new form, on the other hand, through negotiations requiring Russia’s cooperation or, in other words, acquiescence to Russia. At the time that Socor’s article was published, Ivanishvili’s government was still trying to maintain the two objectives and not choose between them. In a recent article by Joshua Kucera, the Kremlin seems to have been caught flat-footed by the realisation that NATO membership is, in fact, a goal desired by a broad swath of Georgia’s political class and not merely the population of Georgia. Despite this vagueness and ambiguities, Putin’s interview amounts to an unprecedented overture to Tbilisi. By hinting that nothing is non-negotiable, Putin insinuates that the ultimate status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is not necessarily a closed question but might hypothetically be re-opened in the future. He seemingly professes to be agnostic about the optimal or ultimate solution. For all its vagueness and ambiguities, Putin’s interview amounts to an unprecedented overture to Tbilisi. By hinting that nothing is non-negotiable, Moscow sees to nudge Tbilisi into choosing between its two sets of objectives: those associated with the Western orientation, NATO and the EU, on one hand and improving relations with Russia and re-creating Georgia’s territorial integrity in some new form, on the other hand, through negotiations requiring Russia’s cooperation or, in other words, acquiescence to Russia. At the time that Socor’s article was published, Ivanishvili’s government was still trying to maintain the two objectives and not choose between them. In a recent article by Joshua Kucera, the Kremlin seems to have been caught flat-footed by the realisation that NATO membership is, in fact, a goal desired by a broad swath of Georgia’s political class and not merely the population of Georgia. Despite this realisation, Vladimir Putin’s confrontational approach has not changed. As is known, Putin does not like to be fooled.

Unfortunately for Georgia and its population, former Prime Minister Ivanishvili’s conviction that relations with the Kremlin can be improved by making positive gestures towards Russia but, at the same time, by pursuing European integration and NATO membership, has turned out to be unrealistic. President Vladimir Putin’s consistent policy of forcing the Georgian leadership to surrender its sovereignty and Euro-Atlantic integration not only has not changed but has been pursued steadfastly.

Russian military presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia represents the most dangerous threat to Georgia’s territorial integrity, independence and statehood. Although Moscow claims upon a regular basis to be the guarantor of peace and stability in the South Caucasus, its military presence, in fact, remains the single biggest challenge to peace and stability – not only in Georgia but in the entire South Caucasus region. This assessment will be dismissed out-
right by the Russian officials who will claim the opposite
and name Georgia responsible for the turn of events and
the warmongering.

As long as the West talks softly to President Vladimir
Putin’s regime, Russia remains the dominant military
power in the South Caucasus. Conversely, however, as long
as Russia remains militarily entrenched in the region, the
resolution of the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts
will continue to be elusive.17 Thus, as long as the West stays
a reluctant interlocutor between Georgia and Russia,
Georgia remains vulnerable to Russia’s creeping occupa-
tion policy and Georgian calls for concrete help from the
West stay unanswered.

One has to remember that for Europe [or, rather, the
EU], the victory of Ivanishvili and his change of course in
relations with Russia came as a surprise. Over the last years,
European leaders have become accustomed to President
Saakashvili and his pro-Western foreign policy course
European leaders have become accustomed to President
Saakashvili and his pro-Western foreign policy course
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Therefore, the Georgian-
Russian rapprochement is met with scepticism and the EU
repeatedly seeks reassurances from the Georgian govern-
ment that improved relations with Russia will not affect the
ongoing negotiations about the EU-Georgia Association
Agreement which is supposed to be signed at the Eastern
Partnership Vilnius Summit in late November 2013.

In light of the fading interest and ambiguous feelings,
Georgia should not expect any meaningful support from
Europe for the long-term normalisation of its relations with
Russia. Nor is a European initiative for the resolution of the
conflict with Abkhazia and South Ossetia likely in the near
future. Georgia has to go down this path on its own – and
get it right.18 Namely, either going back to the renewed
"USSR," going forward to the lukewarm EU if and when, the
EU is still around or maintaining its sovereignty and inde-
pendence at all cost and on its own. The author’s assertion
will be dismissed outright by EU officials. However, Georgian
reality shows that the militarily impotent EU has left
Georgia to its own fate. Furthermore, the EU is unwilling to

antagonise Russia for the sake of Georgia and, as a result,
leaves Georgia in a difficult position. The latter point is half-
heartedly recognised by Georgian officials, however, at the
same time officials are not willing to acknowledge it.

To conclude, unrealistic expectations on the side of the
Georgian government regarding the potential improve-
ment in relations with Russia have failed to materialise.
Unfortunately, it is easier to criticise former Prime Minister
Ivanishvili and his cabinet today than to provide sober
policy analysis with potential options out of the deadlock.
What is evident is that the Georgian political establish-
ment from the start has been wrong in assuming or per-
haps envisaging that the dual policy of Euro-Atlantic inte-
gration and improvement of relations with Russia was
doable. At least this approach was tried, however, even
though the end result proved to be futile. Apparently, the
newly-elected President of Georgia, Giorgi Margvelashvili,
faulted to understand that the dual policy pursued by Prime
Minister Ivanishvili led to a dead-end. Otherwise, he would
not propose pursuing the same dual policy.19

In addition to the dual policy, the so-called policy of
small steps regarding Russia: namely, the appointment of
Zurab Abashidze and subsequent meetings between
Abashidze and Grigory Karasin, have led to minor changes
while in the bigger picture one steadily sees the deterio-
ration of the relations between Russia and Georgia. At the
same time, EU officials have left Georgia to its own fate
and, basically, said: "We encourage you in Georgia to
improve relations with Russia but we have nothing to do
with the process. Go on and bless you!" As a result, Georgia
has three choices to ponder:

a) Pursuing the course of Euro-Atlantic integration
against all odds since the European dream may not
become a reality and the goal of joining NATO is
slowly turning into a fading memory
b) Maintaining its sovereignty and territorial integrity at
all cost and alone since neighbouring Turkey is not
going to side with Georgia militarily against Russia or
c) Succumbing to the wishes of Putin and becoming a
member of the Custom Union and, subsequently, the
Eurasian Union.

Each choice that the Georgian government decides to
pursue has both pros and cons that this time around need
to be carefully assessed. Lessons learned from the experi-
ence of the past 12 months should not be repeated.
However, this point needs to be emphasised. This time
around, Putin and his administration are unwilling to give
the Georgian government time to rethink its choice of
polices. The grace period is over. Full stop.
As for the Russian side, the policy of wait-and-see has been terminated. Putin clearly stated that: "I will not tolerate Georgian government stubbornness and misbehaviour. Do not think that you can fool me again. The policy of the creeping occupation will continue at full force and you in Georgia may complain as many times as you wish. Your supporters in the EU will continue to behave meekly and talk softly. Finally, remember my interview with Sophie Shevardnadze and draw the right conclusion. The choice is in your hands. If you choose the right path, you will be rewarded. Otherwise, you will bear the consequences." ■

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7. For the complete article, see www.trend.az/regions/scaucasus/georgia/2205531.html – online on 28 October 2013.

8. According to Abashidze: "They [the Russians] say that borderisation [or rather creeping occupation] is a result of the August 2008 war; borderisation started in 2009 and funds were allocated from the budget for that purpose followed by the signing of agreements with these independent states and so we are helping them with the development of the border infrastructure." For the complete article, see www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=26497 – online on 27 September 2013. See also Molly Corso, "Georgia: Tbilisi Bracing for Russian Pressure" in Eurasianet.org online at www.eurasianet.org/node/67629 – online on 15 October 2013. Abashidze's wording contradicts the information published earlier; namely, that putting up barbed wire fences was first started by the border guard troops of the Russian Federal Security Service in April-May 2011 www.civil.ge/eng/_print.php?id=26144 – online on 4 June 2013. Abashidze's wording also contradicts the information that metal barriers went up two years after the August 2008 war; namely, in August 2010. Goga Aptsiauri and Claire Bigg, "Georgian Villagers Irate as Fence Goes up on South Ossetian Boundary" in Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) online at: www.rferl.org/content/georgia-mssia-ossetia/2513531.html – online on 9 October 2013. Hereafter cited as Goga Aptsiauri and Claire Bigg, "Georgian Villagers."
Exclusive economic zones (EEZ) of Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in the Eastern Mediterranean

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ABSTRACT

Being highly discernible especially in the past ten years, chiefly owing to Southern Greek Cypriot Administration (SGCA)’s declaration of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), as well as its bilateral delimitation agreements with some littoral countries, a struggle, or rather a disarray with respect to the delimitation of maritime jurisdictional areas in the East Mediterranean has surfaced. In completely understanding the issue, there are several points which need to be examined.

These include: 1) whether the contemplated EEZs of Greece and SGCA or the bilateral delimitation agreements, which they have been exerting great effort towards them being signed, are indeed in accordance with the principles and provisions of international law of the sea and the rulings of the relevant international courts; 2) whether Turkey correctly determined the relevant littoral countries, with which it will sign maritime jurisdictional areas delimitation agreements; 3) whether Turkey and, as an independent and sovereign state, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) have inherent rights within several parcels of the EEZ, so-called declared by SGCA; 4) how big an area the island of Cyprus would be accorded in line with the former decisions taken by the related International Court of Justice and Court of Arbitration; and finally, 5) the maritime jurisdictional area which Turkey should have in the region.

This paper includes the legislative discussions, author’s assessments and suggestions with respect to above-mentioned issues.

INTRODUCTION

LEGAL DIMENSION OF EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE (EEZ)

Being well-established in the customary law before, EEZ went into state practice with the Presidential Decree of Chile, dated 23 July 1947, in which it claimed sovereignty over its continental shelf and the area of 200 miles wide adjacent to its coastline. This practice was affirmed later with the announcement of Peruvian Government, dated 1 August 1947, where it established an area of protection, preservation and exploration, which reaches to a width of 200 miles and does not preclude the freedom of navigation of other states. Then, in the latter half of 1970s, when several states unilaterally adopted a 200-miles zone, they unwillingly faced with the
term of EEZ. As this practice became widespread, many authors began to claim that international customary law granted littoral states rights and privileges within the 200-mile area. Then, in the mid-1980s, doctrinal literature debates with respect to the validity of EEZ in international law became more discernible in comparison with the first ten years of the term. According to the dominant opinion, EEZ is claimed to appear as a positive legal rule in the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of The Sea since 1979. Though they think differently in terms of the special content of the EEZ, many authors share this perception and agree that customary law permits all littoral states to establish a 200-mile EEZ (Bozkurt, 2006) which was positively codified with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The width of EEZ could be up to a maximum of 200 miles, starting from the baseline, where the breadth of territorial waters is measured. Within the EEZ, the littoral state has the inherent right to explore, exploit, preserve and manage the natural resources on and under the seabed, as well as the living and non-living resources which include benefiting from water, current and winds in producing energy besides oil and other materials in the water above the seabed. Such a state is also granted other sovereign rights, such as establishing and the use of artificial islands and infrastructures, conducting regional explorations, protection of marine environment, making arrangements with respect to customs, fiscal, health and immigration issues, to conduct the requisites for some of its licenses in this body of water. EEZ is measured from the baseline, where the breadth of territorial waters is measured (UNCLOS, 1982, Art. 57; Art. 5-16). If the width of maritime area is not big enough to accommodate such a space, UNCLOS foresees an agreement to be made among all related parties. However, there is no provision for banning a unilateral EEZ declaration.

To sum up, reaching an equitable solution, both the UNCLOS and the international court decisions (Sample decisions: 1977 United Kingdom-France Case, 1983 Gineau-Gineau Bissau case, 1992 Canada-France Saint Pierre & Miquelon Case, 1999 Eritrea-Yemen Case, 2009 Romania-Ukraine "Serpents Island" Case) refer to an "agreement to be made among all related parties". However, there is no provision for banning a unilateral EEZ declaration.

POLICIES OF LITTORAL STATES TOWARDS EEZ IN THE EAST MEDITERRANEAN

Besides multi-dimensional (military, economic, transportation etc.) strategic importance of East Mediterranean, abundant energy resources (USGS fact sheet 2010-2027), which are assessed to exist under its seabed, has naturally brought together the struggle and clashes of interest in the allocation of these resources and the maritime domain. In this struggle, it is witnessed that states have opted to unilaterally declare their EEZs or make bilateral agreements. In this regard, Southern Greek Cypriot Administration (SGCA) (Sezer, 2008), Libya (It was declared to the United Nations in 27 May 2009 with the order of the law made by Libyan General Public Committee, dictating a breadth of 200 miles), Syria (UN, 2010), Lebanon (http://www.un.org/depts/los/legislationandtreaties/statesfiles/lbn.htm) and Israel (It submitted a list of geographical coordinates detailing the boundaries of its EEZ to the United Nations on 12 July 2011 through its UN Permanent Representative) declared their EEZs, whereas Lebanon, Israel and Egypt signed maritime jurisdictional areas delimitation agreements.

On the other hand, drawing a baseline along the island chain of Crete, Kasos, Karpathos, Rhodes and Meis, Greece has undertaken a series of talks with
Egypt and Libya to sign a maritime jurisdictional areas delimitation agreement based on a median line (http://www.pioner-investors.com/news2.asp?newsid=3619) and watch out for the appropriate timeframe to also make such an agreement with SGCA (http://www.sana.sy/tur/237/2010/11/04/317205.htm). In accordance with Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs document, dated 24 December 2008, and titled "Syrian Oil and Natural Resources Minister's visit to SGCA", SGCA maintains its posture to cooperate on energy issues and the delimitation of maritime jurisdictional areas also with Syria. It is known that SGCA watches out for an appropriate timeframe to proclaim the agreed maritime jurisdictional areas with Syria as well as Greece. Declaring an EEZ without making any agreement was also debated in the Greek Parliament (http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/en).

In the meanwhile, during the past eight years in the East Mediterranean with respect to the struggle for delimiting maritime jurisdictional areas, Turkey has not yet signed a bilateral delimitation agreement with any littoral state in the region (except the one signed with TRNC on 21 September 2011 in New York to delimit the continental shelf between the north of the island of Cyprus and Turkey). Turkey has also not declared any EEZ to the United Nations. However, whenever appropriate, Turkey expressed that it has legitimate rights and interests in the maritime area to the west of longitude $32^\circ16'18"$E and north of latitude $33^\circ40'N$ in line with international law. Moreover, Turkey occasionally went beyond such expression and claimed that the above-depicted figure (Figure 1) indicated its own maritime jurisdictional area in the region. R/V EXPLORA, registered to Alcatel Telephony Company, establishing telecommunications network along Bar/Italia-SGCA-Israel-Egypt, entered the continental shelf and the possible EEZ of Turkey and was informed that she would not be able to go on her activities inside the probable Turkish EEZ without the formal consent of the Turkish Government, having been informed of the geographical coordinates. She was then requested to leave the area on 12 March 2011 by Turkish corvette, TCG BANDIRMA. Afterwards, Italian Embassy in Ankara was notified of the incident via a note annexed with a map detailing the boundaries of Turkish maritime jurisdictional areas and requested to seek permission to conduct such activities. Subsequently, Italian Embassy filed a formal request to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs for R/V EXPLORA to undertake research activities in the abovementioned area and the relevant permission was granted between 21–27 March 2011.

In fact, no map except the one devised by Prof. Dr. Sertaç Hami BAŞEREN in Figure 2 was put to use during this period (Başeren, 2011). As its underlying causes will be explained in the below paragraphs, this map was charted with a minimalist approach, meaning that only the median lines were adopted as the delineation lines and restricted number of coasts and littoral states were made eligible through the use of perpendicular lines. In that map, Turkey’s reserved rights in the south of the island of Cyprus were also not depicted. However, as it was mentioned before, it is possible to claim that Turkey has sovereign rights and interests in the area between the median line (between SGCA and respective littorals) and the (median) line moved towards the island of Cyprus in accordance with the principle of proportionality. One could then easily assert that upon enclaving the island of Cyprus with such proportions, it would be appropriate for Turkey to sign delimitation agreements with other littorals, such as Israel, Lebanon, Egypt and Syria.
In the meanwhile, it was recognized that 5 of the 13 oil exploration licensed areas, which SGCA declared to exploit on 26 January 2007, were inside the probable Turkish EEZ depicted with red lines by BAŞEREN (2011) in Figure 2.

**Examining the Thesis Underneath the Claims of SGCA and Greece**

Confining Turkey to the Bay of Antalya through the allocation of a very small continental shelf/EEZ area, policies of SGCA and Greece, based on accepting the island chain of Creet, Kasos, Karpathos, Rhodes and Meis as a baseline and advocating the method of median lines in declaring EEZs, when signing bilateral delimitation agreements either among themselves or with other littorals, are not compatible with respective equitable norms of international law and devoid of any legal basis.

Motives for such assertion are as follows. First of all, islands of Creet, Kasos, Karpathos, Rhodes and Meis are "the islands on the opposite side", considering the median line drawn between mainland Greece and Turkey. Therefore, such a line connecting these islands cannot be adopted as a baseline for delimitation purposes and granted a continental shelf outside their territorial waters. In the legal decision dated 3 February 2009, with respect to the case of the delimitation of maritime jurisdictional areas between Romania and Ukraine in the Black Sea, International Court of Justice did not consider Serpents Island, while determining the relevant coasts and used the method of "median line" and ruled on such basis. Such presumption is clearly seen to be embodied in the decision for Canal Continental Shelf Cases (Court of Arbitration, 1977; International Boundary Cases, 1992, p. 363) by the International Court of Arbitration between UK and France. In that respect, connecting the islands of Creet, Kasos, Karpathos, Rhodes and Meis with a line and having that line to form a baseline, not taking into account of the Turkish coastline overlooking the disputed maritime area in favor of Greek claims is not possible.

On the other hand, in any delimitation process, a list of principles serving justness and equity could be derived from related court decisions (Libya-Malta Case, par. 46; Maine Bay Case, par. 88; Eritrea-Yemen Case, par. 103). Among such decisions, the principle of "geographical superiority" comes forward. Geography here denotes the "mainlands" in the region subject to delimitation, indicating that the most important geographical consideration is the length of the coastline on the mainlands. This principle is well-rooted in several cases decided by the International Court of Justice. For instance; in the ruling of North Sea Case, it was expressed that "reshaping geography is not possible" (North Sea Case decision, par. 91); in UK-France Case, it was ruled that "geographical conditions determine the appropriateness of equidistance or any other delimitation method" (UK-France Case decision, par. 96); in Libya-Malta Case, it was decided that "coasts of the Parties constitute the baseline of measurement" (Libya-Malta Case decision, 1985, par. 47); in Tunisia-Libya Case, it was concluded that "mainland dominates the sea" (Tunisia-Libya Case decision, par. 73) in Herman (1948). Moreover, in legal decisions delimiting both EEZ and continental shelf in a single case, the principle of "geographical superiority" is also highlighted (Canada-France Case decision, par. 24. Jan Mayen Case decision, par. 51-53. Qatar-Bahrein Case decision, par. 185).

Detailing how this principle works, one notes that international courts first determine a prospective delimitation line between two mainland countries, reflecting their geographical characteristics. If the length of their coastlines are approximately equal and the topography of their coasts are similar, then the delimitation line becomes the equidistance line. Difference in the length of coastlines and dissimilarities in coastline topography indicate that the delimitation line should differ from the equidistance line. International Court of Justice (1992) began the process of delimitation with equidistance line in the cases of Libya-Malta, Jan Mayen, Maine Bay and Qatar-Bahrein. Only in the Eritrea-Yemen Case (par. 139-164), decision by the Court of Arbitration did not begin with the equidistance line, since the Court picked the historical line, on which both sides concurred upon, for delimitation purposes. (International Boundary Case, 1992).

Having determined the delimitation line, courts then assess whether or not this line is deemed equitable, taking into account of other related geographical issues. In this assessment, islands take the priority and what effect they should have are evaluated. As for especially the islands situated between the mainlands, the magnitude of such effect is dependent upon factors like geographical balance, population, position and size. Although islands are granted continental shelf, it just does not mean that they have the status equal to that of the mainlands. For instance, in some cases, islands either affect the determined delimitation line to
a limited extent or do not change it at all in line with their abovementioned characteristics.

Especially, the effect of islands close to the coasts of another country is severely reduced, since distortion effect of such islands over the delimitation line necessitated by mainlands is exceedingly high. Therefore, these islands generally either have very limited effect on the position of the delimitation line or are completely ignored (UK-France Case Decision, par. 183, 184, 187, 192). If these islands are small and their population is few, then their chance to have any effect becomes remarkably low. It is also seen that islands, which are not near the coasts of another country, but are closer to such country with respect to the position of the equi-distance line, are also overlooked as long as they are not inhabitable to a great extent (Qatar-Bahrein Case Decision, par. 219).

In reaching an equitable solution, besides geographical issues, it is necessary to consider all the relevant factors. Thus, subsequent step in delimitation process is the analysis of all non-geographical factors by international courts (For instance, Tunisia-Libya case, par. 81 (Herman, 1984); Gineau-Gineau Bissau case, par. 112). In line with related legal practices, among all other factors, existing natural resources in the maritime area to be delimited is first analyzed. A delimitation line appropriating natural resources disproportionately will not be accepted as an equitable boundary line (Canada-France Case, par. 84; Jan Mayen Case, par. 73, 74; Eritrea-Yemen Case, par. 62, 63, 74). In such an analysis, boundary lines, which the parties determined beforehand due to reasons like oil exploration licenses etc. and the lines to be agreed with third-party states are also taken into account (Tunusia-Libya Case Decision, par. 96, 117).

In legal decisions by relevant courts exist also some principles governing the cross-effects of related factors. First of these principles is "proportionality". In line with this principle, the ratio between two state's coastline lengths should be near the ratio between the continental shelf/EEZ areas accorded to these states. Proportionality serves as the final test to check whether or not the delimitation process has been fairly implemented. In accordance with this principle, if any factor is observed to significantly change the effect of the ratio between coastline lengths, it will not be deemed as a rational method (seen in UK-France Case decision, par. 182, whereas proportionality also played a role in France-Spain (1974) and Netherlands(Antilles)-Venezuela (1978)).

Another principle in similar nature is the principle of "non-encroachment". Especially after "distance" was adopted as an important factor in determining the breadth of continental shelf, it was agreed that a delimitation line could be drawn in such a way that each state should be accorded the maritime jurisdictional area near its coasts, meaning that her coasts should not be encroached upon with such an area of another state. In other words, it was emphasized that a delimitation method resulting in an allocation of a maritime area near the coasts of one state to another state would be unjust (For instance, Gulf of Maine Case Decision, par. 92, 98; Canada-France Case Decision, par. 70).

Therefore, factors such as "islands on the opposite side", "geographical superiority", "length of coastlines", "significant differences in coastal topography", "islands to change the position of the delimitation line either
partially or not at all”, “equitable allocation of natural resources”, “prior determination of oil exploration license areas”, “principle of proportionality” and “principle of non-encroachment” annul the legal basis of the EEZ claims by Greece and SGCA’s.

In the meanwhile, in case Greece and SGCA claims were realized, which would be absolutely against international law, Turkish EEZ would be confined to the Bay of Antalya, amounting to approximately 41,000 km², indicating that Turkey would lose a maritime jurisdictional area of at least 104,000 km² (Figure 3).

**DISCUSSION**

1. **Examining the EEZ declared by SGCA and the agreements it signed with other littoral states**

   Disregarding the rights of TRNC and Turkey, SGCA declared its EEZ on behalf of “Cyprus” with the support of European Union on 2 April 2004, effective from 21 March 2003 (Figure 4). Turkey filed a note to UN General Secretariat on 2 March 2004, stating that Turkey has inherent rights in line with international law. In the meanwhile, SGCA signed EEZ delimitation agreements with Egypt on 17 February 2003, Lebanon on 17 January 2007 (Ministry of Turkish Foreign Affairs, 2007) and Israel on 17 December 2010 (http://www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=102276&hmpn=1, http://www.financialmirror.com/news/cyprus_and_world_news/22099, http://www.jpost.com/international/article.aspx?id=199896&r=r1).

   Agreement with Lebanon has not yet been ratified in accordance with Lebanon’s domestic law. It is also known that SGCA conducts talks with Syria on a possible delimitation agreement and seeks (http://www.cyprusweekly.com.cy/main/92,1,283,0,14593-.aspx) to make a similar agreement with Libya.

   In declaring its EEZ and signing delimitation agreements, unlike Turkey, SGCA indeed made use of diagonal lines besides perpendicular ones, therefore both increased the number of littoral states it would sign such agreements and enhanced her possibly accorded maritime jurisdictional area.

   On the other hand, SGCA also declared 13 oil exploration license areas in the south of the island of Cyprus on 26 January 2007 and proclaimed them for bids. After the deadline, rights pertaining to Area Number 12 was contracted by Noble Energy; an energy company from the United States (Newspaper Imersia, 8 November 2010, Newspaper Eleftherotypia, 27 December 2010).

   Acting against the principle of proportionality as well as the measures of fairness and equity, SGCA was granted maritime jurisdictional areas, which indeed belonged to the states that signed delimitation agreements, like Lebanon, in a way against the rights and interests of these states in accordance with international law. In case EEZ is determined in accordance with the proportion of coastline lengths, median line should be moved with the same proportion. Thus, it would be possible for Lebanon to attain an additional 3925 km² area in line with the ratio of 1/1.83; for Israel an additional 4600 km² in line with the ratio of 1/3.74 and for Egypt an additional 21500 km² in line with the ratio of 1/13.06 Because, according to international law of the sea, delimitation of maritime jurisdictional agreements should be made by taking into account of the ratio of respective states’ coastline lengths, the principle of non-encroachment and whether or not they are on the opposite side (Figure 5 and 6). These special factors constitute the general principle of whether or not the islands could own as much maritime jurisdictional areas as the mainlands. If, the island of Cyprus is excluded, the coasts of Turkey, Lebanon, Israel and Egypt were accepted as the relevant coasts subject to delimitation of maritime jurisdictional areas, taking into account of the length of opposite coastline lengths, it would be appropriate to say that the median line between Turkey and Lebanon should be moved towards Lebanon at a minimum ratio of 0.25; the median line between Turkey and Israel should be moved towards Israel at a minimum ratio of 0.75; the median line between Turkey and Egypt should be moved towards Egypt at a minimum ratio of 0.25 and the delimitation of maritime jurisdictional areas between Turkey and these countries could take place as such.

   Decisions by international courts witnessed in Libya-Malta (International Court of Justice decided.
be accorded, in view of the principle of non-encroachment, could be as much as the area that would extend to the median line between SGCA and Lebanon, Israel, Egypt, however, now which would be to move towards SGCA in accordance with the principle of proportionality.

For instance, coastline length of Syria, Lebanon and Israel in total is 316,907 miles, whereas the coastline length between Cape Baf and Cape Zafer, which is assessed to be adopted as the "relevant coast" by SGCA, is 168,905 miles. This makes the ratio between coastline lengths 1.87, meaning that Syria, Lebanon and Israel should have been granted 1.87 times more maritime jurisdictional areas than SGCA was granted.

However, SGCA was allocated almost an equal size area, which could be interpreted as it intentionally seized the maritime jurisdictional areas of the respective littoral states. The situation is even worse for Egypt. Its coastline length is 400.128 miles, whereas the coastline length between Cape Arnauti and Cape Zafer, which is assessed as the "relevant coast" by SGCA, is 197,659 miles. In other words, the proportion of coastline lengths is in favor of Egypt, dictating that SGCA should have been granted half of the area Egypt was granted.

However, with the agreement it signed, SGCA attained an additional 21,500 km² maritime jurisdictional area. On the other hand, cumulatively, as could be seen in the below maps, owing to the related agreements, SGCA was handed an additional 4,600 km² area from Israel, 3957 km² from Lebanon and 21,500 km² from Egypt.

In a similar delimitation agreement signed between Greece and Albania on 27 April 2009, upon determining that it was against its interests, Albanian Supreme Court annulled the agreement on 27 January 2010, pre-
senting a significant example for the possible prospects of abovementioned issue (Anatolian Agency, 2010).

**COMPARISON OF THE POLICIES OF TURKEY AND SGCA**

As indicated before, Turkey only made use of the perpendicular lines and considered Syria, TRNC and Egypt as relevant littoral states. It delineated the maritime area (Figure 7), amounting to 145,000 km², as its probable maritime jurisdictional area but did not declare it.

However, this map was even criticized for being maximalist in several platforms including Greece, as it was argued that littoral states (Karyotis (2010) argues that Egypt and Turkey do not have opposite coasts) and relevant coasts it depicted were found to be having no effect in the calculations, though it was actually delineated with a minimalist approach. If, for instance, SGCA had used perpendicular lines like Turkey, it would have signed delimitation agreements only with Egypt and Israel and been accorded a maritime jurisdictional area of much less than one third of the area it currently claims (Figure 8).

However, if Turkey acted with SGCA’s approach, it would be in a position to sign delimitation agreements with Libya, Israel and even Lebanon, besides Egypt, Syria and TRNC as relevant states and thus, be accorded maritime jurisdictional areas more than the one currently predicted by both itself and relevant littoral states. For instance, in Figure 9 a map is presented, detailing the probable delineation of maritime jurisdictional areas between Turkey and Israel.

As could clearly be seen from this map, if, having opposite coasts, Turkey and Israel signed a delimitation agreement, being absolutely in line with the principles of international law of the sea, Israel would be accorded the whole of Parcel 12, in which rich hydrocarbon reserves were believed to exist, a big portion of Parcels 8, 9 and 11 and a part of Parcels 1, 7 and 10, while Turkey also would be accorded some areas in the south of the island of Cyprus.

In this perspective, also the Libyan coastline between Libya-Egypt border and Dernah is opposite the Turkish coastline between the Cape Deveboynu and Kaş. This gives both states a legitimate right to sign a delimitation agreement, taking into account the median line between the coasts of Anatolia and the continent of Africa, being in the absolute interest of both states. If such an agreement would be reached between Turkey and Libya, Libya would be accorded an additional 16,700 km² of maritime area, compared to a delimitation agree-
ment it would sign with Greece (Figure 10). However, the gains of Libya would not be limited with that, since a probable Turkey-Libya delimitation agreement would lay the foundation for a delimitation agreement to be signed between Greece and Libya, but now taking into account of the geographical superiority of mainlands. In that case, Libya's cumulative gain of maritime jurisdictional area in the south of the island of Crete would increase 62 percent and reach an area of at least 39,000 km² (Figure 11).

In order to have a fair EEZ delimitation in the East Mediterranean, it is necessary to;

- take into account of "median line" between Anatolia and the continent of Africa (Libya and Egypt),
- take note of the principles of "geographical superiority" and "non-encroachment" since the island of Cyprus and the related Greek islands are situated on the opposite side and encroach upon mainland Turkey,
- note that the islands on the opposite side should only be accorded maritime jurisdictional areas as much as their territorial waters as seen in the Serpents Island Case, and if it were argued that the island of Cyprus does not belong to an opposite coastline state, then still note that it cannot have as much an area as a mainland state.

In this regard, it is possible and legally appropriate to sign a delimitation agreement with Egypt along the length of opposite coastlines. It is also a valid case for Turkey to sign a delimitation agreement with Lebanon, as its descriptive drawing is shown in Figure 12.

In view of the calculations made heeding to the abovementioned principles, if Turkey followed the reasoning of SGCA and Greece, it would be accorded an EEZ of at least 189,000 km²; as shown in Figure 13. In that respect, comparing the maps detailed in Figure 13 and Figure
14, one will notice a difference of at least 44,000 km² of a maritime jurisdictional area.

**MARITIME JURISDICTIONAL AREA RIGHTS OF TRNC OVER THE EEZ DECLARED BY SGCA**

As an independent and sovereign state, TRNC has the right to have her own maritime jurisdictional areas in accordance with the principles of international law and the decisions by the related international courts. TRNC has a relevant coastline, making it eligible to sign maritime jurisdictional delimitation agreements with Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Egypt.

In this regard, it will be seen that, inside the EEZ so-called declared by SGCA, TRNC has inherent rights in the whole of Parcels 3 and 13 and the parts of Parcels 2, 9, and 12, in which drilling of the Cyprus-A well has been operations are currently being conducted on behalf of SGCA (Figure 15). In fact, claiming that it represents the entire island of Cyprus, SGCA signed the related maritime jurisdictional delimitation agreements with respect to Parcels 2, 3, 9, 13 and 12 by way of basing its arguments on Cape Karpaz, which indeed is governed by TRNC, not SGCA. Thus, it initiated the bidding process only in the southern section of its declared EEZ.

In the meanwhile, if Egypt, Israel, Lebanon and Syria signed delimitation agreements with TRNC instead of
SGCA, (in fact they should have, since they have opposite coastlines), they would be accorded more maritime area than they were with respect to the agreements they made with SGCA, in line with the coastline lengths and the principle of equitable sharing.

**CONCLUSIONS**

Owing to its position pursued so far in terms of making delineations only through the use of perpendicular lines, Turkey narrowed its scope of relevant coasts and littoral states. Due to a lack of such broad outlook and comprehensive approach, it determined its maritime jurisdictional area only with a minimalist methodology.

However, in line with the respective principles and provisions of the law of the sea and related decisions rendered by the international courts, it would be possible and necessary for Turkey to sign maritime jurisdictional areas delimitation agreements with Israel, Libya, Lebanon and Syria, besides Egypt and TRNC, as they all happened to be relevant littoral states. Such agreements would be in the interest of these littoral states, as they were for Turkey, in comparison with the gains attained from the agreements signed between them and SGCA. In line with such probable agreements, especially, to be signed with Israel and Egypt, it would be possible for Turkey to claim its own EEZ rights in the south of the island of Cyprus, more specifically, in the numbered parcels of 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11 and 12, which were so-called declared by SGCA.

On the other hand, as an independent and sovereign state, TRNC also has maritime jurisdictional areas and reserves its right to declare an EEZ and sign delimitation agreements. It was noted through related studies that TRNC had relevant opposite coasts subject to delimitation of maritime jurisdictional agreements with Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Egypt. In case TRNC...
signed such agreements with these littoral states, then it would be realized that TRNC will have inherent rights in the whole of parcels 3 and 13 and some parts of parcels 2, 9 and 12.

In this regard, considering the ongoing developments in the region, it is necessary for Turkey and TRNC to first delineate again their maritime jurisdictional areas in accordance with the international law of the sea, then declare their EEZs and afterwards, sign delimitation agreements with all relevant littoral states.

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In the second half of the nineteenth century, Romania’s Ploiești region was, along with Baku, a major petroleum source for the Black Sea region. Oil was first extracted from hand-dug pits, but the 1860s and 1870s saw the use of drilling rigs, a technique imported from the booming industry of western Pennsylvania. After the 1877 War of Independence, the refining of oil into kerosene and lubricants started to be developed. This was facilitated by the massive involvement of foreign companies, which would characterize Romania’s oil industry until the onset of the communist regime.

OIL, WIND AND SUN: ENERGY PRODUCTION THEN AND NOW

But as most of the oil production was marked for export, the challenge was to bring it from Ploiești to the Danube and to the Black Sea port of Constanța. As noted by Charles King, "Late into the nineteenth century, getting oil from well to market was still accomplished [by] pumping crude oil into wooden barrels and then hauling it in wagons over impassable roads." Indeed, Ploiești lay hundreds of kilometers from the coast, with no railway connection. Yet plans to link Constanța (the ancient port of Tomis, called Köstence in Turkish) to the Danube ports had been under-way since the late 1850s, as it became part of the Ottoman vilayet of Tuna. Under the administration of Midhat Paşa, the Sublime Porte undertook to link the coast to the Danube and further to Bucharest, and thus promote Köstence as a regional grain trade hub, rivaling the Russian Empire’s Odessa. Interrupted by frequent wars, the construction of the railway spur from Bucharest to Constanța was eventually completed in 1895. With it, sizeable quantities of oil started to flow from Ploiești to the Black Sea, where they were loaded onto newly constructed tankers.

The entry of Standard Oil, Deutsche Bank, and Royal Dutch to Romania boosted oil output sevenfold in the 1910s, and in the process they ended up controlling most of the country’s oil industry. In both WWI and WWII, Romanian oil was a strategic objective for Germany. In November 1916, in an effort to deny German access to the Ploiești fields, the British organized a vast sabotage operation, blowing up the region’s oil rigs and refineries. In 1936 Romania was the world’s fourth largest oil producer, with 8.7 million tons per year. In WWII Germany again was dependent on Ploiești, which in 1940 provided 58 percent of the German oil imports. "The life of the Axis depends on those oilfields," Hitler told Mussolini. On August 1, 1943, the American Air Forces bombed the region’s refineries in a daring yet costly and strategically unsuccessful raid called Operation Tidal Wave.

During the communist decades, oil production and petrochemical capacities were further expanded. Constanța served as an export outlet for Romania’s petroleum and...
other mineral resources. Its hinterland, the steppe of Dobruja, was important for agricultural production, thanks to fertile soils and despite an arid climate. For energy, however, Dobruja was a mere transit region, traversed by railways, roads, pipelines and high-voltage grids connecting the inland with Constanța and the Danube basin. However, the situation has changed profoundly in recent years. In 1996, the first reactor of the Cernavodă Nuclear Power Plant was completed and commissioned, followed by the second in 2007. Together they now produce 19 percent of the country’s gross electricity generation. And just a dozen kilometers from the seashore is Europe’s largest onshore wind farm at Fântânele-Cogealac, with 240 turbines over 1,100 hectares. It was built by the Czech CEZ Group and completed in 2012. By itself, this wind farm added almost 2 percent to Romania’s gross power generation. Twice as much wind power capacity was commissioned in other parts of Dobruja’s two counties, Constanța and Tulcea, while again twice as much is currently under construction. Additionally, the region hosts Romania’s largest share of solar-generated power.

This quick concentration of power generation capacity in Romania’s coastal counties, where energy consumption is rather low, has turned out to be just as much a blessing as a curse, because of the national transmission system operator’s limited capacity to transport that power to the rest of the country. Suddenly, the idea of a submarine high-voltage cable linking Constanța to Istanbul, conceived a decade earlier, began to seem urgent. The cable would stretch 400 km under the sea and export 800 KW of electrical power at 500 kV (direct current) from crisis-struck and de-industrialized Romania, with its excess of power generation, to the energyhungry Turkish market. The cost is estimated at about €500 million. However, the project may be behind the curve, as Turkey is currently planning the construction of three nuclear reactors, which may well turn it into an electricity exporter in a decade’s time.

NEW GAS PRODUCTION PROJECTS

But there is more to the Romanian Black Sea coast’s rise to prominence in the way of energy production and transport. In the natural gas sector, two of the most hopeful prospects that have recently opened up are offshore deepwater gas fields in the continental shelf, and probable shale gas reserves in the Vaslui and Constanța counties.

Romania started the oil exploration of its near-shore waters in 1969 and made the first discovery in 1980. Production eventually started in 1987, but it stayed at a modest level. Overall, offshore exploration has until recently been small scale and limited to shallow waters. In 2008, the American giant ExxonMobil entered a partnership with OMV Petrom in the concession of a large Black Sea acreage. One year later, Exxon started acquiring 3D seismic data in the Romanian offshore. In March 2012, it confirmed the discovery of a gas reservoir of up to 84 billion cubic meters (bcm), which could secure an annual supply of 6.5 bcm (almost half of Romania’s current consumption) for 6 to 13 years. Apart from that, the Canadian company Sterling Resources hit gas in two offshore perimeters, with estimated reserves of 10 bcm.

Concerning shale gas, another American colossus, Chevron, won in 2010 a concession agreement from the Romanian state that included two coastal blocks in Constanța county (next to Costinesti and Vama Veche) and an adjacent non-coastal one (Adamclisi). Fears that fresh water aquifers might become contaminated as a result of hydraulic fracturing, the technology used to extract gas from shale formations, led to sizeable protests by the local communities. Nonetheless, the authorities have issued the necessary permits for these perimeters, and Chevron’s exploration activities are to start in the near future.

To properly appreciate the importance of these prospects, let us put things in perspective. Romania has a relatively high degree of energy security compared to its Central and South-East European neighbors. It imports about a quarter of its annual gas needs from the sole regional provider, Gazprom. Against the backdrop of diminishing domestic oil and gas production, this relatively low percentage is partly due to a drop in consumption in the years since the onset of the economic crisis. Nonetheless the price paid for Russian gas in this part of the world is high compared to the EU average, not to mention the current gas prices on the North American markets. Accordingly, Romania could well use cheaper and more diversified gas supplies for both its own consumption and the goal of becoming a regional gas hub.

BIOGRAPHY

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Other than these prospective domestic sources, Bucharest has long been engaged in a broad regional undertaking encompassing the Black Sea and Caspian basins; Caspian natural gas is to be shipped to the European markets so as to bypass Russian territory. The notion of enhancing the security of supply by diversification of sources and delivery conduits has not been lost on the energy strategists of the Black Sea states or the Brussels planners. However, the progress of the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), designed to pipe Azerbaijani and Central Asian gas to Europe via Georgia and Turkey, has been uneven and protracted. The corridor's whole point has been to loosen Russia's stranglehold on European gas supplies, yet the main burden has proved to be the unwillingness of some EU powers and major energy corporations to antagonize the Kremlin on this particularly sensitive front. for Russia, which delivers around a quarter of the total EU natural gas imports, the European market share is the "goose with the golden egg". It accounts for more than half of Gazprom's revenues and a correspondingly large chunk of the Russian state budget, of which energy revenues make up no less than half. But gas exports are also a tool of coercive diplomacy for the Kremlin. It has not hesitated to cut off gas supplies to Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova during successive politico-commercial disputes since 2006. Although no country outside the former Soviet bloc has been targeted with such means so far, the states of the Balkans and the Black Sea region are in an uneasy position of overdependence on Russian gas supplies.

Until recently, the fate of the SGC has hinged on a decision concerning the route through which 10 bcm/year of Azerbaijani gas from the Shah Deniz field in the Caspian Sea will reach the European markets. As the SGC track to western Turkey was already defined (over the South Caucasus through an expanded Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline, and further across Anatolia through the planned Trans-Anatolian Pipeline), a commercial and political contest has taken place between two contending extensions toward Europe: the Nabucco West proposal – the Central-European route, which would have crossed Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary on its way to the Baumgarten an der March terminus hub in Austria; and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) proposal – the southern European route, which runs through northern Greece and Albania to southern Italy, underneath the Adriatic Sea. Eventually, at the end of June 2013, the latter proposal won out. The commercial aspects obviously prevailed over the (geo)political ones. However, at least in the short to medium term, this resulting configuration of the SGC left Eastern Europe under Gazprom's structural dominance.

Liquefied natural gas transport (LNG)

An idea ventured three years ago was that of a liquefied natural gas (LNG) chain of supply that would link Azerbaijan to Romania. The AGRI (Azerbaijan-Georgia-Romania Interconnector) project would consist of a pipeline reaching from Baku to the Georgian port of Kalevi, where a liquefaction train would be built; the gas would then be carried on LNG tankers to a regasification terminal in Constanța. But apart from the unrealistic costs of such an endeavor, a fundamental barrier to the project is that Turkey opposes any LNG tanker traffic through the already congested Bosphorus. Without the prospect of tapping into the largescale international LNG trade, and also given Azerbaijan’s limited gas supplies and multiple commitments over the next decade, AGRI makes no commercial sense.

Flexible supplies

More likely, the key to the security of natural gas supply for the Black Sea consumers is onshore interconnectivity. From Bucharest’s vantage point, multiple interconnections with its neighbors are a strategic priority for several reasons: to enable short-term deliveries in case of supply cutoffs, to allow access to the regional markets for the expected domestic gas supplies, to achieve an integrated regional market, with gas flowing in either sense across the borders, traded on a competitive basis and priced “gas-on-gas” (i.e. separated from the price of oil, as is currently the case with Gazprom’s long-term supply contracts).
THE DANUBE BASIN: UNTAPPED POTENTIAL

Now, in a broader sense, the Black Sea region encompasses not only the six riparian states, but also the entire Danube basin, stretching upstream all the way to the Alps. Access to the Danube mouths was a centuries-old point of rivalry between the Russian and the Ottoman empires. The Treaty of Paris (1856), which settled the Crimean War, marked an internationalization of the Danube's status. An international commission monitored the freedom of navigation and trade, thus opening up the Black Sea to the interests of West European powers.6

During the Cold War, the Danube again turned into a line of separation. Socialist Romania was one of the most hermetically closed countries of Eastern Europe, although Nicolae Ceaușescu pushed hard for the construction of the Danube-Black Sea canal, whose 64.4 km main branch was built between 1976 and 1984. The idea of the canal went back as far as the late 1830s, after the Treaty of Adrianople (1829), when the Austrian Empire proposed a means of by-passing the Russian-controlled navigation through the Danube delta by directly linking Cernavodă to Constanța. Infamously, the digging began in the 1950s by means of forced labor for political detainees, several thousand of whom were exterminated.

At present, the Danube is probably the world's most international river: it connects 14 countries (8 of which are EU member states) and is home to 100 million people. Thanks to the Rhine-Main-Danube canal, which joins the Danube and Main rivers through the Bavarian Bamberg-Kehlheim link, Constanța has a navigable artery all the way to Rotterdam on the North Sea. It can thus effectively become a gateway for the Black Sea countries to and from Western Europe. At present Romania consumes 9 million tons of oil per year, twice as much as it produces (4.2 million tons).7 Constanța's oil terminal is an entry point for crude oil, much of which is gobbled up by a sizeable (though diminishing) petrochemical industry. The Danube-Black Sea canal allows oil transfer on barges. Yet the Constanța port presently operates at half of its 100-million-ton annual handling capacity, while transports on the Danube-Black Sea canal are just a third of its capacity. The infrastructure on the lower Danube is meager and rusty. For the 630 km section of the border along the Danube between Romania and Bulgaria, a mere second bridge has just been completed between Vidin and Calafat.

In order to boost development in the Danube basin, in 2011 the European Commission launched the Strategy for the Danube Region. It reasonably endeavors to support projects that protect the environment, increase transport and energy interconnections, and advance business and scientific cooperation among the region's countries. The progress so far has been rather disappointing, but nevertheless tangible. The economic crisis saw the available finances dry up considerably; also, the recent changes in the global energy system brought the renewable energy sources – on which the strategy largely capitalizes – into disfavor because of their costly support schemes and the overall competitive disadvantage caused by the high energy prices.

Nonetheless, the Black Sea-Danube gateway has significant development potential. As it links Europe's richest and poorest extremities, the vision is to turn it into a segment of a modern-day Silk Road, and thus revive and rescale the once vibrant regional trade and travel of the Pontus Euxinus. ■

NOTES

4) Yergin, idem, p. 335.
Despite all the present problems, Romania nowadays is one of the most impressive examples of achieving positive results by a country after its joining the European Union and NATO. Thus, not longer ago than in late 1990’s of the twentieth century Romania was the farthest "backyard" of Europe, lagging behind the civilized European world by at least 100 years. All this had changed radically within two-three years of real European and Euro-Atlantic integration of the Romanian state.

Romania’s gaining full-right membership in the EU in 2007 became the main stimulus of the transformation of the base principles of the Romanian statehood and settling the country’s most complicated problems, which included the need of radical renewal of the Romanian economy and introduction of European models into its work; overcoming corruption in the bodies of state power; transfer to the democratic principles and norms of life of the Romanian society.

Having achieved the mentioned above goals (even though not in the full volume), allowed Romania to create favorable conditions for the fast development of its economy and drawing in foreign investments, which positively influenced the economic situation of the country. At this the most positive for the Romanian state was the modernization of its economic sector, which actually became a driving force of the country’s economic growth.

At the same time Romania has always been one of the most consistent members of the EU in the aspect of promotion of the European Union's interests both, on the all-European level, and in the Black Sea, Danube and Balkan regions.

Bucharest is taking an active part in the realization of the main programs of the EU, including the common foreign and security policy of the European Union, "Eastern Partnership" and policy of widening of the EU. In particular, like Hungary, Romania is one of the main bearers of the ideas of the European integration of the Balkan countries, which aim at creating a favorable security space in the region. Apart from this, it was Romania who in October of 2008 presented the "Initiative of the European Union on the Questions of Immigration and Development in the Black Sea Region", aiming at regulation of the labor markets and labor migration in the Black Sea countries.

**ROMANIA’S ROLE IN EUROPE’S GEOPOLITICAL TRENDS**

In the process of preparations to its joining the EU, Romania presented a number of its own initiatives concerning the development of cooperation in the Black Sea region, like that of creating in 2006 the Black Sea Forum for a Dialogue and Partnership, and of transformation of the Black Sea teaching and training centre in the Romanian Galati into an effective regional structure for fighting international terrorism, drug and weapon traffic, human trafficking.
At the same time, Romania still has a number of problems which slow down the process of the European integration of the country, its prospects of joining the Schengen Area included. The main problems are as follows: still a high level of corruption; low effectiveness of the judicial system; weakness of law-enforcement authorities; a number of unsettled problems in the Romanian economy; permanent confrontation among the main political forces of Romania. Yet, all these problems are sooner "problems of the age" and do not principally influence the realization of the general course of the country's European integration.

Not less important was Romania’s joining NATO in 2004. The geographical situation of the country at the Southern flank of NATO in the Black Sea region has made Romania’s situation in the Alliance as a special. Thus, at the present moment, Romania is the main USA and NATO’s partner in the aspect of advancement of their military infrastructures eastward. In particular, in 2007-2008 at the base of Romania’s military infrastructure (Mihail Kogalniceanu aircraft base and the port of Constanta) the "East" Joined Operation-Tactical Group of the AF of the USA was deployed, for transport-logistics securing the actions of the American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. At this, in case of a threat of an armed aggression against Romania, at this base a proper brigade of the AF of the USA numbering up to 1.5 thousand servicemen can be deployed in an operative order.

Besides, with the help of the USA, Romanian Anti - Aircraft System and the system for detection of sea objects have been qualitatively modernized. The most important was the replacement of the obsolete soviet radio technical navigation systems, with which the Romanian Armed forces had been equipped, with the more effective American AN/fPS-117 air search radar.

The assistance on the part of the USA and NATO allowed Romania to create its own park of military transport aircrafts of the middle and long distance radius.
of action, which became a principally new property of the Romanian Armed Forces for all the time of their existence. Thus, in 1990's Romanian AF began to receive American turboprop military transport aircraft the Lockheed C-130 Hercules, which considerably increased the capabilities of the Romanian side concerning the country's participation in NATO's operations at removed theaters of war (in Iraq and Afghanistan included).

**GENERAL DYNAMICS F-16 FIGHTING FALCON**

In the aspect of strengthening the military and military navy potentials of the country, positively important for Romania was also its receiving a few armed warships of the corvette class (by the soviet classification, – a guard, antisubmarine ship and a harbor minesweeper from Great Britain and Germany. Besides, at the stage of realization is presently the program of Romania's receiving from the USA American fighter-bombers F-16, which have to replace the obsolete Russian aircrafts MIG-21, with which the Romanian aviation is still equipped.

**THE CONCEPT OF AN AMERICAN MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM IN EUROPE**

Apart from this, very important for Romania are the USA's plans as to the deployment of the US /NATO's ballistic missile defense objects (mobile anti-missile complexes SM-3) at the Romanian territory, which helps increase the role of the country in the Alliance, as well as increase its national security.

In general all the mentioned above guarantees irreversibility of the process of Romania's returning to the European and Western worlds not as of a problematic and weak "backyard" of Europe, but that of a proper member of the European and North-Atlantic Unions.
The role and influence of Armenia in the Black Sea region

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The enhancement of security and stability in one of the most significant geopolitical centers in the world – Black Sea region, where come across interests of different power centers, is important for protecting security, stability and balance in Europe, Middle East and Eurasian Region. Security and stability in the Black Sea region is also important for incremental European integration of region’s countries. The above mentioned importance is even more substantial for states of Southern Caucasus region.

Not without reason, three states of Southern Caucasus region are members to Black Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC) and actively participate in a number of measures implemented within the frameworks of the organization, including programs for development of economic co-operation and adoption of declarations, thereby contributing to enhancement of stability in the Black Sea region.

Currently, the possible instability in Southern Caucasus can have significant impact on region’s countries and their relations with European institutions, because it is considered as the region full of conflicts and it impedes the development of democracy and regional co-operation. Universal and common systems of stability, security, communication and economic co-operation are not well-established in the region of the Southern Caucasus at this stage. And because regional security and stability are mainly conditioned by actions of Southern Caucasus states, European Union is interested in the improvement of efforts aimed at the resolution of conflicts and enhancement of good neighborly relations.

In several strategic documents of European Neighborhood Policy, adopted in different periods, was repeatedly underlined the idea that "Frozen Conflict" endanger regional stability and security, threaten the protection of human rights and freedoms, by creating big opportunities for the increase of organized crime. Enhancement of stability and good neighborly relations in the region are guarantees of regional development and prosperity; and this approach is enshrined in the above-mentioned documents. In other words, in the line of priorities of countries in this region, security-related issues are of key importance.

Notably, the Republic of Armenia always speaks in favor of forming an atmosphere of co-operation in the region, developing security system and enhancing constructive relations with neighbor states, in favor of exclusively peaceful resolution of conflicts, vividly indicated in efforts of Armenia for providing security and enhancement of stability, defined in a number of documents.

For instance, according to the Action Plan of the European Neighborhood Policy between the Republic
of Armenia and European Commission, which is a legal result of individual agreement of European Commission with each country of the Southern Caucasus region, was signed on November 14, 2006 and in priority area 3.8 of the appendix approved by the mentioned Action Plan, the Republic of Armenia agreed to enhance efforts in the field of regional cooperation with the help of specific actions; out of them can be separated the following actions: 1) continue efforts, in co-operation with neighboring countries, to resolve regional and other related issues and to promote reconciliation; 2) enhance participation in regional co-operation initiatives in the Southern Caucasus; 3) strengthen Armenia’s participation in regional law enforcement co-operation initiatives in Southern Caucasus; 4) enhance bilateral and multilateral co-operation in the Black Sea region, including strengthened regional co-operation through continued engagement with the Black Sea Economic Co-operation Organization (BSEC), and between the Black Sea and Baltic Sea regions; 5) enlarge youth exchange and co-operation between the three Southern Caucasus countries, including particularly through EU funding programs and initiatives.

The mentioned actions are implemented within annual action plan approved by the President of Armenia. The plan stipulates Armenian Government responsibilities in the given field for the upcoming year and state responsible bodies. For the Republic of Armenia this plan performs substantial progress on a way of European integration, providing the ongoing constructive co-operation with EU with the aim to develop and enhance co-operation in different fields.

Meanwhile, priorities and goals, established by the European Neighborhood Policy Action Plan conform to goals, defined in the Armenian National Security Strategy Concept (hereinafter—the Concept). The Concept, designed to guide the main directions, challenges and priorities of internal and external security strategy, approved by the Decree of the President of the Republic of Armenia number PD-37-N, adopted on February 7, 2007. According to the point 1.1 of the Concept, the main components of political-military security of Armenia are the following: 1) bilateral relations with Russia, defense and military technical co-operation, strategic partnership between two states; 2) membership in Collective Security Treaty Organization; 3) bilateral military co-operation, in particular with USA and Greece; 4) co-operation with NATO; 5) involvement in security agencies of international security organizations, including Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, which provides open and transparent control over the armament.

Brief analyses of the mentioned components brings to the following conclusions.

The political-military co-operation between Russian Federation and Republic of Armenia is one of the the main pillars of Armenia’s security system.

For security of Armenia, these relations are of strategic importance, conditioned not only by Armenian-Russian traditional friendship, but also by the role of the Russian Federation in resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, strategic partnership, established between the parties with adoption of Russian-Armenian Treaty "On Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Aid between Armenia and Russia" and Declaration "On Strategic Co-operation between the Republic of Armenia and Russian Federation aimed to 21st century". From this point of view such strategic partnership can be described as a factor of stability and security protection in the region. The partnership was enhanced in 2013, when the 102nd Military Base, located in Gyumri, Armenia was strengthened by signing of the Armenian-Russian bilateral Agreement on the Development of Military and Technical Cooperation.

At the same time, Russian Federation actively participate in the process of peaceful resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, by initiating a number of meetings of presidents of two states in Moscow in three-party format within the frameworks of OSCE Minsk group for peaceful resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Taking into consideration the historical role of Russian Federation and its traditional leverage in the region, EU ignore the interests of Russian Federation in resolution of conflicts.

Armenia is a member to Collective Security Treaty, which gives real guarantees of security. Collective Security Treaty signed on May 15, 1992 and developed to separate organization in 2002, is one of the important components of Armenia’s security. Within the Collective Security Treaty Organization, Armenia carries out continuing efforts, primarily with the aim to provide implementation of responsibilities of states, pursuant to the Article 4, namely—the principle of collective defense, in case of threat of aggression or
act of aggression against Armenia, and in order to receive support from Collective Security Treaty Organization member states on issues set on agenda of international organizations, which of vital importance for the Republic of Armenia.

In the current system of international relations there are two influential collective powers – Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and NATO.

Armenia intends to intensify practical and political co-operation with NATO, not intending to join NATO. At the same time, it should be noted that the Republic of Armenia cooperates with the USA on non-proliferation of nuclear arms, peacekeeping actions and other issues, related to security and its enhancement. Meanwhile, as Co-chair of OSCE Minsk Group, the USA is fully engaged in efforts for Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution.

At the same time, Armenia effectively cooperates with NATO within Individual Partnership Action Plan, and intends to deepen the co-operation in order to draw closer to the Alliance, pursuant to the point 1.1 of the 1st section of the IPAP for 2011-2013. In the point 1.1 of the 1stsection of the Action Plan, for promoting regional stability and security in the Caucasus, the following measures are designed on state level:

1. work for peaceful settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, fully supportive of the efforts of the OSCE Minsk Group in this regard, and inform Partners about the developments;
2. create opportunities for initiation of dialogue on regional issues and settlement of dividing lines;
3. normalize the relations with Turkey, without preconditions.

In strategy of regional conflicts and particularly in providing the RA security, the normalization of Armenia-Turkey relations is also important; their absence has its negative impact on enhancement of regional stability. Armenia has no diplomatic relations with Turkey.

On the one hand, the problem is the opening of Armenia-Turkey border and establishment of normal relations, on the other hand, the blockade of Armenia by Turkey and Azerbaijan considerably impede the full implementation of regional initiatives and in some cases, the fact of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict endangers the implementation of energy and communication projects. The Republic of Armenia is in favor of opening of Armenia-Turkey border and establishment of diplomatic relations without preconditions, which was documented in 2009, when on August 31, 2009 was announced that Armenia and Turkey pre-sign Protocols "On Establishment of Diplomatic Relations" and "Development of mutual relations" between Armenia and Turkey. The Protocols were signed same year on October 10 in presence of heads of foreign departments of USA, EU, RF and Switzerland. In a result of severe opposition of Azerbaijan to the Protocols, the contradictions were even deepened and Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan declared that opening of border with Armenia depends on resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Up to date, Armenia-Turkey Protocols have not yet been ratified by Turkey. Turkey continues to lay certain preconditions on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and continues its policy of denial of the Armenian Genocide. It is obvious that Turkey pursues double-standard policy, by implementing steps, directed to regulation of Armenia-Turkey relations, on the one hand, and keeping Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on agenda as the main precondition for opening the border, on the other hand. It is in contradiction to the principle of "negotiations without preconditions", therefore under such circumstances, the President of the Republic of Armenia stated that Armenia suspends the Protocols ratification process.

It should be, obviously, mentioned that opening of Armenia-Turkey border and regulation of Armenia-Turkey relations can become a new way for regional cooperation on security and stability issues and will substantially contribute to enhancement of stability and security in the Black Sea region.

The above-mentioned idea was stipulated in the Concept, where in the point 2.1 of the 2nd section is said that Armenia-Turkey unresolved relations, particularly the existence of close border, creates threats for national security of Armenia and stand on the way of sustainable development of Armenia. Non-regulated relations have direct negative influence on enhancement of stability in the region and development of regional co-operation. In a result of regulation of relations, the threats of developing dividing lines will be decreased, and there will be created conducive conditions for final resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Armenia and Azerbaijan have no diplomatic relations, because of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, since Azerbaijan continually refuses to find ways of co-operation with Armenia within regional programs.
The relations of Armenia with Iran are important due to the fact that Iran pursues a balanced approach to resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

On February 7, 2007, by Tbilisi Declaration between Georgia, Turkey and Azerbaijan, was seemingly declared not only energy but also strategic co-operation between the signing states, and developments in this field can have significant influence on national security of Armenia. Nevertheless, Armenia and Georgia continue to develop good neighborly relations in all spheres which in its turn has positive impact on overall regional stability.

In conclusion, we can mention that security of the Black Sea region is a security environment, formed in a result of engagement of different states and international organizations, and can be provided by co-operation of all interested powers and, in particular, on a level of law-enforcement agencies. In the 21st century the fight against such trans-border crimes as terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, money laundering, trafficking in human beings and others cannot be effectively implemented without co-operation of competent agencies of neighbor states. Conflicts existing in region should not impede the enhancement of co-operation. In general, co-operation can contribute to resolution of conflicts. The EU role in enhancement of security and stability in the region will be strengthened, if resolution of conflicts will be stipulated as commitments of the parties. Otherwise, EU will not be able fully implement security strategy in the region, which will result in weakening of trust to EU, if compared to that of the USA and Russia. Though EU is not directly engaged in negotiation process on resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, EU can have serious role in Confidence building measures in the area of conflict, there by creating conducive conditions for the progress of negotiation process and peace building. In its conclusions of the Council of European Union, adopted on February 27, 2012, the European Union called for "providing unconditional access for representatives of the EU to Nagorno-Karabakh". For that purpose, Special Representative of EU to Southern Caucasus should not yield pressures from one of the conflict parties and should, certainly, pay visits not only to Armenia and Azerbaijan, but also to Nagorno-Karabakh, because without participation of Nagorno-Karabakh, it is impossible to carry out Confidence building measures or, in future, provide implementation of possibly signed peace agreement.

In conclusion Armenia speaks in favor of exclusively peaceful resolution of conflicts – by means of dialogue and integration, in line with norms and principles of international law, and which is enshrined in a number of above-mentioned legal documents. The following main measures should be in the axis of Armenia's strategy on security and stability, aimed at the enhancement of regional stability, development and strengthening of bilateral and multilateral co-operation: normalization of relations with Turkey, resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, establishment of relations with Azerbaijan, further development of good neighborly relations with Georgia and Iran, implementation of several co-operation programs.

It is appropriate to underline the provision of the Concept, according to which Armenia declares that regional and border co-operation, as means of creation and improvement of mutual trust, can have significant positive role. Armenia will continue to take efforts for establishment of atmosphere of mutual trust and with that aim will enhance co-operation, contacts and mutual visits on different levels.

ENDNOTES

1. Notably, through the two Black Sea straits Bosphorus and Dardanelles passes the majority of regional transport routes, which enhances the economic and political importance of Black Sea Basin. Through this region pass West-East energetic (oil, gas) important sub-structures, which provide European states with energetic resources.
2. Permanent representation of Armenia to BSEC was established in August 2001.
Armenia–NATO: new partnership based on cooperative security enhancement

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"Enhancing Cooperative Security: The Added Value of NATO New Partnership Policy"
Co-organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia and NATO International Staff, 5-6 November 2012, Yerevan

Starting from early 1990s NATO has taken out a policy towards partners resorting to the concept of cooperative security. This looking-forward strategy proposed under the banner of Partnership for Peace Program at the period of the time characterized with the high level uncertainties because of demise of the bipolar system of the global balance of power proved to be rather productive of tackling the problems jeopardizing international peace and security. The achievements reached during the past two decades attested to the efficiency of the cooperative security concept, which has been further confirmed in the NATO’s new 2010 Strategic Concept and the decisions taken at the Lisbon and Chicago Summits.1

Armenia’s partnership with NATO within the framework of cooperative security goes back to 2002, when the country joined the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) thus getting the opportunity to have its own contribution to multinational training, exercises and operations under the auspices of the Alliance. One of the prioritized directions of Armenia – NATO cooperation became establishing and developing Armenian peacekeeping brigade focusing on reaching interoperability with the NATO partners for using its advantages for advancing Armenian Armed Forces’ own internal experience, as well as for cooperative security practice within the NATO led international peacekeeping missions. Since 2004 Armenia has been engaged in NATO-led peacekeeping Kosovo Force (KFOR) that furthered the relations between the parties.

Armenia’s peacekeepers participation in the US-led Coalition in Iraq in 2005-2008 should also be mentioned as a vivid manifestation of experience gaining and contributing into the Armenian Armed Forces’ lessons learned from those cooperative security partnership in the field. Since 2009 Armenia has
been contributing armed forces to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. As a unique Armenia-US military cooperation format can be considered also the establishment of the Center for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise under a treaty signed between the Armenian Ministry of Defense and the US Defense Department and Kansas National Guard – Armenian MOD’s partner from the fraternal US state.

Currently Armenia continues to advance further peacekeeping brigade’s skills by using NATO innovated standards and intends to evaluate the units of this brigade in the framework of the Operational Capabilities Concept thus making them more effective interoperability and capability of contributing to NATO-led peacekeeping operations.2

Within the scope of the NATO IPAP the process of the civilian personnel introduction to the Armenian Ministry of Defence was also launched aimed at strengthening the democratic civilian control over the Armed forces3 by redistributing the power between Ministry of Defense and General Staff, as well as with introducing the special civil service within Ministry of Defense. The participation of Armenia in Partnership Action Plan on Defense Institution Building initiative reinforces these efforts thus increasing the level of compatibility on values and principles between the parties, thereby providing Armenia with more opportunities for enhancing the dialogue in the spirit of cooperative security.

Within the framework of IPAP the process of elaborating the defense security documents of strategic calibre such as the Armenian National Security Strategy and Military Doctrine was initiated. An interagency committee within the Armenian INSS was formed for drafting the Armenian NSS based on the methodological support acquired from US NDU and NATO led international security advisory group comprising experts from seven NATO member states.4

Within the scope of IPAP, NATO PfP International Security Advisory Group assisted in launching the first Strategic Defense Review of Armenia. The Ministry of Defense completed its Strategic Defence Review (SDR) based on its Strategic Documents while continuing to improve its defence planning and budgeting system and the development of the Peacekeeping Brigade.5

Another critical element for boosting the compatibility and interoperability between the parties has been and now is the improvement of Professional Military Education system in Armenia.

An important landmark in this process was the signing of the first Armenia-NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) in 2005.6 In accordance with the first IPAP NATO experts in military education were engaged in the process of elaborating the defense education system reforms focused on faculty building. This process is being implemented within the framework of Defense Education Enhancement Program (DEEP) established by NATO PfP Consortium Working Group.7 It should be noted that PIP Consortium’s DEEP became a unique innovative tool for modernizing Armenia’s defense educational system by making it more compatible with the most innovative and advanced educational models and technologies of the world.

The main aspect of NATO supported PME reforms is the development of new education and training programs for all levels of PME starting from NCO preparation courses, command and chief officers courses as well as the programs aiming to craft a new generation of strategic calibre elite. One of the substantial pillars in these reforms is the transformation of the Armenian institute for National Strategic Studies into US-model-based National Defense University with interagency graduate and postgraduate education as well as executive education programs. Our NATO Partnership Forum’s podium is the right place to thank our estimable academic consultants from the US National Defense University, the Harvard National Security Program as well as other NATO Countries assisted us under the auspices of Marshall Center resided NATO PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Institutes for Security Studies.

The reformation of the Armenian defense education system is not an end in itself but aimed at cultivating a fundamentally new proactive security thinking built on the smart power oriented interagency defense security approach thus combining the sophisticated use of hard and soft powers in dealing with the innovative education and training of the upcoming generations of strategic calibre policy-making and defense security decision making.

Taking into account the history of productive cooperation with NATO on the one hand and NATO’s resolve to deepen the cooperation with the partners based on cooperative security approach on the other,
Armenia is determined to be actively engaged in securing the international peace and stability more broadly, as most of its goals and aspirations fully fit in with the values the Alliance shares and the strategic objectives enumerated in the 2010 Strategic Concept.

Armenia appears to be in a unique position combining the knowledge and experience gained both from NATO-led peacekeeping operations and the CSTO drills within the framework of the Collective Rapid Reaction Forces and has a solid willingness to become a bridge for sharing experience with the members of the two respected organizations. For instance, the developments in Afghanistan and particularly NATO’s decision to terminate its combat operations in the country by 2014, make salient the importance of consultations on the NATO-CSTO cooperation in post-2014 Afghanistan – after the withdrawal of the NATO Coalition Forces. Both NATO and the CSTO are interested in neutralizing the possible threats coming from Afghanistan8 and in this context the Armenian experience can serve as a good basis for fertilizing the ground for launching the NATO-CSTO cooperation mechanisms focused on the uncertainties and difficulties associated with the upcoming withdrawal from Afghanistan.

One of the additional platforms for sharing the Armenian peacekeeping experience can be the involvement of the Armenian peacekeeping battalion in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. This force includes not only some NATO members, but also CSTO members – Russia and Belarus. In my point of view, the recent agreement signed by the Minister of Defense of Armenia and Italy could facilitate the advancement in this new possible area of cooperative security led at the current period of time by the Italian Command.

One of the main pillars of NATO policy is the contribution to the regional peace and stability, which has been clearly formulated in the 2010 Strategic concept.9 Armenia is welcoming the prioritization by NATO the peaceful resolution of the Karabakh conflict under the Co-Chairmanship of the OSCE Minsk Group. Armenia strongly shares that approach based on the fundamental principles of international law and supported by the Heads of the States of French Republic, Russian Federation and the United States of America. But the arms race unleashed by Azerbaijan, the bellicose rhetoric of its leadership, as well as the blockade of Armenia by Azerbaijan and Turkey endanger not only the security of Armenia but also the stability and security of the entire region.

Armenia-NATO partnership has been developed dynamically fostering country’s defense and security capabilities. Based on its achievements and experience gained during the years of fruitful security cooperation with NATO partners and the CSTO allies, Armenia during these years of productive partnership for peace has made the irrevocable strategic-calibre decision to innovate uninterruptedly its smart power compatibility and practical interoperability with its NATO partners and allies to enhance its capacity of a cooperative security provider country sharing commitment of international community for maintaining the Global Peace and Security.

ENDNOTES

2. INDIVIDUAL PARTNERSHIP ACTION PLAN 2011-2013: http://www.mfa.am/en/international-organizations/NATO/
3. NATO’s relations with Armenia: http://www.NATO.int/cps/en/NATOlive/topics_48893.htm
9. NATO Unclassified: Active engagement in cooperative security: a more efficient and flexible partnership policy. Annex to PO(2011)0124
Azerbaijan is playing a growing strategic role, as confirmed by the 2013 Azerbaijan-agreement to build the Trans-Anatolian gas Pipeline (TANAP) to the Turkish – Bulgarian border and from there connect to the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) that goes through Greece to the Western Balkans and eventually to Italy. The TANAP-TAP program is the first and only genuine alternative to the Moscow-backed South Stream pipeline. In combination with the AGRI (Azerbaijan-Georgia-Romania Interconnector), Azerbaijan now has two instruments by which to become seriously engaged in European gas trade, and moreover recently suggested transit of Iraqi gas through these pipelines.

**BACKGROUND**

For several years few took Azerbaijan’s strategic capabilities seriously and the country was thought of in the U.S. largely as a stopover on the road to Afghanistan. However, these new moves underscore the vision behind Azerbaijan’s energy policies and the possibilities offered by those policies, without directly confronting Moscow and Gazprom, to find alternative ways of providing Europe with energy. Azerbaijan profits thereby and gains considerable status as an investor in Balkan security and stability.

Similarly for years there was virtually no movement by the U.S. on the "frozen conflict" over Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia. Yet, Azerbaijan’s press reports that Ambassador Morningstar has become increasingly active in working to find a political solution to this conflict and the U.S. Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, Ambassador James Warlick, has also called for full scale talks, apparently including the "government" of Nagorno-Karabakh in these talks.

All these moves signify a dawning realization abroad that Azerbaijan has now attained significant and influential capabilities in its own neighborhood as an investor and energy supplier. Moreover, foreign governments now see that they stand to benefit, not least economically, from an expansion of ties with Azerbaijan. From a U.S. standpoint, heightened ties to Baku not only make it harder for Russia to dominate the Caucasus and energy flow to Europe, or Russian machinations in the Middle East, they also provide a basis for moving forward on conflict resolution regarding Nagorno-Karabakh.

And should the negotiations with Iran progress to a mutually acceptable agreement, we could see an easing of Iranian-Azerbaijani tensions, a potential end to the disputes preventing the realization of the Caspian Sea’s legal demarcation, and even Iran’s entry into the Southern Gas.
Corridor, possibly through the TANAP-TAP connection or through AGRI.

**IMPLICATIONS**

As demonstrated by the Ukrainian and Middle East crises, the status quo is ultimately not tenable across much of Eurasia without significant reforms. Russia’s efforts to reinvigorate a new kind of neo-imperial policy have already proven to be beyond its objective capabilities though Moscow may not yet be reconciled to that fact. Likewise, new players are making their own regional moves. Turkey has done so for several years and now, albeit on a smaller scale, Azerbaijan is following suit.

Therefore it behooves the great powers to attempt to defuse points of conflict like Nagorno-Karabakh, Iran, and issues like Caspian demarcation. It also is equally important to continue to sustain Georgia economically and politically against ongoing Russian threats and pressure. Azerbaijan will not directly confront Moscow but it will pursue its own interests that cut against Russian imperial designs in the Caucasus and the Balkans if not the Middle East. And it clearly wants to be in the West.

Progress on resolving all the disputed issues discussed here is very much in the West’s collective interest, for the U.S., Europe, as well as for Azerbaijan. The U.S. and Europe should therefore welcome these initiatives and keep them going even if they encounter resistance. Only by displaying sufficient attention to resolving these problems can we enhance regional security and stability in the Balkans and the Levant even if doing so takes several years. Failure to seize the moment in these zones leads to outcomes resembling that of Ukraine, where failure to adjust to reality and to the superior attractiveness of the European choice has led to an unnecessarily bitter, protracted, and ultimately violent crisis whose end is only beginning to come into sight. Supporting Azerbaijani initiatives and conflict resolution is therefore strategically justified on several grounds even if we should not lose sight of the problems along the path.

Yet, if the West acquiesces in the detaching of Crimea from Ukraine, then this analysis will be vitiated as nobody will be able to trust Western support in the future.

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Prior to this appointment Dr. Blank was Associate Professor for Soviet Studies at the Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education of Air University at Maxwell AFB. He also held the position of 1980-86: Assistant Professor of Russian History, University of Texas, San Antonio, 1980-86, and Visiting Assistant Professor of Russian history, University of California, Riverside, 1979-80.

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guarantees or assurances. Russia has demonstrated that not only does it regard treaties as a mere scrap of paper and that the integrity and sovereignty of its neighbors is merely a contingent factor, it also has proven other gravely disturbing consequences. The invasion of Crimea confirms that for Putin and his entourage, their state cannot survive other than as an empire entailing the diminished sovereignty of all of its post-Soviet neighbors and also – and this is crucial – the former members of the Warsaw Pact.

It is equally clear that unless the West, acting under U.S. leadership and through institutions like the EU and NATO, resist Russia forcefully (this does not mean using force preemptively but does mean displaying credible deterrence) the gains of the last 25 years regarding European security will have been lost and we will return to the bipolar confrontation that was the primary cause of the Cold War.

Moscow cannot induce consent except through force, it commands no legitimate authority beyond its borders, it cannot sustain an empire economically, and most importantly, the peoples it targets neither want a Russian empire nor will they accept it. For the U.S. whose main concern has hitherto been democracy and Azerbaijan whose main concern is security, the opportunity for a rewarding strategic dialogue and process is clearly within reach. But unless the U.S. and Europe stand up to Russia in Ukraine, this opportunity will be lost and Azerbaijan will, like other post-Soviet states, realize that it is essentially alone vis-à-vis Russia.

CONCLUSIONS

The strategic consequences of that outcome should be obvious. For both sides to draw maximum benefit from their relations, both sides must listen to the other side’s concerns and move to respond to them. This means that Baku must take the lesson of Ukraine to heart and reform while it can. The growing unwillingness to reform can only harden internal socio-political and economic divisions, making it harder for Azerbaijan to realize its positive strategic vision and ultimately leaving it vulnerable to attacks from adversarial forces. For the U.S. and the EU, this means a vigorous effort not only to bring about the full realization of the Southern Gas Corridor but to facilitate conflict resolution in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Only if both sides take account of the other’s primary concern can they truly maximize the achievements that are possible in energy, conflict resolution, and the resolution of disputed questions that could still become a source of future conflict. Everything that contributes to growth, development, peace, security, and democracy from Vienna East is essentially in the interests of the U.S., the EU, and Azerbaijan. Moreover, a stronger Azerbaijan adds to the West’s ability to ensure security in all of its multiple forms: economic, political, energy, etc. and peace throughout this expanse. This is not a call for a sweeping geostrategic vision but for practical progress on multiple lines in diverse regions to ensure security by states who have a growing common interest and growing capability to do so.

One cannot say if and when we and Azerbaijan will get another opportunity to make progress on these issues that benefit even states like Armenia who suffers from the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Undoubtedly, there will be resistance from parties with interests opposed to such progress, but the West clearly has overwhelming resources if it can find the will to bring them to bear. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan is showing that will and is at the same time maximizing and expanding its capabilities to realize a more positive vision for Eurasia. Failure to seize the opportunity that now lies before us would be an unconscionable mistake that will not be corrected for years and could lead to more unnecessary strife rather than to more security, prosperity, and peace.
New format of cooperation with NATO for protection of critical energy infrastructure in Azerbaijan

ABSTRACT
Following its independence from the Soviet Union, in 1990s Azerbaijan started to implement an independent oil and gas strategy, which led to an extraordinary amount of international investment flowing into the oil and gas sector. As a result of those investments and close cooperation with international oil companies Azerbaijan managed to build up sound energy infrastructure. In parallel, significant oil and gas transit infrastructure has been developed in Georgia. Today, Azerbaijan-Georgia energy corridor, with its best in class energy infrastructure, is critical not only for countries itself and the South Caucasus and Caspian regions, but also for the Europe, where the majority of the final consumers are. Therefore, assuring the security of that energy infrastructure becomes even more important.

Of course, the protection of critical energy infrastructure is responsibility of host countries and Azerbaijan is doing its best for the neutralization of current security threats. However, raising security relations with NATO to a higher level can positively influence the security of critical energy infrastructure in the South Caucasus. The proposed "Article 4.5" format can be agreed between NATO and partner countries in South Caucasus (Azerbaijan and Georgia) to reach that higher level of security relations. This article analyzes possible positive implications of that new format for protection of existing energy infrastructure in Azerbaijan, which are critical for energy supply to Europe.

INTRODUCTION
Azerbaijan is one of the world’s oldest oil producers and Baku, its capital, has long been known as historic site for oil. The first oil well in the world was drilled in Baku in 1847 at Bibiheybat oil field under the direction and initiation of Russian engineer Semenov using a primitive percussion drilling mechanism. It was not until eleven years later that the first oil well in America was drilled in Pennsylvania (Ciarreta A., Nasirov Sh., 2010). Oil turned Baku into a center of world oil commerce and enabled it to exert an incredible influence on the entire Caucasian economic development. In 1897-1907, the largest pipeline in the world at that time was built from Baku to Batumi on the Black Sea Coast, a distance of 883 kilometres (Aliyev N., 1994, 22-27).

Throughout 20th century, oil has been used as a leading mechanism in Azerbaijan’s political and economic life. At the beginning of the 20th century, in 1900, Azerbaijan produced more than 50% of world’s oil (11.4 million tons). About 80% of oil production during World War II in former USSR was made in Baku (peak production – 23.5 million tons in 1941). However, oil production subsequently declined sharply starting from 1950s.

Following its independence from the Soviet Union, in 1990s Azerbaijan started to implement an independent oil and gas strategy, which led to an extraordinary amount of...
international investment flowing into the oil and gas sector. As a result of those investments and close cooperation with international oil companies Azerbaijan managed to build up sound energy infrastructure.

Today, Azerbaijan becomes very important part of Southern Corridor. Best in class energy infrastructure are critical not only for country itself and the South Caucasus and Caspian regions, but also for the Europe, where the majority of the final consumers are.

**CRITICAL ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE IN AZERBAIJAN**

The major elements of critical energy infrastructure of the region are located in Azerbaijan.

The largest oilfield in the Azerbaijan sector of the Caspian Sea is Azeri-Chirag-Deepwater Gunashli oilfield (ACG). Production started in 1997. In 2013 production from ACG was (over 239 million barrels (an average of 655,570 barrels per day). In addition, about 6 billion standard cubic metres of associated gas was also produced in 2013. In total, ACG produced 2.3 billion barrels of oil from 1997 to end 2013 (BP in Azerbaijan Sustainability Report, 2014, 11).

The **Shah Deniz** gas field (SD), the largest gas field in Azerbaijan, was discovered in 1999. SD is geologically challenging and highly pressured. It has a reservoir thickness of more than 1,000 metres and is 22km long. The field lies beneath water depths ranging from 50-600 metres. Production began in 2006. In 2013, SD produced about 9.83 billion standard cubic metres of gas and around 19.6 million barrels of condensate from four wells. Since the start of SD production in late 2006 till the end of 2013, about 47.3 billion standard cubic metres of gas, and 99.5 million barrels of condensate was exported to the markets (BP in Azerbaijan Sustainability Report, 2014, 11).

On December 17th, 2013 the final investment decision was made for further development of the SD and expansion of South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) through Azerbaijan and Georgia with total expected cost around 28 billion USD. This decision triggers plans to construct the Trans Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP) across Turkey and to construct the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) across Greece, Albania and into Italy. Together these projects, as well as gas transmission infrastructure to Bulgaria, will create a new Southern Gas Corridor to Europe. Additional 16 billion cubic metres per year of gas produced from SD will be carried some 3,500 km to provide energy for millions of consumers in Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, Italy and countries in Europe. First gas is targeted for late 2018, first deliveries to Europe will follow in 2019 (Shah Deniz Final Investment Decision Paves Way for Southern Corridor Gas Link with Europe, BP Press Release, 17 December 2013). Those huge projects will be implemented by 11 companies representing 10 countries and together represent one of the largest and most complex endeavours yet undertaken by the global oil and gas industry.

Both ACG and SD are connected with offshore and onshore pipeline systems to the Sangachal Terminal, one of the biggest terminals in the world. Sangachal Terminal is a hub where offshore oil and gas is processed prior to export. The terminal includes oil and gas processing facilities. Processing capacity of the terminal is 1.1 million barrels of oil per day and 36.8 million standard cubic metres of gas per day. Maximum storage capacity is about 4 million barrels, with working storage capacity of about 3.2 million barrels of oil. It is designed to treat production from all assets in the Caspian basin and has room for expansion. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the South Caucasus gas pipeline and the Western Route Export oil pipeline are starting here. In 2013, the terminal exported about 286.2 million barrels of oil. On average about 26.6 million standard cubic metres of SD gas was exported from the terminal daily in 2013 (BP in Azerbaijan Sustainability Report, 2014, 11).

**BIOGRAPHY**

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Mr. Bakhtiyar Aslanbayli is a Lecturer of the Baku State University. His main areas of expertise are the security, energy politics and fiscal aspects of the energy projects. He has spoken at numerous institutions, universities, think-tanks and is frequent speaker at international conferences. In 2001 he was winner of the Scientific Competition on Oil and Gas Researches conducted by the Ministry of Education and National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan. In 2009 he was honored with special Emanuel Nobel Memorial Medal by Baku Nobel Heritage Fund for implementation of World Energy Politics discipline at Baku State University and researches on contemporary energy politics. Mr. Aslanbayli is the author of one book and more than 50 professional articles and commentaries. He holds BA and MA in International Relations from the Baku State University and is currently PhD researcher at the Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences.
In addition to ACG and SD fields, the critical energy infrastructure of Azerbaijan also includes few onshore oil fields with relatively less production, as well as 2 offshore gas fields (Umid and Absheron) with proved significant gas reserves, but still at pre-exploration phase. Another significant element of the energy infrastructure is existing pipeline system to export oil and gas reserves of the Caspian Sea to the international markets.

The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline (1,768km) carries oil from ACG and condensate from SD across Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. In addition, crude oil from Turkmenistan is transported via the link. Starting October 2013, the pipeline resumed transportation of crude oil from Tengiz field in Kazakhstan. The BTC pipeline connects Sangachal Terminal on the shores of the Caspian Sea to Ceyhan marine terminal on the Turkish Mediterranean coast. By the end of 2013, 2,390 tankers had been loaded at Ceyhan since the opening of the BTC pipeline in June 2006. During this period around 1,835 million barrels of crude oil had been moved to world markets. The transport capacity of the pipeline is 1.2 million barrels per day (BP in Azerbaijan Sustainability Report, 2014, 9).

SCP has been operational since late-2006 and delivers gas from Sangachal terminal to the Georgia-Turkey border. During 2013, SCP’s daily average throughput was 13.4 million cubic metres of gas or about 81,600 barrels of oil equivalent per day (BP in Azerbaijan Sustainability Report, 2014, 9).

**POTENTIAL THREAT TO CRITICAL ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE REGION**

With above mentioned energy infrastructure and growing energy potential, Azerbaijan is playing increasingly significant role in energy supply to the Euro-Atlantic region. Today Azerbaijan produces 1.1% of global oil (BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2014, 9). These oil volumes are transported via Azerbaijan and Georgia to the Mediterranean cost of Turkey and onwards to the international markets. Any potential attack to any part of the infrastructure (either to the oil platforms, or terminal, or any part of the pipeline in one of mentioned 3 countries) may result in lack of oil supply to the markets in the capacity of 1.1% of the global production for uncertain period (subject to the scale of potential damage). It can only be guessed how the oil price would react to this shortage.

The situation around natural gas supply from the Caspian brings even more attention to the region. The above mentioned energy infrastructure will be increased due to the start of SD Full Field Development (or SD Stage 2). This is one of the largest gas development projects in the world. Plans for the project include 2 new offshore platforms, 26 subsea wells to be drilled with 2 semi-submersible rigs, 500km of subsea pipelines built at up to 550m water depth, additional export capacity in Azerbaijan and Georgia and expansion of the Sangachal Terminal (BP in Azerbaijan Sustainability Report, 2014, 9). All of this will increase gas supply and energy security in European markets through the opening of the new Southern Gas Corridor. The project is expected to add a further 16 billion standard cubic metres per year of gas production to the approximately 9 billion standard cubic metres per year from SD Stage 1.

Observers generally agree that the threat of a terrorist attack targeting energy infrastructure is the real one. Energy infrastructures are an attractive target for terrorists. Several groups have already indicated their intention and demonstrated their capability to conduct such attacks. Some major terrorist figures have clearly expressed their intention to strike global energy markets.

- In an audio message from December 2004, the Al Qaeda leader had explicitly called for attacks in the Gulf region and in the Caspian Sea (NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2008).
- In Turkey, the PKK terrorist group has also stated its intention to target economic interests, and has claimed responsibility for several incidents involving energy infrastructure. In August 2008 there was an explosion at a valve station on the Turkish portion of the BTC pipeline, which forced the pipeline to be shut down for over two weeks. Although the doubts about the PKK’s involvement in this incident were high, the Turkish authorities have refused the terrorist nature of this incident. Nevertheless, the potential threat of PKK terrorism cannot be totally excluded, and raises the issue of the increased level of protection of the BTC pipeline. This is a major export pipeline to transport Azerbaijan oil (and possibly some part of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan oil as well in foreseeable future) to the European market.

The attractiveness of the energy infrastructure to terrorists is a result of specific characteristics – interdependence of the entire infrastructure, dependence of other vital services and sectors on energy, dependence of Western economies on energy infrastructure located outside of Euro-Atlantic region. Even though an attack on a major energy infrastructure might not necessarily cause many victims, the economic cost and disruption are likely to be enormous. In fact its impact can be amplified several times disrupting the targeted infrastructure; having a cascading effect on other energy infrastructures downstream as well as on other sectors of the economy; having a psychological
impact upon and being amplified by the media; and potentially causing an overreaction of financial markets (NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2008).

In addition to above mentioned threats from terrorist groups, there are also threats of another nature, arising from geopolitical situation in the region.

During the period of tense relations between the USA and Iran, different officials in Iran announced the energy interests of Western countries in Azerbaijan as a main target in case of military intervention to Iran.

Another neighbouring country, Armenia, which occupied some part of Azerbaijan for more than 20 years now, remains a member of the CSTO security system with hard security guaranties by Russia. In October 2012, Armenian army had military exercises practicing the scenario of attacking Azerbaijan’s oil facilities in case of a war. In particular, the simulation modelled several strikes on oil and gas infrastructures, energy carriers that would affect the economy (Kucera J., 2012).

Unfortunately, the terror attacks are not the only potential threat to the critical energy infrastructure in Azerbaijan:

- The complicated geopolitical situation in the region;
- Often sounding security threats from the neighbouring countries such as Iran, Armenia and Russia;
- Lack of membership in Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), but declaring integration to Europe and Euro Atlantic structures as one of the main directions of the national security;
- Existence of critical energy infrastructure in its territory, which is of vital importance for energy supply not only for Azerbaijan, but also for many European countries, including NATO member states; and
- Many other political factors make Azerbaijan’s energy infrastructure a potential target for some countries.

Any military action in the region would have an impact on production of energy resources, as well as on their export routes, as it was during Russia-Georgia war in August 2008, when all export pipelines in the territory of Georgia were shut down. This led to decrease of oil production in Azerbaijan, as the transit capacity via Georgia was not available. This led to decrease of oil production in Azerbaijan, as the transit capacity via Georgia was not available. Therefore, from energy supply security point of view, it is also in the interest of energy consumer countries in Euro-Atlantic region to decrease the possibility of potential military actions and potential terrorist attacks to the minimum level.

**NATO AND ENERGY SECURITY**

Energy security has become a matter of growing concern in Europe in recent years. Most states in the Euro-Atlantic region are far from full energy independence, and rely on resources located abroad, often in unstable regions. They are therefore dependent on a series of external developments, some of which have recently indicated worrying trends: evolution of the global energy market, a political use of energy resources by supplier states and a growing threat of terrorist attacks on energy infrastructures, the effects of which would be felt worldwide.

NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept stated that Alliance’s security interest could be affected by the interruption of the critical resources. But this recognition was not translated into concrete measures until 2006. At the Riga Summit in 2006, allied governments have also tasked NATO to consider its potential role in enhancing energy security collectively. The outcome of this reflection was examined at NATO’s Bucharest Summit in April 2008, where Heads of State and Government agreed on a number of principles and fields for NATO’s role in energy security. NATO’s strategic concept of 2010 highlights the importance of such objects, as well as transportation and transit routes for energy security, the need for their protection against attacks and other disruptions. This shows that NATO sees energy security not only as security of supply, but as stable operations of logistics, transmission, computer management systems ensuring undisrupted supply of necessary energy resources to the Alliance troops.

It is mentioned in the Strategic Concept that increasing energy needs will further shape the future security environment in areas of concern to NATO and have the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operation (NATO Strategic Concept, article 15). Furthermore, referencing to the need of having the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of its population, NATO considers developing the capacity to contribute to energy security, including protection of critical energy infrastructure and transit areas and lines, cooperation with partners, and consultations among Allies on the basis of strategic assessments and contingency planning (NATO Strategic Concept, article 19).

One of the major threats in NATO terms is disruption of energy supply chain by terrorist attacks and other modes of aggressive actions. The energy supply chain is formed by wide range of the infrastructure, starting from the ones for drilling, production and storage, till the ones for transportation and supply. When protecting the infrastructure, the Alliance primarily attempts to identify vulnerabilities, thus reducing the possibility for attack against critical objects to the minimum.

It must be noted that creation of response measures to help restoring supply of energy disrupted by accidents, natural disasters or politically motivated decisions is not yet under NATO’s agenda. Nonetheless, the Alliance can re-
Increased level of NATO-Azerbaijan relations from cooperation within the PfP program to the execution of Individual Security (Partnership) Agreement would be in the mutual interest of the parties, as well as in the interest of energy consumers in Euro-Atlantic region.

Of course, Azerbaijan’s current geopolitical position, military potential, active foreign policy in the region serves as a strong background for the neutralization of current security threats. But raising security relations (security guaranty) with NATO to higher level can positively influence the security situation of the country. Then the question would be—how those relations could be developed in addition to the PfP program?

It is well known that the corner stone of NATO’s activities, the principle of collective defence from the armed attack stipulated by Article 5 of North Atlantic Treaty, applies to the member countries only—“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” (NATO Handbook, 2006, 372). Obviously, realization of the security guarantee in the format of the Article 5 is not realistic for both sides.

Relations with partner countries are regulated mainly within the framework stipulated under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty — “The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.” (NATO Handbook, 2006, 372). But “consultations” meant in the Article 4 may not be sufficient for the neutralization of existing security threats in decisive moments.

For this reason, in my opinion, we are in need of the new “Article 4.” format. This format can be agreed in the midst of existing format between NATO member countries (“an attack against one state shall be considered an attack against all”) and “consultation” format between NATO and partner countries. The new format could be realized by signing an Individual Security (Partnership) Agreement between Azerbaijan and NATO.

Of course, protection of critical energy infrastructure inside a country is primarily the responsibility of the national governments. Each country faces its specific threats and must make its own decisions on neutralization of such threats as a part of national security strategy. However, in our days, energy supply map is very international. Protection of critical energy infrastructure goes beyond the borders of a country and a region. In other words, protection of energy infrastructure is not the issue of national security of a single country anymore, especially if that infrastructure serves to provide energy to millions beyond that country and region. Each element of the infrastructure is crucial; therefore, despite international differences and differing priorities, both national and common Alliance-level strategies are required to ensure security of the objects of energy production and supply in Azerbaijan.

With signing of such agreement Azerbaijan can gain additional guaranties vital for protection of their critical energy infrastructure, NATO member countries can declare their interests in the security of critical energy infrastructure in the region, which are of vital importance for their energy supply, also NATO can seriously restore its weakening positions in the South Caucasus.

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Military doctrine and defence planning

Amidst the current discussions and deliberations within the Hellenic Ministry of National Defence for the preparation of a new Policy of National Defence, the HDMB presents an overview of those principles necessary to be taken into consideration and highlights the important steps of this very important process.

THE NATURE OF DOCTRINE

In an attempt to underline a military doctrine's significance for the Armed Forces as a part of the nation's Security/Defence Policy and Military Strategy we consider useful analyzing what doctrine really is, especially the military doctrine, its role and influences on a nation's grand strategy.

Doctrine provides a common frame of reference across the military. It helps standardize operations and facilitates readiness by establishing common ways of accomplishing military tasks. Doctrine links theory, history, experimentation and practice. Its objective is to foster initiative and creative thinking. It provides the military with an authoritative body of statements on how military forces conduct operations and provides a common lexicon for use by military planners and leaders. Also, it is defined as 'what is taught; a body of instruction'. It is though an overburdened term since doctrine has developed differently among nations. National doctrine is related to a complex process. This is true, despite the fact that national doctrine is congruent with doctrines of allied and friendly states (whenever possible). However, differences always exist. Military planners, strategists, military commanders and specialists on security issues must understand the nature and different development of doctrines. Also, doctrine is defined as 'fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of their objectives. Doctrine is authoritative but requires judgment in its application; it is dynamic and must be reviewed for relevance'.

NATO specifies the aim of doctrine as the outlining of a framework that helps understanding the plan approach and the fulfillment of military operations while it provides guidelines and explanatory assistance. Knowledge of the doctrine, its comprehension and applications allow people to think clearly in the fog, within the chaos and intensity of a crisis, conflict or war. It also provides a common approach based on methodic thought, which in turn is not based on imposing rules. Sir Julian Corbet describes it as 'a common vehicle for expression and a common plane of thought'. Its aim is to direct, explain and educate. Furthermore, it provides the basis for further study and informative discussion. In combination with effective education, a clear doctrine must lead to consistent behavior, mutual trust, understanding and effective common action which does not limit individual initiative. In AP3000, British Air Power Doctrine, we can find the following quote concerning doctrine made by Sir Michael Howard: 'I am tempted to declare that whatever doctrine the Armed Forces are working on, they have got it wrong.'
am also tempted to declare that it does not matter that
they have got it wrong. What does matter is their capacity
to get it right quickly when the moment arrives. It is the task
of military science in an age of peace to prevent the doc-
trine being too badly wrong'.

First and foremost, doctrine covers the strategic
and, to a certain extent, the operational level of military
planning, both in the event of conflict and peaceful
implementation of military strength. The main aim of
document in general, is to reap the greatest benefit from
the existing armed forces, while underscoring the
country's national policy.

Military doctrines are crucial elements of a national
security policy or grand strategy. Grand strategy can be
viewed as a civil-military chain of ends and means. It is the
theory of a state, regarding how to best guarantee its secu-
rity. A grand strategy must recognize possible threats against
the country and must devise political, military, economic
and other countermeasures for these threats. Priorities must
be placed among the threats, as well as among the counter-
measures. This is important because the number of threats
is great in a global environment characterized by anarchy.
Furthermore, recourses are limited within the national
economy. For this reason, the most appropriate military
means must be selected for the completion of any policy
objective. Of course, main strategies are never formulated in
an inflexible way. The analyst may allow himself to be
guided by this way of thought in his effort to conceive-cre-
ate a state's grand strategy, compare it to the strategies of
other countries and finally materialize it into a doctrine.

Military doctrine, according to The Soviet Dictionary
of Basic Military Terms is de fined as having two aspects:
social-political and military-technical. The social-political
side encompasses all questions concerning methodology,
economic and social bases, or the policy goals of war. It is
the defining and the more stable side. On the other hand, the military-technical side must accord with the
policy goals. It includes the creation of military structure,
the technical equipping of the armed forces, their train-
ing, definition of forms and means of conducting opera-
tions and war as a whole.

Military doctrine must never be dogmatic and must
not lead to unanimous and inflexible ways of thinking. It
represents an amalgam of collective and accepted advice
on the provision of military forces in times of war. The
different readings of history, the available means for
defence and the conclusions of past wars and conflicts
affect the formulation of doctrine. Such influences shape
the entire dogma. However, influences such as the devel-

opment of technology may have disproportional signifi-
cance in its creation and synthesis. Finally, when refer-
ing to the Armed Forces, each Service must explain the
demands of its operational environment (e.g. land, sea,
air, space and cyberspace).

Continuing the analysis, doctrine is not the exclusive
work of just military specialists, but rather the work of any-
one having professional, academic or social interest in the
use of military force. There is a special need, for the lower
military ranks to have access to an explanation and full
understanding of the strategic doctrinal framework, within
which they are called to practice their profession. This is
particularly important, for reasons of incentive, morale,
professional operational understanding and commitment.
The development of doctrine is a constant process. A doc-
trline is in a state of constant review and improvement. The
factors that influence doctrine and strengthen the strategy
may be depicted in a closed circle as seen in Fig. [1].

Doctrinal levels may differ between the land, sea and
air environment. Each one contains three components:
strategy, operations and tactics. These doctrinal levels may
be defined as follows:

• **Strategic Doctrine.** It contains the most basic
and enduring principles, which guide the use of
armed forces in military action. The Strategic doc-
trine is the foundation of all operational doctrines.
It defines the framework and the effective use of all
military means.

• **Operational Doctrine.** It enables the practice of
the principles of strategic doctrine in military opera-
tions. It describes the use of armed forces within the
framework of specific targets, power potential, gen-
eral types of operations and operational environ-
ments. The Operational doctrine provides the neces-
sary organization for the effective use of land, sea,
air and space capabilities. It deals with the changes and
effects on future operations. Advanced technology
may cause such effects.

• **Tactical Doctrine.** It enables the implementation
of the strategic and operational doctrine in military
activities. It describes the appropriate use of specific
weapon systems and other systems for the accom-
plishment of objective purposes. The tactical doc-
trine also deals with the performance of roles and
missions. **The most important factors influenc-
ing the doctrine are analyzed below:**

  * National Interest and National Military Objectives:
    What does the government want the armed forces
to achieve? Such objectives depend on the avail-
able defence capabilities and strategic objectives in case of conflict.

- The Declared Threat: The doctrine depends on the evaluation of the threat which friendly forces are called to confront. More specifically, a change in the intention or capabilities of a potential enemy could have a significant effect on the doctrine in use. Such a change could require the swift reevaluation and change of the doctrine.

- Policy/Policies: The desires of the government are steady for a society in which the armed forces are under democratic control. Changes in the political structures, security policies and more specifically the defence policy of a government may affect the entire doctrine.

- Experience: As emphasized before, historical lessons are a component in the formulation of the doctrine.

- Theory: The texts of strategists and the orieticians continue to affect the doctrine. For example, the study of the classic writings of Sun Tzu, Thucydides, Clausewitz, Corbet, Douhet, Jomini and Liddell Hart, Tukhachevsky, Sokolovsky remain useful in any conflict study. This does not mean however that one theory applies to all scenarios. History has proven that each conflict is different and offers different lessons for the future.

- Education/Training: The study of conflict and the future battlefield shapes better commanders both in conflict and in war. Anyone involved in com-

mand, the planning and execution of operations must continue this personal preparation.

Once the doctrine is formulated, it will have a constant influence and effect on the operations of all armed forces. However, it is important not to make changes for the sake of change during regular revision. The main principles, at the military-strategic level may change rarely. On the contrary, at the tactical level, the doctrine is influenced directly by current challenges, threats and capabilities and in coordination to the weaponry and the operational environment.

Above all, the doctrine must remain flexible and adaptive in order to meet the constantly changing demands of the conflict. We must be prepared to react during the conflict in a changing strategic environment. If necessary, we must change our doctrine in order to confront the challenges of a new strategic environment.

Usually, the types of military operations can be classified as: offensive, defensive, deterrent, stability or support actions. Offensive doctrines are aimed at disarming an opponent (destroying its armed forces). These increase the possibility and intensity of arms race – wars and also appear to make some states more competitive. Offensive doctrines promote arms races in two ways. Firstly, the fact that an effective first strike can quickly and successfully end a war, so the state will support this strategy with large recourses. Secondly, it implies a belief on superiority of offensive action over defensive action; states feel threatened by increases in one another's military capabilities and react quite strongly to these increases. All offensive doctrines call for early, intensive attacks and they stress the importance of a preemptive strike. An example of offensive doctrine is the combination of tanks, mechanized infantry and combat aircraft. This combination is aimed at a swift victory such as that of the Germans in 1940 (referred to as Blitzkrieg ever since). Israelis have adopted the operational parameters of the Blitzkrieg since 1956. This has had great success in 1956 and 1967 under General Tal's leadership.

Defensive doctrines aim at defence tasks and to the denial of the objective an enemy he seeks. Deterrent doctrines aim at dissuading a potential adversary from resorting to a particular course of action by convincing him that the cost of pursuing it will outweigh potential gains. Defensive and Deterrent doctrines allow status quo states and aggressor states to be clearly indentified. They tend to assume longer wars, need more time for mobilization, and thus require smaller armed forces in structure.

Other than activities such as the protection of land, airspace and territorial waters, which are based on the
need to deter, defence tasks and activities in peace time may include Peace Support Operations (PSO), Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), Peace Enforcement, Conflict Prevention, Humanitarian Aid, Coercion, Post Conflict Activity and Peace Building, Humanitarian Operations and Preventive Diplomacy. The use of armed forces as an instrument of international policy to settle a dispute with the restricted introduction of enforcement of coercive measures was shown in Bosnia. Also, Professor James Gow analytically illustrates the contemporary types of military operations in the Yugoslav War of Dissolution and analyzes their tasks and missions in Bosnia, Croatia and FYR Macedonia. The UNPROFOR committed in Yugoslavia constituted the first UN peacekeeping mission in continental Europe and was an active instrument of international diplomacy and of European Security. Today, peacekeeping is one element of peace support, which, to paraphrase Clausewitz's famous dictum, is a continuation of policy by other means and peace support includes multilateral military operations which serve the peacemaking initiatives of international diplomacy. International cooperation to resolve regional disputes begun before the Gulf Conflict, but spurred by it, might become a permanent feature for world politics. Attention to the humanitarian issue arose in part because of the sense of promise created at the popular level by the wider concept of a stable world order. This policy resulted from popular pressure on western governments to do something and that pressure, of course, is a repercussion of the television age.

In conclusion, doctrine is founded in history and derives its authority from the fact that it is the result of many hardwon experiences. It has endurance in time but it is not unchangeable. Consequently, doctrine develops in response to the changes of the political or strategic scene in the light of experience, or as a result of modern technology. It influences in turn the way in which policy and planning are developed, forces are organized and trained and armaments are procured.

**STRATEGY AND FORCE PLANNING FRAMEWORK**

The post Cold War era is characterized by the rearrangement of the international geopolitical and financial correlations and the rapid advance of technology, factors that capsize the terms of financial, political and defence programming. The vanquish of the threat of a major clash between East and West has brought into light the dangers of nationalistic conflicts, peripheral conflicts, the spread of WMD and asymmetric/nonconventional threats. Within this liquid and unstable environment, a new security architecture is being developed for which the transformation of all previous forms is considered necessary. Evidently, all security institutions born and tested during the Cold War are reinventing themselves (NATO new strategic concept, EU enlargement, NATO-RUSSIA relations, NATO enlargement and possibly UN future transformation), in their effort to confront the new dangers and threats that emerged after the end of the Cold War. Changes on the planning of the global, peripheral and domestic environment which encompass new threats, constrains, opportunities, technological advances and other factors prompt nations to address both their strategies for dealing with that environment and their military posture.

It is a general view that, national security involves not only territorial integrity, but also the financial and social prosperity of citizens and that dangers and internal threats for state security are not only military and so cannot be faced only with military means. Besides, national security has a much broader meaning compared to foreign policy and defence. Finally, the ‘militarization’ of international help, has become a great policy dilemma, one that did not exist during the Cold War, since force was rarely used in international assistance operations.

In light of these changes, there has never been a greater scope for reviewing a nation’s national objectives and threats to them, creatively weighing these against recourses available and planning a strategy suitable to the new, emerging conditions. Also, extraordinary developments emerging from the technology base are opening up possibilities for radically new ways of conducting military operations.

Each country’s government has the responsibility for its territorial integrity, while at the same time, it takes care of plans and adapts its national security and defence policy. Consequently, she defines those national objectives that serve its national interests. National interests and national objectives (political, economic, security, defensive) form the basis upon which national policy is formed and shaped. This strategy, which has political, military, economic and diplomatic dimensions, harnesses the nation’s recourses to protect and advance national objectives in light of the challenges and opportunities that emanate from beyond a nation’s border.

The questions that emerge for defence planning are the following: Are the National Security and Defence...
Policies appropriate for the new era that has dawned? Which are the main missions the Armed Forces should be preparing for, in order to respond to, and support, this strategy? Are existing doctrines effective or are changes needed? (All of the above define the framework of relative actions, for domestic problems, international relations, military structure/doctrine, and the country's general orientation as seen in Fig. [2] (R. Lloyd, 'Strategy and Force Planning Framework', in Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, ed., Strategy and Force Planning, (Newport: Naval War College Press, 2000), pp. 1-4, see also D.Ochmanek, S.Hosmer, 'The Context for Defence Planning: The Environment, Strategy and Mission', in Z. Khalilzad, D. Ochmanek, eds., Strategy and Defence Planning for 21st Century, [Santa Monica: RAND, 1997], pp.35-40).

Furthermore, in order to identify the capabilities that will be most needed in the future towards planning the security/defence policy and the force structure, we must also address the following major issues:

- What basic national security strategy is most appropriate for the era we are entering?
- What major missions must the armed forces be prepared for in order to undertake the support of the above strategy?
- Under what conditions might these missions have to be carried out?
- How should a Ministry of National Defence conduct force planning and evaluation so as to take full account of the uncertainties in the future operational environment?
- How capable will the armed forces be in conducting future combat operations? What criteria should be used to determine the overall size of the armed forces?
• What should be the top priorities for improving their combat capabilities?
• What are the implications of emerging technologies in the way armed forces fight, and in force mix and size?
• How should the armed forces be restructured in order to provide a stabilizing presence near and abroad in peacetime?
• Are future defence budgets likely to be sufficient for sustaining the forces and capabilities they need?
• To what extent can the reform and reshape of the Ministry of National Defence infrastructure and business practice yield the savings needed to sustain, operate, and modernize the force?

Administrations, defence and force planners must continue to ensure that they can secure and advance the basic objectives of their nation – such as the protection of their people, their democratic values, and their prosperity – they must ensure the will and capacity to underwrite the security and stability in their geopolitical environment. An existence gap between planning strategy and capabilities can be extremely dangerous for the nation. Such a gap could lead to the creation of security commitments made under false doctrine and force planning which in turn the nation will be unable to fulfill, jeopardizing its security and defence policy implementation and even perhaps its ability to undertake military tasks.

**EPILOGUE**

To sum up, developments in the international (political, financial, societal, military technological) and closer geopolitical environment, have created new factors and orientations for the country's National Security/Defence Strategy, which demand the formation of a national security/defence policy, capable to respond and confront the existence/future challenges. This policy focuses on the reform and modernization of the armed forces, on maintaining their power and prevention capability and on promoting the country as a core of force stability in its geopolitical environment, with the assistance of an effective foreign policy. Defence planners will need to pose key questions for their nation in the post – Cold War era; to what degree such arrangements are in their own national interest and what extent they can afford to play as a stability player in the international arena of geopolitics. Ending, it requires foresight, sustained and capable leadership, and considerable political courage to carry out the agenda of security and defence policy.

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Ukraine as a Test Case for the future New World Order: Back to the Realpolitik

Iulian CHIFU

ABSTRACT

The crisis in Ukraine has created a new opportunity for the revision of the thoughts that we’ve once had on the future of the World Order. As Fukuyama revised his idea about the End of history1, we are now confronted again with the situation of an end of the holiday that stability and peace offered at a large respect in Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The "holiday" is over and we’re back to the old power politics. In this context, there’s a full revision of what continues to stand from the general theories and our ways of seeing the world, from globalization, post-modern soft power, influence and transformative power of the EU in the borderlands, the liberal approach of the security through interdependence, and the fall onto a new era of geopolitics and realpolitik.

The data was there, we just didn’t want to accept that the retreat of the Russian Federation from the CFE Treaty in 2007, or the Russian Georgian War in 2008, or even the annexation of Crimea in February 2014 will through us in a new inter-war period once we took note of the speech of President Putin, 18th of March 2014, on the long term project that he is offering to the Russian people, but also to Russians, Russian speakers, "compatriots" in the neighboring independent states.

Back to square one, we’ve taken on our desks the books of Geopolitics and Realism in international relations and we are looking into the evolution to decide if we are moving towards a revisionism in international affairs – renegotiating security in Europe, a transformative system – keeping just the few rules that survived to the new type of post-Cold War Wars, an adaptative system of the existing rules, accepting that what happens in the post Soviet space is a "special case", to be considered under different type of glasses, respecting the exceptionalism and the interests of a once again strong Russian actor in Europe or should we stand in the orthodoxy of the International Law, meaning respecting rules, norms and principles that offered more or less peace in Europe and the World after WWII, 1948, the creation of the UN, 1975 and Helsinki Final Act, 1991 the Chart of Paris for a New Europe, 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act.
Globalisation is a method and a school of thinking in International Relations that is preaching the existence of an objective process of globalisation, since communication, trade, speed of transportation, level of travel of the persons and goods around the world is pushing to this end. But the dispute is still under way discussing if the globalisation goes through the creation of regional-continental blocks and the final integration (according to Arnold Toynbee description of the process) or, on the contrary, globalisation as a process will break the boundaries that such blocks are making to the global trade on the way to global integration.

The other discussion is if there is a possibility of real global integration of continental regions belonging to different generations of development. A tribal Africa could be integrated as such into a world made up of post-modern European Union and the global power of America, or should it undergo a process of state building, democratisation, institution building and than being integrated eventually in the global world.

The same goes for the role of the state. Should we still keep states as a fundamental brick in the future globalised world or is this going to play against the process? EU is an example of a regionally administered part of the sovereignty of the state. On the other hand, the idea of the “global village” and the split of the state into smaller communities are also under consideration.

Fact is that prospective studies have a lot to do in the future, since new developments in the reality changed the perspective. Before Ukraine, the debate was more focussed on the future shape of foreign affairs as the very nature of international relations seems to be changing in accordance to the post bipolar world. The rules of the game are slightly changing from a pragmatic game of rivalries and control to a more strategic approach of positioning and “filling the space” for a possible use of those assets in a future confrontation. The name of the game is shifting from chess to Go.

The consequences for the Global Big Game are becoming dramatic, once energy shift in the US has freed the hands of Washington in international affairs thorough internal solutions: the Middle East ceases to be as important for energy supply, thus the only thing at stake for the US remains its strategic partnership with Israel. The relinquishing of oil and gas from the region allowed other consumers to step in and try to fill their own energy deficit. The lack of interest on the part of the US and the rise of China as a competitor, as well as the economic crisis have all determined Washington to prioritize its investments on the global scene and to choose to pivot towards Asia-Pacific as well as to retreat from other regions, thus cutting the costs.

Basically the new Big Global Game shifted in the manner in which the big consumers of the world are being supplied – Europe and South East Asia. There were two options: using the Eurasian Suppliers Belt running from the Gulf Countries and Middle East via Central Asia to Russia, in a continental approach, or using suppliers from other parts of the world – Africa or Latin America. Answering this question was

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tremendously important for the Big Game, in order to
decide whether China is moving towards being
more continental than it was traditionally during its
evolution, or becoming more maritime and global,
thus challenging the US as a global power.

No doubt China is already a global power, even
though it does not recognize this status and claims
that its only interest is market-oriented. Its activities
in Africa, South America and the Pacific are designed
only to grant supplies for its growing economy and
no military interests are linked to this behaviour.
On the other hand, it is true that the G2 format for
engaging China and the US and sharing the burden
at an international level proved unsuccessful, since
China does not want to assume any responsibilities
globally.

So the main problem in this respect is not to de-
cide between continental and maritime China, be-
tween black and white, but more between shades
of grey and the extent to which China aspires to be-
come a maritime and global power. Once this step is
made, the way of addressing China’s level of ambition
and its strategic posture will be far easier.

The second part of the Global Big Game is this:
should China remain a rather continental power,
what will the regional game of the big continental
Eurasian continuum look like? Europe (mostly the
EU countries), which has a combined economy that
thrive to be the first in the world, needs energy
mostly from the Eurasian Suppliers Belt, as did South
East Asia with countries such as China, Japan, India,
South Korea. Is this going to lead to competition, a
confrontation of the Big Bargaining type between
the two blocks? Or is it going to be an opportunity
for some supplier countries to play the game and
raise the price of oil and gas, or create artificial dis-
putes between consumer countries?

The most important problem is that the Eur-
asian Suppliers belt is subject to instability and wars,
to the Arab Spring and regime changes, to sectar-
ian wars, to radicalization and civil wars, all able to
reshape the borders of the region and the Middle
East. If these major shifts spread north to Central
Asia and Russia, this would directly affect supplier
routes, contracts and sustainability, shaking the
whole global economy. That’s why Central Asia is
central to Eurasian Security and stability.

After the economic crisis, America moved its
level of ambition from the two plus two wars –
two simultaneous wars to win and two to block
the enemy from achieving its goals – into a one
plus one format – one war to win and another one
to prevent the enemy from winning. This led to a
reshape of the military and of the defence indus-
try, an important move in the economy of the US.
The pivot to Asia-Pacific was the solution in order
to prioritize actions in the US foreign and security
policies in times of scarce resources and the rise of
China as a global power.

Prioritization in international politics also has
another side effect: the so called market-oriented
choices took over in American foreign affairs and
become more important than mid to long term
strategies of positioning. So the US retreated from
Central Asia and the Caucasus as it is preparing to do
in the Middle East, thus passing the burden of secu-
ritiy to existing regional actors or trying to find such
actors, and keeping just minor strategic capabilities
in these regions.

The rationale behind these gestures was also
pushing China to invest more in continental routes
and posture, because of the easy way of getting re-
sources through continental pipelines, and chasing
it away from the maritime needs and from the per-
spective of challenging America as a global power.
Retreating from Central Asia was an invitation for
China to step in and use those resources, while the
shift from Afghanistan was also an invitation to use
Pakistan as a transit route and get energy from the
Middle East via land lines.

At the same time, European countries were more
inclined to completely give up their military capabili-
ties or at least maintaining them at a minimum level,
and instead investing in their soft power, economic
capacity and prestige. The result was ineffective, as
the rise of Russia and its assertiveness blocked the
EU deterrence ability and the power of attraction in
the Eastern Partnership countries. It was the same
with its military hard power when in Libya just the
US military presence and capabilities led to a victory
in a war with a minor army.

Leading from behind allowed the US to stay
out of North Africa and still grant its European al-
lies unique capabilities that helped win the war and
maintain the level of prestige. But the reality after
Lybia was there and some European states realized
that there is no such thing as soft power without
some military hard power capabilities. And the re-
The reflection period allowed the possibility to launch a Global European Strategy as a modernized European Security Strategy – the Solana Papers adopted in 2003, some 10 years ago – and to think of a reshaped European Defence Strategy to be discussed in December at the European Council. But there are a few solutions in perspective.

The global and maritime China is not a dilemma, but a fact, especially because China took all the advantages left by the retreat of the US and the open space in Central Asia. Basically, in 2009-2010, China offered to the states in Central Asia the alternative export routes via Russia in the North, and broke Russia’s monopoly of gas exports through the Kazakhstan-China and Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-China gas pipelines and the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline. Moreover, the last oil investment contracts in Kazakhstan truly set the stage for China becoming the most important consumer of Central Asian hydrocarbon energy products.

Despite this opportunity, China is not considering Central Asia an alternative, but more of a source for extending its development needs. Russia is currently still the most important supplier, and Saudi Arabia and the Middle East will become so in the future. But this does not exclude China’s globally relevant maritime transportation capabilities and ambitions. In this respect, China is the owner of the most capable ice breaker and became an observer in the Arctic Council, at the same time as the US addressed the issue through its new Arctic Strategy, but without owning ice breaking capabilities.

Nevertheless, perhaps the most illustrative example is what I call the Tonga paradigm. Tonga is a small island country in the Pacific that is part of the British overseas dominion. The retreat of the British governor and the transfer of authority to Australia and New Zealand transformed the responsibilities in the region. An unfortunate management of a scandal linking Australian politics to the Tonga monarch made the island fall into the hands of China. China took over Tonga, invested heavily in this state of 100,000 inhabitants, and turned it into a proxy, if not a dependent client state.

Tonga is not a singular case. On the contrary, the Tonga Syndrome expanded to the Fiji Islands in its proximity. The idea of taking advantage and investing into other insular Pacific states expanded to Kiribati, Vanuatu and lately, The Maldives. Basically, China chooses to invest into its position all around the world in places of meaningless importance for the others, where it is quite easy to move in with relatively modest investments, and where such an involvement is very much welcomed.

There are multiple targets: the geopolitical position, the place on the routes of transportation, resources in places that have their Economic Exclusive zones the size of India’s, the fact that the votes of these minuscule international actors are equal in the UN General Assembly with those of major players in the global economy, such as Germany or Japan. Hence China invested in places where it could obtain some advantages with a minor effort and where competition was low, if any.

The Tonga paradigm proves that China, with the ambitions of a global player, is playing the national Go game of positioning and controlling areas all over the world, at a moment when the US and the West are still playing Chess. Taking new areas under control or setting the place for military capabilities, access to resources or votes in the UN General Assembly is a strategy which proves that China is an actor with global ambitions and a global strategy. So that’s the reason why I think that the Global Big Game changed dramatically from Chess to Go.

Russia is contemplating the world through its own perspective of the threats and risks that are affecting its own strategic posture. Putin’s Russia is still on the rise and with assertiveness far beyond the capacities it has at hand. Russia adapted to the new game despite the fact that it maintains the spirit and the reflexes of the Cold War, The Grand Chessboard, as Zbigniew Brzezinski called the world. The level of ambition and financial resources, as well as a very high assertiveness, in a context of a lack of will of European countries to play a role due to their own economic sovereign debt crisis, made Russia move from chess to a different type of game, moving closer to the Chinese game of Go.

Russia succeeded in maintaining strong pillars of its strategy that are falling under the „because I can” Strategy. It maintained its military presence in Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, even though it was costly in the context of the economic crisis and it didn’t fit into any strategy or objectives worth of this investment. On the contrary: Russia’s strategy was implemented only because it could,
and because nobody else – US, the EU, The West as a whole – could prevent it from doing so – from maintaining its military presence in the region.

The rationale of such a position came from the fact that „sometime, in the future, I could find a role and a purpose, maybe an objective to achieve“, and to use those assets in Russia’s approach. Even if it didn’t fit into any plan, it doesn’t have a purpose and it no way helps any policy, some capabilities were maintained because Russia could afford doing so.

The most obvious case is that of Transnistria, a strip of land in the Republic of Moldova transformed by a separatist frozen conflict into a Russian military stronghold that prevents both the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine to move closer to the EU or NATO. Even during the Communist times in Chisinau, when everything was on the table and the control was total in the Republic of Moldova, Russia didn’t give up its position and refused to retreat its troops, in spite of a commitment undertook by Boris Yeltsin in 1999 at the OSCE Istanbul Summit. Nobody was able to remove Russia from this territory, neither from Abkhazia or South Ossetia, and in the latter case this led to the Russian-Georgian War from August 2008. In the case of Transnistria, since there was nothing to gain from the retreat, the position is good; Russia could afford paying the money for maintaining the 70% deficit and dependence of the separatist region. Its troops are still there in several capacities – so-called peacekeepers, guardians of the Cobasna weapons storages, or under the clauses of the local independent separatist paramilitary police, intelligence and army. All this „because we can“, „because you cannot make us leave“, or „because nobody could prevent us from staying there“.

This type of non-pragmatic policy is the opposite of the US and the West „market-oriented“ rationale of spending related to foreign policy – a very strict rationale based on arguments, strategy, objectives to be reached and resources allocated. Even the Mes-senberg agreements8 that transformed the Transnistria conflict resolution into proof of Russia’s good will in order to move to a broader security arrangement in Europe were not able to make Russia retreat from the separatist region and allow the Republic of Moldova to come back to its unity and full control of its territory. Because Russia could do it.

**POST MODERN ORDER: TRANSFORMATIVE INFLUENCE AND SOFT POWER OF THE EU IN THE BORDERLANDS**

EU considered and developed its most important policy the enlargement of the last 20 years or so. First, it developed a tremendous attraction, in tandem with NATO, for the post-socialist countries in Eastern Europe, that were exiting from the Soviet bloc with the will of their citizens to move to liberty, democracy and prosperity in Western Style. That created a real soft power9 and the support of the EU and NATO for this journey towards norms, rules and institutions "Western style" succeeded in making the transformation from a centralised state planned economy with authoritarian if not dictators into market economy, democratic states, with a development of the rule of law, subject to an intensive Security Sector Reform, civilian control of arm forces and intelligence institutions formed after the reform of the former political police of the socialist states.

This tremendous journey is not over yet, since on one side democracy developed and it is doing so in a continuous way to an irreversibility of the regime to grant peace and prosperity to the citizens and since parts of the rule of law, independence of the judiciary, fight against corruption and rules of incompatibility of business, interests and politics lay behind in this institutional development. Moreover, it has been proved that after the good governance as a part of a more perfected democracy, fight against corruption and clear rules for political activities are needed not only in Eastern Europe, in the new member states, but also in the core of Europe, in some founding countries of the original European Communities.

Enlargement and this transformative power of the EU played an important role in Europe for the new member countries, but also for the borderlands. The countries included in the European Neighbourhood Policy in the East of the continent, at the contiguous border, and then in the Eastern Partnership, were subject of this same attraction of the EU, but were not offered the perspective of integration. The original idea came from Barry Buzan’s approach that there is a huge difference at the border, there are grounds for conflicts, and, per a contrario, if there are the same rules, norms, level of economic
developments, no big differences, possibility to travel and trade, the space for conflicts is very low. A post-modern approach for a post-modern actor, the EU, but also a liberal approach of the security through interdependence.

Basically the EU offered through ENP money and knowhow for the transformation of the normative system to a democratic one and then selective access to the common market. Then, in the Eastern Partnership, the offer was far more concrete and targeted, special changes for the liberalisation of visas and access to the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area of the EU, so more access to the common market, but under the rules of competition, and access to travel visa free if rules of security are observed and no excess for immigration appear.

The transformative power of the EU was even more important after the Ukrainian crisis. We've seen how corruption, vulnerabilities, real holes in the sustainability of the state that not only local oligarchs, but also foreign interests are using could turn apart a country. Ukraine proved to be a vulnerable state way beyond its capability or preparedness including in the security sector once politicization, corruption, influence altered its institutions. And the EU learned the hard way that those vulnerabilities experienced by Ukraine, are easy to be identified in the Republic of Moldova or Georgia, the most advanced states in signing the Association Agreement, as some EU member states could also have such vulnerabilities. Basically, in the case of Ukraine, the oligarchs' democracy proved to be a cancer for the Ukrainian state including in the security and defence sector.

So the post-modern model was also shaken with full strength by the reality. Moreover, after the economic crisis in Europe, and the emergence of a high number of euro sceptic, populist, xenophobic, anti-immigration anti-system parties with representation in the European Parliament, there's a high possibility that the appetite of the EU to move ahead with enlargement or interest in its neighbourhood to be much more reduced in the future, so it will be up to the Eastern Partnership states themselves to push for reforms, to ask for knowhow and technical support, then to prove that they did fulfil the needed changes and meet the criteria for moving closer to applying for EU membership. But the perspective should be there, as a guiding line for an eventual future.

**Russian Geopolitics: The New Realpolitik of Exceptionalism in Territorial Claims**

Russian Geopolitics today is taking the shape of new old-forms of territorial control and the "near abroad" on behalf of "defending Russians, Russian speakers and compatriots" with an ideology of "Lebensraum" drawn from classic books of German geopolitics and geopolitical motivations dating back to Catherine the Great and lessons learned of the burning of Moscow by Tartar troops. Thus, because the area is a flat plain, with little geographic advantages to prevent the advance of an army to the capital, Russia has faced, throughout history, the inability to remove the army outside the city gates and combat invading troops away from the bosom of power. Therefore it needs space.

Today, new technologies render space almost useless, easily overcome in a matter of minutes by intercontinental missiles, supersonic aircrafts or airborne troops. It is true that there is still use for corridors, rights to fly or use of bases and military facilities – see the case of Incirlic in the war in Iraq when the refusal to use the US base in Turkey resulted in changing tactics and attacking from only one direction, or that of the Manas base in the war in Afghanistan. But Russia's propensity to geopolitics, in particular, and realpolitik, in general, is of present interest. When you add the relapse into early 20th century nationalism, revisionism and complete ignorance of the rules of international law (or their disguise into the model of Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, combined with the experiences of frozen conflicts) we deal with the current threat of re-discussing and redrawing the borders of Eastern Europe.

Current events in Ukraine bring us to a contemporary reality that we would not have otherwise guessed. It is true that there have always been objections to the thesis of defending "Russians, Russian speakers and compatriots" because it exceeds by far defending their rights within the state in which they lived, with respect for borders and the rules of international law. It went towards a claim of paternity in defending all Russian speakers and, in fact, "compatriots", i.e. all former residents of the Soviet empire.

When defending them actually requires the use of armed force against another State, we are already
outside of UN rules of sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of all the countries. The March 18th 2014 speech of President Putin is reminding to a lot of post-socialist countries the claims of another era where the land where nationals and associated are leaving is due to become part of the kin state or that there is an exception from the international rules that the power and military force is imposing. The return to the policies of force or to the exceptionalism in international affairs and especially in Europe is against the basic rules of the security and borders in Europe, and the Sudeten German model or that of "Austrian brothers" for the occupation of Czechoslovakia or the Austrian Anschluss memories are back, reading Putin's statement, a real project for the "new Russia" where any state that does not respect the "right of observance" and the veto to its security and economic policies by Russia becomes subject to its military capabilities.

This is a vision and a long term project of Russia in its neighbourhood which comes back to the idea of Spheres of influence and the rational of geopolitics of Russia who needs space and nations/states with limited sovereignty in order to "defend its interests". The only solutions that Putin's Russia offers in the post-cold war era is, basically, a return to the Cold war and a nationalistic Russia that defends its co-citizens or "compatriots" in the former USSR wherever they are, using all the means including military ones and challenging the will of the people and states to choose their solution of security and their option for prosperity.

If we add to this the creation of the military doctrine on the same basis and also mention that Russia announced that it assumes the use of nuclear weapons in conventional regional wars that affect its "fundamental interests", negative signals of revisionism have long been on the map.

Russia has orchestrated numerous "conflicts" in the Soviet period and that is how "Frozen Conflict" appeared. Newly independent states gained strategic separatist areas – Transdniester, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia – with frozen conflicts in which Russia supplies at the same time the basis for separatism, the role of mediator as well as that of guarantor in order to resolve the conflict, which is never resolved, but offers Moscow levers in all of these countries. Subsequently, the citizens of these regions have acquired Russian citizenship en mass and have automatically become subjects of the future doctrine of defending Russians, Russian speakers and compatriots, thus creating a self-assumed right to military intervention by Russia.

In 2008, Russia attacked a neighbour for the first time after the Cold War, occupying Abkhazia and South Ossetia, one step away from occupying Tbilisi and almost taking down the recalcitrant pro-European leader of Georgia, Mikhail Saakashvili. The two regions were unilaterally recognized as independent states, they were militarized and occupied by Russian troops in what constituted a first reply to the "threat to the fundamental interests" and to NATO's closeness to the borders of the Russian Federation, as NATO was considered, in the same military doctrine, the main threat to Russia's security.

Finally, today's Ukrainian episode raises the threat that Russia brings to security and peace in the world to a higher level. Here too we can speak about the vocation for posterity that haunts a leader who said the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest catastrophe for Russia in the last century – we are talking about Vladimir Putin and his integration projects for the post-Soviet space – the Customs Union Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan and the Eurasian Union, both projects intrinsically dependent on Ukraine joining them.

The "pro-European" revolt in Ukraine was named so simply because its trigger was an opaque 180-degrees-turn – the decision of President Viktor Yanukovych and a majority made up of the Party of Regions and the Communist Party – before Vilnius, when the pro-European orientation turned into a "pause" in negotiations. Later, the constraint that the Ukrainian establishment had suffered became obvious, as did the road to the Eurasian Union and the strong comeback to the Russian orbit. Pro-European protests immediately added a strong Ukrainian nationalist footprint – which otherwise could become the largest Eurosceptic and anti-European basis, in other conditions. We dealt with a popular uprising in Kiev with a deep nationalist base that embraced and supported the post-Vilnius pro-European wave in order to counter the neo-imperialism and neo-Russian expansionism. The uprising in Kiev is of the same type as the "Arab spring" in terms of counteracting an authoritarian regime; it is not a type of peaceful "colour revolution" the era of which has ended. The philo-
The "civil" secessionist scenario in Crimea and eastern Ukraine has not worked – the Kharkov Congress\textsuperscript{21} has not taken the measure of declaring "Malorussia" or the Eastern Republic of Ukraine with Viktor Yanukovych as President. Subsequently the scenario of Taiwan was lost as well – with a President-elect a refugee in Sevastopol (he gave the decree to move the entire administrative powers in Crimea) and the creation of a new government. The main reason was the discrediting of Viktor Yanukovych due to the fact that he was abandoned by his Party of Regions, which voted for the Yatseniuk Government, and to his fleeing to Russia.

Russia has used the Transnistria scenario: a breakaway region with "self-defence forces", protected by Russian troops (supplemented to the maximum, formally because of the agreement in Kiev in 1997 regarding the stationing of troops). It is not certain if we have overcome the war scenario and have come to the negotiating table: Putin has not achieved his objectives; the pressure on the Crimean military is high, a war can be triggered at any moment, even by chance or accident – at the time this article is being written negotiations and dialog for de-escalation of conflict have not been accepted or are being postponed.

There are fundamental differences between the crisis in Crimea and frozen conflicts: not a shot has been fired, there are Ukrainian troops with equipment and weapons in Crimea and at sea (it is the only case of "frozen conflict" where the region is at an open sea) loyal to the government in Kiev, there is pro-Ukrainian anti-separatist Tatar minority (a minority that was deported by the Russians/Stalin in Uzbekistan in Stalinist times and returned to their hometowns in an independent Ukraine after 1991).

The side effects of military aggression against Ukraine in Crimea are that the Yatseniuk Government has become cohesive, representative and welded the relationship between the political opposition and new political figures given by the Maidan. Militarized anarchy has disappeared (paramilitary groups and militias with different agendas), as did the control over the Government and its policies by the Maidan. Events in Crimea led to efforts to unite all Ukrainians facing the crisis – the Maidan, the former political opposition / currently in power and the Party of Regions.
Additionally, Russia has definitively lost "Free Ukraine" – after the Crimea episode, both oligarchs (some of them appointed governors in the East) and the Party of Regions rejected association with Russia in any form. Regaining it can only be achieved by military occupation or the imposition of new leaders and Viktor Yanukovych has completely lost legitimacy in Ukraine.

Maybe it is worth mentioning here why the Malorussia scenario or that of the Republic of South-eastern Ukraine did not work. I think there are some elements to be decrypted here: the association of the pro-Russian project with Viktor Yanukovych was not good news, the president was not even loved in his own party because he had taken over it with the Family group at the expense of old activists; second because oligarchs were no longer following his lead or feared his habit of taking over their businesses or creating the business competition-monopoly that bankrupted them.

Against this background there comes the second big assessment mistake made by Russia: that the Russian Ukrainians can hardly wait to live in Russia. It turned out that they embraced the adage "better be on top in your own village, than be the last one in the city"; moreover, after the occupation of Crimea, groups of "Russian tourists", agitators who attempted to takeover regions of Eastern Ukraine managed to involve only small groups of people; furthermore, there were confrontations with Russian Ukrainians outraged by the occupation of Crimea.

The scenario for Crimea is more radical than that of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, i.e. the recognition as states and de facto occupation: in this case, Crimea proclaimed itself a state, it is joining Russia and Russia’s Parliament consented to this gesture of territorial change, a step that was to be recorded by law. That way, Crimea becomes part and subject of the Russian Federation.

But it didn’t stop there: Eastern Ukraine was back under assault and with Russian troops at the border, thousands of military trained groups well armed and well trained in Russia, thousands of mercenaries, paramilitaries and soldiers of fortune from Russia inserted in Eastern Ukraine, a real war has been forged on Ukrainian soil with a low possibility for a credible denial from Moscow in those actions on the ground. All came with the support of some 20% of the local population drawn first under the idea of more money and more power to the regions, then to autonomy, finally to independence and to joining Russia. But no public support was proved, with "referendums" where 32% participated in Donetsk and 24% in Luhansk (30% in Crimea with 50% of the "voters" for the independence, for being strictly clear on this matter) even though those "referendums" took part in an occupied militarised environment and under huge pressure.

Towards the Future New World Order: Revisionism, Transformative System, Adaptative System of the Existing Rules or Orthodoxy of the International Law

Now what’s new for the international law, norms and rules, what is the future that such developments are offering? I don’t know if we can talk about genuine revisionism, imperial dreams, ignoring the rules or if Russia is just playing for a renegotiation of its position in Europe or in the world, claiming this new revival and global ambition. But the basic instruments of international law and all the agreements in this area are put at stake, and the general perception is that Russia is no longer a strategic partner, but a strategic competitor, rival or even enemy. And this perception in Eastern Europe, at the borders of the EU and NATO is playing an important role that no politician, local or European, can ignore.

Another global harm is the challenge to an instrument of non-proliferation like the guarantees for territorial integrity of the states that give up nuclear weapons. The 1994 Budapest Agreement stated Ukraine joining the NPT- the Non Proliferation Treaty and giving up its nuclear weapons, transferred to Russia, against a guarantee of security and territorial integrity. With its move in Crimea and Western Ukraine, as through its direct official statements, Russia blows up this instrument that could be used by the international community in the cases of Iran or North Corea. It’s another fundamental harm to the security and arm control system of the world.

If this is the case, it would be complicated to explain to the public that we are able to have a spiritualised border between the Western European World and Russia. The idea that Russia is going to embrace European norms and rules failed during Medvedev’s presidency, as “sovereign democracy” took over, but
even this new system was not enough; it is not about an alternative to the democracy and Western world, not only about the perception of insecurity with NATO getting closer to Russia’s borders, but about EU as well, about free trade areas that would attract post-soviet states in the “interest area” of Russia.

So the Russian annexation of Crimea and the military aggression in Eastern Ukraine via proxies are creating the sense of the need for a new strong border, enforced border, containment border between East and West, a new line of division, wherever this line could run – The Eastern border of Ukraine, closer to Kiev or at the Eastern border of the EU and NATO. The sense of the enemy at the gates is very present in Eastern Europe and that’s a fact of life nobody could reject.

Second there’s a sense of limits of the security through interdependence. Interdependence is a liberal approach, which states that security is higher when there’s a high number of common interests and a lot of mutual relations between two actors. If there are too many interests, it means that this prevents conflicts, because there is a lot to lose from this interdependence which is mutually profitable.

This first solution comes from the conjecture (meaning a rule that has never been proven, but neither the contrary, so it is accepted as true) that the interdependence and a higher number of relations between two countries is forging a situation where conflict is far less possible. Conjecture also refers to the democratic paradigm that democratic countries are not fighting each other since they have other means to deal with their differences. Hence, the Liberal approach to the world states that interdependence is a solution for security, and we are all inclined to say that this is a reality.

The problem is if, at some point, one of the partners makes a surprise exit from observing the rules that stand at the basis of this interdependence. We never thought of a backdoor or way out from interdependence, and when using another liberal tool, sanctions, economic and political sanctions, there is the sense that any sanctions against an interdependent partner are a sanction against ourselves. Fact is that the security through interdependence, so the liberal approach, has suffered a tremendous hit once the Ukrainian crisis erupted and sanctions have been discussed especially at the European level.

NATO is also under pressure, and has rediscovered its raison d'être after Afghanistan. The need to rebalance the positioning of some capabilities in the Eastern border, in order to reassure its allies is a first step, as the need to find solutions for the transfer of technology to those border states. It should find ways to cooperate with the countries in the borderlands, Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, why not, if they demand assistance.

NATO should also revise its national member states policies of selling technology and military capabilities in the neighbourhood and to third states that could become threats to some allies, beginning with Mistral, but not stopping to only one public and very visible capability. Military expenditures especially for the countries in Europe should come back to the 2% GDP convened, and that level would be used in developing territorial defence capabilities as well as expeditionary forces for NATO’s missions.

It is true that here, too, there are differences of view between EU/NATO states, but Eastern European states are closer to that reality and a possible divide inside Europe is not a good step now. Moreover, there’s an opportunity for a boost in European relevance at the global level if its hard power can follow its economic power and improve once again its soft power.

NATO also has to deal with symbolic gestures, enshrined in the open door policy and enlargement. There is a need to state that this is an ongoing policy, that Russia does not have a veto inside NATO and that the Alliance policies should respond to the needs of the allies and not to the Russia’s interest or Russia’s will and veto.

And there’s also a need for lessons learnt from the Ukrainian crisis. Here a lot has to be analysed, beginning with the vulnerabilities and fragility of the Ukrainian state and institutions, penetrated by foreign control and interests, and ending with the type of war developed in Eastern Ukraine on the ground, an insurgency war, a proxy war, an informational war, cyber war low intensity war in a charted and extremely well known environment. Lessons learnt are needed in order to avoid this type of fragility in the case of the other countries in the post-soviet space, first and foremost in countries at Russia’s borders, but also in order to diminish these vulnerabilities in other countries, both in Eastern and in Western Europe.
So the solution goes more on the adaptative system rather than a transformative system, trying to preserve the existing rules and to learn the lessons of the last confrontation and challenge to the international system. It doesn’t mean that we have to give up all interdependence with Russia – it’s no longer feasible, and the costs are enormous, it is not realistic – and it’s not about a type of new McCarthyism in Europe, chasing influences and vectors with strong relations to Russia. But the Ukrainian crisis, in a line of developments beginning with Russia’s retreat from the CFE Treaty in 2007 and the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008, could not pass without consequences and adaptation of both the international system rules and European security, but also with important lessons learnt at the national level.

**SOURCES**

1. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, Free Press, 1992
4. Go – Chinese game of strategy with two players and similar pieces of two colours, black and white, where the purpose is filling the space and creating zones of control where you can take all the pieces of your competitor.
5. Here "Eurasia" is a reference strictly to the great continental continuum of Europe and Asia, and not a geopolitical concept or reference to Russia’s approach to integrative policies or to the Medvedev plan conceived by the Valdai Club for common security in Eurasia by ousting the US, dismissing NATO and offering Russia a veto right in the continent security.
8. An agreement between the German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev establishing that EU and Russia could move to closer security talks in a bilateral format if Russia succeeds in helping to the resolution of the Transnistria separatist conflict, considered to be the easiest frozen conflict to be solved by the EU and Russia.
11. Security through interdependence – a liberal approach, which states that security is higher when there’s a high number of common interests and a lot of mutual relations between two actors. If there are too many interests, it means that this prevents conflicts, because there is a lot to lose from this interdependence which is mutually profitable. See bellow note 23.
14. Lebensraum – or the theory of the "vital space", the living "necessary" space policy promoted by Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party who said that,
after the Treaty of Versailles the country did not have not enough space to feed and host the large German nation, so that triggered expansionism in World War II. Detail in Stephen J. Lee, Europe, 1890-1945, p 237

15. George Friedman, Russian Geopolitics, Stratfor, and Next 100 years, 2009.

16. U.S. base in Turkey for which the host State did not give its consent for use during the war in Iraq in 2003.

17. Manas Air Base, Alamanudun, Kyrgyzstan, has been used by U.S. troops until its control was returned to local authorities in 2014, when the role was taken over transit centre airport MK, Constanța.


21. The Kharkiv Congress of deputies of all levels brought together representatives from the Eastern regions of Ukraine and Crimea and had to decide, on February 22, the creation of autonomous regions of Southeast Ukraine and a referendum on breaking away from Ukraine and joining Russia. Viktor Yanukovych was supposed to take part in the Congress. The resolution did not contain these provisions and the leaders of the rebellion, the chief of the Kharkiv region and the mayor of Harkiv fled to Russia. Later, on return, the originator of separatism, "popular governor" Donetsk region, Pavel Gubarev was arrested.


24. A conjecture is a proposition that is unproven. Karl Popper pioneered the use of the term "conjecture" in scientific philosophy (see Popper, Karl, Conjectures and refutations: the growth of scientific knowledge. London: Routledge, 2004). Conjecture is contrasted by hypothesis (hence theory, axiom, principle), which is a testable statement based on accepted grounds. In mathematics, a conjecture is an unproven proposition that appears correct. See Schwartz JL, Shuttling between the particular and the general: reflections on the role of conjecture and hypothesis in the generation of knowledge in science and mathematics, Oxford University Press, 1995.


27. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Putere şi interdependenţă, op.cit.

28. McCarthyism is the practice of making accusations of disloyalty, subversion, or treason without proper regard for evidence. It also means "the practice of making unfair allegations or using unfair investigative techniques, especially in order to restrict dissent or political criticism." The term has its origins in the period in the United States known as the Second Red Scare, lasting roughly from 1950 to 1956 and characterized by heightened political repression against communists, as well as a fear campaign spreading paranoia of their influence on American institutions and espionage by Soviet agents. Originally coined to criticize the anticommunist pursuits of U.S. Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin, "McCarthyism" soon took on a broader meaning, describing the excesses of similar efforts.
On only year ago it was difficult to imagine that in 2014 the events in the Black Sea will take such a turn with the annexation of a territory of a sovereign state, or will lead to new hot conflict which threatens the regional and global security. Today, NATO-Russia and EU-Russia’s relationships face the danger of entering new strained phase.

The conflict in Ukraine will have serious consequences in all spheres, including politics, economy, security etc. Although we cannot expect that the crisis will spread beyond its current boundaries, it will have broader dimensions than mere opposition between the Ukrainian authorities and the pro-Russian separatists.

The downing of the Malaysian aircraft MH17 escalated the military conflict in Ukraine beyond its regional dimension by involving European and Asian-Pacific countries whose citizens were among the victims. No doubt the main reason for this accident is the raging conflict and unless it is resolved, there will be no security in Ukraine or in the larger region of South East Europe.

On the other hand, we already see the economic consequences of the Ukrainian crisis, which also have very large dimension. More and more Bulgarian companies avoid traveling through Ukraine which leads to heavy losses due to insecurity and growing corruption, stolen vehicles transporting goods, etc. Another example is Germany whose export to Ukraine declined 31 percent compared to the previous year – with a drop in export volume of over 500 million Euros. Even more serious in absolute terms is the decline in export to Russia, which fell by 14 percent, or around 1.7 billion Euros, over the same period.(1). To that should be added the sanctions that the U.S., EU and other countries impose on Russia affecting Russian citizens and businesses. This means that the crisis in Ukraine will have negative impact not only on Ukrainian and Russian economies but might have spillover effect on the economies from the Black Sea region and beyond.

This paper will analyze the security mechanisms in the Black Sea, which were built over the years, their ability to deal with crises and their future. One thing is certain. The mechanisms for regional security and cooperation in the Black Sea did not play role and there was no attempt to use them in order to prevent the emerging crisis in Ukraine and its development in a hot conflict. The risk potential in the region exceeded the capabilities of the regional mechanisms for risk management. This analysis is based on the author’s own experience as a representative of the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense for the Black Sea security initiatives.

Between the six Black Sea countries has always been disagreement about the nature of these mechanisms. Bulgaria and Romania defended the view that existing regional mechanisms are insufficient to deal with the risks and threats in the Black Sea and they
both insisted on the need for sensible NATO presence in the region. (2)

Contrary to this view, Russia and Turkey were opposed to a greater NATO role. As Panagiota Manoli states "the existing mechanisms of regional cooperation were used by Turkey and Russia as an argument that the Black Sea countries themselves have to take care of the security of the region" (3) which implicitly contains the idea that NATO must not have any substantial role in the region.

Regional mechanisms were created from the late 90s on, aiming at establishing higher level of security in the Black Sea region by discussing the risks and threats, contributing to a better interaction of the military and countering new risks and threats such as terrorism, transnational organized crime, illicit trafficking, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction etc. Among these mechanisms are BLACKSEAFOR, Document on confidence- and security building measures, Burgas Center and Operation Black Sea Harmony. The common feature of all of these initiatives is that the focus is on military-technical cooperation and they do not have mechanisms for discussion of wider range of regional issues. In fact, they did not go beyond the level of confidence building measures.

The most active and ambitious is the Agreement establishing the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group, BLACKSEAFOR. The initiative was created in 2001 in order to contribute to the further strengthening of friendship, good relations and mutual confidence among the Black Sea states as well as to improve peace and stability in the region, through the enhancement of co-operation and interoperability among the naval forces. (4)

The idea to establish cooperation between all Black Sea countries was positive, but this initiative never had clear objectives and mechanisms and never achieved more than confidence building exercises which resulted only in improvement of the coordination between the respective fleets. Every year Navies conducted two activations with participation of at least 4 ships under single command on rotational principle, ports visits etc. The importance of the BLACKSEAFOR is that it is an operation in which Russia and NATO countries work together and has been functioning as a confidence building measure among costal states. (5)

Although the Agreement on the establishment of BLACKSEAFOR provides for political and military consultations at the ministerial level, there were never meetings of Ministers of Defense or Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Meetings of deputy foreign ministers were carried out in order to have broader consultations on risks and threats to the Black sea security which in 2005 led to the adoption of a document named "Maritime Risk Assessment in the Black Sea". Unfortunately this format stopped functioning shortly after this document was adopted.

It is important to note that even after the war between Georgia and Russia in 2008 BLACKSEAFOR survived and it became the only venue where Russian and Georgian military representatives have to work together which was very positive for the regional security.

On April 25, 2002 a politically binding Document on confidence- and security building measures in the naval field in the Black Sea was signed in Ukraine. The Document specifies the activities which Black Sea Navies will conduct in order to create a climate of mutual understanding, confidence and security. Initially countries from the region were keen on cooperating in the framework of the document, on sharing information and on conducting different activities. Delegations from each country regularly met in Vienna but several years after the signing of the Document the initial impetus went down, countries stopped sending delegations, leaving all activities to permanent delegations to the OSCE in Vienna. This was the first signal that the countries involved don't have intention to further develop the initiative.

Black Sea Border Coordination and Information Center in Burgas is another initiative between all littoral states which aim is to fight the illegal migration, drug smuggling, piracy and armed robbery, illegal fishing, weapon and ammunition smuggling, etc. The Center is operational since 01.01.2004 and provides good basis for cooperation in fighting new threats. Currently, as a consequence of the Ukrainian crisis all activities of the Burgas Information Center are canceled but the exchange of information on suspected commercial ships.

**BIOGRAPHY**

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There was an attempt to create a political format in the Black sea region, Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership initiated by Romania in 2006. The idea was to bring together heads of states and governments from the Black sea countries and to serve as a venue for discussion of all security issues in the region. It was clear from the beginning that Russia will not participate and even at the first meeting the country sent its ambassador just as an observer. No other meeting in the framework of this initiative took place.

Black sea Harmony is another initiative with the aim to contribute to the security in the Black sea. It is initially established as a Turkish national maritime security operation and lately other countries from the Black sea were invited to join based on bilateral agreements with Turkey. Countries from the region have different views on the cooperation with Turkey in the framework of Black sea Harmony operation which results in different texts of the agreements and in different rights and obligations. Due to this fact Black sea Harmony doesn't have the potential to become a truly regional organization.

The conclusion we can draw from the analyses of these initiatives is that they stay at the level of confidence building measures and provide grounds for basic military-technical cooperation. However, these mechanisms did not become a forum for in-depth dialogue to discuss the key issues of security in the Black sea area. After the war between Russia and Georgia in 2008, and especially now with the crisis in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea, trust between the countries of the Black Sea region is lost, removing any basis for regional cooperation. After the suspension of practical military cooperation between NATO and Russia (6) virtually all regional formats will cease its activities. Activations within BLACKSEAFOR for 2014 were canceled, but it is unthinkable to hold other events and establish measures of trust and cooperation when the level of trust between countries is freezing.

We have to acknowledge that despite its limitations, the mechanisms of cooperation in the Black Sea were important to keep the level of military collaboration in the region, as well as to create a basis for countering such risks and threats as terrorism, organized crime, illegal trafficking and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. (7).

Although the security mechanisms do not function as a result of the Ukrainian conflict, regional risks and threats have not disappeared. On the contrary, the crisis in Ukraine strengthens some of the existing risks and threats, and contributes to the emergence of new ones. Events in Ukraine will undoubtedly have serious consequences on regional security, which are already being felt. These effects can be traced in several directions. First, an overall destabilization of Ukraine and the existence of regions out of the control of the central government. Second, the growth of cross-border crime. Third, the deterioration of the general climate of relations between NATO and the EU, on the one hand, and Russia on the other. A very serious problem is the presence of large amounts of uncontrolled weapons that are currently in the hands of the rebels of Eastern Ukraine who possess small arms along with large-caliber weapons. Serious concern is the presence of unknown number of MANPADS in the hands of pro-Russian separatists. There is evidence that several aircrafts and helicopters of the Ukrainian army were downed by MANPADS. A relevant issue remains that such weapons do not fall into the hands of terrorists, but also the prevention of entering of illegal weapons in other countries.

This raises the need to seek mechanisms to counter the risks and threats, but hardly any regional cooperation could be resumed before the Ukrainian crisis is being overcome. Only after the restoration of peace and stability in Ukraine we may think whether to give new life to the amended existing mechanisms or to seek new ones. There is another opportunity to seek forms of cooperation with participation of limited number of Black Sea countries, which will have a clear political signal, but will lead to further disunity.

The crisis in Ukraine and Russia's actions once again raise the question of the role of NATO in the region where three of the six littoral countries are members of the Alliance. The annexation of Crimea by Russia and its support for the rebels in Eastern Ukraine have led some NATO members to raise concerns about their own security. The result is increased NATO military presence in the Baltic states, Poland, Romania and the Black Sea to respond to these security concerns, and to give support to the Government of Ukraine to deal with the insurgency in the eastern part of the country.

Strengthening NATO's presence and giving bigger role to the Alliance, however, will have to go through overcoming the opposition of Russia and Turkey because, as Vladimir Socor noted "the Russian-Turkish de facto condominium is at best irrelevant to dealing with hard security challenges and crisis management in the Black Sea basin". (8) Very important in this regard will be the position of Turkey whose general policy
according to Serkan Demirtaş is "to keep NATO away from the Black Sea in order not to hurt the fragile balance in the region with Russia". Demirtaş thinks although that "Turkey has now softened its strict policy toward NATO presence in the Black Sea", but under three important conditions: full compliance with the Montreux Convention, the presence and NATO activities should be carried out in an non-provocative manner and NATO’s presence and activities should not be indefinite and open ended. (9) 

A lot of upcoming debates will dwell on what will be the role of NATO in the Black Sea region, but one must have at least to meet the concerns of the member states. NATO will also need to develop action plans to cover the territories of all new members states. It is necessary to assist partner countries such as Ukraine and Georgia to build their defense and security systems and to deal with different threats. On the other hand, this role will have to be measured in order not to reduce the relationship between NATO and Russia simply to the level of military confrontation, because we know Russia is distrustful toward any NATO presence in the region. (10) 

Greater NATO activity on the eastern flank, including the Black Sea, will aim at countering threats that may be a consequence of the Ukrainian and other conflicts in the region. It is also important to counter threats such as terrorism, organized crime, illegal trafficking, etc., exacerbated by conflicts and the existence of uncontrolled territories. Inevitably NATO Black Sea countries will have to seek closer cooperation between themselves. 

The Black Sea region is the line where today the division between Russia on the one hand and the EU and NATO on the other runs. This makes the Black Sea filled not only with internal contradictions, but also an arena where different interests clash. Addressing properly the security issues in the Black Sea new approaches and formats are needed. Ending the war in Ukraine and resolving the conflict on the negotiation table is a precondition to start working on these new formats. 

It is necessary to build new security architecture in the Black Sea region which will overcome the drawbacks of existing security agreements. This security architecture should involve countries from the broader Black Sea region which face the same problems and security challenges, including Armenia, Azerbaijan and Moldova. The new system should have different levels – political, military, police, etc. In this new system along with countries from the region stakeholders such as NATO and EU will have to play a role. Without having constructive and open dialogue at all levels it will be impossible to build up stable and secure Black Sea area. 

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